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Preface
THIS BOOK IS THE RESULT of a research project sponsored by the
Japan Studies Program at the University of Kentucky, with the participation
of an interdisciplinary group of scholars from Eastern Kentucky University,
Northern Kentucky University, Nagoya University, and Hokuriku University,
and representatives of Japanese and American businesses, state and local gov-
ernment agencies, the Japan/America Society of Kentucky, and investment
bankers and lawyers.
The papers were originally presented at a conference at the University of
Kentucky in April 1999. The conference was inaugurated by former Japanese
Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa. It began by examining the pattern of
Japanese investments in Kentucky and then moved to a discussion of social,
economic, and environmental impacts of the investment on the Bluegrass re-
gion. The papers were revised and rewritten for this book.
This book presents research results of fourteen social scientists from
Japan and the United States—six geographers, three political scientists, two
sociologists, an economist, a planner, and an environmental scientist—who
have many years of research experience in their respective disciplines. Their
research findings provide a unique interdisciplinary approach exploring the
impact of Japan on the Bluegrass State.
This is the first comprehensive study examining the social, cultural, eco-
nomic, and environmental impacts of Japan's investment in a region by an
interdisciplinary group of Japanese and American scholars. Most studies of
foreign investments in the United States and abroad have focused only on
economic and employment aspects at the state or national scale, ignoring the
important social, cultural, and environmental impacts at regional and local
levels.
Many people contributed to the success of the conference and this vol-
ume, and I would like to acknowledge the support here of Doug Slaymaker
(Japan Studies), Kristin Stapleton (History), Greg Waller (English), and Larry
Burmeister (Sociology), along with Julie Quinn Blyth, executive director, and
Stephen D. Cecil, president, of the Japan/America Society of Kentucky. I want
to thank all my colleagues in the Japan Studies Program and the Department
of Geography for generously sharing their time and professional experience
throughout the research project.
I acknowledge the assistance of Richard Gilbreath, director of the Uni-
versity of Kentucky Cartographic Laboratory, who prepared all the illustra-
tions and maps for conference presentations. The maps for this volume were
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drafted by Hui Xie, a graduate student in geography, and Tony Zerhusen and
Jason Litteral, both undergraduates in the Department of Geography, under
the able guidance of Richard Gilbreath.
This book has benefited from several sessions with executives and workers
in Japanese factories, local government officials, and residents of Kentucky
communities that have Japanese firms. They were generous in providing in-
formation and answering numerous questions. In particular, I want to thank
Taiji Hasegawa, president, Larry Royalty, executive vice president, and Konomi
Kaji of Hitachi Automotive Products (USA); Stephen J. Hesselbrock, general
manager, and Hideki Torii of Trim Masters; Kenichiro Imasu, president and
CEO of Matsushita Appliance Corporation of America; Ted Ikeda, president,
Rick Fields, human resources manager, and Jason Cartwright, production
engineer, Matsushita Electric Motor Corporation of America; Yu Saito, ex-
ecutive vice president, Denyo Manufacturing Corporation; Larry Green,
Bardstown city administrator; Yusitaka Mizumoto, president, Universal Fas-
teners; Herb Krase, vice president of administration, Toyotetsu America;
Masaaki Kushida, president, and Massamichi Danjo, vice president, Y H
America; Brian Deatrick of Cardinal Industrial Contracting; and Mayor Carol
Walters of Harrodsburg. Responsibility for the book's contents, however, is
solely with the authors.
Professor Wilford A. Bladen read the drafts of the book and offered
many suggestions for improvement. Above all I thank the Japanese and Ameri-
can contributors for their research, writing, and dedication to the research
enterprise of which this volume is a part.
Funding for the research project and field research in Kentucky commu-
nities was generously provided by the University of Kentucky College of Arts
and Sciences and University of Kentucky Research and Graduate Studies.
A Note on Terms
THE TOYOTA PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM entails the use
of kanban (or signboards) attached to work in progress at the assembly line.
It reduces both physical and procedural wastes and increases efficiency through
better management of time, space, and motions involved in the manufactur-
ing process. When a subassembly is completed, its signboard is detached
and returned to the previous workstation. Slow pace of signboards released
from a workstation indicates a bottleneck at the station. It is a sign for
workers to move from other stations to that one. Also, a lot of signboards
accumulating at a workstation means a bottleneck forming at that station,
and signals need to hasten the work. Kanban is a means to implement Just-
in-Time (JIT) delivery of parts needed for automobile assembly. The suppli-
ers deliver quality-guaranteed parts according to the kanban inventory
control system, and those parts are used immediately rather than placed in
stock. Under this system, suppliers have to ship their products several times
a day. The parts have to arrive just in time for assembly. Kanban requires
the development of a finely turned subcontracting system to meet Toyota's
requirements. In addition to its own assembly line, Toyota also requires its
subcontractors in Kentucky and elsewhere to use this system. The kanban
system has enabled major reduction in the use of space on assembly lines,
and it economizes on Japan's scarce space resource. Although developed in
Japan, the kanban system is now transforming manufacturing enterprises
throughout the world.
Keiretsu is a family of firms normally controlled by a large bank, with
links to a common trading company and several major first-tier manufactur-
ers spread over a range of industries.
Toyota Motor Corporation (TMC) was formed in 1982 by the merger
of Toyota Motor Company and Toyota Motor Sales Company. The Toyota
Group of companies comprise many firms and businesses, including wholly
owned plants in many countries. In this book, the Toyota plant in
Georgetown-Scott County, Kentucky, known as the Toyota Motor Manu-
facturing, Kentucky (TMMK) is also referred to as the Scott County plant
and the Georgetown plant; Toyota North American headquarters at Erlanger,
Kentucky, is called Toyota Motor Manufacturing, North America
(TMMNA). In chapter 5 TMC refers to only large automobile plants in
Toyota City, Japan.
Unless otherwise indicated, all employment figures in Japanese compaies
in Kentucky in this book are for the year 1999 as reported in Kentucky Cabi-
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net for Economic Development, Announced/Reported Japanese Industrial
Investment in Kentucky (At Least 10% Foreign Owned), 1999. The spelling
of Japanese company names are also based on the above publication.
Japan and Kentucky
P.P. KARAN
UNTIL THE EARLY 1980s, Kentuckians had formed most of their
impressions of Japan on painful memories of World War II. And the Japanese
knew of Kentucky only as the home of a famous colonel and his chicken.
Time has changed that. In the years since Toyota announced it would locate a
facility in Kentucky, the cultural influences of each place have been visited on
the other in significant ways.
Japan, an urban society with 126 million people living in an area 4 per-
cent as large as the United States, was virtually closed to outsiders until 1868.
Their culture, in many respects, remains somewhat baffling to Westerners.
People bow instead of shake hands. They tend to see themselves as members
of a group rather than as individuals. Although English is taught in schools,
the average person generally does not speak it.
In Japan, of course, "chicken" and "Kentucky" still are commonly asso-
ciated. KFC Corporation—Kentucky's famous chicken restaurant chain—is
one of a handful of U.S. business success stories in Japan that includes Coca-
Cola and IBM. Now, people in Japan are hearing Hank Williams on the ra-
dio; smoking Marlboro, Kent, and Lucky Strike cigarettes; and drinking Early
Times, I.W. Harper, and Maker's Mark whiskeys.
Kentuckians, meanwhile, have become more familiar with Japanese cul-
ture, customs, and foods since the introduction to the state of Toyota and
other Japanese companies. Small Japanese markets are common in several
Kentucky cities, Japanese condiments line supermarket shelves, and Japanese
restaurants and sushi bars serve Kentucky patrons. Increasing numbers of
secondary schools and colleges in Kentucky offer courses in Japanese lan-
guage and culture. Nearly three thousand Japanese live in Kentucky, and the
relationship between Japan and Kentucky has come a long way since it began
in earnest in the mid-1980s.
In July 1985, Toyota, following the lead of Nissan, Honda, Mazda, and
Mitsubishi, announced that it was initiating a search for an appropriate site
in the United States on which it would locate an assembly plant. On Decem-
ber 11, 1985, Kentucky's Governor Martha Layne Collins stood before an
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assemblage of top state political figures, prominent Kentucky business lead-
ers, local politicians, and a host of reporters and news cameras to announce
that Toyota Motor Corporation would build its first wholly owned assembly
plant in rural Scott County, Kentucky. It was the culmination of the state's
three-year effort to lure an assembly plant to Kentucky. The state had lost the
Honda plant to Ohio in 1979; Nissan had located its facility in Tennessee in
1980; Mazda had formed a joint venture with Ford in Michigan in 1984; and
in 1985 Mitsubishi had formed a joint venture with Chrysler in Illinois. Toyota
was viewed as the state's last chance to recruit a major Japanese automaker,
and Kentucky won.
Geographers Bladen and Karan discuss the pattern of Japanese invest-
ment in Kentucky within the context of Japanese investment activity in the
United States in chapter 2. The major factors entering into the Japanese's
decision to establish plants in Kentucky are analyzed. Most of Kentucky is a
great expanse of farmland, dimpled by woodlands with flowering dogwood
and crabapple trees and pocketed by small towns that are islands of manufac-
turing. Wide, smooth highways meet in Louisville, Lexington, Covington,
and Elizabethtown and branch to all points of the Midwest and South, in-
cluding auto assembly plants in other states. Along these highway spokes,
small-town mayors, private citizens, and chambers of commerce have worked
together to convince teams of Japanese company executives that their towns
are ideal locations for factories. Of course, good location is a nice asset, as
Bladen and Karan point out, but competition among states, and cities within
Kentucky, is fierce. Rural Kentuckians have been forced to break out of small-
town molds and jump into new roles as global traders, translators, and nego-
tiators. Only a few years ago, attracting international trade, industry, and
investment was left to state and federal governments. Not anymore. Market-
ing savvy and geopolitical sophistication have soaked deeply into places like
Harrodsburg, Richmond, Russellville, Hopkinsville, and Bardstown. Whereas
mayoral trade trips to Japan once may have been criticized as junkets, they
have become almost routine. Full-time economic development professionals
have been hired to run far-flung marketing campaigns and to coordinate lo-
cal and state efforts.
The important roles of state and local governments in attracting foreign
investment to Kentucky is discussed in chapter 3 by David Potter, a political
scientist specializing in Japanese politics and policy. One thing Governor
Collins omitted from her speech welcoming Toyota's decision to locate in
Kentucky was that the state had to pay Toyota to locate in Scott County.
Kentucky attracted Toyota through a hostile process (known as a bidding
war) that pitted state against state in a battle fought with financial incentives.
Kentucky's use of financial incentives to lure Toyota was not without prece-
dent. In the 1980s direct state incentives emerged as a major element of for-
mulating economic development programs in many states. The process of
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The site of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky (TMMK) near Georgetown in
rural Scott County. The State of Kentucky paid more than $10 million for purchase
of this land, $20 million to prepare the plant site, $10.2 million to build water and
gas lines, $12.2 million for a wastewater facility, and $32 million to make highway
improvements. An additional $55 million was spent by the state for training and
education, as well as $7.2 million to build a training center. The money spent by the
state on incentives and interest totaled more than $305 million. (Photograph by P.P.
Karan)
negotiating and formulating the incentives package, due to the nature of the
exercise, was generally conducted in all cases without public or legislative
involvement by a few cabinet-level officials. In several states, including Ken-
tucky, controversy centered around the size of the incentives package and
when or if the state would recoup its investment. As is discussed later in this
volume (chapter 7), Kentucky's incentives strategy more than recouped its
investment with substantial spin-offs from Toyota. In the scholarly debate
that has sought to understand Japanese foreign direct investment, compara-
tively little attention has been paid to a key two-part question: how do state
governments negotiate with multinational corporations, and what character-
istics of the bargaining environment constrain their ability to secure agree-
ments with the multinationals that are also acceptable to their publics? Potter
uses a two-level bargaining game model in international negotiations as a
device for thinking about the characteristics of state government-multina-
tional corporation negotiations.
Among other factors influencing Toyota's interest in building an auto-
mobile assembly plant in America was the trade friction and protectionist
trade sentiment growing in the United States at that time. U.S. sales trends
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had turned in favor of Japanese small-car imports, and U.S. automakers were
unable to retool existing operations due to high interest rates and a stagnant
market. The "adversarial trade policy" that Japan's Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) had effectively promoted for more than two de-
cades was widely debated in the United States. The policy involved targeting
industries such as automobiles, electronics, and engineering firms, which
formed the major segment of the U.S. industrial base, through creation of an
export manufacturing program, designed by MITI in conjunction with the
Japanese industries. By allowing the private ownership of capital and prop-
erty combined with state direction, Japanese industries had both state protec-
tion and promotion of capital ventures which American corporations did not
enjoy. Japan was called a "capitalist development state," in which the state
provided opportunities for entrepreneurship and created markets with pri-
vate ownership of capital and property (Johnson 1982). In contrast, the United
States has private ownership and private control. The differences allowed
Japan to formulate and implement successful economic development policies
to exploit weaknesses in the American political economy. The dislocation
which the Japanese policies created in the United States escalated trade hos-
tility and resulted, in part, in calls for Japan to reform its trade policies by
reducing institutional barriers to American goods and to encourage domestic
spending. There were calls for import restrictions on Japanese automobiles.
In 1981, MITI instituted a voluntary restriction of exports to the United States
to last until 1984. Japan extended its voluntary export restrictions of auto-
mobiles to 1985. As noted in Toyota: A History of the First 50 Years, for
Toyota "setting up production facilities in the United States became a matter
of the utmost urgency" to maintain its share of the American market (Toyota
1988,329).
Kentucky, along with other state administrations, began making over-
tures in 1985 to the largest Japanese automobile corporation seeking to es-
tablish an assembly plant in America. Offers of tax abatements, low-interest
loans, land, employee training, and other economic incentives from various
states and municipalities were submitted to Toyota headquarters in Japan. By
November 1985, Toyota had received offers of economic incentives from thirty-
six states which considered investment by Japanese manufacturing concerns
to bring the greatest investment returns. Being the last major Japanese
automaker to come to America, Toyota had witnessed the dramatic escala-
tion of the value of incentives packages awarded to other Japanese firms—
from $33 million received by Nissan from Tennessee in 1980 to $83 million
given to Mitsubishi by Illinois in 1985. Kentucky offered Toyota an extraor-
dinary incentives package, the largest incentives package yet awarded to a
foreign automobile corporation—a package valued at $147 million in direct
state investment and $320 million when indirect costs are included. Toyota
agreed to locate its first wholly owned assembly plant near Georgetown, in
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rural Scott County, to make an $800 million investment, to produce two
hundred thousand cars per year, and to employ directly some three thousand
workers.
Both Kentucky and Toyota approached the site selection process from
relatively powerful bargaining positions. Possessing knowledge based on les-
sons drawn from the experiences of other states in their successful recruiting
of Japanese firms and analyses of principal determinants used by Japanese
automobile makers for site selection, Kentucky approached Toyota from a
relatively strong position. Also, Toyota made a conscious decision to use the
experiences of other Japanese transplants and to draw lessons from them to
strengthen their American production strategy in regard to site selection and
negotiating position.
Toyota's North American manufacturing headquarters in Erlanger, Ken-
tucky, opened in 1996, and a quality and production engineering laboratory
opened at the site in 1998. By May 2000 Toyota had added eighty thousand
square feet to its headquarters in Erlanger to make room for added work that
was done previously in Japan and Georgetown. With the $15.4 million ex-
pansion, the staff has grown to seven hundred and the total investment at
Erlanger to $68 million.
The Erlanger office handles purchasing, production control, finance, and
engineering for Toyota's eight North American plants, including the seventy-
eight hundred-employee Georgetown plant. North American purchases
through Erlanger exceed $8 billion a year from 500 companies—150 of them
in Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana. Toyota's purchases from minority-owned
businesses should approach $500 million by 2002. In contrast, Ford already
spends $2.5 billion a year with minority suppliers. Toyota encourages its sup-
pliers to buy at least 5 percent of parts, materials, and services from minority-
owned businesses. Other automakers, such as Ford, require their suppliers to
meet the 5 percent minimum. The emphasis at Toyota is on sound business
fundamentals—quality, price, timeliness, integrity—to keep customers.
Toyota Motor Corporation (Toyota Jidosha) is a global enterprise with
headquarters in Toyota, a city with a population of 332,000, in central Aichi
prefecture in central Honshu. Unryu Suganuma, a professor in the Faculty of
Law at Hokuriku University, analyzes the geography of this multinational
corporation (chapter 4) whose first plant was built in 1937 in Toyota City.
Today it is the largest automaker in Japan and the third largest in the world
with more than a dozen plants in Japan and more than thirty plants overseas
in North America, South America, Asia, and Europe. The company began in
1933 as the Automobile Department of the Toyoda Automatic Loom Works
and became independent of the parent firm in 1937. The company's first
prototype passenger car, the Model Al, was completed in May 1935. World
War II left the company in economic ruin, but with the introduction of the
Toyopet Crown in 1955, passenger car production began in earnest. In the
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TMMK employs nearly eight thousand, and average employee income is $61,000
(1997). Toyota's investment in Kentucky amounts to $4.5 billion. TMMK produces
Camrys, Avalons, and the Sienna minivan; and builds V-5 and four-cylinder engines
and powertrain parts. Annually, it produces more than 400,000 vehicles and 350,000
engines. (Photograph by P.P. Karan)
following years, new models were added in rapid succession as motorization
took hold in Japan. In 1987 Toyota became the fourth automaker to surpass
the sixty million mark for cumulative domestic production, following Gen-
eral Motors, Ford, and Chrysler of the United States.
Several other companies are affiliated with Toyota Motor Corporation.
Among these are Toyota Auto Body Company (Toyota Shatai) and Toyota
Tsusho. Toyota Auto Body is an automobile body manufacturer incorpo-
rated in 1945, with headquarters in the city of Kariya, Aichi prefecture. It
manufactures the bodies of Toyota Motor's small cars and is developing spe-
cial-purpose and multipurpose cars. Toyota Tsusho is a comprehensive trad-
ing company with headquarters in Nagoya and Tokyo. It is a core member of
the Toyota group of Toyota Motor Manufacturing Corporation. It was incor-
porated in 1948 and has more than fifty overseas business offices and nearly
a dozen overseas subsidiaries in forty-five countries. The company has diver-
sified into telecommunications and new materials and has equity interest in a
number of overseas joint ventures.
Toyota Motor Corporation's one hundred millionth domestically made
vehicle rolled off the production line on October 4, 1999, at Motomachi
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Plant. The milestone came slightly more than sixty-four years after the first
Toyota rolled off the production line at the Toyoda Automatic Loom Works
in August 1935. It comes slightly less than fourteen years after the company
produced its fifty millionth vehicle built in Japan in 1986.
As Japan's top car manufacturer, Toyota has huge technological advan-
tages, as Dr. Suganuma points out. In 1984 it became the first among domes-
tic rivals to market an affordable sports car with a rear-engine layout. In
1998 it became the world's first automaker to mass produce a hybrid car,
Prius, powered alternately by a conventional gasoline engine and a self-charging
electric motor. Toyota's success in the global market comes from the produc-
tion of designs and technologies that meet the demands of different regions.
The hybrid Prius was entirely designed by the company's Calty Design Re-
search in California.
Yuichiro Nishimura and Japan's leading urban geographer, Kohei
Okamoto of Nogoya University, discuss the social impact of Toyota Motor
Corporation's seven large plants on Toyota City in chapter 5. They discuss
the influence of the Toyota production system on the local community. Since
automobile manufacturing is a great assembly industry, a lot of parts suppli-
ers are organized around the assembly plant. It is also a labor-intensive indus-
try, and a lot of workers must be allocated efficiently around the production
system. Toyota introduced the "just-in-time" system to control parts produc-
tion and delivery as well as to arrange human resources in the area surround-
ing Toyota City.
In 1995 Toyota changed the system of day and night shifts into a se-
quential system (6:30 A.M. to 3:15 P.M. and 4:15 P.M. to 1:00 A.M.) to reduce
production cost. Nishimura and Okamoto discuss the impact of the shift
system change on the local community, where the economy and the lives of
the residents are closely tied to the automobile industry.
Two Georgetown, Kentucky, residents, Janet W. Patton, a political sci-
entist, and H. Milton Patton, a geographer and planner, discuss in chapter 6
patterns of growth and change in Georgetown since the arrival of the Toyota
plant. Toyota City in Japan, like Georgetown in Kentucky, was an agricul-
tural town long before it became an industrial city, and the municipal land
areas of both cities still retain tracts of agricultural land. Like many of the
people of Georgetown, Kiichiro Toyoda, founder of Toyota Motor Manufac-
turing Company, wished not to disturb the agricultural heritage of the area
around Toyota City (then known as Koromo). Local people and leaders in
both Toyota City and Georgetown welcomed the automobile production
plants, viewing them as opportunities to revitalize rural economies which
had become depressed. In Georgetown, Toyota's biggest impact has been to
cushion the regional economy from the downturn faced by many regions in
the United States in the 1980s.
In both cities the automobile industry has brought increased prosperity.
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In Toyota City company housing for Toyota's employees was built near the
plants. In Georgetown, most of the employees commute to work from vari-
ous communities in the Bluegrass region of central Kentucky. In both towns
Toyota has been an excellent corporate citizen, supporting health, education,
sports, parks, and cultural activities. In Georgetown the arrival of a powerful
global corporation only temporarily threw the community off balance, but
several key individuals and activities, which are discussed by the Patrons,
helped shape the process by which the town responded to the new challenges
as the home of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky. Fears that growth
and change would destroy the way of life in Georgetown, the authors point
out, have not been realized.
Internationally renowned economist Charles F. Haywood offers a rigor-
ous analysis of the economic impact of Toyota in chapter 7. Toyota employs
seventy-eight hundred persons (December 1999) at its plant in Georgetown.
In 1985 the State of Kentucky offered incentives worth $147 million to lure
Toyota's plant to Georgetown. Fifteen years later, the state was earning a
36.8 percent return on that investment, according to Haywood's research.
Haywood looked at the cost of the incentives and the cost of borrowing $147
million. Over twenty years, Haywood points out, the state will pay about
$305 million. He then compares those costs with the amount of tax revenue
the state gained because of Toyota's presence in Georgetown: taxes paid by
the company's employees, construction workers, suppliers, and others. From
1986 through 2005, Haywood calculates the inflows to total $1.5 billion.
The use of an incentives package turned out to be a success far greater than
anything that was projected in December 1985.
Yukio Yotsumoto, a Japanese sociologist, examines the social impact of
Japanese businesses in small Kentucky communities in chapter 8. To gather
data for the study, Yotsumoto, along with geographer Karan, visited thirty-
nine Kentucky communities and conducted detailed interviews with Japanese
plant managers, American and Japanese employees, and mayors or other city
officials in five cities—Bardstown, Berea, Danville, Harrodsburg, and
Versailles. These communities were selected for in-depth study because Japa-
nese plants account for 20 percent or more of the employment.
Yotsumoto and Karan found that Japanese investments in these com-
munities go beyond employment. The Japanese-owned companies are signifi-
cant players in the cultural, social, and educational activities of the communities
in which their businesses are located. Japanese have taken active roles as
members of the small communities in Kentucky. Japanese firms lead in con-
tributions to the United Way, Junior Achievement, the Christian Appalachian
Project, the American Cancer Society, and the Pritchard Committee for Higher
Education and routinely finance student and group trips to Japan as well as
cultural and educational activities in public schools. They are actively in-
volved in facilitating good understanding and cooperation between the cul-
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tures of Japan and Kentucky. When it comes to lending a helping hand, the
Japanese can be very American, conducting cleanup projects and blood
drives.
Miranda Schreurs, a leading American scholar of Japanese environmen-
tal politics at the University of Maryland, discusses environmental policy of
Japanese corporations in Kentucky in chapter 9. Schreurs states that since
most of the Japanese firms came to Kentucky after the mid-1980s, their par-
ent firms in Japan had already made major strides in energy efficiency im-
provements and pollution control practices. Thus, the Japanese firms came to
Kentucky with already strong environmental standards. The major problem
areas may surround expectations regarding the use of toxic chemicals, for
which Japanese and U.S. laws differ somewhat.
Environmental groups such as the Sierra Club have no major problems
with Toyota. Sierra Club was initially concerned about what Toyota might
do to the area's water supply. Only about 5 percent of Toyota's wastewater
qualifies as household waste. The rest is industrial waste, which the plant
pretreats before sending to the Georgetown wastewater plant that serves only
Toyota. (Construction of the wastewater plant was funded by municipal bonds,
all of which were bought by Toyota.) The pretreated water is reported to be
so clean that not enough "food" is left for microorganisms that ordinarily
clean wastewater. So Toyota, it has been reported, mixes dog food with the
water to keep the microorganisms alive. Toyota regularly tests water above
and below the site where the treatment plant discharges treated water into
Lane's Run Creek, which feeds into Elkhorn Creek. These tests show that the
stream has more natural life now than it did in the 1980s. Japanese compa-
nies in Kentucky have made major efforts to develop a reputation as environ-
mentally friendly manufacturers.
Gary O'Dell, an environmental science scholar and geographer, assesses
environmental performance of Japanese industrial facilities in Kentucky in
chapter 10. O'Dell uses data on hazardous waste generation reported to the
Kentucky Division of Waste Management under the provisions of the federal
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 and the federal Toxic Re-
lease Inventory established by the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
to-Know Act of 1986 for this study. These programs require industrial facilities
to report on materials that are potentially harmful to human health and the
environment, and the programs were established prior to a significant Japa-
nese manufacturing investment in Kentucky. Corrosive wastewater consti-
tutes most of the exempt hazardous waste which is treated and discharged
through state water permits to surface waters or to publicly owned wastewa-
ter treatment plants. O'Dell notes that Japanese firms generated 9,203 tons
of managed hazardous waste and 86,030 tons of exempt waste in 1996 (out
of state totals of 405,867 and 17.4 million tons respectively). About 40 per-
cent of the waste generated by Japanese firms in Kentucky is produced by a
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single facility, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, in Georgetown. Toyota
is also among the top ten in Kentucky in the quantity of toxics (1,141 tons)
released primarily into the atmosphere. This quantity constitutes nearly 60
percent of the total Toxic Release Inventory for all Japanese firms in Ken-
tucky. Most Japanese firms in Kentucky depend on off-site waste manage-
ment. Toyota sent a little more than half of its toxics to off-site facilities for
management, and most were recycled. Case studies of the environmental
policies and practices of five Japanese plants in Kentucky are examined by
O'Dell.
Geographer Stanley Brunn and sociologist James Hougland discuss atti-
tudes about and public perception of Japanese investments in Kentucky in
chapters 11 and 12, respectively. To assess public attitudes toward Japanese
investment, Brunn examines editorials regarding Japanese investment in Ken-
tucky that appeared from 1985 to 1999 in the Lexington Herald-Leader, the
Louisville Courier-Journal, and the State Journal of Frankfort. A variety of
issues related to Japanese investment, particularly building of the Toyota plant
in Georgetown, are addressed in the editorials. Some express praise for the
initial decision; some raise questions regarding the incentives package the
state provided Toyota; and others discuss the impacts on Scott County. The
Herald-Leader from the start has been a strong supporter of the Japanese
investment and its significance to the state's economy; the Courier-Journal's
editorials noted the scale and importance of Japanese investments in Ken-
tucky, particularly in Georgetown.
Hougland notes that Toyota's decision to locate in Scott County in 1985
led to a combination of optimism, apprehension, and controversy. Residents
of the area disagreed about the relative benefits and strains that Toyota's
presence would introduce as well as the appropriateness of the incentives
package used to help attract Toyota to Kentucky. On the basis of random
sample surveys of Scott County residents and other central Kentucky resi-
dents conducted during the ten years following Toyota's announcement,
Hougland concludes that perceptions of several positive outcomes have be-
come increasingly prevalent, while concerns about some negative outcomes
appear to be abating. While Scott County residents consistently see their com-
munity as becoming more congested and more expensive, they have become
more likely to view their community as more interesting and a more exciting
place to live than it was before Toyota's arrival. Support for the state's incen-
tives package has shown consistent increases over time. The survey revealed
that support for Toyota is particularly strong among those who believe that
they or members of their family are benefitting from the company's presence
and those who have positive views of the quality of their county. The increas-
ing favorable perception of Toyota in central Kentucky suggests that a com-
bination of new employment opportunities, carefully focused programs of
community relations, and a commitment by Japanese corporate officials to
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continue investing in an area can increase the local acceptance of the new
Japanese investors.
Chapter 13 explores the growing economic ties and cultural exchanges
between Kentucky and Japan, Kentucky's traditional industries in Japan, and
the impact of globalization on Kentucky communities. By any measure, the
change has been remarkable. In 1983, two years before Toyota announced its
plan to build cars in Scott County, three Japanese manufacturing plants were
in Kentucky. In early 2000 Kentucky had more than one hundred Japanese-
invested companies employing more than thirty-five thousand Kentuckians
with a total investment of more than $7 billion. Kentucky's business climate,
existing Japanese companies, available industrial sites, and financing and tax
incentives continue to attract Japanese companies. For former governor Martha
Layne Collins, who made more than a dozen trips to Japan while courting
Toyota, there is vindication in what has happened since Toyota first located
in the state. As the study by Charles F. Haywood in chapter 7 points out,
Toyota's economic impact has far exceeded original expectations.
The social and cultural bond between residents of the Bluegrass region
and the Japanese people continues to grow. Japanese executives who return
home to Japan find many reminders of the state they left behind. Kentucky's
name appears more frequently in advertising and marketing efforts in Japan.
At Toyota dealerships in Japan, the Kentucky flag, signs saying "Kentucky
U.S.A.," and baskets representing Kentucky crafts are used to sell the Camry
made at the Scott County plant. It is unfortunate that sales have been sluggish
due to the continued economic recession in Japan. The image of Kentucky is
very good in Japan. All of this might be just a beginning. Then again, it could
be an indication of how two extremely different places have gained an appre-
ciation for each other.
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Japan in the Cultural
and Economic Landscape
of Kentucky

Japanese Investment
in Kentucky
P.P. KARAN AND W.A. BLADEN
JAPANESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT—the setting up of Japa-
nese-owned manufacturing plants—has seen steady rise in Kentucky as well
as throughout the southeast United States since the early 1980s. As Japanese
firms began to invest overseas following the yen revaluation (endaka) in 1985-
1986, the number of Japanese companies operating in Kentucky grew rap-
idly. This wave slowed down considerably in the mid-1990s after the burst of
the Japanese bubble economy, slow economic recovery, weak corporate prof-
its, and continued liquidity problems in the Japanese banking system.
Two major analytical approaches explain what motivates foreign direct
investment and help elucidate the large capital inflows into the United States
during the 1980s. The first is based on classical investment theory, in which
movement of capital is explained in terms of changes in real interest rate
differentials between countries. Foreign investors weigh incremental expected
returns against the marginal cost of capital. They are motivated by the de-
sire to earn the highest rates of return for any given level of risk. Foreign
investors also attempt to hedge against interest rate and exchange rate fluc-
tuations by diversifying asset holdings (Graham and Krugman 1989; Hufbauer
1975).
The second approach is based on the theory of the firm, in which invest-
ment is explained in terms of the strategic behavior of the firm. A firm or
multinational corporation expands its activities overseas (a) to maintain prof-
itability when faced with competition due to rising production costs, rising
wages, and adverse changes in foreign currency exchange rates; (b) to in-
crease or maintain market share in the foreign country; (c) to retain access in
an overseas market, especially in terms of trade restrictions (Barrell and Pain
1999); (d) to maintain control over an advantage specific to the firm, such as
marketing, management, and/or technology, or comparative advantage in
producing in a foreign market; and (e) to improve the firm's ability to meet
the overseas market's needs (Hymer 1976; Dunning and Rugman 1985). The
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strategic decisions of the multinational corporation hinge on factors which
are both internal and external to the firm.
Hymer (1976) articulated the widely accepted notion that a firm whose
operations cross national boundaries faces extra costs of managing geographi-
cally widespread operations including those dealing with different languages,
cultures, technical standards, and customer preferences. To overcome these
extra costs, the firm must possess internal firm-specific advantages which
largely take the form of economies of scale or of superior product technology.
A number of works have attempted to pin down the firm-specific advantages
that drive foreign direct investment. Aharoni (1966) noted the importance of
imperfect information about markets as a determinant of foreign direct in-
vestment flows; Vernon (1966; 1974) pointed out the linkage between the
product cycle in technology and the shift from exports to direct investment
among multinational firms; Kindleberger (1969) noted the role of firm-spe-
cific advantages other than technology, such as organizational and marketing
skills. Caves (1971) has noted that advantages possessed by multinational
enterprises include a number of intangible assets such as organizational and
marketing skills and product and process technologies. Buckley and Casson
(1976) have suggested existence of some "internalization" advantages for the
firm's foreign direct investment activity. These advantages are associated with
a firm exploiting a market opportunity through internal operations rather
than through the sale of rights to the firm's intangible assets to other firms.
Dunning (1988) has pointed out that the advantages of internalization must
interact with both firm-specific advantages and locational advantages to ex-
plain foreign direct investment.
Since the seminal work of Hymer, the general consensus is that a firm's
corporate strategy is a more important factor in explaining foreign direct
investment than the classical investment theory. Most scholars studying for-
eign direct investment tend to focus on industrial-organization motivations
to explain the expansion of multinational enterprises. Recent work by Frankel
(1992) suggests that the difference between U.S. and Japanese capital costs
narrowed during the 1980s, indicating that cost-of-capital differences are not
as significant an explanation of Japanese foreign direct investment.
The fast growth in foreign direct investment from Japan rapidly built a
significant presence in the United States. The foreign direct investment repre-
sented a fundamental shift in the strategies of many Japanese multinational
corporations to replace exports, at least partially, with the sales of overseas
affiliates, and is attributable to a number of factors. Primary among these
were the desire of Japanese firms to overcome mounting threat of protection-
ism in the major American market and to position themselves as "insiders."
This is reflected in the fact that most Japanese investments in the United
States are trade-replacing in nature, concentrated in such industries as auto-
mobiles and electronics. Japanese strategies in the United States were geared
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to serving the local market with a small percentage of the sales exported to
other countries, although that proportion is rising as Japanese affiliates ex-
pand. Recent evidence points to the fact that Japanese multinational firms
are building up networks of suppliers to serve their American affiliates. Trends
thus indicate rising local content by Japanese affiliates located in the United
States, although this is often achieved through sourcing from locally based
Japanese suppliers.
A substantial concentration of Japanese manufacturing plants, most of
them related to the automobile industry, emerged in Kentucky by the late
1980s. The issue of Japanese investment has been high on the economic agenda
since the late 1970s as the state government began to make energetic at-
tempts to encourage Japanese firms to set up manufacturing plants in Ken-
tucky. At the national level the political edge sharpened markedly in the early
1980s as the Japanese trade surplus continued to grow and as United States-
Japan trading friction intensified. In the case of trade, the issues were a mix-
ture of high level of import penetration of the American market by Japanese
firms and the structural impediments which inhibited imports into Japan and
closed some parts of the Japanese market to foreign firms (Mann 1989).
Aside from the broader national dimension, Japanese direct investment
is seen by the Kentucky state government as being potentially the most dy-
namic and influential source of international investment. In 1999,109 Japa-
nese firms in the state employed approximately thirty-five thousand workers.
There is no doubt that the Japanese presence in Kentucky has grown rapidly.
Japanese firms continue to be courted assiduously by the state government,
at the highest level, down to county and city levels. For example, Kentucky
governors and the staff of the Commerce Cabinet make annual trips to Japan
to attract Japanese businesses to Kentucky.
Japanese investment in Kentucky is both an economic and a political
phenomenon. Its geographical form is the outcome of a complex interaction
between economic and political forces, both internal and external. The goals
in this chapter are to set Japanese investment in Kentucky into its broader
context, to examine the geographical location of the Japanese foreign direct
investment in the United States and in Kentucky, and to explore some of the
underlying mechanisms and causes.
GROWTH OF JAPANESE INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
For twenty-five years following the end of the second World War (until 1971),
Japan's foreign direct investment was limited. Japan's major priority during
this period was reconstruction of its domestic manufacturing base, which
was destroyed by the ravages of war. The Japanese successfully achieved this
and by 1963 had regained the country's pre-war share of international trade.
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After 1965 Japanese exports were increasingly directed toward the United
States and comprised a narrow range of consumer durables such as automo-
biles, television sets, and radios. Soon Japanese exports to the United States
began to greatly exceed U.S. exports to Japan (Cohen 1985). By 1971 Japan
had built up a $3.2 billion trade surplus with the United States. In response
the United States introduced restrictions on a number of Japanese imports
and allowed the exchange value to slide from 360 yen to 300 yen to the
dollar. In Japan this event is known as the "Nixon Shokku." It was a shock to
the Japanese because the 360-yen-to-the-dollar exchange rate had existed since
1949 (Allen 1981). Japan's reaction to the U.S. policy was to divert some of
the export trade to western Europe (with whom Japan also soon built up a
huge trade surplus) and to start investment in manufacturing in the United
States to circumvent the effects of the import restrictions and the stronger
yen. The objective was to maintain its share of the U.S. market, which Japan
considered vital (Marsh 1983).
Japan ranked seventh as an investor in the United States in 1980. As the
trend in Japanese investment in the United States continued to be steeply
upwards in the 1980s, Japan ranked second as a foreign direct investor in
1989 and 1995. The sharp appreciation of the Japanese yen since 1985, espe-
cially after the Plaza Agreement in September 1985, and the continuation of
high yen (i.e., 263 yen/dollar in February 1985 to 152 yen/dollar in August
1986 to approximately 104 yen/dollar in the early 1990s) created new and
changed economic conditions which prompted Japanese firms to increase
production in the United States (Bagchi-Sen 1995). In addition, since the 1970s
major Japanese corporations increasingly adopted globalization strategies to
Table 2.1. Largest source countries of foreign direct investment in the
United States, 1980-1995 (rank order by percentage share of total foreign
direct investment)
Country
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Canada
West Germany
Netherlands Antilles
Switzerland
Japan
France
1980
23.1(1)
17.0 (2)
14.6 (3)
9.2 (4)
8.0 (5)
6.1 (6)
5.7(7)
4.5 (8)
1989
15.1 (3)
29.7(1)
7.9 (4)
7.0 (5)
2.6 (8)
4.8 (6)
17.4 (2)
4.1 (7)
1995
12.1 (3)
23.6(1)
NA
NA
12.1 (3)
NA
19.4 (2)
NA
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Foreign Di-
rect Investment in the United States, 1997 Benchmark Survey. Washington, D.C.,
1999.
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expand overseas production. Small and medium sized corporations also have
sought to internationalize their activities as part of their survival strategies. In
addition, Japanese have invested heavily in research and development facili-
ties in the United States to develop and customize products for the American
market and provide technical support for manufacturing (Florida and Kenny
1994).
The United States has been the destination for nearly half of total Japa-
nese investment since 1986. It also accounted for nearly 64 percent of manu-
facturing investment between 1986 and 1989. Investment in transport
equipment was a major focus. Japanese automobile makers made massive
investments in the United States while they agreed to voluntarily restrain ex-
ports to the United States since 1981. Five of the Japanese automobile com-
panies had already started production in 1989, and by early 1990 more than
two million units of automobiles were produced by Japanese plants in the
United States. To overcome foreseeable competition, Japanese firms have made
sizable investments in such related fields as design, sales, and financial service
and have started exporting cars made in the United States. To increase use of
locally procured parts, automakers are producing engines in the United States
and have made investments in companies that make auto parts.
REGIONAL PATTERN OF JAPANESE INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
Japanese-owned corporations exercise control over a relatively small share of
the U.S. aggregate employment, sales, and investments in manufacturing, and
their economic impact on the national economy is small. Yet, for certain in-
dustries and regions of the country, such as the Bluegrass region of Kentucky,
the potential impact is considerable. The locational choices of Japanese in-
vestors within the United States reveal a preference for three regions: (1) the
country's traditional manufacturing heartland, comprising the northeast United
States and upper Midwest, which in 1987 accounted for 41.8 percent of all
workers employed by Japanese manufacturing plants in the United States; (2)
the Far West and Southwest with 32.1 percent of the workers, mainly in
California; and (3) the Southeast with 23.4 percent of the workers (McKnight
1988). Until 1980 the majority of Japanese investment was located mainly in
California, which had nearly 38 percent of the Japanese-employed manufac-
turing workforce in the United States.
Since 1980 there has been a gradual shift of geographic investment from
the Far West and Southwest to the Midwest and South, although California
continues to be a major locational choice. Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, and
Ohio in the Midwest and Tennessee and Kentucky in the South have recorded
impressive gains. The growth of Japanese investment to the Midwest and
South can be partly explained by Japanese investment in automobile produc-
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Japanese Automobile Plants in the U.S.
^ Joint venture with Genera] Motors
• Joint venture with Chryder Motors
400 km
400 mi
Fig. 2.1. Japanese automobile plants in the United States.
tion. The American automobile industry is geographically concentrated in
Michigan, Illinois, and Ohio in the Midwest and Georgia, Tennessee, and
Kentucky in the South (Rubenstein 1986). Japanese automakers have fol-
lowed the regional locational strategy of the major American automobile
manufacturers (fig. 2.1). The geographic concentration of Japanese invest-
ments in the South and Midwest reflects a location close to the population
and market in order to minimize the distribution costs of their product to the
consumer.
Japanese investments in the South have grown steadily (table 2.2). Geor-
gia was the first state to start recruiting Japanese companies in the early 1970s
under Governor Jimmy Carter. Atlanta became a focus of Japanese business
in the South in late 1970. An active role played by Governor Lamar Alexander
of Tennessee led to the establishment of the Nissan plant at Smyrna. Ken-
tucky spent more than $125 million, including $55 million in worker-train-
ing grants, to persuade Toyota to build an auto plant in Georgetown. With
tax incentives the total bill has been estimated at $350 million (War Between
the States 1988).
It is interesting to examine the relationship between the location of Japa-
nese foreign direct investment in the United States and the economic charac-
teristics of the recipient states. Since new plant and plant expansion activities
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Table 2.2. Manufacturing employment in Japanese-owned plants in
southern states, 1991-1997 (in thousands)
States
Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Kentucky
Louisiana
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Carolina
Tennessee
Virginia
West Virginia
1991
5.9
3.2
1.6
13.0
17.2
—
1.3
9.5
8.5
14.6
4.5
—
1995
7.3
4.4
4.3
18.4
22.3
0.9
1.7
13.9
12.4
25.5
5.6
1.2
1997
7.4
4.0
3.6
19.4
29.4
1.1
1.4
13.1
10.5
25.0
7.5
1.3
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Foreign Di-
rect Investment in the United States, 1997 Benchmark Survey.Washington, D.C., 1999;
and Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Establishment Data for Manu-
facturing, 1991. Washington, D.C., 1994.
create new jobs, it is interesting to see if foreign direct investment in new
plants and plant expansions occurs most often in states in which unemploy-
ment problems are relatively severe or in which government policies toward
potential investors are relatively favorable. A detailed empirical analysis of
data by Ray (1991) revealed, contrary to popular belief, that differences in
the relative tax burden across states did not influence new foreign direct in-
vestment activity and that state incentives programs to encourage businesses
to invest in a state generally did not have a significant impact on new plant
and plant expansion resulting from foreign direct investment activity. High
state unemployment rates tended to discourage foreign direct investment ac-
tivity. High unionization rates among employees by state tended to discour-
age foreign direct investment. Data indicates that the United Kingdom and
European Union have tended to locate investments in states with relatively
high employment shares in the petroleum and automobile industries. Japan
has concentrated foreign direct investment activity in states with high auto-
industry employment, and Canada has concentrated direct investment activ-
ity in states with high steel-industry employment shares. Since each of these
major industries experienced high unemployment in the 1980s, it can be said
that each of the major countries and suppliers of foreign direct investment
activity in the United States invested in states plagued with serious structural
unemployment problems. In this context, foreign direct investment helped
alleviate some of the social and economic hardship associated with persistent
unemployment.
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PATTERN OF JAPANESE INVESTMENTS IN KENTUCKY
The Japanese investment in Kentucky came in two waves. The first wave
arrived with the biggest Japanese automaker, Toyota, when it decided to build
its plant in Georgetown in 1985. The first giant wave engendered a much
more broadly based second wave: small Japanese companies arriving to sup-
ply parts and components to the big auto companies. This second surge of
investment started to roll across Kentucky beginning in 1987 as smaller Japa-
nese companies searched for towns and cities located along major transpor-
tation arteries with easy access not only to the Toyota plant in Georgetown
but also to other Japanese automakers like Nissan (Smyrna, Tennessee), Honda
(Marysville, Ohio), Mazda (Flat Rock, Michigan), Mitsubishi (Bloomington,
Illinois), and Isuzu (Lafayette, Indiana). Tiny communities and modest cities
that grew up beside the wide highways of Kentucky—towns that still have V-J
Day parades and an all-American appearance—began to coax successfully Japa-
nese companies to build factories and hire workers in their neighborhoods.
Since the late 1980s small Kentucky towns have been winning new factories
and jobs, and the influx of Japanese companies is improving local economies.
Today Japanese manufacturing plants in Kentucky are in small or me-
dium sized towns close to interstate highways 64, 65, and 75 and adjacent to
the Bluegrass Parkway and other major highways in the state (fig. 2.2). Among
these towns are Ashland, Bardstown, Berea, Bowling Green, Danville,
Edmonton, Elizabethtown, Erlanger, Flemingsburg, Florence, Frankfort,
Franklin, Georgetown, Glasgow, Harrodsburg, Hopkinsville, Lawrenceburg,
Lebanon, Leitchfield, Lexington, London, Louisville, Maysville, Morgantown,
Munfordville, Nicholasville, Paris, Richmond, Russellville, Scottsville,
Shelbyville, Somerset, Sonora, Springfield, Stanford, Versailles, Walton,
Williamsburg, and Winchester (table 2.3). Three of Kentucky's largest cities,
Louisville, Lexington, and Bowling Green, have a number of small Japanese
auto-related plants that employ fewer than one hundred workers each.
Most of the parent companies of Japanese firms investing in Kentucky
are based in Japan's Keihin Industrial Region, which extends along Tokyo
Bay and nearby inland areas with major concentrations in Tokyo, Kawasaki,
and Yokohama and covers parts of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, and Ibaraki
prefectures (fig. 2.3). This region ranks first in Japan in the value of goods
produced. The Hanshin Industrial Region, which extends along Osaka Bay,
is the home of more than a dozen major Japanese firms investing in Kentucky.
Chukyo Industrial Region, which is centered on the city of Nagoya in Aichi
prefecture, is the home base for more than thirty Japanese companies operat-
ing in Kentucky, including the Toyota Motor Corporation. The Tokai Indus-
trial Region, located along the Pacific coast in Shizuoka prefecture, is the
home base for Fuji Kiko, Fuji Univance, and Miyama Kogyo, whose affiliates
operate plants in Hopkinsville, Winchester, and Louisville. Three companies
Number of Employees
8.500-
EMPLOYMENT IN JAPANESE COMPANIES
1999 data
Fig. 2.2. Employment in Japanese companies, 1999.
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located in the Setouchi Industrial Region, along the Inland Sea with principal
industrial centers of Hiroshima and Okayama, have affiliates operating plants
in Shelbyville and Flemingsburg (table 2.4).
Toyota, the largest of the Japanese firms in Kentucky, is located in
Georgetown, near the intersection of 1-75 and 1-64 with excellent connec-
tions to Louisville and Cincinnati, Ohio. Lexington has a regional airport,
but Louisville and Cincinnati (Northern Kentucky) are international airports,
and Cincinnati is a Delta Air Lines hub with worldwide connections. More
than half the population of the United States lives within a five hundred-mile
radius of the Bluegrass region, creating a huge market potential. More than
half the population of Kentucky is in the Bluegrass region, providing a large
labor pool. Most of Toyota's suppliers also have Bluegrass locations. The
region's rural character and open space provide a number of amenities.
In addition to the Toyota Motor Manufacturing plant, which employs
| Maioc Industrial Area
• Urban Center
0 200 km
200 mi
HOKKAIDO
Sea of Japan Pacific Ocean
-KCIHIN
Fig. 2.3. Headquarters of Japanese firms investing in Kentucky.
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Table 2.3. Employment in Japanese plants in Kentucky cities, 1999
City
Ashland
Bardstown
Berea
Bowling Green
Danville
Edmonton
Elizabethtown
Erlanger
Flemingsburg
Florence
Frankfort
Franklin
Georgetown
Glasgow
Harrodsburg
Hopkinsville
Lawrenceburg
Lebanon
Leitchfield
Lexington
London
Louisville
Maysville
Morgantown
Munfordville
Nicholasville
Paris
Richmond
Russellville
Scottsville
Shelbyville
Somerset
Sonora
Springfield
Stanford
Versailles
Walton
Williamsburg
Winchester
Total
Employment in
Japanese
Plants
1,600
1,402
1,073
361
2,601
824
1,562
50
102
1,102
1,320
250
8,525
1,328
1,720
630
298
765
282
958
60
616
915
1,000
47
270
275
540
60
560
915
530
30
262
18
767
469
284
521
34,937
Population,
1980
27,064
6,401
8,600
40,450
12,942
1,448
15,380
14,466
3,043
15,586
25,973
7,738
10,972
12,958
7,265
29,386
5,116
6,590
4,533
204,165
4,002
298,694
7,983
2,000
1,783
10,400
7,935
21,705
7,520
4,278
5,329
10,829
3,179
2,764
6,427
1,651
5,560
15,216
877,331
Population,
1998
22,402
7,879
10,341
44,822
16,470
1,559
19,905
16,901
3,333
19,501
26,418
8,109
14,365
14,062
7,862
32,045
7,949
5,754
5,459
241,749
7,045
255,045
8,479
2,515
1,640
17,099
8,898
27,644
7,869
4,736
6,849
12,618
290
2,930
2,989
8,233
2,027
6,008
15,937
925,736
Percent
emp. in
Japanese
firms in
each city
7.0
17.8
10.4
0.8
15.8
52.9
7.8
0.3
3.1
5.7
5.0
3.1
59.3
9.4
21.9
2.0
3.7
13.3
5.2
0.4
0.9
0.2
11.3
39.8
2.9
1.6
3.1
2.0
0.8
11.8
13.4
4.2
10.3
8.9
0.6
9.3
23.0
4.7
3.3
Source: Population Estimates, 1998, Kentucky Population Research. University of Louisville;
Population, 1980, Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, Frankfort, Kentucky;
Employment data from Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, Frankfort, Kentucky.
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seventy-eight hundred workers, six other Japanese-owned plants located near
Georgetown from 1986 to 1998. These are Louisville Forge and Gear Works
LLC, Toyota Tsusho, Vuteq Corporation, and ARK, all subsidiaries of Japa-
nese firms based in Aichi prefecture, and Trinity Industrial Corporation and
International Crankshaft, subsidiaries of firms in Tokyo. The companies manu-
facture steel forgings, automotive steel, automotive windows, paint finishing
systems, and automotive crankshafts. The parent company of Louisville Forge
and Gear Works is Aichi Steel Works, which has headquarters in Tokai, south
of Nagoya. A member of the Toyota group, Aichi Steel was established in
1934 as the steel manufacturing department of Toyoda Automatic Loom
Works. The company produces and sells special steel materials and forged
steel products. A R K and Toyota Tsusho America are affiliates of Toyota
Tsusho Corporation, a comprehensive trading company that is a core mem-
ber of the Toyota group. International Crankshaft is part of the Sumitomo
group, which comprises some eighty firms. Toyota's just-in-time production
system and the need for close technical cooperation between companies have
led to tendencies toward spatial clustering of plants in the Bluegrass region.
AK Steel Corporation, with head office in Tokyo, manufactures steels
and coils in Ashland and employs sixteen hundred workers. The company
was established in 1989. AK Steel's parent company is Kawasaki Steel Cor-
poration, with headquarters in Tokyo and Kobe. It ranks among the top five
in Japanese crude steel production and has thirteen overseas subsidiaries, in-
cluding Aramco Steel Company.
Bardstown, thirty miles from Louisville, attracted eight Japanese plants
between 1986 and 1996. The plants employ approximately fourteen hundred
workers. The largest company, Intertec Systems LLC (with Japanese head
office in Aichi prefecture) employs 425 persons in the manufacture of poly-
urethane auto instrument panels. Jideco of Bardstown and Trim Masters
employ 300 each in automotive parts industries (windshield wiper motors
and automatic speed control devices, and door trim panels). Trim Masters
has its Japanese headquarters in Aichi prefecture, and Jideco in Kanagawa
prefecture. Other Japanese plants in the city are F E T Engineering of Aichi,
which makes automotive interior molds; AMB of Kanagawa, which makes
blower motors; Mabex Universal Corporation of Aichi, producer of protec-
tive foam; and Sumitok Magnetics Company of Osaka, which manufactures
ceramic magnets. A nonautomotive-related Japanese plant in Bardstown is
Inoac Packaging Group of Aichi, which manufactures heavy-wall plastic bottles
for the cosmetic industry. Bardstown, with a rich history and local distilleries
that produce 60 percent of the world's supply of bourbon whiskey, is an ex-
ample of a town that has been successful in securing Japanese plants.
Berea, located on 1-75 in Madison County (which extends into the foot-
hills of Appalachia), has four Japanese manufacturing plants. Tokico of
Kawasaki, the largest plant in Berea, makes auto shock absorbers, struts, and
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caliper brakes and employs 564 persons. Tokico, incorporated in 1949, is the
industry's largest producer of shock absorbers and gasoline flowmeters. The
company also sells suspension systems to U.S. automobile makers. KI Corpo-
ration, based in Kanagawa, manufactures components for shock absorbers
and employs 312 workers. Matsushita Electric Motor Corporation makes
small electric motors and employs 160 persons. Kentucky Steel Center, affili-
ate of a Japanese-based firm in Osaka, is engaged in steel processing. It was
established in Berea in 1996.
Bowling Green has three Japanese plants: Bando Manufacturing with
the parent company in Tokyo, NHK-Associated Spring Suspension with par-
ent company in Yokohama, and TWN Fastener of Hadano (a city in western
Kanagawa prefecture) employ more than 360 workers. They manufacture
power transmission belts for industrial machines and automobiles, coil springs
for automotive suspensions, and drywall fasteners for the building industry.
NHK-Associated Spring Suspension is operated by NHK Spring of Japan and
Associated Spring Company of Connecticut. NHK Spring Company is one of
the world's largest spring manufacturers. The company has nine branches
and twenty-seven affiliated companies in Japan. In the overseas market it has
manufacturing bases in seven countries. Eighty percent of its production is
related to the automotive industry, and it realizes annual sales of more than
$1 billion.
Danville is another focus of Japanese plants in the Bluegrass region. The
largest Japanese plant in Danville is Matsushita, a home appliance manufac-
Jideco of Bardstown (Kentucky), established in 1986, employs three hundred work-
ers. Its Japanese parent company is Jidosha Denki Company (JIDECO) of Yokohama.
Jideco makes windshield wiper motors and automatic speed control devices for
automobiles. (Photograph by P.P. Karan)
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Table 2.4. Major Japanese firms operating plants in Kentucky, 1999
City
Anjo, Aichi
Ayase, Kanagawa
Fujinomiya, Shizuoka
Hadano, Kanagawa
Higashi Matsuyama
Saitama
Hiroshima
Inashiki, Ibaraki
Kanagawa-Ken
Kawasaki
Kodaira City, Tokyo
Kariya, Aichi
Kyoto
Nagoya
Japanese parent company
and product
Nishi Kasugai-gun, Aichi
Niwa-gun, Aichi
Obu City, Aichi
Okayama
Location in Kentucky
Central Motor Wheel Company
wheels
Toshin Company, auto parts
stamping
Miyama Kogyo Company,
stamping/assembly
Topura Company,
drywall fasteners
Yamamoto F B Engineering,
auto brake
Toyo Seat, seat for autos
Jonan Industries Company,
plastic inj. molding
Shimoda, wiring harness for
wiper motors
Tokico Ltd., auto shock absorbers
Toyo Denyo Company,
auto welding equipment
Aisin Seiki Company,
diecastings for autos
Takara Shuzo Company,
packaged beverages,distilled
products, and distillers dried grain
Aichi Kikai, transmission gears
Aichi Steel Works Ltd.,
Paris
Stanford
Louisville
Bowling Green
Louisville
Flemingsburg
Winchester
Bardstown
Berea
Walton
London
Frankfort
Richmond
Georgetown
steel forgings
Chukyo Yushi, industrial mold
release agents and
thermosensitive paper additives
Chuo Springs, automotive
cable controls
Far East Tooling Co., Ltd.,
Automotive interior molds
Electro formed tooling
Gomunoinaki Co., Ltd.,
rubber auto parts
Howa Kasei, automotive armrests
Inoac Corporation.
Plastic bottles for cosmetics
industry
Polyurethane auto instrument
panel
Maruyasu Industries, auto gasline
ana brake line tubing assemblies
Toyota Tsusho
Recycle steel, automotive steel
Auto seat/door trim
Toyoda Gosei, plastic auto parts
Nakagawa Sangyo Company,
auto muffler parts
Yamazaki Mazak Corporation,
machine tools
Aisan Industrial Company,
auto engine parts
Tokai Kogyo Company, auto trim
Katayama Kogyo Company,
window frames and flexible
stainless steel mesh joints for
auto industry
Elizabethtown
Glasgow
Bardstown
Lebanon
Winchester
Springfield
Bardstown
Bardstown
Lebanon
Georgetown
Harrodsburg/Georgetown
Lebanon
Sonora
Florence
Franklin
Maysville
Shelbyville
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Table 2.4. Continued
Japanese parent company
City and product
Osaka
Shizuoka
Takefu, Fukui
Tokyo
Daikin Clutch, automotive/truck
after market
Itochu Corporation, steel wire
tire cord
Kyeoi Steel Ltd., fabricated steel
Matsushita Appliance Corporation,
vacuum cleaners
Nissho Iwai Corporation,
drywall fasteners
Sumikin Bussan Corporation,
steel processing
Sumitomo Electric Industries
Magnet wire
Automotive electric wiring harness
Sumitomo Special Metals,
ceramic magnets
Wako Electronics Co., Ltd.,
appliance thermostats
Yuasa Battery Company,
storage batteries
Fuji Kiko
Steering columns
Automotive seat mechanisms
Fuji Univance Corporation,
auto and RV parts
Matsushita Electric Motor Company,
small electric motors
Akebono Brake, brake parts
AMAK Brake, auto disc pads
Asahi Glass Co., Ltd., automotive glass
Asahi Tec, wheels
Bando Chemical,
power transmission belts
Bridgestone Corporation,
auto air springs
Calsonic Group, blower motors
Clarion Co., Ltd.,
automotive radio equipment
Denvo Co., Ltd., generators
Fujikura Ltd., wiring harness
Hayes Lemmerz IntL Inc., wheels
Hitachi Ltd., auto electric devices,
alternator and starter motors
Ichikoh Industries, Ltd.,
rear- and side-view auto mirrors
Itochi Corporation, steel parts, processing
Jidosha Kiki, brake parts
Kawasaki Steel Corporation,
steel sheets, coils
Kokoku Intech Company,
rubber components for auto,
medical, and business machine industries
Kokoku Wire, automotive cable controls
Mitsubishi Corporation
Steel wire tire cord
Plastic acrylic sheets
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation,
electronic auto products
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
Horizontal and vertical machining centers
and lathes
Location in Kentucky
Florence
Danville
Louisville
Danville
Bowling Green
Berea
Edmonton
Scottsville/Morgantown
Bardstown
Louisville
Richmond
Hopkinsville
Walton
Winchester
Berea
Munfordville/Elizabethtown
Glasgow
Elizabethtown
Somerset
Bowling Green
Williamsburg
Bardstown
Walton
Danville
Shelbyville
Somerset
Harrodsburg
Shelbyville
Louisville
Russellville
Ashland
Richmond
Glasgow
Danville
Florence
Maysville
Hopkinsville
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Table 2.4. Continued
Japanese parent company
City and product
Tokyo Mitsubishi Rayon Co., Ltd.,
(continued) plastic acrylic sheets
Mitsubishi Steel Manufacturing, torsion bars
Mitsui & Company, animal feed additives
Neturen, spring wires for autos
Nippon Glass,laminated and
tempered glass parts
Nippon Zeon Company, synthetic elastomers
Obara Corporation, welding equipment
Sumitomo Corporation
Crankshafts and steel forgings
Cranes and excavators
Tachi-S Company
Auto and truck seat covers
Auto seat covers
Tokyo Rope Manufacturing Company,
steel wire tire cord
Topy Industries, Ltd., auto wheels
Toyo Radiator Company
Copper and brass radiators for off-road
industrial equipment
Heat exchangers for autos
Trinity Industrial Corporation,
paint finishing systems
Yokohama Hydex, and
Yokohama Rubber Company
Automotive air conditioning
and power steering hoses
Y K K Corporation, automatic attaching
machines, metal buttons,
snap fasteners, hooks and eyes
Toyota, Aichi Araco Corporation
Trim for car seats
Seat for autos
Door trim panels
Chubu Industries Co., Inc.,
automotive windows
Fuji Seiko, carbide cutting tools
Kito Machine Industry Co., Ltd.,
welding equipment
Toyo Seisakusho, tape for auto industry
Toyoda Iron Works, auto stamping
Toyota Motor Corporation, automobiles
and auto engines
Toyotomi Kiko Ltd., automotive body panels
Yokohama Jideco Group, blower motors
Jidosha Denki Company
Windshield wiper motors and speed
control devices
Keiaisha Manufacturing, components for
shock absorbers
NHK Spring, coil springs for
auto suspension
Ohi Seisakusho
Auto components
Auto door hinges, seat support hardware,
hood and door latches
Location in Kentucky
Florence
Hopkinsville
Louisville
Florence
Versailles
Louisville
Erlanger
Georgetown
Lexington
Glasgow
Maysville
Danville
Frankfort
Hopkinsville
Hopkinsville
Georgetown
Versailles
Lawrenceburg
Leitchfield
Nicholasville
Bardstown
Georgetown
Lexington
Lexington
Lexington
Somerset
Georgetown
Springfield
Bardstown
Bardstown
Berea
Bowling Green
Winchester
Frankfort
Source: Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, Frankfort, Kentucky.
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FET Engineering, located in Bardstown, makes automotive interior molds. Estab-
lished in 1988, it is wholly owned by Far East Tooling of Nagoya, Japan. (Photo-
graph by P.P. Karan)
turer. It employs 2,000 workers making vacuum cleaners and microwave ov-
ens. Matsushita is Danville's largest employer and one of the largest manu-
facturers of home appliances in America. Most Matsushita products are
shipped overseas. A T R Wire and Cable makes steel wire tire cord and bead
wire and employs 564 people. A T R Wire and Cable is a joint venture of
Osaka-based Itochu Corporation (C. Itoh and Company until 1992) and To-
kyo-based Mitsubishi Corporation and Tokyo Rope Manufacturing Com-
pany (Tokyo Seiko), which produces various types of wire ropes, wires, and
steel cords. Production of steel cords for auto tire is the main business of the
company, which was incorporated in 1887 and established in its present
form in 1946. Another Japanese company, Denyo Manufacturing Corpora-
tion of Tokyo, established a plant to manufacture generators in Danville in
1994.
Two Osaka-based Japanese firms in Edmonton, Sumitomo Electric Wir-
ing Systems and S P D Magnet Wire Company, manufacture wiring products
and magnetic wire for the automotive and cycle industries. Both Sumitomo
Electric Wiring Systems and S P D Magnet Wire Company are affiliates of
Sumitomo Electric Industries, with headquarters in Osaka and Tokyo. Estab-
lished in 1897 and with annual sales of nearly $6 billion, it is one of the major
enterprises in the Sumitomo group.
Two Tokyo-based companies, A P Technoglass Corporation and Ambrake
Corporation, manufacture automotive glass and brakes in Elizabethtown and
employ more than 1,500 workers. Ambrake Corporation is a joint venture
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Kentucky Steel Center, located in an industrial park in Berea, Kentucky, was estab-
lished in 1996. The plant processes steel and is wholly owned by Sumikin Bussan
Corporation of Osaka, Japan. (Photograph by P.P. Karan)
between Akebono Brake Industry of Japan and Delco Division of General
Motors. A third, smaller company, Cytech Products, a joint venture of Tomen
Corporation and Chukyo Yushi, makes industrial mold-release agents and
thermosensitive paper.
Obara Corporation, a Tokyo-based firm, manufactures welding equip-
ment in Erlanger, and Toyo Seat, a Hiroshima-based firm, makes auto seats in
Flemingsburg. Four Japanese-owned plants in Florence employ more than
1,100 workers. IT Spring Wire and Airtech Acrylics LLC, subsidiaries of To-
kyo-based firms, manufacture spring wire for autos and plastic acrylic sheets.
Meritor Automotive, an affiliate of an Osaka-based firm, specializes in auto-
motive business, and Yamazaki Mazak Corporation, an Aichi prefecture firm,
makes machine tools. Yamazaki Mazak, the world's third largest machine
tool company, began producing in Kentucky in 1979.
Frankfort has three Japanese plants from Kyoto, Tokyo, and Kanagawa.
Leestown Company, an affiliate of Takara Shuzo Company, makes packaged
beverages and distilled products. Takara Shuzo, incorporated in 1825, is a
distiller of alcoholic beverages such as sake, with annual sales of more than
$1 billion. It is the largest domestic producer of mira (a sweetened cooking
wine) and shochu (a distilled drink made from rice or sweet potatoes). Since
1970 it has been developing new fermented products, including pharmaceuti-
cals. Tokyo-based Topy Corporation manufactures auto wheels, and
Kanagawa-based Ohi Automotive makes auto door hinges, seat support hard-
ware, and hood and door latches. These Japanese firms employ more than
1,300 workers. Topy is a world leader in the production of wheels for cars,
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trucks, buses, and off-road vehicles and undercarriage components for con-
struction and earth-moving machinery.
Franklin Precision, an affiliate of Aisan Industries in Obu City in west-
ern Aichi prefecture, manufactures auto engine parts in Franklin. ACK Con-
trols (an affiliate of Nagoya-based Chuo Springs) and AMAK Brake and
Technotrim (affiliates of Tokyo-based firms) have plants in Glasgow that make
auto cable controls, disc pads, and seat covers. Together these three compa-
nies employ more than 1,300 workers.
Harrodsburg, Kentucky's oldest city, attracted its first Japanese plant,
Hitachi, in 1985. At the time, strong anti-Japanese sentiments lingered from
the destruction of a National Guard unit from Harrodsburg in the Bataan
death march, which left widows, children, and parents with bitter feelings.
More than half a century later, Hitachi has proved to be a good resident,
employing 950 workers. Trim Masters, a joint venture of Johnson Controls,
Toyota Tsusho, and ARACO Corporation, came to Harrodsburg in 1988,
bringing 700 more jobs. Hitachi manufactures autoelectric devices, and Trim
Masters makes auto seats and doors, seat covers, and trim.
Hopkinsville has four Japanese plants, three from Tokyo, M H I Ma-
chine Tool (an affiliate of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries), Meritor Suspension
Systems (a joint venture of Rockwell International and Mitsubishi Steel), and
CoPar (an affiliate of Toyo Radiator Company), and one from Shizuoka,
Douglas Autotech Corporation (an affiliate of Fuji Kiko). M H I Machine
Tool specializes in vertical and horizontal machining centers; the other com-
Hitachi Automotive Products (USA) was established in 1985 in Harrodsburg, Ken-
tucky. The plant employs 950 persons and is owned by Hitachi Ltd. of Tokyo. It
produces automobile electric devices, alternators, and starter motors. The pond
and rock garden in front of the plant suggests Japanese landscape. (Photograph by
P.P. Karan)
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panies manufacture steering columns, torsion bars, and copper and brass ra-
diators. These companies employ more than 600 workers.
A subsidiary of Tokyo-based firm Y K K Corporation, Universal Fasten-
ers employs nearly 300 people and makes automatic attaching machines, metal
buttons, snap fasteners, hooks, and eyes in Lawrenceburg. Three Aichi-based
firms, Curtis-Maruyasu, TG (USA) Corporation, and F E T Engineering,
manufacture automotive gas line and brake line, plastic parts, and electro-
formed tooling equipment in Lebanon. Curtis-Maruyasu is a Japanese-Ameri-
can venture which makes auto gas and brake lines and employs 20 workers in
a small town where unemployment was about 12 percent. In Leitchfield, Inoac
Packaging Group and Trim Masters manufacture plastic bottles and trim for
car seats.
Tokyo-based Link-Belt Construction Equipment Company, an affiliate
of Sumitomo group, employs more than 900 persons in Lexington in the
excavating equipment business. Two other Japanese companies in Lexington,
Tokyo-based Toyo Seisakusho and Accuromm (a joint venture of Fuji Seiko
and Toyota Tsusho) make tape and carbide cutting tools for the auto indus-
try. About 950 workers are employed in Japanese firms in Lexington. In nearby
Nicholasville, Trim Masters makes seating for automotive interiors. To the
south in London, Aisin Automotive Casting, an affiliate of Aisin Seiki of
Kariya, makes aluminum die castings for automobiles and employs about 60
persons. Aisin Seiko is Japan's leading manufacturer and seller of automotive
components. Incorporated in 1949, it is a member of the Toyota group with
eight overseas offices and twelve subsidiaries and affiliates and annual sales
of more than $4 billion.
Two major Japanese firms making synthetic elastomers and thermostats
in Louisville are Tokyo-based Zeon Chemicals (affiliate of Nippon Zeon Com-
pany) and Osaka-based Wako Electronics. Together these two plants employ
about 420 persons. In addition, six smaller Japanese-owned plants employ
fewer than 50 persons each. They make brake parts, fabricated steel, stamp-
ing and assembly equipment, and bioproducts.
Maysville has two Tokyo-based plants, Mitsubishi Electric and
Technotrim (a joint venture of Johnson Controls and Tachi-S Company),
manufacturing electronic auto products and seat covers. There is also Green
Tokai, an affiliate of Tokai Kogyo Company, that makes auto trim products
and is based in Obu City (Aichi prefecture). Japanese companies provide
employment for nearly 950 persons in Maysville. Osaka-based Sumitomo
Electric Wiring Systems employs more than 1,000 persons in Morgantown.
Tokyo-based Akebono plant makes brake parts in Munfordville. Akebono
Bureki Kogyo is one of Japan's leading manufacturers of brake mechanisms
for automobiles, railway cars, and industrial machinery. Incorporated in 1936,
its major stockholders are Japanese automakers and Bosch of Germany.
Central Manufacturing Company in Paris, a Japanese firm based in Anjo
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(a satellite city of Nagoya), manufactures aluminum wheels and related prod-
ucts and employs about 300 workers. It is a joint venture operated by Kelsey-
Hayes Company, Chuo Seiki Company, and Toyoda America.
In Richmond, Yuasa-Exide of Osaka employs 300 workers. Auto Parts
Technology, an affiliate of Aichi Kikai of Nagoya, and Kokoku Rubber of
Tokyo each employ 120 persons. They manufacture batteries, transmission
gears, and rubber components for auto, medical, and business machinery.
Established in 1943, Aichi Kikai is a principal manufacturer of automobile
engines and transmissions with annual sales of more than $2 billion.
J S Technos Corporation, a joint venture of Japanese companies based
in Tokyo and Hiroshima, makes brake parts in Russellville. Osaka-based
Sumitomo Electric Wiring Systems manufactures plastic connectors and elec-
tric wiring harnesses for automobiles in Scottsville. Shelbyville has three Japa-
nese firms: Ichikoh Manufacturing, an affiliate of Ichikoh Industries; Alcoa
Fujikura from Tokyo; and Katayama America, an affiliate of Katayama Kogyo
Company of Okayama. These three plants manufacture rearview and side-
view auto mirrors, wiring harness, and window frames and provide employ-
ment for nearly 900 persons.
Somerset has two Japanese plants—Toyotetsu (an affiliate of Toyota-
based Toyoda Iron Works) and Tokyo-based Hayes Lemmerz—specializing
in auto stampings and aluminum wheels and employing more than 500 per-
sons. Hayes Lemmerz is a joint venture of Hayes Lemmerz, Asahi Tec, and
Tomen Corporation. N S U Corporation (an affiliate of Nakagawa Sangyo
Company based in Nawa-gun) makes muffler components in Sonora (Hardin
County). Automotive armrests are made by an Aichi-based plant in Spring-
field. Auto parts stamping equipment is made in Stanford by a subsidiary of
Toshin Company of Ayase, Kanagawa.
Versailles is the site for two Tokyo-based companies, Y H America and
United L-N Glass. Y H America, owned by Yokohama Hydex Company and
Yokohama Rubber Company, manufactures air conditioning and power steer-
ing hose, fittings and hose assemblies, and sealant and primer for automo-
biles. United L-N Glass, which makes laminated and tempered glass parts for
automobiles, is a joint venture formed by Libby-Owens-Ford Glass and Nippon
Sheet Glass of Japan. The Versailles plant combines the best of both compa-
nies in technology and marketing expertise.
Three Japanese firms, Tokyo-based Waltex, an affiliate of Toyo Denyo;
Clarion Manufacturing, an affiliate of Clarion Company; and Shizuoka-based
Dynamec (a joint venture of Bertrand Faure and Fuji Kiko), make auto weld-
ing equipment, audio equipment, and auto seat mechanisms in Walton (Boone
County). These three plants employ about 470 workers. Firestone Products,
owned by Bridgestone Corporation of Tokyo, manufactures auto air springs
in Williamsburg and employs about 285 persons.
Winchester has five Japanese plants. The largest is Ohi America, owned
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by Ohi Seisakusho of Yokohama and Nissho Iwai of Tokyo. Ohi America
makes auto components and employs nearly 235 persons. The other compa-
nies are Itochu Steel of Tokyo; Ainak Industries, an affiliate of Gomunoinake
Company of Nagoya; Wintech of Ibaraki; and Fuji Univance of Shizuoka.
They make a variety of products for the automobile industry such as rubber
parts, plastic moldings, and recreational vehicle parts.
A majority of the Japanese plants located in Kentucky are suppliers of
parts not only for Toyota of Kentucky but also for other domestic and Japa-
nese automakers in the United States. For example, the major customers of
Y H America in Versailles include Mitsubishi Climate Control, AutoAlliance
International, Calsonic North America (California), Calsonic Climate Con-
trol (United Kingdom), Calsonic Climate Control (Spain), Cami Automotive,
Honda of America, Isuzu Motors America, Mazda North America, Nissan
Forklift Corporation, Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Toyoda TRW Automotive,
Zexel U.S.A., Libby-Owens-Ford, Toyota of Canada, Toyota of Kentucky,
Toyota of Indiana, United L-N Glass, Vuteq of Kentucky, Vuteq of Illinois,
Guide Corporation, North America Lighting, Stanley Electric, and Textron.
Kentucky's position provides Japanese companies a central location
within easy reach of major automobile manufacturing plants and industrial
centers in the United States and Canada. Since many of the small communi-
ties where Japanese plants are located are in less-developed areas of the state,
Japanese investments have played a big role in the local economies. In turn,
the politically and socially conservative people in these small communities
have provided a stable and hard-working labor force with high "work eth-
ics" in the words of a Japanese plant manager.
The importance of agglomeration economies has also played a signifi-
cant role in decisions to locate Japanese firms in Kentucky (Head, Reis, and
Swenson 1995). Japanese investors prefer to situate their plants in areas with
concentrations of previous Japanese investments in the same industry and, in
the case of auto-related firms, where the previous investments were made by
group affiliates. In conjunction with factors such as labor and incentives,
agglomeration benefits have driven locational choice.
JAPANESE PRESENCE IN KENTUCKY
Most Kentuckians and many Japanese perceive that Kentucky has several
advantages in attracting Japanese businesses to the state. A survey of Japa-
nese executives in Kentucky was conducted in March/April 1999 to find out
why their companies chose to locate in Kentucky. A number of factors were
mentioned: work ethics and reliability of the labor force in the smaller towns
and communities where most of the Japanese plants are located, cost and
availability of transportation, cooperation of local and state business and
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political leaders, availability of technical and vocational training programs
for employees, and the geographic and climatic similarities between Japan
and Kentucky.
It is clear that locational decisions by Japanese firms are made primarily
on economic factors such as access to transportation and availability of labor
force. When these criteria are met, Japanese businesses prefer to locate in
smaller cities on the periphery of major metropolitan areas in Kentucky. Ab-
sence of labor unions in the peripheral communities is a major consideration
in locational decision making for Japanese firms. The Japanese management
style and the American union style are often viewed as incompatible (Gordon
1985), but in many places labor unions and Japanese management have learned
to work together. Japanese managers in Kentucky have attempted to develop
a feeling of company loyalty among workers to create a family-like atmo-
sphere in the plant. Labor recruited from rural areas in Kentucky tend to
respond better to this approach than workers from large metropolitan areas.
Efforts to unionize Toyota's Georgetown plant have not succeeded. The
United Auto Workers (UAW) targeted the plant in 1985 when Toyota an-
nounced the location. The UAW opened an office in Georgetown in April
1989 but closed it in the early 1990s. Attempts to organize the union at the
plant have been extremely difficult. For one thing, many employees—who
earn as much as $60,000 a year with overtime—are strongly opposed to the
union. Most workers appreciate the high wages and direct access to manage-
ment. No local union has ever been formed at a foreign-owned auto plant in
the United States. Workers at the Toyota-run plant in Fremont, California,
are represented by the UAW, but that plant is half-owned by General Motors,
which brought the union with it. Most Daimler Chrysler plants in the United
States were organized before Daimler-Benz acquired Chrysler in 1998. In Feb-
ruary 2000 an effort to organize an Alabama Mercedes plant faded.
In Japan, factories in peripheral areas surrounding major industrial re-
gions have recruited workers from rural areas. The same preference for rural
workers has been demonstrated in Kentucky. People from rural Kentucky are
responsive to Japan's personal style of business. Our interviews with workers
in Japanese plants and Japanese managers indicate that both the Japanese
and rural Kentuckians feels comfortable with the traditional style in labor
management as well as in business relationships.
Cooperation from state and local governments was often cited in the
interviews as a major factor in the decision to locate in Kentucky. Many county
and city officials in Kentucky, it appears from our interviews, have done ex-
cellent jobs in recent years in attracting Japanese plants to their communities.
Japanese executives in Kentucky have also made major efforts to establish
good relations with the communities through their support of local activities
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by generous grants. Other things being equal, incentives packages have made
the difference in the final locational decision in many cases.
The important role played by the Kentucky office in Tokyo, which opened
in April 1983, is also significant in attracting Japanese investments to the
state. Jiro Hashimoto, who had been with Sumitomo Corporation, a major
trading house, for twenty years, became the chief representative of Kentucky's
Tokyo office. "My most difficult task was to give Kentucky a new image as
an industrial state for Japanese investors, rather than as the home of Ken-
tucky Fried Chicken and bourbon whiskey," remarked Hashimoto in an in-
terview with the Daily Yontiuri (Tokyo). The telephone rarely rang for a while
after the office was opened. At that time, twenty-one U.S. states already had
representative offices in Japan. What should a latecomer do after all other
state offices had supposedly finished or nearly finished inducing Japanese
investments? Taking a hint from a map of automobile manufacturing compa-
nies in the United States, the Kentucky office in Tokyo decided to target auto
parts suppliers to take advantage of the presence of major Japanese automakers
in Kentucky's neighboring states—Honda Motor in Ohio and Nissan Motor
in Tennessee. Hashimoto spent one and a half years "seeding"—visiting com-
panies and relevant government offices—before Japan's top auto wheel pro-
ducer, Topy Industries, decided to invest in Kentucky and established a plant
in Frankfort in 1986.
In May 1984, one year after the opening of the Tokyo office, the Ken-
tucky representative contacted Toyota for the first time and scheduled a meeting
between Toyota executives and Kentucky state officials visiting Japan. At
that time there was widespread belief that the largest automaker in Japan
would not build a wholly owned plant in the United States because it had
agreed with General Motors in the preceding year to set up an equally owned
venture in California. Nonetheless, thirty-two locations, including those in
Kentucky, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, and Tennessee, fiercely com-
peted with one another to entice Toyota. In December 1985, the automotive
giant decided to set up Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, wholly owned
by the Toyota group, in Georgetown. Hashimoto's experience at a leading
trading company does not let him miss chances to lure Japanese investment
to Kentucky.
Almost all the effort of the Kentucky office in Tokyo is spent inducing
Japanese investment in Kentucky. The Kentucky office highlights the Blue-
grass State's geographical advantage of being located at the center of the thirty-
one-state distribution area that has 70 percent of the U.S. market, the state's
good transportation network, a high-quality workforce, and various business
incentives. Timing, clear goal setting, and efforts to win battles with other
states are three major factors contributing to the success of Kentucky's office
in Tokyo.
During the interviews many Japanese pointed out cultural and geographi-
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cal similarities between Japan and Kentucky as an element in their attraction
to the Bluegrass State. Regional and place identities are strong among people
of both Japan and Kentucky. Few states are so vivid regionally as Kentucky,
and this is evident remarkably in the common idiom (Karan 1973; Karan and
Mather 1977). Most Kentuckians identify strongly with their home county.
Likewise the Japanese closely identify themselves with their home region or
prefecture (Mather, Karan, and Iijima 1998). In Tokyo and other large cities of
Japan, people coming from other prefectures or regions have established social
associations or clubs where members from the specific area meet regularly in
an effort to maintain identity and bond with others from their home place.
In Japan, Bluegrass country music is a shumi, a hobby or "taste" like
calligraphy or tea ceremony, that goes a long way toward defining lifestyle
and circle of friends. At a Country Gold Music Festival held in Kumamoto in
September 1998 at an outdoor venue overlooking scenic Mount Aso, an ac-
tive volcano in the lonesome heart of the southern Japanese island of Kyushu,
we noticed people coming from all over Japan—from Hokkaido to Okinawa.
Many fans made a weekend of the event. They tossed back mizuwari (Scotch
and water) and exchanged meishi (name cards) documenting membership in
Bluegrass music clubs like Chuck Wagon Family in Kyoto, Deep River in
Tokyo, and Cattle Call in Okayama. In most Japanese cities, Bluegrass bands,
such as Turquoise at the Chuck Wagon in Fukuoka, are popular. Stephen
Foster's famous ballad "My Old Kentucky Home" is enormously popular in
Japan—so much so that the home in Bardstown said to have inspired the
song has become a popular stop for Japanese tour groups in the United States.
There are other links. The Marlboro man, long banished from American tele-
vision, is riding high on late-night airwaves in Japan. Breaking broncos and
kicking up dust that disappears in the cigarette smoke, the cowboy brings the
message, "Smoking is cool." The Bluegrass music, songs, and cigarettes re-
flect similarities in likeness for cultural icons between Japan and Kentucky.
Geographically and culturally, Japan and Kentucky—or "Kentakky" in
katakana, the Japanese alphabet for words borrowed from other languages—
have found they have much in common.
Kentuckians have come to realize that Japan is essential to the state's
economy. It would be interesting to speculate where Kentucky would be if the
109 manufacturing plants accounting for more than thirty-five thousand jobs
and nearly $7 billion in direct investment had not located in Kentucky. It is
expected that investment by Japanese firms will continue as Japan's best com-
panies transfer production abroad in response to the ever-growing pull of the
global marketplace (Hirsh and Henry 1997). The overregulated Japanese
marketplace no longer works best for Japanese multinational companies.
40 Karan and Bladen
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Part II
Toyota in Kentucky and Japan

State and Local Government
Negotiation with Japanese
Multinational Corporations
DAVID M. POTTER
SINCE THE 1 9 8 0 S , FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) in Ameri-
can states has been a concern of academics, policy makers, and businesspeople.
Since the mid-1980s the inflow of Japanese direct investment, especially au-
tomobiles, into the Midwest and South has engendered a corresponding pub-
lic and academic debate as to its effects. In the academic discussions that have
sought to understand that investment, comparatively little attention has been
paid to a key question: how do state governments negotiate with multina-
tional corporations (MNCs), and what characteristics of the bargaining envi-
ronment constrain their ability to secure agreements with MNCs that are
also acceptable to their publics? In this chapter, Robert Putnam's model of
the two-level bargaining game in international negotiations is used as a de-
vice for thinking about the characteristics of state government-MNC nego-
tiations.
This research is significant for three reasons. First, most of the research
has focused on negotiations between states, or alternatively, governments such
as the European Union that can be seen as variants of states (Putnam 1988;
Evans, Putnam, and Jacobsen 1993; Schoppa 1997). This study extends
Putnam's two-level framework from state-state negotiations to negotiations
between subnational governments and MNCs. It is clear both from the per-
spective of interdependence theory and from practical international politics
that subnational governments increasingly play roles in international rela-
tions. In countries like the United States, subnational governments may have
significant room to formulate what may be considered independent, if not
autonomous, foreign political and economic policies. In recent years, they
have engaged in foreign economic policies that include official visits to for-
eign countries, transnational agreements, and the establishment of more or
less permanent economic representation overseas (Grubel 1993; Fry 1998).
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Fry (1998, 5) notes that "state governments now operate almost as many
permanent offices overseas as the U.S. government operates embassies." Con-
sidering structural factors that might enhance or inhibit their abilities to ne-
gotiate in the international arena deserves attention.
Second, MNCs and their impact on the international economy and spe-
cific societies have engendered an enormous academic and policy-oriented
literature. Again, from the perspective of interdependence theory and practi-
cal politics, the behavior of MNCs in their negotiations with governments
merits research in its own right. This study combines both of these research
agendas by examining the characteristics of the negotiation process between
American state governments and foreign MNCs over siting of manufacturing
facilities. The structural characteristics of the negotiating process outlined
below are applicable to any state government entering into negotiations with
any major MNC.
Finally, the chapter is significant because it attempts to expand our un-
derstanding of the political dynamics of Japanese and other FDI in Kentucky.
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, North America (TMMNA) in Erlanger, Kentucky, pro-
vides centralized support for Toyota's U.S. and Canadian manufacturing activities.
A new $15 million production engineering/quality laboratory has been completed.
Toyota's U.S. investments total $9.2 billion; it employed 164,865 with direct payroll
of $1.4 billion in 1998. Auto parts purchases by TMMNA totaled $8.3 billion ($6.6
billion for U.S. production and $1.7 billion for exports to Japan). Other purchases of
goods and services amounted to $2 billion. Toyota produced 791,091 vehicles in
the United States in 1998; more than 30,000 vehicles were exported (8,145 to Ja-
pan, the rest to other countries). There were 1,470 Toyota dealerships in the United
States in 1998. (Photograph courtesy of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, North America)
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To date, the literature on Japanese FDI in industrialized nations,1 including
the United States, has focused on economic motives and impacts (Dunning
1986; Strange 1993; Han 1994; Mason and Encarnation 1994; Sachwald
1995; Hollerman and Myers 1996; Belderbos 1997); management practices
(Trevor 1983; Kissler 1996; Besser 1996); and general social, political, and
economic issues of industrial recruitment in American communities (Gelsanliter
1990; Yanarella and Green 1990; Sherman 1994; Chapman Elhance, and
Wenum 1995; Kim 1995). Studies that take up negotiations between state
governments and MNCs tend to be descriptive (Gersanliter 1990; Sherman
1994; Chapman, Elhance, and Wenum 1995; Kim 1995). In this regard,
Yanarella and Green's edited volume (1990) stands out as an exception, but
its authors have tended to be varied in their research and conclusions. This
chapter focuses on the issue of state-MNC negotiation as a way to account
for the various issues in this diverse literature.
The research for this study draws from the Kentucky state government's
experience negotiating with Toyota Motor Corporation to establish its
Georgetown plant, a headquarters for Toyota Motor Manufacturing, North
America in Erlanger (fig. 3.1), and proposed construction of a parts distribu-
tion center for Toyota Motor Sales in Hebron, but it also draws from the
lessons of other negotiations between state governments and MNCs. FDI by
the automotive industry has been chosen for two reasons. First, automotive
investment is large scale, involving significant costs to the investor as well as
to the state inviting that investment. Because of the perceived benefits to state
economies and economic development policies from automotive investment,2
state government officials are willing to engage in serious negotiations with
corporations. MNCs, for their part, have incentives to bargain for conces-
sions that will alleviate their costs. Second, because the results of those nego-
tiations are likely to have a variety of impacts on state and local economies
and communities, they tend to have high profiles. As a result, a great deal of
journalistic and scholarly literature has been produced on this topic, which
allows the researcher to reach accurate conclusions about the negotiating
process.
THE MODEL
The core of Putnam's (1988) framework consists of the argument that nego-
tiators of international agreements must negotiate on two levels simulta-
neously.3 On what he called Level 1, negotiators from each state bargain with
each other across the table. On what he called Level 2, Level 1 negotiators
must then bargain with key agencies and constituencies within their own
governments and societies to secure ratification of the agreement made at
Level 1. Ratification may consist of a formal vote on a Level 1 agreement by
Toyota's North American
Headquarters
• Urban Service Area
_J Areas of Interest
Fig. 3.1: Erianger: Toyota's North American headquarters.
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a legislature or executive body or may consist of a de facto acceptance or veto
by key constituencies not formally part of a formal ratification process.
Based on this understanding, Putnam introduces the idea of win set:
"the set of all possible Level I agreements that would 'win'—that is gain the
necessary majority among constituents—when simply voted up or down" by
Level 2 actors (p. 437). Level 1 agreements are tentative until ratified: Putnam
observes that "the only formal constraint on the ratification process is that
since the identical agreement must be ratified by both sides, a preliminary
Level I agreement cannot be amended at Level II without reopening the Level
I negotiations" (p. 437). The Level 2 win set thus determines the success of
international agreements.
This is significant because the sizes of win sets affect the ability of Level
1 negotiators to effect an agreement. The larger the range of acceptable out-
comes, the greater the possibility for agreement. Yet, Putnam argues that Level
2 coalitions and their preferences, as well as Level 2 institutions, affect the
size of the win set. In general, the more intransigent are Level 2 preferences
for no agreement or a substantially modified one, and the more Level 2 insti-
tutions' ratification roles are formalized, the smaller that side's Level 1 win
set. Homogeneity v. heterogeneity of preferences among Level 2 ratifiers, dif-
ferences in constituencies' participation rates, and the ability of Level 1 nego-
tiators to make side payments are also factors. This is a significant feature in
this chapter because the organizational structures that link each side's Level 1
and Level 2 actors differ. I argue that difference greatly affects the scope of
win sets.
Putnam's model, despite its utility in analyzing links between domestic
and international politics, focuses on endogenous factors.4 Because its focus
is on state-state negotiations, it ignores structural characteristics of the inter-
national system. This paper must inevitably deal with structural characteris-
tics of the political system (largely the United States, for our purposes here) in
which state governments operate when they conduct negotiations with out-
side actors such as MNCs. At the risk of inelegance, this paper adds an addi-
tional level of analysis, Level 3, to encompass those environmental
characteristics that condition state government-MNC negotiations.
Level 3: Structural Characteristics of State Government-MNC
Negotiations
In the case at hand, the primary objective of state-MNC negotiations is to
agree on a site for the MNC's facility. Other issues are negotiated as well, but
these are usually consequences of the main negotiations over a suitable site.
These negotiations have a number of important features.
First, the bargaining game discussed here takes place in an environment
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characterized by severe competition in an anarchic system. A large number of
states engage in competitive bidding in which there is little or no incentive to
cooperate or coordinate decision making. Given the economic transnationalism
that lies behind the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), if any-
thing, states in Canada and Mexico add to the number of potential competi-
tors.5 Moreover, in an industry like automobiles or machine tools, the number
of major corporate players is limited. In such an environment, states perceive
their efforts to bring in a large multinational, the Toyota case is a good ex-
ample, as a zero-sum competition.
The anarchic environment is abetted, even created, by the lack of
suprastate organization that could promote cooperation or coordination of
state investment policies. The federal government has largely left FDI poli-
cies, except in certain cases involving national security, to the states them-
selves. That is not to say, however, that the federal government is irrelevant in
state economic development issues, and specifically it does not mean that it is
irrelevant in fostering a climate, conducive or not, in which states attempt to
attract FDI. There is general agreement in the literature from the 1980s on
Japanese direct investment in the United States that the threat of protectionist
policies at the federal level was an important pull factor inducing Japanese
firms to invest in the United States. Simply, the federal government does nothing
deliberate to affect specific MNC decisions to locate in particular states. The
impact of federal nonpolicy is highlighted if we look at national government
decisions concerning FDI across the industrial democracies. First, there is a
range of host government policies concerning FDI (Bailey, Harte, and Sugden
1996), and host governments with unitary systems have attempted to guide
FDI into particular regions in accordance with national priorities (Han 1994).
In such an environment, MNCs will be able to choose among states
when deciding on a location. Indeed, they have fifty states from which to
choose, more if we add the impact of NAFTA. Nissan Motors reportedly
considered thirty-four states in its initial search for a site for the plant it even-
tually built in Smyrna, Tennessee; a Nissan supplier considered nineteen be-
fore it decided to locate in that state (Kim 1995, 54).
State constitutions represent another potential environmental obstacle
to state attempts to recruit outside investment. A number of constitutions,
Kentucky's included, place strict limits on levels and types of state debt and
other schemes that can be used to promote private sector investment (Green
1990).
This environment affects how the states' Level 1 actors approach their
MNC counterparts and in turn how those counterparts enter negotiations.
First, the state government acts as supplicant, asking the MNC to locate a
facility within its borders instead of in some other state. State governments,
of course, have no power to coerce MNCs into investing in their states. In the
typical case the MNC announces its intention to establish a plant or other
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facility in the host country, and in turn state government executives respond
with invitations to look at the state, begin preparations on incentives pack-
ages, and so on. Former governor Martha Layne Collins's trip to Japan to
plead Kentucky's case before Toyota is not exceptional. Former Tennessee
governor Lamar Alexander and former Ohio governor James Rhodes had
made similar trips to court Japanese automobile manufacturers (Gelsanliter
1990; Kim 1995).
Second, states are immobile, while their MNC counterparts are not. States
cannot move to adjust to changing economic realities; MNCs can and do.*
Significantly, MNC decisions on a single facility, while potentially very im-
portant to the state, are but one of many decisions about facilities around the
world. While states may be focused on one automotive or other operation,
MNCs tend to see things in terms of a broader global corporate strategy. In
1995, for example, a year before Toyota announced it would establish its
North American operations subsidiary in Erlanger, its chairman announced
the company's plans to establish manufacturing plants in China, Vietnam,
Mexico, and other countries. The driving force behind this international ex-
pansion was the recognition of a prolonged slump in demand in Japan's do-
mestic market (Gurobaruka wo Sekkyoku Suishin 1995).
Third, state governments have a limited range of incentives they can
offer MNCs. The literature on MNC site selection, moreover, demonstrates
that state incentives packages tend to be homogeneous (see, for example,
Yanarella and Green 1995; Kim 1995; Chapman, Elhance, and Wenum 1995).
At most, the literature suggests that states may lose FDI by having too nega-
tive policies (Hollerman 1981). Furthermore, many issues that affect site se-
lection—geography, climate, labor force, and proximity to markets and
transportation arteries—are either beyond state government control or diffi-
cult to adjust to suit MNC needs in the short run.
Finally, it is not at all clear that even these homogeneous, often limited
financial incentives have much impact on inducing MNCs to choose one state
over another. Chernotsky (1983, 48) found that financial incentives ranked
low in German and Japanese companies' decisions to locate in Charlotte,
North Carolina. Interviews (Potter 1999) and other literature (Yanarella and
Green 1990; Han 1994; Kim 1995) essentially confirm this. Dunning (1986)
found that in Britain grant incentives to induce Japanese MNCs to locate in
certain areas were not viewed by the companies as serious considerations
when deciding on sites but were more important to them once they had made
the decision to locate.
We can clearly see the effects of this environmental configuration in the
pattern of negotiations that led to Kentucky's initial agreement with Toyota
for the Georgetown plant. Following the latter's July 1985 announcement
that it planned to open new plants in the United States and Canada, officials
from seventeen states appealed to the company to locate within their borders:
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nearly every Midwest and Southern state was represented (Toyota Koujou
Zehi 1985). Every Canadian state applied for the future Ontario plant as
well. Claiming that such a process would avoid suspicion of favoritism or
unfairness, Toyota announced in August that it would follow a process of
"open bidding" (koukai nyusatsu) from prospective states and municipalities
to decide on its plant sites. In a questionnaire it sent to each prospective
government, it asked if land, electricity, water, roads, and incentives packages
would be available (Koukai Nyuusatsu de Kettei 1985). In the initial stages
of negotiation, therefore, prospective Level 1 state negotiators had every rea-
son to stake out as large win sets as possible. That former governor Collins
was willing to invest as much as the state eventually did to secure an agree-
ment, much criticized for being the largest incentives package paid to a MNC
at the time, becomes understandable if we consider the Level 3 constraints
and the subsequent structuring of opening negotiations they afforded Toyota.
RATIFICATION: LEVEL 2 ABILITY ON EACH SIDE TO MODIFY
LEVEL 1 AGREEMENTS
A structural asymmetry of accountability exists between Level 1 and Level 2
players in state-MNC negotiations. The ratification of the agreement with
Toyota concerning its Georgetown plant is instructive in this regard. Gover-
nors, who because of the entrepreneurial nature of game initiation tend to be
the key Level 1 negotiators, are elected officials whose careers depend on
pleasing their coalition constituencies. Moreover, governors must answer to
their state legislatures, whose members are in turn responsible to their con-
stituents, to local governments, and sometimes to the courts. Finally, local
governments (if they weren't already in the race) must be persuaded to accept
the new industrial site.
Moreover, Level 1 and Level 2 parties in the states tend to have different
views of the benefits of FDI. Level 1 executives tend to see foreign investment
solely in terms of economic benefits: employment, economic and technologi-
cal development, etc. Level 2 ratifiers in the site communities tend to see not
only the economic benefits but also social disadvantages: increased traffic
and pollution, transformation of small-town lifestyle, and so on.
Local governments can also impede ratification because they have pow-
ers over local zoning ordinances and local corporate taxes, and, of course,
they must represent those people in the state most likely to be directly af-
fected by the introduction of a major industrial site (Gelsanliter 1990; Sherman
1994).
Furthermore, barriers to entry during the ratification phase are low, which
makes it easy for opponents of Level 1 agreements to slow down, if not stop,
ratification. The Georgetown case is instructive: national actors (i.e., Ralph
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Nader and the National Building Construction Trades Union) involved them-
selves in, respectively, a suit before the state Supreme Court to prevent the
state from using public moneys for the incentives package and negotiations
to alter the conditions of construction contracting. Yanarella and Reid (1990)
argue that local opposition to the Georgetown plant site failed because it was
neither politically nor organizationally united. In this case, we may say that
structural characteristics blunted the opposition's efforts. Yet Yanarella and
Green take it for granted—and this is the key point—that plant site oppo-
nents would participate.
Japanese corporate Level 1 negotiators, on the other hand, face different
relations with their Level 2 ratifiers. Internally, corporations are not demo-
cratic and are under no obligation to report their actions to the public. They
are certainly not legally accountable to their own publics nor to those of the
states in which they wish to locate. Barriers to entry of actors outside the
industry group, therefore, are high. Keiretsu stakeholders, such as allied banks,
labor unions, supplier firms, affiliated corporations, and stockholders, may
be important Level 2 ratifiers, but the keiretsu structure and especially enter-
prise unionism largely internalize the relationship between levels. Given their
tendency to view credit decisions involving keiretsu partners from the long-
term perspective, banks are not likely to seriously challenge a manufacturer's
decision to locate overseas. This would have been especially true during the
bubble economy era of the late 1980s when huge capital surpluses and the
hollowing out of Japanese industry made it particularly attractive for banks
to lend for overseas projects.
Of course, many Japanese suppliers will tend to follow their main manu-
facturer. For them, relocation rather than opposition to the MNC's move
overseas is their main choice. Kim (1995) points out that the Nissan supplier
mentioned above moved to the Smyrna area to locate near other firms within
the industry group. For others, however, the relocation of a main manufac-
turer overseas means loss of a customer. In the mid-1980s, for example, Toyota
had to worry about the impact of potential American suppliers if its Japanese
subcontractors were to move en masse into the United States. Given the eco-
nomic frictions between the two countries at the time, Toyota decided to
establish tie-ups with American suppliers and correspondingly limit the num-
ber of subcontractors it would take with it to Kentucky. (Toyota, Taibei
Shinshutsu Chousei ni Nayamu 1985.)7 Unlike the situation facing Kentucky
negotiators, opposition to Toyota's win set from local business would be in-
ternalized.
Similarly, enterprise unions are unlikely to publicly oppose management
decisions to relocate abroad. In the Toyota case, the union was notably quiet
about the decision to locate in Kentucky, with the president of the All-Toyota
Labor Federation publicly on record that the move was unavoidable and that
the federation would negotiate simply to maintain employment levels within
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the Toyota group {Bei-shinshutsu de Roudoujouken Hyoujunka 1985). This
is in contrast to the vocal effort the National Building Construction Trades
Union, which was organized with national level help, mounted to alter the
deal (see Gelsanliter 1990). In sum, a major Japanese corporation is in a
position to internalize potential Level 2 opposition to a move in ways no
American state government can match. In particular, while this is not likely to
be directly relevant to a specific negotiation with a particular state, it cer-
tainly means that MNC Level 1 negotiators are free of Level 2 ratifiers who
can force no agreement.
It is possible for interlevel negotiations across the table to occur in a
two-level bargaining game, a situation referred to as reverberation (Putnam
1988,454-56; Schoppa 1997, 32-34). Level 1 negotiators attempt to expand
their counterpart's win set by persuasion or threats targeted at the counterpart's
Level 2 constituents. Honda's efforts to sell the local community on its
Marysville site and Toyota's use of a senior American executive to negotiate
with sympathetic Georgetown officials (Gersanliter 1990) are examples of
this kind of tactic. Since 1986 Toyota's efforts to portray itself as a positive
contributor to the commonwealth's economic and social life can be under-
stood as a continual use of a reverberation strategy. It strikes me that this is
critical for the MNC in its negotiations with state governments because it
proposes to move into the state's jurisdiction. As a result, it has an incentive
to assist the state's efforts to win ratification from local communities. More
important to the MNC, because of its site decision, in future negotiations the
state's Level 2 ratifiers will become the MNC's Level 2 ratifiers as well.
The bargaining stakes change when site location negotiations become
an iterative game. Assuming a satisfactory first investment, a MNC may be
inclined to invest capital in a new facility in the state again. Essentially, this
reduces the competition from other states and correspondingly expands the
MNC's win set. Consequently, a state should have less incentive to provide
special benefits to a MNC to induce it to invest. The MNC in turn should
perceive advantages, such as reduction of transaction costs, that offset the
potential state concessions. For example, Toyota's siting of its North Ameri-
can headquarters in Erlanger in 1996 followed the establishment of the
Georgetown plant by a decade.
This hypothesis is largely confirmed in the Erlanger and Hebron cases.
Partly, the decision on subsequent sites is conditioned by the initial agree-
ment. In Toyota's case, northern Kentucky is a likely spot for headquarters
and parts distribution facilities because it is close to sister facilities in Indiana,
West Virginia, and Kentucky. So, however, is southern Ohio, which would be
somewhat closer to the Ontario, Canada, plant. Toyota appears to have de-
cided that northern Kentucky was its preferred site early on, before it entered
into negotiations with state and county officials. As observed in the discus-
sion of state Level 1 bargaining resources, representatives from both the Eco-
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nomic Development Cabinet (EDC) and Toyota characterized the state in-
centives package for the Erlanger deal as "icing on the cake," and which, the
EDC was at some pains to explain, did not involve direct cash transfers to the
company (Boyer 1996; Carfagno 1996). On the other hand, Toyota was care-
ful not to commit to the Erlanger site until it had agreed with the EDC on an
incentives package. One respondent interviewed for this paper indicated that
had the incentives package been unacceptable to Toyota, it would have seri-
ously considered sites out of state. Similarly, Ohio and Kentucky were pub-
licly in competition for the Hebron site in the months before the December
17,1998, announcement that Hebron had been chosen.8
A significant feature of iterative investment bargaining games, exempli-
fied by Toyota's negotiations over the Erlanger and Hebron sites, is that the
Level 1 actors change. The governor acted as Kentucky's Level 1 negotiator
in the initial negotiations for the Georgetown site in 1985. Local govern-
ments served initially as Level 2 ratifiers, then as Level 1 negotiators in the
series of collateral negotiations that ensued once ratification had been se-
cured. In the negotiations for the Erlanger and Hebron sites, negotiations
followed the jurisdictional pattern seen in the Georgetown case. The EDC
was involved in the early stages when Toyota requested financial incentives.
But site decisions and local incentives fall under local jurisdiction. In the
Erlanger case, Toyota ended up bargaining with Boone County and the City
of Erlanger, both of which claimed jurisdiction over the site, and the Tri-
County Economic Development Corporation (TriEd). One respondent referred
to the latter organization as a "facilitator" in negotiations between munici-
palities and outside investors, a definition which sidesteps neat placement in
Putnam's framework. Distinguishing Level 1 from Level 2 in the latter phase
is not as straightforward as a nation state-centric model of negotiation would
suggest.
The Erlanger site presented its own difficulties since it straddles a county
line. Because the property, formerly owned by Cincinnati Bell Telephone, lies
predominantly in Boone County, Toyota entered into negotiations with Boone
County for incentives and other arrangements. Kenton County, in which the
remainder of property lies, can be seen as a Level 2 ratifier. As it turned out,
however, the building Toyota proposed to use is located mostly in Kenton
County, within the city limits of Erlanger. As such, the city could expect to
impose its gross receipts tax on Toyota earnings posted at that facility: the tax
would have been high because all of Toyota's North American receipts would
have been posted there. In the final phases of the negotiations, therefore, the
City of Erlanger became a Level 1 player in the bargaining over tax structure
and levels, while contenting itself with the role of Level 2 ratifier of the whole
deal. (It is the author's impression that the City of Erlanger was not opposed
to the Toyota decision in principle.)
The change in the bargaining game can also be noted in the quiescence
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of potential Level 2 ratifiers in the Erlanger and Hebron siting cases. There is
a progression from high opposition to the Georgetown plant following a high
profile negotiation between governor and Toyota, to lower profile state-TriEd-
county negotiations with Toyota over its Erlanger site, followed again by low
profile negotiations over the Hebron parts plant site. The latter two engen-
dered almost no public opposition. In part, scope of Level 2 participation was
less than in the Georgetown case. Because the negotiations over the Erlanger
site involved location of a national headquarters in an existing facility, issues
the National Building Construction Trades Union had cited in its campaign
during the ratification of the Georgetown plant did not arise. In any event, it
did not send national representatives to northern Kentucky.9
Similarly, no local environmental opposition organized. This may be
due to three factors. First, northern Kentucky already has a fair number of
manufacturing firms in the region. Second, both the Erlanger and Hebron
sites were already zoned for commercial use. A significant difference in the
ratification processes of the two Toyota decisions probably lies in this distinc-
tion. Toyota in 1986 proposed to establish a major manufacturing facility in
a largely rural county, with significant local impacts. In 1996, it proposed to
take over an existing building complex in a northern Kentucky industrial
park to establish its North American subsidiary's headquarters. The appre-
ciable social and environmental impact of substituting Toyota for Cincinnati
Bell at that site would be difficult to determine.10 Area staked out by orga-
nized interests as environmentally sensitive or of significant historical value
was not involved. Finally, significant local interests in the form of the TriEd
and county government (Boone, at least in the headquarters decision; Kenton
and Erlanger effectively became Level 2 ratifiers because of the zoning mix-
up) were incorporated into Level 1 bargaining. In sum, concocting overlap-
ping win sets between local authorities and the corporation was eased by the
absence of any local constituency committed to no-agreement (i.e., the status
quo before Toyota announced its decision).
CONCLUSION
We should be aware that an iterative game changes the dynamics of MNC-
government negotiations, but certain characteristics persist. Municipalities
are no more mobile than state governments. The possibility that Toyota might
locate its North American headquarters in a nearby state was publicly bruited
during all three negotiations. Toyota's preliminary structuring work—in par-
ticular it used TriEd offices to assist in the location of suitable sites in north-
ern Kentucky without divulging its identity in the early stages of its site
search—means that it will enter a negotiation with a local government with
an information advantage. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the
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structural asymmetry of accountability between government and MNCs does
not affect win sets. The fact that there has been little or no public opposition
to Toyota's direct investments in northern Kentucky does not preclude the
possibility that there could have been. While Toyota might have taken such
opposition into account in expanding its win set to include fewer incentives
or to meet demands for local or union participation in construction contracts
(which it did in the Georgetown case), it would not be legally obliged to
factor in Level 2 opposition in ways that local governments would.
Finally, how local governments negotiate and the kinds of incentives
packages they can offer does not seem to be a significant factor for Japanese
MNCs. One respondent who had observed the negotiations over the Erlanger
site noted that incentives packages were fairly low on Toyota's list of location
criteria. A bigger factor cited by local officials was the Greater Cincinnati/
Northern Kentucky International Airport. While Toyota did receive economic
incentives, including a reduced gross receipts tax from the City of Erlanger,
no one suggests that such enticements alone will sway a MNC in favor of one
community over another.
NOTES
1. Not surprisingly, the Japanese literature on this topic has tended to fo-
cus on economic issues as they affect Japanese MNCs and the Japanese economy
(see, for example, Morita 1992; Minamoto 1992) and on FDI in Asia (Horaguchi
1992).
2. See, for example, University of Michigan 1998. This is the case not only in
the United States but worldwide. See Bennett and Sharpe 1985; Jenkins 1987; Doner
1991. Even in this literature, however, the focus has of necessity been on the negotia-
tions between national governments and MNCs.
3. Putnam allowed for the possibility that subnational or private sector nego-
tiations might have this dual character as well, which point is explored in this paper,
but he chose to concentrate his analysis on international negotiations.
4. In subsequent research, some attempt has been made to consider environ-
mental factors. See Evans, Jacobsen, and Putnam 1993.
5. A startling example of the impact of NAFTA on interstate competition can
be found in an anecdote cited by Fry (1998): In 1995, a delegation from the Mexican
state of Baja California Norte went to South Korea to try to persuade a major corpo-
ration from that country to locate a television parts plant in the Tijuana area. The
delegation was accompanied by the California secretary of trade and commerce, who
supported the proposal. The California government calculated that it was better to
have a large maquiladora operation just across the border, with attendant economic
spillover benefits, than to have the same plant locate to another state in the Midwest
or South.
6. Thomas (1997) argues that capital mobility is the factor that most signifi-
cantly impairs host governments when they negotiate with MNCs.
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7. A 1990 interview conducted at a die cast metal manufacturer in northern
Japan tends to confirm this view of the "internationalization" of small and medium-
sized businesses in Japan. The company had recently set up a manufacturing opera-
tion in Rizal, the Philippines. When queried as to the company's decision to locate
there, the president responded that "we didn't decide to locate there, it was decided
for us" when the company's major customer, Mitsui, had established a facility in the
province.
8. Respondents from the Kentucky side, perhaps somewhat wishfully, observed
that the company did not seriously consider possible sites in Cincinnati. Toyota's
willingness to stay in state, according to respondents on both sides of the negotia-
tions, is due to Toyota's desire to maintain a relationship with the commonwealth.
9. One interview respondent did note that Toyota has worked with that union
since 1986 when contracting for new construction.
10. A typical example of the attention paid to the latter decision was a report in
a local newspaper that the City of Erlanger was interested in attracting a Japanese
restaurant to the area.
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The Geography of
Toyota Motor Manufacturing
Corporation
UNRYU SUGANUMA
THE WORLD AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY is in transition. In the Euro-
pean and North American continents, the merger of Germany's Daimler-Benz
and American Chrysler on May 6,1998, created the world's fifth largest car
maker (The Economist 9 May 1998). In Asia, the currency crisis and many
consecutive years of economic recession in Japan, as well as the banking cri-
sis, have had an impact on the auto industry. In March 2000 Daimler-Chrysler
offered to take over 34 percent of shares of Mitsubishi Motor Corporation,
effectively bringing the firm under the umbrella of one of the world's leading
automakers. Renault SA of France has already acquired a 36.8 percent stake
in Nissan Motor Company. Ford Motor Company has acquired a 33.4 per-
cent stake in Mazda Motor Corporation, and Fuji Heavy Industries has agreed
to let General Motors (GM) Corporation take a 20 percent stake. After
Mitsubishi Motor Corporation joins Daimler-Chrysler group, the only Japa-
nese automakers without foreign capital investment will be Honda Motor
Company and the Toyota group.
Toyota Motor Corporation (TMC) remains profitable even with the Japa-
nese economy in its worst shape since World War II. TMC had the highest
profit margin of any Japanese company for the fiscal year ending in March
1998 (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 27 June 1998). Moreover, the World Invest-
ment Report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
ranks TMC as seventh in overseas assets among one hundred multinational
corporations (Sankei Shimbun 11 November 1998). In fact, TMC seems to
be the only Japanese multinational corporation to enjoy its vibrant status in
production and sales (fig. 4.1) and ranks third among the major world
automakers (fig. 4.2).
Why is Toyota doing so well? The answer to this question provides the
context for a geographic analysis of the company. Throughout the evolution
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Domestic Production
Domestic Sales
Export Shipment
Overseas Production
Note: Regarding overseas production, the record before 1984 is not printed because
of the difference from present statistical classification.
Fig. 4.1: Toyota: Domestic and overseas production, domestic sales and export,
1965-1997. (Source: Toyota Motor Corporation, 1998)
of Toyota, from a tiny family business to a multinational corporation, many
members of the Toyoda1 clan have contributed to the development of the
long-term geostrategic vision of the company. TMC has overcome numerous
problems, including the Japanese-U.S. economic conflict and trade problems,
and geo-economic considerations have led Toyota to develop a global expan-
sion strategy. In the twenty-first century, it appears that Toyota will continue
to remain the top automaker in the world.
EVOLUTION OF A JAPANESE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION
Toyota Motor Company was established in 1937, and Toyota Motor Sales
Company was established in 1950. These two companies merged in 1982 to
form the Toyota Motor Corporation (TMC). To consider the legacy of Toyota,
two persons must be noted: one is Kiichiro Toyoda (hereafter Kiichiro), the
founder of TMC, and the other is Sakichi Toyoda (hereafter Sakichi), Kiichiro's
father, who provided the ideology behind TMC, or Toyotaism. Toyota's his-
tory started during Sakichi's era. Sakichi was born during the Japanese era of
modernization when the Meiji government came to power (1868). Because a
number of the leaders of the new Meiji government dedicated themselves to
the enormous task of transforming Japan into a modern nation and catching
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Note: The figure excludes recent mergers, such as Daimler-Benz and Chrysler as
well as others.
Fig. 4.2. Production of major world automobile manufacturers, 1998. (Source:Toyota
Motor Corporation, 1999)
up with the West, the timing could not have been better for ambitious entre-
preneurs, including inventors and investors. Both the rapid influence of in-
dustrial products from Europe and the United States and the open door policy
to the West allowed many individual entrepreneurs to realize that moderniza-
tion of the national industries was critically important. Sakichi was one of
those people in Japan. He had a great business talent with considerable vi-
sionary power with respect to invention; he developed many useful devices
during his life. At age twenty-three (1890), he developed his first invention, a
hand loom, or manually operated loom, which was ignored by the small-
scale Japanese textile business community. In April 1895, Sakichi was recog-
nized as one of the ten most influential inventors in the nation over the previous
one hundred years by the Japanese Patent Office. Since J. Kay, L. Pole, and
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Toyota City, situated in the middle of Aichi prefecture in east-central Japan, lies in a
region where the Mikawa Heights slope down to the flatland of the Mikawa Plain.
Formed around the fertile basin of the Yahagi River, the city is the birthplace and
namesake of Toyota Motor Corporation. With a population of 348,532, Toyota City is
first and foremost an automotive metropolis. Toyota is to Japan much like its sister
city Detroit is to the United States. Toyota has production companies in more than
twenty-five countries. Foreign subsidiaries ensure production and supply are in line
with regional demand and stimulate employment and parts procurement to pro-
mote local economic development. (Photograph by P.P. Karan)
J. Wyatt in 1733 and R. Arkwright in 1769 had already contributed their
inventions of similar machines to the British textile industry, Japanese enter-
prise was evidently one hundred years behind the European countries.
Despite this, however, Sakichi changed the history of the world textile
industry. With suggestions from his friends, he went into the weaving busi-
ness. In 1889, along with his partners, Sakichi opened a textile mill fitted
with steam-powered looms, which increased productivity fourfold and re-
duced costs by more than 50 percent (Toyota Motor Corporation 1988). At
the same time, Mitsui and Company expressed an interest in marketing
Sakichi's steam-powered looms. But Sakichi dissolved his previous business,
Toyoda Shokai, and established Toyoda's Loom Works (1907) with capital of
¥1 million. With capital of more than ¥1 million, Toyoda's Loom Works was
considered a large-scale enterprise, having the same capital as Mitsui Com-
pany. In 1918, Sakichi formed Toyoda Spinning and Weaving Company with
capital of ¥5 million. Even today, Toyoda Spinning and Weaving continues to
flourish as one of the fifteen core corporations in the TMC group.
Disturbed by the number of Western machines used in his mills, Sakichi
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asserted, "By using Japanese brains and arms, I will make a great Japanese
product which is better than those of the West" (Toyota Jidosha Kogyo
Kabushiki Kaisha Shashi Henshu Iinkai 1968,3). Eventually, in 1926, Sakichi
invented an automatic loom with the highest international standards. How-
ever, he paid a price in order to concentrate on the invention of the power
loom and later described the tough time: "Apart from food and clothes, I
also needed money for my research and my projects. It seems like serious
inventors always end up being poor and being cut off from others; some-
times they even get persecuted. It is as if an inventor has to have his fill of
hardship before he can fulfill his ambitions" (Toyota Motor Corporation
1988,26).
Platt Brothers from the United Kingdom, then the world's largest maker
of spinning and weaving machinery, approached Sakichi with an offer to pur-
chase the patent rights. Three years after Sakichi's invention of the automatic
loom, Kiichiro, his son, went to England to negotiate with Platt Brothers.
Both sides reached an agreement with a price of £100,000, which ultimately
became the research fund of TMC (Toyota Jidosha Hanbai Kabushiki Kaisha
Shashi Henshu Iinkai 1971). Sakichi died in 1930, a year after he sold the
patent rights to the Europeans. He never saw the first Toyota automobile.
As an inventor, Sakichi was interested in technology. When Sakichi trav-
eled to the United States in 1910, he witnessed the power of western technol-
ogy, in particular the automobile. Sakichi entrusted his dream of making an
automobile to Kiichiro. After the Kanto earthquake in 1923, Japan imported
a number of buses from overseas for the rescue mission. Sakichi told Kiichiro,
"human beings must at least accomplish an undertaking. I spent my life in-
venting a spinning machine. Son! For the sake of society, you have to accom-
plish one thing. How about making an automobile" (Toyota Jidosha Kogyo
Kabushiki Kaisha 1959, 10). Kiichiro had inherited his father's dream and
had been inspired by his father's achievements in the textile industry. Funded
by the £100,000 from his father's invention, he immediately began research-
ing small gasoline-powered engines. Kiichiro believed that the Japanese auto-
mobile industry someday would be the best in the world, just as Sakichi had
invented a world-class automatic spinning machine (Aichi Toyota Jidosha
Kabushiki Kaisha Shashi Henshushitsu 1970).
Those working under Sakichi also helped fulfill his conviction by apply-
ing his basic doctrine regarding management after his death. Kiichiro later
codified these ideas. On the sixth anniversary of Sakichi's death (1936), Kiichiro
declared them the principles of Toyota. Toyotaism contains the following five
principles.
1. Contribute to the development and welfare of the country by
working together, regardless of position (i.e., both management
and labor), faithfully in one's duties.
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2. Be the vanguard of the times through endless creativity, inquisitive-
ness, and pursuit of improvement.
3. Be practical, and avoid frivolity.
4. Be kind and generous; strive to create a warm, homelike (i.e.,
family) atmosphere.
5. Be reverent to Shintoism and Buddhism, and show gratitude for
things great and small in thought and deed (Toyota Jidosha
Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha 1979, 29; Toyota Motor Corporation
1988,38).
The fundamental management style of both TMC and its suppliers, as well as
affiliates, is currently based on these five principles, which have been handed
down to the present generation, serving as guidelines for policies and activi-
ties. By examining Toyotaism, one can conclude that these principles reflect
Japan's national policies during the Meiji era, such as "wealthy nation, strong
army" and "industry development."
The first principle of Toyotaism emphasizes the solidarity relationship
between management and labor by creating a single power in the industry. To
create successful business eventually led to dedication to the nation. To achieve
a successful business and to keep stability in the group, Toyotaism stresses
that management-labor relations should be harmonious, one of the funda-
mental cultural elements in Japanese society (Sato 1988). In fact, the ideas of
cooperation and harmony are heavily colored by the elements of Confucian-
ism (Benedict 1946).
Regarding the second principle of Toyotaism, the creative and research
mind for the future generation of automobile has been another theme behind
Toyota's business. Today, slogans such as "good product and good idea"
(Toyota Jidosha Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha 1979,182), "high quality and high
performance" (Ibid., 495), and "building low-priced, high-quality vehicles"
(Toyota Motor Corporation 1988,67) reflect the second principle of Toyotaism.
The harmony principle also mirrors both the third and fourth principles
for the individual spirit at work. Therefore, one should keep splendor. At the
same time, one has to have a life of simplicity and fortitude. Since Toyota
originated as a family business, the family atmosphere has remained essential
for successful management. At work, one should highlight a family atmo-
sphere with a warmhearted and friendly spirit. This family cooperation and
harmony atmosphere is the most important theme for the successful business
of Toyota. Even the catch phrase of the current Toyota pamphlet emphasizes
the word harmony by stating, "Harmony between people, society, and the
environment" with a subtitle "Our goal is to be 'the good corporate citizen'
in the international community (Toyota Motor Corporation 1998d, 1)."
Similar to the ideas of "cooperation" and "harmony," religion—
Shintoism and Buddhism—is another crucial essence of Toyotaism (covered
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by the fifth principle). In other words, to gain the cooperation of the workforce,
Toyota has used the strategy of unifying people into a single group by codify-
ing religious beliefs.
Based on Toyotaism, Kiichiro began the process of making an automo-
bile. When Kiichiro traveled to England by way of the United States to con-
clude negotiations with Platt Brothers, Japan did not have a single automobile.
The first automobile appeared on Japanese soil when Mr. Thompson, an
American who lived in Yokohama, imported a locomobile-steam automobile
from the United States in April 1900. Until Shintaro Yoshida completed Japan's
first gasoline-powered automobile, whose engine was brought from the United
States in 1907, the Japanese automobile industry did not exist (Toyota Jidosha
Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha Shashi Henshu Iinkai 1968). In fact, many Japanese
pioneers were hampered by the fact that the parts and machinery industries
were not developed sufficiently and remained family enterprises. After his
stimulating travel across the United States, Kiichiro was determined to make
automobiles in Japan, and he changed the history of the industry.
Unlike Sakichi, Kiichiro studied mechanical engineering at Tokyo Impe-
rial University and received the finest technical education. His knowledge of
engineering directly contributed to the success of his automobile business.
Kiichiro believed that advanced technical knowledge was useful only if one
first mastered the practical technology of the shop floor, an attitude he inher-
ited from his father (Toyota Jidosha Hanbai Kabushiki Kaisha Shashi Henshu
Iinkai 1971). He struggled to master the technologies required for auto manu-
facture and visited companies selling auto parts and machine tool makers.
Fortunately for Kiichiro, the expansion of GM and Ford in Japan during the
end of the 1920s provided a great knowledge resource, providing him the
know-how for setting up an auto assembly plant and other necessary infor-
mation to make automobiles. Despite the establishment of technical ties with
overseas makers and adoption of Western technology, conditions were not con-
ducive to fostering the Japanese automobile industry into the future. Instead,
Kiichiro believed that it was necessary to promote the development of basic
technology to produce an automobile that was suitable for conditions in Japan.
Kiichiro's dream gradually became a reality as Toyoda Automatic Loom
Works completed its first Model Al passenger car in 1935. Two years later,
Toyota Motor Company was established with a capital of ¥12 million.
Risaburo Toyoda (hereafter Risaburo), the adopted son of Sakichi, became
president, and Kiichiro was appointed executive vice president.
Initially, Toyota Motor Company consisted of seven departments: Ad-
ministration, Sales, Manufacturing, Engineering, Technical, Total Vehicle
Engineering Administration, and Research. During the 1930s, because of good
infrastructure and other convenient factors in the urban cities of Japan, Toyota
Motor Company selected three office locations, namely, Tokyo, Osaka, and
Nagoya (Toyota Motor Corporation 1988). From the early days, the leader-
Research & Lab
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Fig. 4.3. Toyota research and development centers in the world. (Source: Toyota Motor Corporation,
Tokyo)
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ship in Toyota emphasized research and development. At present Toyota's
research and development facilities are spread across the world in Asia, Eu-
rope, and North America (fig. 4.3). Kiichiro headed the Research Depart-
ment and advocated a policy of "building low-priced, high-quality vehicles."
He frequently stated, "If we don't build passenger cars, we will not be able to
develop any meaningful technology (Toyota Motor Corporation. 1988,74)."
Under the guidance of Kiichiro, the prototype Model AA passenger car began
to be produced for the general public. The Model AA was renamed the
Kokusan Toyota Go, meaning "the domestically produced Toyota," and be-
came the first automobile to use the Toyota name. The name Kokusan Toyota
Go symbolizes the realization of Sakichi's dream.
In short, Toyota originated from a family business and has evolved into
one of the major multinational corporations in the world. It is important to
note the link between the Toyota philosophy developed by Sakichi and the
successful business philosophy of TMC developed by Kiichiro. The linkage
led the successful family business of the Toyoda family to become an interna-
tional corporation. It is not an exaggeration to note that the Toyoda family is
one of Japanese revolutionaries who changed the landscape of not only the
automobile industry but also the national economy. Furthermore, it is not an
exaggeration to state that Toyota has contributed to transforming the world
landscape through the automobile.
THREE STAGES OF CORPORATE GROWTH
When Japan was defeated in World War II on August 15,1945, it was a day
for new beginnings for the Japanese automobile industry. Kiichiro stated,
"Catch up with America in three years. Otherwise the Japanese auto industry
will never stand on its own" (Ohno 1984,200). During Kiichiro's lifetime, he
had tirelessly tried to make the best automobile in Japan. Toyota developed
into a global corporation in three stages (fig. 4.4). The first stage emphasized
a strategy of crossing national space. The second stage stressed a strategy of
III. Global Business Strategy
Fig. 4.4. The three-stage development strategy of Toyota.
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crossing continental space and included two phases: expansion overseas-1
(concentration on exports) and expansion overseas-2 (establishment of pro-
duction plants). The third stage highlighted globalization strategy. Toyota
had no ambitious plan in the early stage (until 1950) to market its automo-
biles in Japan, as well as worldwide. Rather, Toyota was forced to search for
its own survival route through various factors, such as the Japanese-U.S. eco-
nomic conflict, the appreciation of Japanese currency, and the wave of glo-
balization.
The First Stage: A Cross-Nation-Space Strategy
The first stage of corporate growth was to expand the cross-nation-space
strategy by marketing products in Japan and in other nations around the
world. In other words, Toyota would blanket entire nations with its product.
After the first automobile was produced by Toyota Motor Company, the lead-
ership of the company began to target its network in the city of Nagoya in
Aichi prefecture. By creating a number of auto suppliers and affiliates, the
company formed a Toyota village that eventually became today's Toyota City.
In 1938, the first production plant (or Honsha Plant) was established. Toyota
did not build another production plant immediately. During the next twenty
years, leaders of Toyota concentrated on building its suppliers and affiliates
around the Honsha Plant in Aichi prefecture. Not until 1959 did Toyota Motor
Company decide to create a second production plant in Toyota City (table
4.1). By adding firms and expanding space around Toyota City, the funda-
mental base of the Toyota network, or keiretsu, was formed. Just as a spider
spins a web, Toyota spun its first stage of corporate growth strategy off its
web of many small firms that smoothly kept up the production plant. By
1989, some forty years after the establishment of the first production plant,
Toyota had created eleven additional production plants around Toyota City
(table 4.1 and fig. 4.5). Toyota dealerships were established in all prefectures
of Japan (fig. 4.6).
Three major points characterized the strategy of the first stage. First, the
network of auto suppliers was created. In order to make a high quality auto-
mobile, it was indispensable to have auto suppliers to support Toyota's pro-
duction. Second, several affiliates were built. It was necessary to provide
housing and entertainment facilities for Toyota's employees and their fami-
lies. As the philosophies of Toyotaism indicate, the family atmosphere of the
Toyota employee is one of the crucial factors for the success of Toyota's busi-
ness. Third, by webbing Toyota dealers, the company built a channel of dis-
tribution for its automobile all over Japan. As figure 4.6 indicates, most dealers
are concentrated in three urban prefectures, Nagoya, Tokyo, and Osaka, rather
than in other regions, such as Okinawa and Iwate prefectures. While the
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Fig. 4.5. Toyota: Employment in manufacturing plants in Japan, 1999. Toyota's
Georgetown plant resembles the Tsutsumi plant in Toyota City in layout and equip-
ment. {Source: Toyota Motor Corporation, Tokyo)
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Table 4.1 .Toyota facilities in Japan and operation years
Name of plant
Honsha Plant
Motomachi Plant
Kamigo Plant
Takaoka Plant
Miyoshi Plant
Tsutsumi Plant
Myochi Plant
Shimoyama Plant
Kinu-ura Plant
Tahara Plant
Teiho Plant
Hirose Plant
Toyota Motor
Kyushu, Inc.
Toyota Motor
Hokkaido, Inc.
Toyota Motor
Tohoku Co., Ltd.
Location of plant
Toyota City, Aichi Prefecture
Toyota City, Aichi Prefecture
Toyota City, Aichi Prefecture
Toyota City, Aichi Prefecture
Toyota City, Aichi Prefecture
Toyota City, Aichi Prefecture
Toyota City, Aichi Prefecture
Toyota City, Aichi Prefecture
Southwest Toyota City, Aichi Prefecture
Southern Toyota City, Aichi Prefecture
Toyota City, Aichi Prefecture
Toyota City, Aichi Prefecture
Fukuoka Prefecture
Southern Hokkaido
Tohoku Region, Miyagi Prefecture
Year
1938
1959
1965
1966
1968
1970
1973
1975
1978
1979
1986
1989
1992
1992
1998
Source: (Toyota 1999b, 4).
production plants are centralized in Toyota City, dealers are concentrated in
large urban cities throughout Japan.
As the second production plant opened in 1959, the leadership of Toyota
turned its cross-nation-space strategy to different countries on different con-
tinents worldwide. During the 1950s and 1960s, Toyota adopted nation-spe-
cific strategies to export automobiles after successfully networking in Japan
with targeted nations. To target foreign consumers and to gain market share,
Toyota Motor Sales (TMS) set up its export department to pioneer overseas
markets. As an independent sales company, TMS was created in April 1950
and was capitalized with ¥80 million.
The first substantial export order for the company came in February
1952 from Brazil, an order for one hundred Model FXL large trucks. Brazil
was a market with great potential; Toyota did not miss this opportunity. In
November 1955, TMS sent its first staff to Sao Paulo to set up an overseas
station to conduct various marketing activities, including a market survey
and appointment of distributors. Since Brazil is a developing country with
poor economic infrastructure (e.g., poor roads), TMS decided to market the
four-wheel-drive (4WD) Land Cruiser, which was mounted with a powerful
engine and had a rugged chassis, making it both powerful and able to with-
stand poor roads. Moreover, there were only two other vehicles—the Ameri-
Note: Figures for each prefecture
represent the number of
dealers marketing Toyota
vehicles.
Fig. 4.6. Toyota dealers marketing in Japan, 1999. Toyota has the most elaborate
dealer network in Japan. The company has tried to replicate the best parts of that
system in the United States—giving the dealers technical assistance, recruiting
black dealers, and paying special attention to women. Recognizing that in the United
States two thirds of new car purchases are made or influenced by women, Toyota
views women as deserving of particular attention. (Source: Toyota Motor Corpora-
tion, Tokyo)
Table 4.2. Toyota's overseas production companies (year of operation and employees)
Region Location Name of overseas production company; location of city
Latin America Brazil Toyota do Brasil S.S., Industria e Cornercio; Sao Paulo
Africa South Africa Toyota South Africa Motors (Pty.) Ltd.; Kwazulu-Natal
Oceania Australia Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd.; Jafarabad, Chaittagong
Asia Thailand Toyota Motor Thailand Co., Ltd.; Samut Prakan
Europe Portugal Salvador Caetono I.M.V.T., S.A.; Ovar
Asia Malaysia Assembly Services Sdn. Bhd.; Selangor, Darul Ehsan
Asia Indonesia P. T. Toyota-Astra Motor; Sunter II, Jakarta
North America U.S.A. TABC, Inc.; Long Beach, CA
Asia Thailand Thai Hino Industry Co., Ltd.; Samut Prakan
Africa Kenya Associated Vehicle Assemblers Ltd.; Mombasa
Latin America Ecuador Manufacturas Armadurias y Repuestos; Chia Cundinamarca
Asia Thailand Toyota Auto Body Thailand Co., Ltd.; Samut Prakan
Latin America Venezuela Toyota de Venezuela Compania Anonima; Cumana, State of Sucre
Asia Bangladesh Aftab Automobiles, Ltd.; Chittagong
North America U.S.A. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI); Fremont, Calif.
North America Canada Canadian Autoparts Toyota, Inc. (CAPTIN); Delta, B.C.
Asia Taiwan Kuozui Motors, Ltd.; Chung Li City
North America Canada Toyota Motor Manufacturing Canada, Inc.; Cambridge, Ontario
North America U.S.A. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. (TMMK)
Asia Philippines Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation; Pranaque, Metro Manila
Asia Thailand Siam Toyota Manufacturing Co., Ltd.; Chonburi
Asia China Shenyang Jimbei Passenger Vehicle Manufacturing Co., Ltd.; Shenyang
Latin America Colombia Sociedad de Fabricacion de Automotores S.A.; Cundinamarca
Europe U.K. Toyota Motor Manufacturing (UK) Ltd.; Derbyshire and Flintshire
Year
1959
1962
1963
1964
1968
1968
1970
1971
1972
1977
1979
1979
1981
1982
1984
1985
1986
1988
1988
1989
1989
1991
1991
1992
Employees
716
8261
4426
4249
1984
984
6001
492
659
364
400
111
930
88
4619
188
2462
2095
7696
1671
708
6445
1098
2905
c
c
Region Location Name of overseas production company; location of city
T & K Autoparts Sdn. Bhd.; Selangor, Darul Ehsan
Toyota Autoparts Philippines, Inc.; Rosa, Laguna
Bodine Aluminum, Inc.; St. Louis, Mo.
Indus Motor Company Ltd.; Bin Qasim, Karachi
Toyotasa Toyota-Sabanci Automotive Industry Sc Trade, Inc.; Sakarya
Toyota Motor Vietnam Co., Ltd.; Vinh Phuc Province
Tianjin Jinfeng Auto Parts Co., Ltd.; Tianjin City
Toyota Argentina S.A.; Zarate Provincia de Buenos Aires
Tianjin Toyota Motor Engine Co., Ltd.; Tianjin City
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Indiana, Inc.; Princeton, Ind.
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, West Virginia, Inc.; Buffalo, W.Va.
Toyota Fenjin Auto Parts Co., Ltd.; Tianjin City
Tianjin Toyota Forging Co., Ltd.; Tianjin City
Sichuan Toyota Motor Co., Ltd.; Sichuan Province
Toyota Kirloskar Motor Ltd.
Toyota Motor Manufacturing France S.A.S. (planning)
Source: The number of employees is based on (Toyota 1999a, 4-5), and other data are based on (Toyota 1999b, 6-7).
Asia
Asia
North America
Asia
Middle East
Asia
Asia
Latin America
Asia
North America
North America
Asia
Asia
Asia
Asia
Europe
Malaysia
Philippines
U.S.A.
Pakistan
Turkey
Vietnam
China
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China
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
China
China
China
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France
Year
1992
1992
1993
1993
1994
1996
1997
1997
1998
1998
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
2001
Employees
104
422
759
419
612
260
1128
590
1478
330
89
157
58
1150
1000
115
9
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can Jeep and the British Land Rover—in competition; it was a golden oppor-
tunity for Toyota to set foot in the Brazilian market. In 1959, Toyota created
the first overseas production companies in Brazil (table 4.2).
The expansion strategy of Toyota did not stop with Brazil, but reached
to other countries in Latin America. (The leaders of Toyota began to use the
cross-nation-space strategy to build the cross-continent-space strategy.) From
the mid-1950s, TMS carried out aggressive sales activities centered on the
Land Cruiser in other Latin American countries: El Salvador in 1953, Colom-
bia in 1956, Costa Rica in 1957, Venezuela in 1962, and Puerto Rico in
1965. Eventually, Toyota moved its Latin American headquarters from Brazil
to Colombia.
Toyota also employed its cross-nation-space strategy in other countries
on other continents. In Southeast Asia, Toyota made its first exports as early
as the end of the 1940s. However, the full scale of the export of automobiles
to Thailand began during the period of the 1950s andl960s. In the Middle
East, Toyota presented its SA passenger model, Toyota's first postwar export
automobile, to the king of Egypt in 1947. In the beginning, Toyota hesitated
to export any products to Europe, one of the world's most sophisticated mar-
kets. Finally, during a visit to Tokyo by Walther Krohn, president of Erla
Auto Import A/S, Toyota was persuaded to ship a sample right-hand-drive
Crown to Denmark in December 1962. Toyota's entry into Africa started in
April 1957, when twelve Crowns and Land Cruisers were exported to Ethio-
pia (table 4.3). With the first-stage strategy nearly completed, the first phase
of the second-stage strategy was executed.
The Second Stage: Expansion Overseas-1
(Concentration on Exports)
After successfully entering a particular country's market, Toyota began to use
its second tactic—the cross-continent-space strategy. Once representative coun-
tries on the Latin American continent accepted its products, leaders of Toyota
began to market across the continent (table 4.3). Almost at the same time as
the expansion in Latin America, Toyota sought to develop its market by cross-
ing into the North American continent, in particular the United States. Due
to the weather conditions, Toyota's automobiles in Canada were not selling
in large quantities. In the end, Toyota overcame many difficulties and began
to export the New Corona to Canada in 1967 and the Corolla in 1968.
However, there was disagreement and opposition within the Toyota
Motor Company. In the final analysis, leaders of Toyota felt that if Toyota
approached exporting to the United States with the determination of Sakichi
and the dedication of Kiichiro, the day would come when not only automatic
looms but also automobiles could be exported by Toyota and compete at an
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international level (Toyota Motor Corporation 1988). For marketing to the
United States, Toyota adopted three geographical divisions—western, cen-
tral, and eastern regions. Because of geographical proximity between the
western coast of the American mainland and Japan, California was targeted
by Toyota at first. In addition, the existence of large port cities in the West
Coast region of the United States became a crucial factor for leaders of TMC
in deciding to export Toyota products. In August 1957, two Toyota Crown
sample cars left Yokohama Port and were shipped to Los Angeles. These cars
became the first Japanese passenger cars to be exported to the American main-
land.
Two months later, in October 1957, a Toyota subsidiary—Toyota Mo-
tor Sales, U.S.A (TMS, USA)—was founded. The corporation was initially
capitalized at $1 million, with Toyota Motor Company and TMS each in-
vesting half of the capital (fig. 4.7). TMS, USA's office was located on a large
boulevard in Beverly Hills, with an initial staff of thirteen, comprised of eleven
Japanese sent from Japan, one Japanese hired locally, and one second-genera-
tion Japanese-American. Thereafter, TMS, USA began organizing its
dealerships by establishing Hollywood Toyota Motor in California and started
negotiating franchise contracts. By the end of 1960, there were eighty-five
dealerships in the United States, including Hawaii. Moreover, six months after
Table 4.3 Toyota Exports from Japan by region (in thousands of vehicles)
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Total
North
America
947.8
814
780.2
768.2
684.3
603
653.5
454.4
456.3
526.5
584.3
7272.5
Latin
America
61.1
51.2
60.1
79.4
99.9
96.6
89.2
110.9
86.2
119.6
110.3
964.5
Europe
429.8
441.5
446.6
436
406.8
347.6
334.9
263.3
304.8
401.4
369.7
4182.4
Africa
84.2
46.8
47.9
52.4
54.4
39.8
37
51
50.6
54
56.2
574.3
Asia
106.4
107
123.6
135.6
154.9
186.6
153.5
148.3
172.4
152.3
66
1506.6
Oceania
74.9
95.9
84.1
76.1
82.1
83.8
91.4
76.7
82.1
93.6
104.2
944.9
Middle
East
111.5
112.8
134.6
155.9
215.8
181.6
144.8
97.8
124.2
146.8
172
1597.8
Total
1815.7
1669.1
1677.1
1703.6
1698.2
1539
1504.5
1202.4
1276.7
1494.3
1462.8
17043
Source: (Toyota Motor Corporation 1999b, 21).
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TMS (50% ownership)
I (Merged 1982)
TMC (50% ownership)
TMS, USA (Established 1957)
(80% ownership)
TMMK (Established 1986)
Fig. 4.7. Establishment of TMMK.
founding TMS, USA, Toyota established Toyota Motor Distributors as a di-
rectly operated distributor serving the West Coast region. All Toyota overseas
corporations had Japanese citizens as president and executive vice president.
Export of the Crown by Toyota did not go smoothly. The design of the
Crown was not suited for American highways. The car tended to vibrate
badly at speeds of more than 60 miles per hour and overheated when driven
over mountains and on long, straight desert stretches, such as those between
Los Angeles and Las Vegas. Toyota exported the Tiara models to replace the
earlier Crown, but many problems also existed with these cars. The setback
in the United States taught Toyota a valuable lesson: it was vital to conduct
repeated tests under local conditions. Toyota learned that motor vehicles which
are not competitive in every aspect of a particular market, including perfor-
mance, price, and brand name, have no chance at all of being accepted. Toyota
made the most of this lesson by striving to develop eminently international
products. The first result of the effort was the Model RT-40 New Corona
(Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha 1988). This model successfully expanded
in the United States during the 1960s. The leading slogan for advertisement
of the New Corona was "Get Your Hands on a Toyota and You'll Never Let
Go." This later became "Toyota: We're Quality Oriented" (Toyota Motor
Corporation 1988).
Once Toyota successfully got its foothold in the U.S. market by pen-
etrating the west region, Toyota unfolded its strategy in the central region.
During this period, TMS, USA moved to put into order a sales network that
would cover the entire country and make use of leading local businesses as
distributors. Especially for the fourteen midwestern states, a stronghold of
the Big Three automakers, it was decided to appoint a private distributor. Among
many candidates, TMS, USA focused on the distributor for British Leyland.
Mid-Southern Toyota Distributors was established in Chicago in January 1966.
By 1967 the total number of dealers increased to 716 from 200 in 1964.
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After triumphant expansion in the west and central regions selling the
New Corona, TMS, USA decided to extend its marketing to the East Coast
region, in particular the New York region, in the 1970s. Backed by political
influence resulting from Toyota's contribution of a lot of money to local poli-
ticians during their election years, TMS, USA set up distributors in Baltimore
and Boston, in addition to New York. By the 1970s, TMS, USA had grown
from its original West Coast operational base into a business that covered the
entire United States.
Approaching the 1970s, two major developments occurred in the world
economy: one was the oil crisis, and the other was the breakdown of the
Bretton Woods system (e.g., the appreciation of Japanese currency). The oil
shocks of the 1970s provided an opportunity for Toyota to take a respectable
market share in the United States. Reasonably priced Japanese automobiles,
such as Toyotas, enjoyed brisk sales. By 1973, Toyota was able to consolidate
its system for annual sales of three hundred thousand units in the United
States (Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha 1988). On the other hand, the ap-
preciation of the Japanese yen forced Toyota to take a new direction when
competing with American subcompacts. The company changed the emphasis
of its product line from high-grade small cars to sporty cars, such as the
Celica, and to multiuse pickup trucks. American consumers responded ex-
tremely favorably to the pickup trucks of Toyota when they were introduced
in the West Coast region. Thereafter distribution expanded to the northern
and central regions, then stretched out to the eastern parts of the United
States. Because the pickup trucks had increasing potential as vehicles for rec-
reational use, driving comfort was enhanced by adding air conditioning and
power steering. In other words, the trucks became almost like passenger cars
fitted with rear decks (Maema 1988). Furthermore, the appreciation of the
Japanese yen also brought the second phase of overseas expansion strategy—
the local assembly plan to market Toyota automobiles in the country.
The Second Stage: Expansion Overseas-2
(Establishment of Production Plants)
After the oil crisis, the Japanese economy commenced its recovery in 1979.
With the further appreciation of Japanese currency, exports of Japanese au-
tomobiles to the United States grew quickly, but a series of price increases caused
by the yen's appreciation resulted in a considerable loss in their price competi-
tiveness. In addition, the Japanese-U.S. economic conflict, especially over auto-
mobiles, was gradually worsening (table 4.3). In the end, to decrease exports
from Japanese companies, Japan's automakers, including Toyota, were forced
to consider seriously the need for local production. This led Toyota to enter its
second phase of the second-stage strategy: setting up local assembly plants.
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This new phase also forced Toyota to reorganize its structure. In Janu-
ary 1982, Toyota Motor Company and Toyota Motor Sales decided to merge
to form the Toyota Motor Corporation (TMC). Eiji Toyoda (hereafter Eiji),
the cousin of Kiichiro and president of Toyota Motor Company, and Shoichiro
Toyoda (hereafter Shoichiro), the eldest son of Kiichiro and president of Toyota
Motor Sales, issued a joint statement: "To cope with the turbulent 1980s and
to progress further along the path we have taken thus far, a need has emerged
to integrate our production and sales functions, which are in fact two sides of
the same coin, so that they can augment each other more comprehensively
and organically" (Toyota Motor Corporation 1988, 314). Eiji was named as
chairman and Shoichiro as president of the new Toyota Motor Corporation
(TMC). As Eiji stated, "We must win the struggle to survive in a changing
world. . . . Let us return to our original organization, let us grasp our capa-
bilities to their fullest, and let us make the effort needed to carve ourselves a
new future" (Ibid., 315). By integrating the functions of both companies and
restructuring the new organization, the merger led Toyota to develop its in-
ternational operations and to make decisions more quickly. The new corpo-
ration was reorganized into eight groups: Head Office, Purchasing, Domestic
Sales, Overseas Affairs, Engineering and Production Engineering, Logistics
Control, Production, and Offices.
When the voluntary restrictions (i.e., Japanese companies restricted their
exports voluntarily) on Japanese automobile exports to the United States were
initiated in 1981, it was imperative for Toyota to set up production facilities
in the United States. Leaders in Toyota realized that Toyota's dealers in the
United States would suffer, and many customers would be lost if the company
failed to maintain a punctual and stable supply of products to the American
market (Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha 1988). After the failure of a joint-
production venture with Ford, Toyota successfully made a joint venture deal
with GM when Chairman Roger B. Smith of GM met Chairman Eiji of Toyota
in March 1982. For Toyota, joint production with GM would reduce the risk
related to local production and would let Toyota accumulate experience in
local production in the United States. GM and Toyota reached an agreement
on an annual production volume of two hundred thousand units of a passen-
ger car based on the FF Sprinter. The closed GM plant in Fremont, Califor-
nia, was chosen as the production site (Kawahara 1995). The agreement
between GM and Toyota comprised the following main points.
1. The objective is to establish a joint venture company to produce a
small passenger car, and it is not intended to establish any other
form of cooperative relationship.
2. The equity ratio for ownership of the new company will be 50 percent
Toyota and 50 percent GM.
Geography of Toyota Motor Manufacturing Corp. 81
3. The board of directors of the new company will be made up of equal
numbers of representatives from each of the partners, and the
company's president, who will be the chief executive officer, will be
selected by Toyota.
4. Production will be carried out at the Fremont Plant, previously oper-
ated by GM, and the small passenger car produced will be a new
front-wheel-drive model.
5. Production will begin as early as possible in the 1985 model year, and
annual production will be approximately two hundred thousand cars.
6. The joint venture will be terminated not later than twelve years after
the start of production (Toyota Motor Corporation 1988).
Recently, the Toyota-GM joint venture just renewed the contract for another
five years. According to interviews with leaders of the Toyota Group by the
author (November 9, 1998), Toyota will continue to cooperate with GM
even though there is no new additional agreement.
While accumulating local production experience with GM, Toyota an-
nounced in 1985 that it would establish plants on the North American conti-
nent. A number of site proposals from local governments were submitted to
Toyota. After all factors, such as the procurement of parts, the convenience
of transportation, land prices, electricity supplies, labor resources, and tax
incentives and other preferential treatment from local governments, were re-
viewed, Toyota eventually selected two sites—Georgetown, Kentucky, in the
United States and Cambridge, Ontario, in Canada.
When Toyota creates local production plants in industrial countries, usu-
ally a small community, like Georgetown, Kentucky, or Cambridge, Ontario,
is the most favorable type of place targeted. However, when Toyota decides
to build production plants in the developing countries, the type of place tar-
geted is the urban city, such as Shenyang or Tianjin in China (table 4.2). One
of the major reasons for Toyota to locate in large cities in the developing
countries is that cities in these nations have relatively good infrastructure
facilities. Toyota also focused exclusively on port cities in developing coun-
tries to build production plants. Toyota's manufacturing facilities are spread
over all continents (fig. 4.8).
Toyota has taken advantage of small American communities without
strong labor unions. In the case of the production plant in Kentucky, the good
infrastructure impressed the leaders of Toyota. Certainly, geographical loca-
tion of the Bluegrass and its physical environmental conditions (similar to
Toyota City) were critical decision factors for leaders of Toyota. Tax incen-
tives and local government supports were also major factors. For example,
the Kentucky state government offered to establish a Japanese school for the
children of Japanese employees at the Kentucky plant.
With more than two hundred reporters present, along with Governor
nuiTiDtr
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Fig. 4.8. Toyota: Employment in manufacturing plants around the world, 1999. (Source: Toyota Motor Cor-
poration, Tokyo)
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Martha Layne Collins and other state officials, at a press conference in Ken-
tucky, President Shoichiro stated, "We view today's official announcement of
our plant site selection as one of the highlights in our company's history,
which began in 1935 with the production of the first trial Toyota passenger
car. In fact, choosing the site for our American plant was one of the most
difficult decisions we have ever had to make at Toyota. After considering all
of the factors involved, however, we decided that Kentucky is the best loca-
tion for our American plant . . ." (Toyota Motor Corporation 1988, 338).
In January 1986, Toyota established Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Ken-
tucky (TMMK) in the United States and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Canada
(TMMC). After studying local tax systems and future operating methods,
Toyota decided to establish TMMK as 80 percent owned by TMS, USA and
20 percent owned by Toyota; TMS, USA's share constituted a reinvestment in
the United States of profits it had earned there (fig. 4.7). Once again, a Japa-
nese, Kaneyoshi Kusunoki, executive vice president from Toyota, was ap-
pointed president of both TMMK and TMMC.
There is no doubt that the experience with GM was particularly helpful
as Toyota established its first North American plants. For instance, in devel-
oping an information system for the new plants, Toyota modified the daily
order system formulated for the joint venture with GM so that it could in-
clude information support for TMMK and TMMC. Thus, both plants take
further advantage of producing cars locally. It was not coincidental that the
establishment of the assembly plant in Canada occurred at the successful
conclusion of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between
Canada and the United States.
The Third Stage: Globalization Strategy
In June 1995 TMC announced its New Global Business Plan, which focuses
on efforts to further localize (overseas) and to increase imports of automo-
biles produced overseas (in Japan). These twin pillars have been the canon of
Toyota's global business strategy since the mid-1990s (Toyota Motor Corpo-
ration 1998e). In the case of further localization, Toyota's worldwide local-
ization activities have continued for years (table 4.4). For example, North
American production amounted to more than 962,000 units in 1998, versus
783,000 units in 1996. Production at TMMK in 1998 was 474,588 units, up
from 390,000 units in 1996. TMMK began to produce the new Sienna minivan
in August 1997 (Toyota Motor Corporation 1998e and 1999b), and overall
production capacity of TMMK was raised to 477,527 units a year in 1999.
In the case of increased imports and sales of vehicles produced overseas
in Japan, Toyota established the DUO (Dealer User Onward, cooperation
between dealer and user to move sales) sales channel in 1992 to market
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Table 4.4 Toyota overseas production by region (in thousands of vehicles)
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Total
North
America
74.2
252
382.3
369.2
489.8
532.8
581.3
729.9
783
838.3
962.8
5995.6
Latin
America
5
5
5.1
6.8
3.1
2.6
3.7
3.7
3.2
3.8
15.3
57.3
Europe
2
2.9
7.1
9.7
11.7
49.5
93.5
95.5
124.4
108.8
175.7
680.8
Africa
73.7
83.3
83.8
84.3
67.9
81.1
76.7
87.7
85.1
91.2
74.1
888.9
Asia
34.3
73.3
135.9
147.5
140.7
161.9
222.7
259
255.1
246.7
124.8
1,801.9
Oceania
55.1
53.9
59
49.4
49.3
58.7
68.5
54.1
67.6
77.6
100.4
693.6
Middle
East
0
1.2
4.5
3.1
2
2.1
4.8
23.3
27.7
23.8
14.4
106.9
Total
244.4
471.6
677.7
669.9
764.5
888.7
1,051
1,253
1,346
1,390.1
1,467.6
10,2228
Source: (Toyota Motor Corporation 1999b, 19).
Volkswagen (VW) and Audi cars in Japan. Sales of VW and Audi through
DUO outlets in 1997 were 34,000 units, versus 32,000 units in 1996. By
1998 these sales reached 39,000 units throughout 141 outlets in Japan. Sales
in 1997 of the Toyota Cavalier recorded 9,000 units, and sales of the TMMK-
produced Avalon passenger car reached 5,000 units (Toyota Motor Corpora-
tion 1998e). Furthermore, Toyota has published a Supplier's Guide for overseas
suppliers. The Supplier's Guide is a handbook aimed at providing first-time
suppliers a greater understanding of Toyota's purchasing activities, and it
outlines how to sell to Toyota. For current suppliers, it aims at providing a
greater understanding of Toyota's thinking concerning purchasing and its
purchasing system. Since November 1997, Toyota has provided an Internet
service, which makes overseas supplier requests for auto parts easier. In 1998,
Toyota built a $2.5 billion New Supplier Center, where suppliers can exhibit
their products in Toyota City. For instance, by strengthening its global busi-
ness strategy, TMMK exported 23,000 units of 5S engines to Japan in 1997
and 66,000 units of parts for the Camry to Australia in 1997 (Toyota Motor
Corporation 1998a).
By March 1998 Toyota had thirty-four overseas subsidiaries and affili-
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ates, as well as more than 150 distributors overseas in five continents, and
twenty-five countries and districts have Toyota manufacturing operations
(Toyota Motor Corporation 1998b). As a result, Toyota has successfully en-
tered the foreign market in different countries of the five continents. The
purpose of the fourth stage—global business strategy—for Toyota is to create
a deep-rooted network of the local community overseas. Toyota has actively
played the role of a good corporate citizen around the world by donating
millions of dollars for social and cultural activities, such as nature conserva-
tion, preservation of local culture, exchange student programs, traffic safety
campaigns, and social welfare, within local communities (Toyota Motor Cor-
poration 1998d). Contributing $1 million to build a local community center
in Kentucky and offering to establish a twenty-year program in which TMMK
would contribute $400,000 each year to schools in Scott County are good
examples (Toyota Motor Corporation 1988). As former president Hiroshi
Okuda of TMC states, "We will also increase our share by introducing new
technologies, like our hybrid [electric-and-gasoline-powered] car. The com-
pany that can identify what technologies are needed, introduce them quickly,
and commercialize them will succeed. The company that cannot do that will
be absorbed. I think that will be what the automotive industry will be like in
the 21st century." Okuda responded to the question of how the company can
best use its cash reserves by noting, "Of course, we'll use some of that money
domestically for research and development. But most will go to foreign in-
vestment. We will build factories overseas. And after that, we will invest some
money in telecommunications and housing business" (Business Week 15 June
1998,58).
The global business strategy has been a major tactic for Toyota to keep
consumers driving its products from generation to generation. To launch slo-
gans, such as "For People, For Society, For the Earth" and "Enriching Society
Through Car Making," worldwide shows that Toyota has strenuously tried
to be a part of local communities (Toyota Motor Corporation 1998d). Once
again, Toyota has brought principles of Toyotaism to its companies overseas
(Ogawa 1994). The emphasis of the "family" as a member of the local com-
munity is a primary strategy for Toyota in the 1990s. By undressing the image
of Japanese cars overseas, Toyota's strategy has created a mirror of new in-
digenous products, which are managed, designed, assembled, and driven by
the local people. This strategy certainly will work if local people feel comfort-
able with the products. Toyota automobiles will be driven by local people for
generations to come.
In short, all of the above strategies created by Toyota can be character-
ized as follows: first, Toyota started to target the international market by
focusing on the national (i.e., micro) level and then to the global (i.e., macro)
level. After creating a number of footholds all over the five continents, it
began to be a part of local communities by donating millions of dollars. These
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four stages gradually provided opportunities for Toyota to increase local pro-
duction as well as reduce the tension created by the trade conflict with the
United States. Because of globalization and a successful conclusion of NAFTA,
Toyota has benefited greatly. As a member of the local community, Toyota
has played a wise strategy overseas, which ultimately let Toyota bring
Toyotaism to its companies overseas.
Second, according to local conditions, especially weather and economic
infrastructures, Toyota provided products which fit local people's needs. A
certain model car favored in one country does not necessarily sell in another
country. When Toyota confronted a problem of an unknown field, such as
local production in the 1980s, it implemented a strategy of forming a joint
venture with GM to develop learning local production experience within a
limited period and with limited cooperation. The experience of the joint ven-
ture with GM was a crucial factor enabling Toyota to set up its own manu-
facturing companies overseas, such as in Kentucky. Even though Toyota learned
the know-how of running the manufacturing operation locally, it has never
planned to have a full-scale cooperation (e.g., the merger between Daimler-
Benz of Germany and Chrysler of the United States). When a reporter asked
if Toyota will change its strategy to joint investment (with someone) overseas
in the future, former president Okuda of Toyota stated, "I think Toyota will
want to do this on its own. We don't really join with partners. It's difficult for
us to join various cultures and customs (Business Week 15 June 1998, 58)."
Without the merger, Toyota will continue to emphasize its keiretsu system in
the group (Maema 1998).
Third, when Toyota created a new manufacturing operation overseas,
Toyota headquarters usually dispatched an officer from Japan to take the
chief executive officer position in the foreign country. Despite Toyota's ef-
forts to be "a good corporate citizen around the world," the corporate cul-
ture of Toyota has never disappeared. Just as in Toyota in Japan, minority
groups have not been promoted to the chief executive officer positions. In
Japan, in hiring minorities, especially females, the TMC has the worst record
of any company overseas. No female has worked in an executive position
since the establishment of TMC. Former Singapore Prime Minster Lee Kuan
Yew once stated that he can give the names of many Singaporean CEOs who
work at American and European companies in Singapore, but he cannot name
a single Singaporean CEO who works for a Japanese company in Singapore
(The Annenberg/CPB Collection 1992, vol. 7). In other words, no local people
are allowed to take the CEO position of a Japanese company, including Toyota.
Fourth, Toyota has often changed the new model of its automobile by
creating the "C" model strategy. "C" model means that many automobiles
made by Toyota, in particular passenger cars, are given names that start with
the English character "C," and most of them are unknown overseas. For
instance, according to the 1997 passenger car registrations by model in Ja-
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pan, there are more than thirty types of automobiles: Aristo, Avalon, Caldina,
Camry, Carib, Carina, Cavalier, Celica, Celsior, Century, Chaster, Corolla,
Corolla II, Corona (or Carina II), Corsa, Comfort, Cresta, Crown, Curren,
Cynos, Ipsum, Mark II (or Cressida), MR2, Prius, Raum, Scepter, Sera, Soarer,
Sprinter, Sprinter Carib, Starlet, Supra, Tercel, Vista, and Windom (or Lexus).
Interestingly, about 18 type "C" models dominate these passenger cars. Ac-
cording to Toyota, the "C" model strategy is purely coincidental to when
Corolla became the "hot" product around the world. Therefore, leaders in
Toyota believe the "C" model auspicious; it will bring "fortune" to their
business (interview by the author with the head of the public relations depart-
ment of Toyota in Tokyo on November 9,1998; hereafter interview on No-
vember 9,1998). Toyota probably has the most models of passenger cars in
the world, but only some fifteen types of these models are well known over-
seas. Among these, Corolla, Camry, Tercel, Starlet, Lexus, Celica, and Co-
rona have been popular in the export market (fig. 4.9). By 1997 more than
ninety passenger car models were produced by Japanese automakers in Ja-
pan. Among all models in Japan, Corolla was the number one passenger car
for the twenty-nine consecutive years from 1969 to 1997 (Toyota Motor
Corporation 1998a).
Fifth, the selection of "place" by Toyota during its three stages of growth
can be summarized as follows. During the first stage, Toyota mainly concen-
trated on developing Toyota City as well as Tokyo and Osaka. When the
company began exporting overseas in the 1950s, Toyota targeted port cities,
including those in the United States. During the second stage of the expansion
overseas, leaders of TMC decided to locate assembly plants in large cities in
developing countries, such as Tianjin in China. However, when Toyota built
production plants in the industrial countries, small communities, such as
Georgetown, Kentucky, were selected.
T H E KEIRETSU STRUCTURE OF THE TOYOTA GROUP
Keiretsu, vertical affiliates, have been a well-known characteristic of Japa-
nese business culture. Toyota has one of the most complicated keiretsu, which
involves thousands of companies worldwide. Hiromi Shioji analyzed the
Toyota system in Gendai Nihon no Kigyo Gurupu [The Business Group in
Today's Japan] edited by Kazuichi Sakamoto and Masahiro Shimotani (pp.
51-75) in the 1980s. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Toyota has
expanded its network greatly. The keiretsu system (fig. 4.10) comprises mainly
three groups: the companies of the TMC group (circle A), the enterprises that
provide auto parts to suppliers (circle B), and corporations that involve the
sales, rental, and leasing businesses, real estate, and research institutions in
Japan, as well as manufacturers and subsidiaries overseas (circle C). Compa-
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Fig. 4.9. Toyota: Exports.
A. Exports in 1998. B. Total exports of various makes, 1999. (Source: Toyota Motor
Corporation, Tokyo)
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nies in the D, E, and G zones are created by three interwoven circles—A, B,
and C.
Circle A in figure 4.10 contains about fifteen companies. Needless to
say, TMC is the "heart" of circle A (i.e., the TMC Group) as well as of the
entire Toyota keiretsu system. The other fourteen corporations in circle A
serve as "internal organs" (i.e., the major driving forces) inside the Toyota
system. They are:
l.TMC
2. Toyoda Automatic Loom Works
3. Aichi Steel Works
4. Toyoda Machine Works
5. Toyota Auto Body Company
6. Toyota Tsusho Corporation
7. Aisin Seiki Company
8. Denso Corporation
9. Toyoda Boshoku Corporation
10. Towa Real Estate Company
11. Toyota Central Research and Development Laboratories
12. Kanto Auto Works
13. Toyoda Gosei Company
14. Hino Motors
15. Daihatsu Motor Company
Along with TMC, circle A has ¥824.16 billion capital with 159,035 employ-
ees (Toyota Motor Corporation 1998c).
The members of circle B in figure 4.10 are suppliers who provide mainly
auto parts and components. Two supplier organizations, Kyohokai and
Eihokai, are involved with Toyota in this circle. The former primarily pro-
vides auto parts and components, and the latter mainly supplies molds, gauges,
jigs, and contractors for plant facilities. These suppliers serve as the "food"
of the whole Toyota keiretsu system. To receive inside information regarding
Toyota (e.g., the future plans or changing management style), many compa-
nies have joined these two organizations. Circle B involves about three thou-
sand companies that have business with Toyota amounting to more than ¥1
billion annually (interview on November 9, 1998). Many books, including
those published by Toyota, give only a fraction of the number of suppliers.
For example, Outline of Toyota (1998) states that about 320 companies in
both Kyohokai and Eihokai support Toyota.
Since the expansion of TMC in the 1990s, the number of companies in
circle C in figure 4.10 has increased dramatically. As of the writing of this
paper, at least three hundred affiliates and subsidiaries, which TMC directly
or indirectly provides capital, exist worldwide. Because of rapid expansion
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worldwide, the leaders of Toyota (interview on November 9, 1998) in the
Tokyo headquarters have lost count of the number of subsidiaries and affili-
ates. These affiliates in circle C primarily work as the "blood" of the entire
system. The corporations in this circle have the complicated duty of ensuring
that the Toyota system runs smoothly. These corporations include domestic
plants; dealers and rental and leasing agents; prefabricated housing manufac-
turers and real estate companies; newspapers; insurance firms; overland and
marine transports; research institutions; and overseas manufacturing opera-
tions, subsidiaries, and affiliates. In the keiretsu system, the formation of most
overseas corporations is complicated.
The interwoven zones of the three circles represent one of most compli-
cated keiretsu systems of the Japanese enterprises. Four overlapping areas (D,
E, F, and G) in figure 4.10 indicate the mysteriousness of Toyota's keiretsu
structure. According to the analysis by Hiromi Shioji, the numbers of compa-
nies in areas D, E, and G were estimated at one, two, and nine respectively
(Shioji 1987, 58). Since 1987 Toyota has not increased the "core" group in
circle A by a single corporation; Shioji's analysis is relatively valid today. The
problem is zone F, which is the overlap of circles B and C. Area F in figure
4.10 had twenty-seven companies in the 1980s, but the exact numbers of
companies in circles B and C are not known.
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In short, the Toyota keiretsu system reflects a mysterious picture of a
Japanese corporation system. It is unlikely that Toyota will desert this system
in the next century. However, the wave of economic globalization has pushed
Toyota to face reality in the international arena where the keiretsu structure
normally does not exist. Further study of the keiretsu (or quasi-keiretsu) sys-
tem overseas is needed.
THE FUTURE
There is an increasing tendency for automakers to develop their own produc-
tion technology to meet their needs and to fit the particular conditions in
Japan more precisely. With its own production system, Toyota has done what
every automaker wishes to do. As a survivor, Toyota has developed two ma-
jor pillars, or theories, of production: just-in-time and jidoka (fig. 4.11).
Just-in-time refers to a production methodology whereby the parts needed
for assembly arrive beside the production line at precisely the right time and
in the right quantity. This method of production is long-standing in Toyota's
history. In fact, when TMC was started, Kiichiro instructed his employees to
forget the commonly held notion that warehouses are essential in a plant.
Kiichiro clarified that just-in-time does not mean simply that it is important
to do something on time. Rather, this term refers to the need to be precise in
terms of quantity as well. This is because excess creates waste (Toyota Motor
Corporation 1988). Based on this system, TMC does not permit anything in
Kanban Production Sysstem |
Limited Amount Production
I I
Just In Time Jidoka
I I
Elimination of Waste
|Completion of the Work
Fig. 4.11. Toyota kanban system.
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excess of one day. Moreover, supply of parts is allowed to sit idly beside a line
because warehouse stock is a physical and financial burden to management.
The second pillar is jidoka, which means "self-working." Toyota differ-
entiates between self-working and self-moving automation machines. Self-
working automation allows an operator to stop the machine when a problem
occurs during the production process (e.g., defective parts). As a result, jidoka
results in a reduction in personnel and a dramatic increase in productivity
(Ohno 1984). The idea of a self-working automation machine is rooted in the
invention of automatic looms by Sakichi. Indeed, the automatic looms had a
device that enabled the machine to judge good and bad. Thus, no defective
goods were produced. Although it is impossible to eliminate all defective auto
parts during production, Toyota's process enables it to reduce the problem. In
short, the purpose of jidoka is to build quality into each process of the pro-
duction line (Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha 1988).
The traditional view of the automobile assembly line is that upstream
sections should supply downstream sections. Raw materials are made into
parts, parts are assembled into units, and these units flow to the final assem-
bly line. Thus, parts progress from upstream to downstream sections, and the
automobile is assembled. Toyota has changed this process by turning the pro-
duction flow backward. This enables the downstream sections to go to the
upstream sections to pick up the right items at the right time and in the right
quantities. As a result, the upstream sections should produce only as much as
is requested. As a method of coordinating a great number of sections, it would
be necessary only to indicate clearly what quantity of which item would be
required. By transferring information between processes using various-sized
cards, the well-known production system of Toyota—the kanban (signboard)
system—was formed (Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha 1988; Monden 1991).
By circulating the signboard among the various sections, production volume
may be controlled. For instance, the board displays various code numbers
and letters to inform floor employees of how line operations are proceeding
and when and where problems have occurred. Cards are suspended above the
production lines and may be pulled to stop the line if complications arise. As
a result, it was clear to the person in charge of each process that there was a
keen need to adjust the production speed of the process and that the layout of
the production processes had to be improved.
In short, under these two main concepts of production, leaders of Toyota
believed that auto parts could be supplied from a preceding process to the
subsequent process in the same way that items were supplied by a supermar-
ket to customers. In other words, auto parts by the suppliers should be at the
right time and in the required amounts—resulting in an elimination of ineffi-
cient production. Rather than sending parts on to the next stage as soon as
they were completed, the employee at the later process would go to the pre-
ceding process when he or she needed the parts and pick up only the number
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Employees exercise before the start of the workday at this small automobile parts
factory in northern Tokyo. Numerous such factories exist in Japan. The motor
vehicle industry assembles various processed materials and parts; depending on
classification, several thousand parts of various kinds are required to assemble a
vehicle. (Photograph by P.P. Karan)
required. In turn, at the earlier process, only enough parts would be produced
to replenish what the later process had used (Ogawa 1994).
It is important to note that the production system has not been the
only method used by Toyota to survive in the automobile industry. In fact,
some people have considered the automobile a "bad" product that pollutes
the environment, and an "unsafe" product that is dangerous for children
(Maema 1998). To respond to these calls, Toyota has focused on safety and
environment measures as well as dedicating itself to local communities. By
developing new technologies, including VICS (Vehicle Information and Com-
munication System), AHS (Advanced Cruise-Assist Highway Systems), and
the Hybrid System, Toyota has demonstrated a concern for producing safe
and clean products. This has eliminated a stereotypical image of the automo-
bile that pollutes the environment (Toyota Motor Corporation 1998d). Both
an Internet site and almost all pamphlets produced by Toyota detail facts
about safety and environmental issues (Ibid., 1988,1998a, 1998c, and 1998e).
Improving plant safety and ergonomics is not only important but also saves
money and boosts morale, which in turn make union organizing harder. The
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Toyota plants are scattered among the rice fields on the outskirts of Toyota City,
Japan. Generally Toyota plants in industrially advanced countries are located in
small towns and plants in developing countries are located in large metropolitan
centers. (Photograph by P.P. Karan)
small group of union activists at Toyota's Georgetown plant cites safety as a
primary concern.
At plants in Asia and Europe, workers tend to be about the same size,
weight, and strength. But American factories hire a much more diverse group
of employees, which presents extra challenges in designing work stations for
repetitive tasks. For example, at the Georgetown plant, the diverse workforce
means work processes must accommodate workers who range in height from
five feet to six-and-a-half feet. In 1998, Toyota's incident rating (number of
times employees require medical attention per one hundred workers per year)
at Georgetown jumped 14 percent to 25.7 percent, just above the industrial
average of 25 percent. Since then, the plant has re-examined and refocused its
efforts on improving safety. The aim is to bring the incident rating down to
9.9 percent by 2003. At Georgetown, Toyota's system for handling worker
injuries is similar to those stipulated in the United Auto Workers contract.
Toyota pays workers 65 percent of their basic pay during initial disability,
compared with 60 percent under the United Auto Workers contract. Those
who cannot return to the assembly line can take a worker's compensation
buyout or accept other work within the plant. At the Kentucky plant, those
workers are guaranteed their manufacturing wage rate for one year and a
percentage of that rate for the second year.
Given the fact that Toyota builds and paints thousands of cars each day
at various plants around the world, it is not surprising that it produces pollut-
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ants. Paint that misses the vehicle, called over spray, is a potential air pollut-
ant. For example, Toyota's Georgetown plant produces eighty thousand pounds
of "paint sludge" each week. The over spray is collected by water in large
vats, then distilled to sludge. Since 1992, most of the sludge is dried and
recycled into products such as low-density asphalt and decorative landscap-
ing blocks. This is part of Toyota's continuing effort to develop a reputation
as an environmentally friendly manufacturer.
In Japan, Toyota is attempting to revamp its corporate image through a
$126 million theme park at Tokyo's waterfront. Toyota's park, which is called
Mega Web, is designed to attract younger car buyers at a time when a stub-
born recession has been sending auto sales plunging. Tokyo's waterfront is
vibrant and a big hit with the young Japanese, and the raging success of
Tokyo Disneyland has shown how effective amusement parks can be at at-
tracting children and young couples. Mega Web is part of a futuristic water-
front amusement complex called Palette Town, which has a concert hall,
adventure rides, and a giant Ferris wheel. The park includes exhibits of Toyota's
models from the 1950s. Visitors can also design a car on computers, play
with clay models, and take jaunts in a tiny electric car that showcases an
automated driving system. While Mega Web may attract young buyers, Toyota
still must come up with models that appeal to them.
Toyota faces additional challenges. As the earth has limited natural re-
sources, in particular petroleum, the gasoline-powered automobile eventu-
ally will become problematic. Despite the creation of the hybrid automobile,
Toyota must face the reality that the earth has only limited petroleum. The
issue will be the crucial problem for Toyota in the twenty-first century when
the natural resource depletes. Probably, current leaders of Toyota are think-
ing about the next strategy to deal with the issue because this issue is impera-
tive to determine the fate of the automobile industry during this millennium.
Everyone is looking forward to seeing what kind of strategies Toyota will
develop, and what kind of automobile Toyota will contribute to human soci-
ety. As a survivor, Toyota has conquered many problems so far and probably
will continue to survive in the twenty-first century.
NOTES
The author wishes to thank Dr. P.P. Karan for his suggestions and com-
ments on this paper. Also he thanks Kristen Smith and Jeanette Jeneault for
reviewing earlier drafts, as well as Keiko Aoki, Akihiro Kawakami, Yukiko
Nakazato, Masahide Ohno, and Kentaro Someya for their support of origi-
nal sources.
1. Many people may wonder why the founder name of TMC is Toyoda,
not Toyota. In Japanese, Toyoda and Toyota share the same Chinese charac-
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ters. When the leaders of TMC decided on a trademark, they selected Toyota
because its spelling in katakana uses eight strokes, a felicitous number sug-
gestive of increasing prosperity. The trademark also symbolized the company's
plan to change from a family business into a well-known corporation (Toyota
Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha 1979,77). However, some firms in the TMC group
still use the word Toyoda.
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Yesterday and Today
Changes in Workers' Lives
in Toyota City, Japan
YUICHIRO NlSHIMURA AND KOHEI OKAMOTO
TOYOTA CITY, JAPAN, is the headquarters of Toyota Motor Corpo-
ration (TMC). TMC has seven large plants in Toyota City, where about twenty-
four thousand people work on assembly lines. About four hundred factories
of affiliated companies and subcontractors are scattered throughout the city.
About half of the employed persons in the city work for automobile-related
industries, and including the employees of related businesses and their fami-
lies, it is said that around 70 percent of the total population of the city (348,532
in 1997) is involved with TMC to a greater or lesser extent. Thus, Toyota
City is a typical company town (fig. 5.1).
In a company town, the company has strong and direct relationships
with the region in various ways. The rise and decline of a company's financial
strength affects the regional economy, while the influx and efflux of workers
affect regional society. Huge plants alter the landscape, and industrial wastes
degrade the environment. We can understand the regional structure of a com-
pany town by looking at these aspects. Many geographical studies have ex-
amined Japanese company towns, and some have dealt with the relationship
of TMC and Toyota City. For example, Miyakawa (1980) described the eco-
nomic and political influences of TMC on the local community, and Iseki,
Abe, and Miyamachi (1987) analyzed the role of TMC in local environmen-
tal management.
The influence of automotive industries on the region is more complex,
however, due to their production system. Since automobile manufacturing is
a great assembly industry, many parts suppliers must be organized around an
assembly plant. It is also a labor-intensive industry requiring many workers
to be allocated efficiently at production spots. An efficient method to control
parts production and delivery as well as to arrange human resources is the
Miyoshi
Town j Toyota City
Fig. 5.1. Toyota City.
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just-in-time (JIT) system introduced by TMC. This study sheds light on the
influence of the production system on the local community.
This chapter first describes the history of TMC reorganizing the region
to meet its production system needs. Then, it focuses on the change of work-
ing hours in 1995 and examines the influence of the Toyota production sys-
tem on local communities.
CONCENTRATION OF FACTORIES AND SUBCONTRACTORS
TMC began as the Automobile Department of the Toyoda Automatic Loom
Works, which was located in Kariya City (southwest of the area that is now
Toyota City), and became independent in 1937. At that time, Toyota City
was a leading sericultural town named Koromo. (After the opening of Japan
to the world in the 1860s, silk exports increased and the area developed as a
center of the sericultural industry.) However, in 1930, the market for raw silk
collapsed, which damaged the Koromo region. The town invited the automo-
tive industries to revive the regional economy. Kiichiro Toyoda, who is the
founder of TMC, decided to locate a factory in Koromo for several reasons.
One reason was that Koromo Town offered inexpensive land subsidized by
the town, which was a favorable condition for factory construction. Another
reason was the abundant workforce available from the agricultural sector
(Toyota Motor Manufacturing 1967).
In 1938 the first Toyota automobile plant, now called Head Plant, was
founded in Koromo Town. World War II left the company in economic ruin,
but with the introduction of the Toyopet Crown in 1955, passenger car pro-
duction began in earnest. In 1951, Koromo Town merged with neighboring
small villages to form a city. Then, the changing of the name of the city Koromo
to Toyota became an issue. As a consequence of the conflict between the old
Gemeinschaft, or native group, and the newcomers aiming to transform the
traditional local community into an industrial society, the name of the city
was changed to Toyota City when the second plant, Motomachi Plant, was
established in 1959. In the following years, as motorization took hold during
the period of high economic growth in Japan, large automobile plants were
constructed in succession in and around Toyota City (fig. 5.2).
The plants built in the late 1960s and early 1970s are concentrated around
the border between Toyota City and neighboring Miyoshi Town (fig. 5.2).
These plants assemble passenger cars and produce major parts for the engine
and chassis. Such spatial concentration allowed TMC to deliver major parts
rapidly. In those days, TMC extended production scale and pursued efficient
production simultaneously.
Until the 1950s there were few subcontractors in Toyota City. Before
World War II, TMC made many parts in-house, and after the war they began
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Toyota's Takaoka Plant in the southwestern part of Toyota City, Japan, lies in the
midst of rice fields. The plant started operations in 1966 and has plastic molding,
stamping, body, painting, and assembly shops. It produces Prius, Corolla, Sprinter,
Tercel, and Paseo passenger cars. (Photograph by Yuichiro Nishimura)
dealing with subcontractors in other cities such as Kariya and Nagoya. As the
mass production system started in the 1960s, TMC relocated suppliers close
to TMC plants to supply mechanical parts efficiently. That established the
localization of subcontractors within Toyota City. In 1965, TMC developed
an extremely effective method of streamlining manufacturing operations—
kanban, or the Just-in-Time (JIT) system of inventory control for subcontrac-
tors. The technique obliges suppliers to deliver parts exactly when they
are needed—no sooner and no later. The concentration of subcontractors
was accelerated by the introduction of JIT methods, although it is con-
troversial whether JIT necessarily produces concentration of factories (Mair
1992).
A lot of factories related to automobile industries are distributed through-
out the city (fig. 5.3). Most large factories are located around TMC plants in
the southwest of the city. They connect very closely to TMC plants through
the JIT production system. In the late 1960s, these subcontractors were re-
quired to deliver their parts several times per day only during the daytime.
Since 1975, however, they have started to deliver the parts not only during
the day but also at night. The frequency of parts delivery has also increased
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• factories related to automobile industries
O other factories
Fig. 5.3. Factories in Toyota City in 1982. (Source: Toyota City Office, 1982)
(Azumi 1982). Thus, the activities of subcontractors have been affected spa-
tially as well as temporally by the Toyota mode of production. The municipal
government adopted an urban plan suitable for an Automobile Industrial
City and reinforced road construction, which allowed rapid parts delivery
between factories as well as smooth commuting for workers. Improvement of
public transport services was disregarded.
URBANIZATION OF TOYOTA CITY
AND LIFE COURSES OF TOYOTA WORKERS
The expansion of automobile production after 1960 required a large number
of assembly line workers, resulting in an increase in the number of employees
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in Toyota City (fig. 5.4). Before 1959, automobile production did not even
reach one hundred thousand units, but after 1960, automobile production
and the number of workers increased dramatically. Until the 1980s, both
production and the number of employees continued to grow, though the growth
in both categories slowed in the mid-1970s due to the impact of the oil crisis.
TMC employees during the expansion era can be divided into two cat-
egories. The first category is workers from local farms. Many sons of farmers
worked for a plant, and took care of their farms on weekends (Matsui 1958).
The second category is the new migrants from different areas of Japan. In the
latter half of the 1960s, more than eight thousand people flowed into Toyota
City every year. These newcomers came mainly from Chubu (central Japan)
and Kyushu (fig. 5.5).
In the postwar period of high economic growth, Japan experienced a
massive inland migration from rural areas to urban areas, and many migrants
moved to the industrial areas around Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya (Okamoto
1997). Few workers came to Toyota City from Hokkaido and Tohoku be-
cause the majority of migrants from these locales were destined for the indus-
trial areas around Tokyo. As TMC developed its mass production system in
the 1960s, not only TMC personnel but also the staff of Toyota City, includ-
ing the mayor and municipal assembly members, visited bordering rural ar-
eas to recruit middle-school and high-school graduates to augment the
workforce in Toyota City.
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Fig. 5.4. Automobile production by TMC and number of TMC employees, 1945-
1986. (Source: Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota City)
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The influx of migrants brought rapid population growth and dramatic
change to the employment structure of Toyota City. The population of the
city nearly doubled from 104,529 to 197,193 during the 1960s, although the
annexation of neighboring towns contributed to the population increase.
During the same decade, the ratio of employed persons in secondary indus-
tries increased from 35 percent to more than 60 percent, while the percentage
in the primary sector dropped sharply from 43 percent to 12 percent (fig.
5.6).
Most of the migrant workers were single males. After settling in Toyota
City, they married, had children, and hoped to move from their cramped
quarters to larger houses. In 1964, TMC started a housing loan fund to en-
courage employees to buy their own homes. In 1969, the Toyota Housing
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Fig. 5.6. Employment in three major economic sectors in Toyota City, 1950-1995.
{Source: Population Census of Japan, 1950-1995)
Corporation, a housing company, was established as one of the Toyota Group
corporations. It began construction of housing complexes within Toyota City
to provide affordable houses for TMC employees.
The development of plants, subcontractors' factories, and housing for
employees brought rapid urbanization to Toyota City. The Densely Inhabited
District (DID) expanded between 1960 and 1980 (fig. 5.7). The thick line
indicates the DID in 1960, which corresponds to the urban core of old
Koromo Town. In the 1960s, TMC started to build company houses and dor-
mitories around Head Plant, and the DID consequently expanded to the south.
After that, Toyota Housing Corporation developed housing complexes around
existing urbanized areas, which brought a further extension of the DID.
TMC plants are concentrated in the southwestern part of the city. There
are many dormitories for bachelors and company-owned houses in this area.
Unmarried and newly wed employees live here close to their workplace. After
they purchase their own homes, they commute relatively long distances by
cars, which they assembled themselves and purchased from their employer.
Actually, many TMC workers buy their own homes when they are around
the age of thirty (Fujita, 1988a). Even an employee coming from a poor rural
region can have a house and Toyota car at a young age—and this is the ideal
life course TMC has promoted for its employees since the 1960s. However,
we should recognize that not all employees of the company attain such a life
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Fig. 5.7. Toyota City: Expansion of DID and housing construction by TMC. DID
(Densely Inhabited District) is defined as an area that is composed of a group of
contiguously enumerated districts, each of which has a population density of 4,000
persons or more per square kilometer, and whose total population is 5,000 or more.
(Source: Population Census of Japan, 1960, 1970, 1980; Toyota Motor Corpora-
tion, and Sato ,1987)
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course. Many workers leave TMC and find new jobs at small subcontractors
in Toyota City or the commercial and service sectors in the Nagoya metro-
politan area (Fujita 1988a). The decision to resign is often the result of work-
ing both day shift and night shift at TMC plants.
T H E DAY AND NIGHT SHIFTS IN ASSEMBLY PLANTS
Inl962 TMC introduced the night shift at assembly plants. TMC expected a
great surge in demand for the automobile in the near future because Japan
had entered a period of high economic growth in the 1960s. Since that time,
many employees work a day shift and a night shift. In this working-time
management, one group of employees works a day shift one week and works
a night shift the next week (fig. 5.8). Another group works in the reverse
order to balance the number of employees of both shifts. This style of shift
allocation is common in the Japanese automobile industry.
The day and night shift plan is very important to JIT. JIT is a production
system without stock; that is, a company produces only the amount expected
for demand. That means a company has to be able to quickly adjust the
amount of production, and flexible utilization of labor force is indispensable.
Actually, TMC has used temporary workers at times to adjust the labor force,
but they have mainly utilized their own human resources.
TMC had three strategies, at different time-scale levels, for the flexible
use of human resources. The first was the temporal change of shift system. As
a rule, each plant makes different types of cars. If the demand of a certain
type of car decreases greatly, the plant that produces this type of car discontin-
ues day and night shifts, and temporarily uses only the day shift. Surplus work-
ers are transferred to a plant producing high-demand cars. Since plants are
concentrated in and around Toyota City, workers can easily change their work-
place. The second strategy is working on weekends, usually daytime on Satur-
days. It can be called the production adjustment at week level. The third strategy
is the adjustment at day level. There are two to four hours between a day shift
and a night shift (fig. 5.8). These periods are used for overtime work. In the
high-economic-growth period in Japan, overtime work was normal, and Toyota
assembly workers were accustomed to working overtime. TMC has realized
the flexible use of human resources through combining these three strategies.
Almost all laborers who worked at night, overtime, and on weekends
were male. Fujita (1988b) reported that the long shifts and irregular working
hours at the time made it difficult for workers to have lives outside their
work. Activities at home and in the local community were limited. This labor
management system requires the wives of employees to stay home to allow
husbands to concentrate on their work. Wives have to manage all the house-
work and child care (Kimoto 1995).
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T H E 1 9 9 0 S RECESSION AND THE REACTION BY T M C
Since 1990 TMC has faced upheaval of the business environment and has
had to change the TMC production strategy. On a global scale, TMC faces
the difficult condition of the appreciated yen. Automobiles made by TMC in
Japan weaken the competitive position of TMC in world markets. In addi-
tion, the increase of the Japanese trade surplus has been severely criticized in
the United States. To increase profit margins without being susceptible to the
influence of foreign exchange fluctuations, TMC accelerated the transplanta-
tion of manufacturing to the United States and Europe. TMC intended to
cope with the saturation of global automobile markets through these trans-
plants. One goal in the "2005 years vision" of TMC is the local production
of automobiles tailored to each country. TMC changed its corporate strategy
in Japan from export oriented to domestic oriented.
On the domestic scale, production was restructured spatially. The work
ethic of the younger generation has changed. They tend to avoid heavy work
or physical labor. These changes led the firm to relocate domestic plants.
Toyota City is located in the Nagoya metropolitan area and is close to the
neighboring metropolitan areas of Tokyo and Osaka. Young workers are at-
tracted to the commercial and service sectors in these metropolitan areas. There-
fore, it has become difficult for TMC to attract assembly line workers. TMC
decided to build new plants in the outer regions of Japan, such as Kyushu and
Hokkaido, where the new plants could employ high school graduates.
In 1992, Toyota Motor Kyushu Corporation (TMKC) started operation
of a plant at Miyata Town, Fukuoka prefecture, Kyushu Island. At one time,
Miyata Town was a coal-mining town. For more than twenty years, since
mining declined in the 1960s, Miyata Town had been advocating that TMC
build a plant there. In 1989, TMC decided to build an automobile assembling
plant in Miyata Town. TMC selected Miyata Town as the plant location due
to the presence of a nearby interchange on the Kyushu expressway. Subcon-
tractors followed TMC and also built factories around Miyata Town. Sub-
contractor factories numbered only about thirty to forty, however (Endo,
1997). TMKC operates the JIT production system without a concentration
of subcontractors. A lot of parts are delivered via expressway or shipping
from distant suppliers.
T H E CHANGE OF THE SHIFT SYSTEM
In May 1995, TMC changed the day and night shift system into a sequential
shift system. Under this new working-time management plan, the first shift is
from 6:30 A.M. to 3:15 P.M. and the second shift is from 4:15 P.M. to 1:00 A.M.;
the two shifts are consecutive rather than separated by a long interval (fig.
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5.8). Workers alternate two periods every week in the same way as with the
day and night shift system. About twenty-five thousand workers in twelve
plants in and around Toyota City adopted this change. So it was expected
that this change of the shift system would influence the daily lives of not only
the Toyota employees but also the other citizens.
Why did TMC change the shift system? There were two reasons. The
first reason was cost reduction. The high currency exchange rate for Japanese
yen in the 1980s had weakened the competitive position of the Japanese au-
tomotive industry in world markets. Management tried to reduce labor ex-
pense in order to decrease production costs. In the old day and night shift
plan, workers had received three kinds of extra wages: allowance for work-
ing a night shift, allowance for working overtime, and allowance for working
alternating day shift and night shift. These allowances sometimes added up to a
quarter of the entire monthly income of a worker. By changing the day and
night shift system into a sequential shift system, TMC reduced some of these
allowances, including about half of the allowance for working a night shift and
almost all of the allowance for working overtime because overtime work was
largely eliminated by the new shift system. While the domestic demand for
automobiles has dropped since the collapse of the bubble economy at the be-
ginning of 1990s, local production in plants located overseas is increasing, es-
pecially in the United States. Under these circumstances, overtime work is not
as necessary. TMC expected labor expenses to decrease by ¥3 billion a year due
to the change of the shift system (Nihon Keizai Shimbun May 8,1995).
The second reason for the change in the shift system was to improve
working conditions. Young people today tend to dislike working in factories.
TMC faced occasional worker shortages because young people easily gave up
these jobs. The night shift work and overtime work placed great burdens on
workers. TMC had to attract workers by improving working conditions. In
the new shift system, the hours after the first shift and the hours before the
second shift are available for leisure or volunteer activities.
The first reason, cost reduction, was more important to TMC, but TMC
stressed the second reason in announcements. An increase of leisure time for
employees was an official aim of the change. TMC enlarged the parking lots
around the plants by three thousand spaces because the workers on the first
shift and second shift would use the parking lots at the same time during the
short interval between shifts. This cost around ¥3 billion, which would be
recovered within a couple of years (Yomiuri Shimbun April 22,1995).
THE IMPACT OF THE SHIFT SYSTEM CHANGE ON THE COMMUNITY
The new shift system affects the community in various ways. First, there is an
influence on TMC subcontractors. According to newspaper articles, the three
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affiliate body manufacturers of Toyota—Shatai, Arako, and Toyoda Auto
Loom Works—introduced sequential shifts simultaneously with the change
by TMC. Moreover, about 40 percent of the eighty main suppliers in the
Nagoya metropolitan area had already adopted sequential shifts or intro-
duced the system by May 1995. Consequently, about nine thousand people
working in these companies changed their working hours (Asahi Shimbun
May 2,1995).
To learn the effect on subcontractors in more detail, we conducted a
questionnaire survey in 1999 and received answers from forty-six companies.
According to this survey, the reaction to the change was diverse among sub-
contractors, and it seemed to depend on various aspects of their business
practices such as transactions with other companies, utilization of the labor
force, and parts supply method. For example, one subcontractor, a bolts and
nuts maker, changed the working hours of two shifts from 8:00 A.M.-5:00
P.M./5 P.M.-6:00 A.M. to 7:00 A.M.-4:00 P.M./4:00 P.M.-1:00 A.M. in response to
the shift system change by TMC. This company is located near the Motomachi
Plant and has a close transaction relationship with TMC. It needed to syn-
chronize its production schedule with that of TMC.
Some subcontractors used a three-shift system (twenty-four-hour pro-
duction) and supplied parts not only to TMC but to other automobile manu-
facturers like Honda, Mitsubishi, and Matsuda. They did not alter their shift
system, because they needed to maintain three shifts to adjust to the produc-
tion schedules of different customers. Other subcontractors worked only a
day shift prior to the shift system change at TMC. They responded that it was
impossible to operate the night shift because they hired many female work-
ers. Although a lot of subcontractors hired women, these women could not
work at night because until recently the Japanese Labor Standards Law pro-
hibited night work by women.
Two of the surveyed subcontractors changed their parts delivery sched-
ules for TMC, though they did not change their production schedules. They
stopped night delivery because TMC discontinued nighttime production ac-
tivities. Thus, production schedules and distribution schedules are not nec-
essarily linked in subcontractors. Some suppliers located far from Toyota
City have depots near TMC plants. By using these depots, they can produce
and deliver the parts independent from the change in the shift system at
TMC.
Next, we turn our attention to local businesses other than subcontrac-
tors. A convenience store chain, Family Mart, has changed part of its delivery
system. This chain has forty-five stores in the Toyota region, and food com-
modities like lunch boxes and rice balls are distributed to each store three
times a day, from a distribution center in Okazaki City near Toyota City.
Family Mart changed the departure time of the midnight delivery from the
center to one hour earlier to meet the demand of workers finishing the second
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shift. The change of delivery time included the change of production time in
the food factory of the chain. As another example, a chain of sento, or bath-
houses, also changed their hours of operation. The closing time shifted from
midnight to 3 A.M. (Yomiuri Shimbun May 15,1995).
Few commercial businesses took measures to meet the new situation,
however. According to a questionnaire survey by the Chamber of Commerce
and Industry of Toyota City conducted two months after of the shift system
change, only eight of twenty-eight restaurants around the main plants made
some adaptations. Six restaurants changed their business hours, and two res-
taurants changed their menus for the first shift workers whose finishing time
was poorly timed for either lunch or dinner (Toyota Chamber of Commerce
and Industry 1995).
Traffic congestion during morning and evening rush hours has eased.
Actually, traffic on main roads has decreased by 30 percent from 7 A.M. to 8
A.M. On the other hand, traffic has increased around 4 P.M. Since this hour
corresponds to the time children return home from school, some counter-
measures were considered for safe traffic. Schoolteachers checked which streets
the children used and guided them to safer streets. TMC advised their work-
ers not to drive on roads without sidewalks. Police changed the signal cycle of
about 198 traffic lights, or about 37 percent of all traffic lights in Toyota
City. As a result, most potential problems were avoided.
CHANGES OF THE DAILY LIVES OF TOYOTA WORKERS
AND THEIR FAMILIES
The influence on citizens other than Toyota workers is indirect, while the
change on the daily lives of Toyota workers and their families is very direct.
To examine such influences, the Toyota City Research Institution of Trans-
portation Planning conducted a panel survey. Data on daily life were taken
from an activity diary survey of the households of Toyota workers as well as
the other households. In this survey, the space-time budgets for both hus-
bands and wives were scrutinized in detail. (For a survey method, see Okamoto
1997.) This panel consisted of two time surveys. The first survey was done
during two weeks of April 1995, just before the change, and the second sur-
vey was done during two weeks in October in the same year, or five months
after the change. (For survey results in detail, see Nishimura 1998.)
Here we will focus on data from sixty-one households in which hus-
bands worked a day shift, a night shift, the first shift, the second shift and in
which the daily activity data on all these shifts were completed. Figure 5.9
shows the aggregate daily paths of husbands on a day before the change and
on a day after the change; the chart shows the aggregate daily routine of
wives on a day before the change for comparison purposes. In the top dia-
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gram, between 6 A.M. and 8 A.M., day shift workers leave home and gather at
several plants, while, at the same time, night shift workers return home from
the plants. Between 6 P.M. and 9 P.M., the reverse phenomena occur. In the
sequential shift system, the pattern is basically the same, but the commuting
times are different, and the pattern of daily paths is a bit more complicated,
which means that outdoor activities other than commuting by husbands in-
creased slightly. The aggregate routine of wives is rather complicated. Each
wife has her own activity pattern.
Figure 5.10 illustrates the patterns of one family and charts the daily
paths of wife and husband before the shift change. Figure 5.10a shows a day
when the husband works a day shift, and figure 5.10b shows a day when the
husband works a night shift. In this family, the wife works full time. During
the day shift, the time-space paths of wife and husband are parallel. During
the night shift, the paths are inverse to each other. The wife stays at home at
night and the husband stays at home during the daytime, but they have break-
fast and supper together with both shifts. The wife escorts the child to and
from the day nursery.
Figure 5.11 shows the same family's daily life after the shift change.
Figure 5.1 la is one of the days of the week when the husband works the first
shift. Figure 5.11b is a day when the husband works the second shift. The
path of the husband deviates from the path of the wife. So they can hardly
engage in co-activities such as having a meal together. This is true especially
when the husband works the second shift. On the other hand, the husband
can pick up the child after first shift work and can take the child to the nurs-
ery before the second shift.
From this example we can surmise that the change of the shift system
produced two important influences on family life. One influence pertains to
the co-activity of the family members. The other is the influence on the shar-
ing of household chores by the wife and husband.
Table 5.1 indicates how long the wife and husband spend awake to-
gether at the same location. The length of time they spend awake together is
extremely short when the husband works the second shift. Since the husband
returns home at midnight and sleeps late into the morning, the husband can
hardly see his children. Table 5.2 shows the ratio of husbands who eat with
any other members of their families. In modern society, each member of the
family performs his or her life activities in the daytime, so dinner is an impor-
tant event for family cohesiveness. Before the change, many husbands ate with
the family even when working the night shift. But after the change, it became
impossible for husbands to have dinner with the family when working the
second shift. The husband had to have dinner alone in his home or eat out.
The share of household chores performed by husbands has increased
(fig. 5.12). When working the second shift, husbands have to leave home so
early in the morning that many husbands began preparing breakfast by them-
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Fig. 5.12. Changes of husband's share of household activities. (Source: Based on
field survey)
selves; for this reason, the ratio of husbands setting the table for breakfast, in
particular, has increased. But many wives still prepare breakfast for their hus-
bands. Some wives set the table for meals six times a day. Nevertheless, the
change of the shift system led to the change of gender role traditions and led
Table 5.1. Length of awake time couples spend at the same place in a day
Husbands
Day shift
Night shift
First shift
Second shift
Other than Toyota workers
Average time
3 hours 56 minutes
3 hours 12 minutes
4 hours 27 minutes
1 hour 49 minutes
4 hours 24 minutes
Source: Based on field survey.
Table 5.2. Percentage of husbands who eat with other members of the
family
Husbands
Day shift
Night shift
First shift
Second shift
Other than Toyota workers
Breakfast
52.2
24.0
18.1
45.4
63.4
Supper
65.2
78.0
81.9
0.0
54.2
Source: Based on field survey.
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husbands to become independent. In the two-income family of figures 5.10
and 5.11, the husband shared the child care activity of escorting their child to
and from day nursery after the shift system change, though the wife per-
formed this responsibility before the change. The husband took his child to
the nursery on the day that he worked the second shift (fig. 5.11b) and took
him home on the day that he worked the first shift (fig. 5.11a). But husbands
cannot do both on the same day and cannot do either for successive weeks
because their off hours change every other week.
BUILDING THE N E W TIME-SPACE
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, global environmental problems
are a focus of attention. Successful development of technology to reduce car-
bon dioxide emissions could be a matter of life or death for automobile com-
panies in the near future. In 1998 TMC began to sell a model of hybrid electric
vehicles, the Prius, in Japan. Development of an environmentally friendly car
surely is a part of the answer to the environmental problem, but the realiza-
tion of sustainable transport requires us to reconsider the relationship be-
tween the automobile and society. TMC has recently focused on the research
and development of an Intelligent Transport System (ITS). ITS includes a
variety of technologies to advance both automobiles and infrastructure. ITS
is expected to become a $500 billion business in Japan in the future.
This technological development is imposing another change in the way
of life in Toyota City. As part of the research and development of ITS, TMC
started in Toyota City in May 1999 a social experiment of the "shared per-
sonal commuter EV [electric vehicle] system," called Crayon. This is a com-
muter system of electric vehicles shared among several people. The participants
in the system reserve two-seater electric vehicles via the Internet and pay a
nominal charge for each ride with an IC (integrated-circuit) personal identifi-
cation card. Almost all TMC workers commute by car. The experiment of the
EV car share program is being implemented with the cooperation of three
hundred TMC workers.
Men have predominated in the automobile assembly workplace since
the period of high economic growth in Japan, but the labor force shortage of
the late 1980s caused TMC to consider employing women on the assembly
line. The Labor Standards Law and Equal Employment Opportunity Law
were revised in April 1999 and made it possible for women to work at night.
Under this revised law, TMC has started to introduce women onto the assem-
bly lines. Two changes of working environment made it possible for women
to enter TMC plants: the introduction of the new shift system and the im-
provement of assembly lines. The shift system change in 1995 reduced physi-
cal fatigue because night work and overtime work were decreased by the
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Shared commuter system (Crayon) in Toyota City. Increased use of motor vehicles
has prompted Toyota to promote effective use of a variety of transportation means,
including ride sharing. (Photograph by Yuichiro Nishimura)
sequential shift. Physical fatigue was also reduced by improvements on the
assembly lines. Here, "improvement" means not full automation but recon-
sideration of the way duties between machines and workers are divided and
assigning the exhausting work to robots. The latest type of assembly line was
introduced at the Tsutsumi Plant in Toyota City and the Miyata Plant in
Kyushu. On the new line, physical labor was reduced, enabling women and
the elderly to work in the plant (Fujita 1997). These plants are trying to raise
the percentage of female workers. In the U.S. plants of Toyota, such as the
plant in Georgetown, Kentucky, many female workers are on the assembly
lines. TMC might be able to put the experience in its U.S. plants to use in the
development of female employment in its domestic plants.
In Toyota City, many facilities used by citizens, such as Toyota co-op
and Toyota hospital, are TMC establishments for corporate welfare (Fujita
and Hill 1995). These facilities are dispersed throughout the city. Until the
early 1980s, construction of public facilities was not centralized, though
each facility was well equipped on the basis of abundant revenue. Toyota
City did not have an urban core because of the influence of the "automobile
society."
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In the city center of Toyota, around the Toyota Railway station, renewal plans create
a "new face" for the city. The redevelopment project on the station's west exit (seen
here) was completed in 1988, and a similar plan for the east exit was finished in
1995.The area around the station has a new, youthful image. (Photograph by Yuichiro
Nishimura)
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The new era has led Toyota City to turn to the concept of city planning.
The city government feared that a city without a core would retain the image
of an old industrial city, which cannot attract young people. So they started a
redevelopment program for the city center in 1983. First, a department store
and a multiuse commercial building were built around the Toyota railway
terminal, and these buildings were connected to each other by a pedestrian
deck. Then, some public facilities, such as a new library, a concert hall, and a
Japanese-style garden, were constructed intensively in this area. A parking lot
guidance system using ITS technology was introduced to reduce traffic con-
gestion. The city center has become more attractive to citizens and is easier to
access by car.
The redevelopment program aims to create a new landscape worthy of
the Mother City of a Japanese leading company. TMC and the city govern-
ment are trying to grow out of an old industrial city,to become the center of
new technology based on the automobile industry. Their new initiatives are
transforming both the production structure and the urban structure, and that
will make a new time-space of citizens' daily lives.
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Dynamics of Growth
and Change in
Georgetown, Kentucky
JANET W. PATTON AND H. MILTON PATTON
GEORGETOWN, KENTUCKY, developed at the site of Royal Spring,
which was discovered in 1774 by surveyors from Fincastle County, Virginia.
The first permanent settlement of Georgetown occurred in 1785, when Rev.
Elijah Craig led a party of Virginia Baptists to Royal Spring. Georgetown was
incorporated December 16, 1790, and it became the Scott County seat on
June 22, 1792. Scott, the state's eleventh county, was formed out of part of
Woodford County. It is named after Revolutionary War General Charles Scott,
who became Kentucky's fourth governor. Georgetown College was chartered
in January 1892 as the first Baptist college west of the Allegheny mountains.
By 1890 Scott County's population reached eighteen thousand. For the next
seventy years, the county's population was either stable or declining. Adja-
cent Lexington-Fayette County, the regional trading center and home to the
state university and thoroughbred farms, provided the social center for those
who harked back to ancestral landed gentry.
The first regional post-World War II industrial development began in
Georgetown in 1946 when Elroy Mallard relocated a pencil factory from
central Tennessee. The payment of wages changed the conditions of employ-
ment in an economy of tenant farmers. Sons of tenant farmers remember as
children sitting around the cracker barrels at the local stores hearing farmers
talk about how hard it was to find good help. Mysterious fires were known
to break out in places that paid money for work, putting such places out of
business.
IBM decided to build its Selectric Typewriter plant in Lexington, on
state land north of the mental institution, in 1958. That act established a
contemporary industrial base in the Bluegrass. The dominant product en-
dured until it was supplanted by computers thirty years later. Ownership ul-
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timately passed to Lexmark, makers of computer printers. Fewer than ten
miles from the plant, Georgetown was a generation away.
In the 1970s, while the economy and population showed signs of de-
cline, completion of north-south Interstate 75 and east-west Interstate 64,
which cross just south of Georgetown, made a quiet but ultimately profound
change in the accessibility and character of the community. 1-75 parallels the
main line of the Southern Railroad from Detroit to Miami, and 1-64 runs
from Norfolk, Virginia, to St. Louis, Missouri, and westward. Georgetown
found itself at major crossroads in an interstate-dominated economy. In this
chapter, the growth and change in Georgetown-Scott County since the 1985
arrival of a major Japanese corporation are analyzed.
SELECTION OF THE GEORGETOWN SITE: " I T WAS JUST A FEELING"
Early in 1985 quiet rumors circulated that General Motors' Saturn plant site
selection team ranked a Georgetown site number two. The site was a large
farm just north of Georgetown which had been purchased for $1,200 per
acre by an investor a few years before when farmers shunned the property as
being overpriced.
In late fall, rumors suddenly spread through the community that Toyota
might soon announce the location of a plant in Georgetown. Excitement,
shock, fear, and anticipation were felt throughout the community. News sto-
ries in major national papers heightened the speculation. When a farmer's
wife was reported as the final holdout in site negotiations, it was front page
news in the Los Angeles Times. Many citizens had links with "inside sources"
to negotiations confirming that an announcement was eminent. Characteris-
tic of Kentucky, negotiations were directed by its governor, Martha Layne
Collins. Scott County and Georgetown were informed at the very last stage
of the process and had little or no input during the site selection process.
On December 11, 1985, the large ballroom of the Hyatt Regency Lex-
ington filled with press from around the world. Governor Collins, Senator
Wendell Ford, and Dr. Shoichiro Toyoda, president of Toyota Motor Corpo-
ration (TMC), announced Georgetown-Scott County as the site for the first
Toyota manufacturing plant in America, soon to be one of the largest auto
plants in North America. The excitement of the moment filled the ballroom
with the euphoria of witnessing an international event and then emptied it as
reporters scrambled for the phones.
Journalists and academics quickly fell to analyzing the decision and ap-
plying favored theories about location, state incentives wars, politics, and
speculative impacts. The Kentucky incentives package, the largest ever granted
by any state, drew much criticism. A source privy to internal site team discus-
sion suggests that after all basic requirements for the plant, such as transpor-
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tation networks, access to markets, and a greenfield site, were satisfied, the
location was selected on behavioral grounds by Chairman Eiji Toyoda. As a
career marketing executive, he had led Toyota into the American market. He
once drove a new model on a test run from Chicago to Miami, stopping in
the Bluegrass and liking what he saw.
As the Hyatt ballroom emptied, a small knot of reporters gathered around
the managing director of Toyota, who served as head of the site selection
team. Fluent in English, son of a Japanese diplomat, and engaging in manner,
he fielded all questions with comfort for forty-five minutes. He reflected an
open style, sensitivity, perspective, and set of goals that have held consistent
for fifteen years. His comments reflected understatement, while Toyota has
consistently over-performed. Among the questions and answers were: Q: Why
did you select Kentucky? A: It was just a feeling. Q: This is a hard-nosed
business decision? A: Yes, but with all things being equal, it was just a feeling.
It is an area similar to the area in which we operate in Japan. Q: Did you pick
a state that doesn't have a Japanese plant in order to influence import poli-
cies? A: No, we seek to serve the people with the best possible product, and it
is the people who select their representatives. Q: Were you concerned about
Georgetown and its people? A: Yes, because the plant is so large and the town
is so small. It was a concern, but just a concern. We will respect their way of
life and community. Q: Why are you building a U.S. plant? A: We have wanted
to establish ourselves as part of the U.S. auto industry for twenty-five years.
First, we developed marketing experience. When we felt comfortable about
doing business here, we developed a joint plant with GM to produce cars and
learned about manufacturing here. When we felt comfortable with that, we
decided it was time to build a plant. Q: When was the decision on location
made? A: It was made in New York on Sunday (December 8th) in a meeting
with Chairman Toyoda and President Toyoda. (He implied that other sites
were still in the running at that time, among the thirty states submitting pro-
posals and twenty-two states visited.)
The announcement of the new plant promised twenty-five hundred new
jobs. Direct TMMK employment eventually reached seventy-eight hundred
(1999), more than tripling employment projections of the original announce-
ment.
Invitations to the groundbreaking were sent to every official in
Georgetown-Scott County, including the most minor members of its numer-
ous boards and commissions. It was a rainy winter day in a muddy pasture on
the 1,600-acre site. A local official tried to apologize to Chairman Toyoda for
the weather. "No," he replied with a smile, "the gods are crying tears of joy,
raining down on us, melding our two peoples together." For some, that ob-
servation marked the beginning of a cultural evolution. It would not be long
before the community and a new generation of workers learned that the word
"quality" was more than an advertising slogan and that "continual improve-
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ment" was very close to a religion. Ultimately, the successful melding, or
hybridization, of the two cultures in the Georgetown Camry plant estab-
lished the future direction of Toyota's worldwide operations, an international
demonstration in the global economy. Toyota announced at the ground-break-
ing a $1 million gift to the community. It was to be for a community center,
Georgetown's number one priority
Toyota's arrival was a landmark for not only Georgetown, but also
Toyota. It was not a routine location decision but the achievement of a long-
term goal for a company that nearly failed after World War II. The chairman
was the grandson of the founder, an inventor and loom manufacturer in the
Meiji era. The company began building automobiles in the 1930s and in re-
cent decades emphasized marketing. In Japan, Nissan was considered to be
the better car, while Toyota was considered to be built on advertising. The
chairman would soon be replaced by his cousin, a doctorate in automotive
engineering, who had been focusing on production technology surpassing the
U.S. industry. The Georgetown plant would be a test of hybridization focus-
ing on quality and efficiency. It would quickly achieve the highest plant effi-
ciency award in the American industry, and within ten years, it would produce
America's top selling vehicle, known for quality.
Dr. Fujio Cho managed the plant during its formative years and work-
ing constantly to combine effectively both cultures into a production system
that achieved highest quality. He lived in Georgetown, joined Rotary, and
was seen frequently on the shop floor, personally working on production
problems and safety. His son attended local Georgetown College. Cho left
Georgetown to become a director of Toyota Motor Corporation. He was
appointed president of Toyota Motor Corporation in April 1999. His depar-
ture from Georgetown caused sadness among many residents who revered his
humane and sensitive approach and style. Most had never known a high
executive in common work shirt with a common desk among many in the
same room, or the passion he displayed in personally seeking solutions to
such problems as an employee's severed finger. Veteran auto workers knew
that such things were generally ignored in American auto plants with blame
placed on the worker. In this case, modifications were made to Toyota's presses
throughout the world, twenty-four-hour standby ambulances were located at
the plant, and special arrangements were made for immediate helicopter evacu-
ation to the nearest specialty hospital.
COMMUNITY RESPONSE AND LOCAL PLANNING
"Shock" is the best descriptor for community reaction to the site location
announcement. National press and land speculators immediately descended
on Main Street, respectively interviewing anyone they could find and promis-
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ing lucrative options to anyone who would sell. While the business commu-
nity was ecstatic, local elected leadership, having only recently been informed,
were confused, dispirited, or outright angry for what others had brought on
them without consultation or warning.
National opposition groups, who had been organizing since the announce-
ment, used the groundbreaking to dramatize their concerns. Opposition fo-
cused on several issues. Labor groups challenged the use of nonunion
construction workers; critics of the incentives package, such as Ralph Nadar,
denounced corporate giveaway; environmental and preservation groups wor-
ried about pollution and quality-of-life issues; and a legacy of anti-Japanese
World War II sentiment surfaced from time to time. Some governors in the
National Governor's Conference considered declaration of a truce, propos-
ing a moratorium on incentives package warfare among the states.
Among those filing lawsuits challenging the incentives package and per-
mitting process were Jerry Hammond, secretary-treasurer of the Kentucky
Building Trades Council, and Lucky McClintock, president of the central
division of the Building Trades Council and a Scott County resident. The
lawsuits were designed to slow construction and force Toyota and Ohbayashi,
the construction contractor, to negotiate a labor contract. The suits, rein-
forced by demonstrations and adverse publicity, accomplished their objec-
tive. By December 1986, Ohbayashi accepted union workers and Hammond
withdrew his suits and the threat of a protest demonstration in Washington,
D.C., on Pearl Harbor Day. Other suits ended in June 1987, when the consti-
tutionality of the economic incentives package was affirmed by the Kentucky
Supreme Court with a vote of four to three (Gelsanliter 1990, Hoyman 1997).
In the fury of the interstate bidding war for Toyota, local government
impact had been finessed or ignored. State economic development staff had
focused on what they knew best, interstate highways, major rail line, land
availability, and available workers. Only after the fact did the state modestly
fund the Toyota Impact Center, staffed by the part-time planning director for
Georgetown-Scott County. The state also assigned a local government expert
from its Department of Local Government to coordinate state programs on
behalf of the community and give advice as needed. A resident of Scott County,
Bob Leonard performed a critical role in bridging change for local govern-
ments during the next five years.
While shock gave way to fear of being overrun, several key individuals
and activities began to shape a process by which the community would re-
spond to the new challenges and seek to guide the change to achieve local
community goals. Through negotiation, local government was able to imple-
ment several decisive actions, which enhanced the community's ability to pro-
mote its own interests. The state assumed the responsibility for building permits
and other regulatory processes for the Toyota plant that required little local
input. However, matters of land use, utility location, local tax policies, an-
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nexation, and local government management and services were clearly the
realm of local government. While Governor Collins was and is highly popu-
lar in Scott County, even she was not in a position to direct these matters.
One local issue after another during the next year made the governor's staff
and Toyota managers uncomfortable.
One example is the provision of a new publicly funded sewer plant to
serve the Toyota plant, which had been specified in the incentives package.
The five members of the County Board of Adjustment met for their usual
monthly meeting in January 1986, about six weeks after the announcement.
The typical agenda was to approve variances such as church locations and
enforce ordinances such as locating barns at least forty feet from adjacent
property lines. Other requested variances were typically decided by counting
the number of neighbors who appeared to protest. At the end of the January
meeting, the director and engineer for the Georgetown Municipal Water and
Sewer District stood to ask for location approval for the sewer treatment
plant for the Toyota site. He was asked for his application. He explained
that he met with Toyota "officials" in Frankfort in November and told
them that the location on Lanes Run adjacent to the plant was appropriate
because it met the standard of being a "blue line stream" on the topographic
map. The board inquired how this location related to any existing commu-
nity plan. The response was dumbfounded silence. The board asked him to
complete a proper application like everyone else was required to do and
return in February.
At the next meeting of the board, the five members, probing a variety of
environmental and locational issues, concluded that the application and pre-
sentation were inadequate. The process proceeded in like manner for more
than four months, with growing audiences and experts brought before the
board in formal hearings. The search for the highest expert knowledge was
the heart of the process. State economic development staff and the biggest
lobbyists in the state had become frustrated with the process. They were looking
for ways to circumvent the board's authority but did not put any personal
pressure on the members. At nearly every meeting, additional safeguards were
added, increasing the cost of the facility by $2 million. In the midst of the
hearings, a wealthy landowner through whose land wastewater would flow
legally challenged the Water and Sewer District and the state permitting pro-
cess. Their technical and legal experts added to the testimony and intensified
statewide press coverage.
Finally, board members were satisfied that they had drawn out the high-
est state of the art in facility design and that the scientific community could
add nothing more. The board knew there was a better location alternative
from a community land use perspective, but it was too late to change it.
Before an overflow audience and without prior consultation, a member of
the board moved to approve, with conditions assuring that its operational
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performance would not materially damage the environment. There was a
unanimous vote of approval. That night, the board could have as easily
voted unanimously in the negative. In effect, the board retained for the
community the power to close the plant immediately if a violation of the
conditions occurred.
Legal counsel for the Board of Adjustment was newly appointed City
Attorney Charlie Perkins. The hearings were his testing ground in adminis-
trative process, citizen participation, and local policy development. As attor-
ney for the City of Georgetown, the City-County Planning Commission, the
Board of Adjustment, and the Housing Authority, Perkins guided processes
with patience, skill, and careful respect for the requirements of the adminis-
trative process for the next thirteen years. Some credit him, and his fortuitous
appointment one month before Toyota's announcement, with the positive
outcomes in the community during the ensuing years. The Board of Adjust-
ment hearings established the standards and practices for planning and policy
development for both city and county at the outset of the change process.
During the same period (late 1980s) the county became increasingly con-
cerned with its financial situation. Scott County Judge Executive Charlie Sutton
was among the critics of the state incentives plan. With the termination of
federal revenue sharing, the county was nearly bankrupt. Efforts to impose a
payroll tax in 1985 had been defeated. Early in 1986, however, the Scott
County Fiscal Court moved quickly to impose a payroll tax of 1 percent that
it would levy on the construction workers as well as employees of the new
plant when it became operational. The action was met with hostility and
threats by the state. Tension with the city heightened when the county refused
to consider sharing the new revenue with the city, which had been levying a 1
percent payroll and net profit tax since the 1970s.
The issue of annexation was a major concern to the city. Annexation
was not included in the incentives package, and it was believed that Toyota
was opposed to annexation. Annexation would add to Toyota's tax liability
for both its occupational and net profits, on top of what had been added by
the new county tax. Generally, tension existed between the two governments
and between each government and Toyota. When Tom Prather was appointed
mayor of Georgetown in October 1986, he initiated a process of regular con-
sultation with Alex Warren, a Toyota vice president. As a result of this work-
ing relationship, which has continued through the years, Toyota announced
in April 1987 that it would seek annexation and the City of Georgetown
undertook a number of key actions to upgrade its police and fire protection.
Both services were enlarged and professionalized, and new facilities were es-
tablished. The new generation of city officials realized the need for far greater
professionalization in public administration (Hoyman 1997).
While annexation of Toyota into Georgetown was important for rev-
enue generation, it was equally important for coherent urban land use devel-
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opment (fig. 6.1). Urban services, especially water and sewer, and annexation
were soon tied together in all urban development extensions. Arrival of Toyota
heightened the need to further strengthen planning and land use regulation
practices in a locale that already had a strong tradition of a joint city-county
planning commission. Essentially, a strong discipline was imposed for all new
developments, adjacency, consistency with the comprehensive plan, urban
services, and annexation. Outside the urban area, a strict five-acre minimum
was required. During the 1991 mandatory review of the comprehensive plan,
great effort went into the refinement of these basic requirements.
While government officials worried about finances, increased traffic was
the number one concern of citizens. Older residents still fondly remembered
playing baseball or driving tractors on Main Street in the middle of
Georgetown. As part of the initial package with Toyota, the state upgraded
exit ramps to 1-75 and a four-lane access road to and around the plant site
connected at each end to 1-75. From suggestions submitted by schoolchil-
dren, the access road was named Cherry Blossom Way. Soon afterward, the
state added additional lanes to 1-75 south to Lexington and twelve miles to
the north. However, despite assurances by the state that the community would
not be forgotten, the state did not come up with funds for the bypass around
Georgetown that had been on the county's transportation plan since 1979.
The county refused to share in the cost, so Georgetown paid for the local
share of the first quadrant of the bypass (Hoyman 1997). Georgetown opened
the second quadrant of the bypass in 1998, with plans to eventually construct
a bypass around the urban services area with routine state funding. There
also has been substantial widening and upgrade of Kentucky 25, the old north-
south Dixie Highway. Traffic can be heavy between shifts, but overall it is less
than the typical metropolitan area at rush hour. With continuing upgrades
and improved policies and new and rebuilt infrastructure in roadways, water,
sewer, schools, parks, and public buildings, Georgetown-Scott County is in
an enviable position for any community its size.
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SETTING OF GEORGETOWN-SCOTT COUNTY
IN 1985
Georgetown-Scott County began the 1980s in recession, economically and
psychologically. High interest rates in the 1970s and declining markets had
depressed the traditional agricultural economy. Clarke Equipment, which
moved to Scott County in the early 1970s, held promise, but within ten years,
the company padlocked the gates of its huge, modern forklift plant and moved
production to Korea. Heads were low on Main Street, and a peculiarly mean-
spirited 1981 mayoral election marked the tenor of the times. National infla-
tion and low tobacco prices had settled in to begin a decline of the agriculturally
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Fig. 6.1. Growth of Georgetown, 1985-1999. Until Toyota and its parts suppliers
arrived and began creating a new middle class, Georgetown and Scott County had
extremes of wealth (represented by old-money horse owners and some of the most
individualistic tobacco farmers) and poverty (seen in unpainted houses with ice-
boxes on their porches and abandoned cars in their yards), and little in between. A
number of new subdivisions have now developed on the outskirts. And, around the
courthouse, utility wires have come down, sidewalks have been bricked, and alumi-
num sidings removed to reveal the original facade underneath. (Source: Georgetown/
Scott County Planning Commission and field survey, 1999)
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Aerial view of Georgetown and the Toyota Plant, Scott County, Kentucky, in 1989
during initial Camry production. (Photograph courtesy of Georgetown-Scott County
Joint Planning Commission)
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Aerial view of Georgetown and the Toyota Plant in 1998 after the development of
additional facilities that produce Camry, Avalon, and the Sienna van. The urban
area has grown only moderately since the arrival of Toyota because most workers
do not live in Georgetown but prefer to commute from their homes in adjacent
counties. The town's business district retains much of its distinctive character. Most
of the city's commercial development is moving toward the eastern edge, close to
the huge plant. Several restaurants, car dealerships, and an outlet mall have sprung
up. (Photograph courtesy of Georgetown-Scott County Joint Planning Commission)
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based economy. Scott County's unemployment rate had reached 7 percent by
1985 and continued to rise through the Toyota plant's construction period to
9.9 percent in 1988.
The population of Scott County in 1980 was 21,813, with approxi-
mately 11,000 people living in Georgetown (fig. 6.2). While there had been
little net population growth from 1960 to 1985, there were some changes in
the community. The arrival of IBM in Lexington provided new employment
opportunities for area high school and college graduates in the late 1950s and
early 1960s. Suburban Indian Hills and Indian Acres subdivisions on the south
edge of town were largely built by and populated with IBM families using
IBM earnings. Pensions and severance pay beginning in the late 1980s pro-
vided considerable passive income. Johnson Controls and Hoover (now merged
and producing seats for Toyota) established production plants in Georgetown
during this period.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the growth of state government caused an
increase in the number of professional employees residing in Georgetown.
Georgetown—located only twenty miles west of the state capitol, Frankfort,
and within easy reach of the more urban Lexington—was a logical residence
choice for these professionals. By the 1970s, a small but constant trickle of
newcomers moved to Scott County seeking to have it both ways—urban em-
ployment and small-town or country living. Small clusters of intellectuals,
writers, and artists began to be identifiable on the hill farms and woods north
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Fig. 6.2. Scott County: Population growth.
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of Georgetown. In the mid-1970s the first large influx of "outsiders" arrived
from Michigan. They were executives and engineers employed by Clarke
Equipment Company's newly built forklift plant.
The community, however, continued to think of itself as traditional small-
town southern America. And politics in 1985 resembled traditional rural south-
ern politics. More than 95 percent of the county's registered voters were
Democrats, and any competition for local elections happened within the Demo-
cratic primary. Personalities and factions tended to dominate.
City government, with a mayor-council form of government, had a mayor
elected at large for a four-year term and eight council members elected at
large for two-year terms. The three-way divisive mayor's race in 1981 re-
sulted in the election of the weakest candidate. City government was of low-
est visibility during the next four years, including the fall of 1985 when the
state negotiated for Toyota. Sam Pollack, a well-liked retired state Depart-
ment of Education administrator, was elected mayor that fall and looked to
the part-time office as a good way to remain active in retirement. At the
center of national attention and faced with previously unimagined challenges
and problems, Pollack took office three weeks after the Toyota announce-
ment. He had considerable wisdom and encouragement but resigned within
six months due to a heart attack he had during a trip to Washington, D.C. It
was the duty of the eight City Council members to select a new mayor from
their own ranks. Three aspired to the position. Tom Prather, a relatively young,
well-educated third-generation auto dealer and grandson of a former mayor,
was elected by a one-vote margin. Selection of this articulate spokesman passed
leadership to a new generation with a more contemporary style.
Scott County was governed in 1985 by a county judge executive and
three commissioners who constituted the fiscal court. Charles Sutton was in
his third four-year term as county judge executive when Toyota announced
its decision to locate the plant in Georgetown-Scott County. At the time, the
fiscal court was perceived as representing rural interests, often deadlocked,
and seeing its role as protecting the status quo. Judge Executive Charles Sutton
was uncomfortable about the implications of rapid growth for Scott County
but was successful in passing the new 1 percent payroll tax and initiating land
purchases for a new water supply reservoir. In 1988, Sutton resigned to take
a law enforcement position with state government under a new governor.
After a one-year interim, George Lusby was elected county judge executive in
1989. A former school principal, a veteran City Council member, and a resi-
dent of the city who was also widely supported in the county, Judge Lusby
played a key role in forging cooperative governmental policy initiatives dur-
ing the next ten years.
Historical preservation and environment were values deeply embedded
in the community. Historians in the community and at Georgetown College
had long been active with informed publications and encouragement of pres-
136 Patton and Patton
ervation. Many newcomers had selected Georgetown-Scott County as a place
to live because its agricultural small-town landscape and environment pleas-
antly reflected a good place to live. A book on the fifty "Safe Places to Live"
in 1972 listed Georgetown as "the" place in Kentucky. It was considered a
good place to live, and few if any wanted fundamental change. Social and
cultural activities were dominated by the professional class and landed aris-
tocracy, but there was little conspicuous display of wealth and little evidence
of a power elite that dominated or controlled. There was no country club and
were no cultural amenities other than the few offered by Georgetown Col-
lege.
While the schools had integrated following the U.S. Supreme Court rul-
ing and the city and county schools had merged in the 1970s, vestiges of
traditional southern racial segregation remained, especially in housing pat-
terns and social interaction. The minority population had dwindled to less
than 10 percent. It wasn't until the early 1980s that the community, using
community block grants, began to provide comparable public services, such
as adequate water and sewer service, to its principal black neighborhood. As
farmers continued their eternal search for "good labor" to house tobacco and
undertake other unappealing chores, a new Mexican minority began to ar-
rive in the late 1980s to assume these tasks. The Japanese and Spanish lan-
guages were introduced simultaneously to a community unused to any direct
foreign influence.
GEORGETOWN-SCOTT COUNTY IN 1999
Nearly fourteen years later, small-town life continues, moved to a larger scale
with higher stakes. Growth and change are apparent as the nineteenth-cen-
tury small town settles into the twenty-first century. Eight thousand more
people currently live in Scott County, with many more commuting daily from
across the region to work. Slightly more than half of the county's residents
(15,714) live in Georgetown—92.6 percent are white, 6.7 percent are African
American, and .7 percent are of other ethnicity. The 1998 civilian labor force
was 16,219 with 11,686 in manufacturing (7,800 of these at Toyota) and the
rest employed in retail trade, services, government, transportation and utili-
ties, construction, and finance, insurance, and real estate. Service and con-
struction jobs, thus, have grown significantly along with manufacturing.
Economic data highlight the significant improvement in the economic
well being of community residents. Unemployment decreased from a high of
9.9 percent in January 1988 to 2.2 percent, the fifth lowest rate in the state,
in December 1998 (fig. 6.3). Personal income, at $21,887 in 1998, is the
tenth highest in the commonwealth.
Not all Scott County residents have enjoyed the new prosperity, how-
10
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Fig. 6.3. Scott County: Unemployment pattern, 1986-1998.
ever, despite the fact that the community has been open to inclusiveness. While
there has been a major decrease in the number of Kentucky Temporary Assis-
tance Program recipients as a result of welfare reform and the growing
economy, the numbers of persons receiving food stamps, SSI, and Medicaid
stayed constant during the 1990s. One local nonprofit agency, Scott United
Ministry, a community-wide ecumenical outreach service, has seen its budget
and clientele increase fivefold since 1991. It has provided services to an esti-
mated 10 percent to 12 percent of the population during this period. Much of
the geography and sociology just five miles north of Georgetown resembles
Appalachian topography, geography, and sociology.
Part of the "contract" between Toyota and Kentucky was an emphasis
on hiring Kentucky workers. State employment offices played a major role in
the hiring process, and Toyota's commitment was fulfilled. Ninety-five per-
cent of employees are Kentuckians from all parts of the state. Kentuckians
are known to be place-bound so when Toyota hired a worker, he or she might
not make an immediate move to Scott County. There was a six-month proba-
tion period; retaining home ties was important; the employee's house might
be in a distressed area with depressed prices; and the job of the spouse was
important. It took time for long commutes, long hours, hard work, and eco-
nomic security to result in moving families and loyalties. Anticipated growth
of Scott County was dampened by this factor as well as a national change in
land development tax laws in 1986 and a euphoric early local housing con-
struction approach which assumed that most buyers would be upper income
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Fig. 6.4. Scott County: Building permits, 1985-1997.
executives. In 1999, about 21 percent (1,638 of 7,800) of Toyota workers
lived in Scott County.
There has been a dramatic increase in housing and commercial con-
struction during the last fifteen years. The number of building permits has
increased from 178 for construction valued at $7.6 million in 1985 to 914 for
construction valued at $86.2 million in 1998, an increase of more than ten-
fold (fig. 6.4). In a comparable period, the assessed value of real estate and
personal property has increased from $440,701,570 to $3,978,104,552, also
a tenfold increase.
By the late 1990s a full range of housing was being constructed in
Georgetown and Scott County. Upon Toyota's arrival, and five years beyond,
there was no true housing industry. Home construction and development was
done by small companies, building three to five houses per year. While several
large Lexington builders had been engaged in the market from time to time in
previous decades, their profile was small through the late 1980s. Immediate
over-building in the high priced market that followed the Toyota announce-
ment resulted in bankruptcies of a number of hopeful amateurs. Nearly all
the early outside land speculators had fallen away by 1988. Three locally
based small companies developed a few new subdivisions.
By the early 1990s the Georgetown-Scott County housing market began
to mature as an integral part of the Lexington metropolitan market. Three
large developers and merchant builders, Ball, Barlow, and Cutter, arrived in
Georgetown. Each created its own development. Independent builders had
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Housing development along U.S. Highway 62, adjacent to the TMMK plant in
Georgetown-Scott County. Both single-family homes and duplexes are offered for
rent or sale. (Photograph by P.P. Karan)
grown from a few to many, dependent on local subdivisions and related inde-
pendently purchased lots. At the end of the 1990s, appraisers began to equate
historical factors that go beyond Scott County's isolated rural borders, to
recognize Georgetown's integration in a regional market. A fifteen-mile ra-
dius (versus a county boundary) includes downtown Lexington and some
distance south and nearly reaches Frankfort. The distinction makes a signifi-
cant difference in banking practices, market reach, and a variety of commu-
nity perspectives. All of this is augmented by the Georgetown-Scott County
Comprehensive Plan of 1991, whose emphasis was quality of life, environ-
mental preservation, and retention of small-town virtues.
Through the years, Scott County had had the smallest retail take of all
120 Kentucky counties due to its proximity to Lexington. The number of
local "mom and pops" and multigenerational family businesses had been
declining for several decades. Increased commercialization came late to
Georgetown, but now Wal-Mart, Kmart, Winn-Dixie, Kroger, an outlet cen-
ter, and a variety of strip stores and fast food chains have created a substan-
tial increase in available shopping choices. At the time of this writing, a
Wal-Mart megamart is on the horizon. It will be the third generation of pro-
gressively larger stores in the period, each leaving vacant structures and park-
ing lots in its wake. The number of motels located at the interchanges has
increased dramatically. The two historic banks have been purchased by larger
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ones, a new bank has been created, and two additional banks have entered
the market with branch offices. Branch bank facilities have proliferated.
Scott County remains dry, prohibiting all sales of alcohol. A referendum
vote to make parts of Georgetown wet was defeated in 1997. The dry status
of the city and county is blamed for the lack of quality restaurants, although
there are several home-cooking establishments and many chain restaurants.
Public education data indicate a significant increase (fig. 6.5). With an
increase from 4,098 pupils in 1984-1985 to 5,359 in 1997-1998, school
enrollment is up 30 percent. To accommodate this increase, three new schools—
two elementary schools and one high school—have been built, and most fa-
cilities have undergone major renovation and upgrades. An additional
elementary school is being planned. The county school board had delayed
building a new high school in the 1970s. As the number of temporary class-
rooms mushroomed around the existing high school, the school board could
no longer delay action. It proposed in 1993 a $20 million comprehensive
high school to be built on a new site. Voters rejected a bond issue to fund the
school, sending school planners back to the drawing board. The credibility of
the proposed plan and program was questioned in the community, because
the school board operated independently in formulating the plan, ignoring
the local government cooperative processes. A modification of plans and lo-
cation of the facility on land already owned by the school system (incorporat-
ing the existing junior high school) reduced the cost. Toyota made a voluntary
Fig. 6.5. Scott County: School enrollment, 1984-1998.
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up-front payment of ten years of its in-lieu-of-taxes contribution, and a change
in state law permitted a larger bonded indebtedness. As part of the Toyota
incentives package and use of public bonds, Toyota does not have an obliga-
tion to pay property taxes for the first twenty years. Following common na-
tional practices in such economic development bonding, Toyota voluntarily
agreed to pay the equivalent of its share of school taxes. By agreeing to pay
ten years of those property tax obligations in advance, the school board was
able to move forward in the construction of a $14 million high school with-
out voter approval of a bond initiative.
Political life demonstrates both continuity and change. The possibility
of fiscal court deadlock and the pattern of recent planning commission ap-
pointments led to a petition drive and successful referendum vote in 1997 to
change county government. With the 1998 election, Scott County Fiscal Court
changed from three commissioners nominated by district and elected at-large
to a seven-magistrate board elected by district. With the county judge execu-
tive presiding, the eight-member fiscal court now more broadly reflects and
represents both city and rural populations.
The 1993 defeat of Mayor Prather by Warren Powers, a three-term former
mayor who had served in the 1970s and 1980s, represented a resurgence of
traditional politics. Powers's strength was knowing how to respond to citi-
zens' complaints in a timely way. Powers's five years in office did not reflect
recognition of the changes accompanying the presence of Toyota. The suc-
ceeding mayor, retired school principal Everette Varney, moved quickly to
support new community initiatives, especially in the areas of environment,
education, and international programs.
As a result of economic growth, tax revenue has increased dramatically
(fig. 6.6). In 1985, $531,079 of payroll tax and $94,005 net profit tax was
paid to Georgetown; in 1996-1997, $6,797,501 in payroll tax and $485,028
in net profit tax was paid to the city and county. City and county budgets
have grown significantly since the arrival of Toyota. Scott County's 1985
budget was $2 million; the county spent $13.5 million in 1997-1998.
Georgetown's 1985 budget was $3 million, and 1998 expenditures were $11
million. Starting fiscal year 1999, Georgetown reported cash assets of
$6,619,603. The county reported $9,235,391. This is a significant improve-
ment over the fiscal constraints of the early 1980s.
New public wealth from the local tax system established through city
annexation and county-imposed payroll tax in the early years after the deci-
sion to locate the Toyota plant in Scott County has resulted in fulfilling long-
established goals for additional public services and facilities (fig. 6.7). The
election of a new mayor and the modification of the county fiscal court in late
1998 gave opportunity for the implementation of a long-held agenda. Among
the active implementation items in early 1999 were
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• construction of an expanded senior citizen center;
• institutionalization of the Elkhorn Creek and open space preserva-
tion efforts, with implementation of a trail system throughout the
urban area and riparian reforestation within the urban area,
providing a system longer than in any other Kentucky commu-
nity;
• imminent groundbreaking for a $5 million jointly funded indoor
swimming facility (a dream of two generations of competitive
and recreational swimmers);
• recent groundbreaking for a new, state-of-the-art Scott County
Public Library with a newly imposed county-wide tax;
• further development of Scott County as a state leader in alternative
agriculture and a new grading, processing, and marketing center,
in part learned from the experience of sister city Tahara-cho,
Japan;
• creation of a major reservoir and naturally protected small water-
shed in northern Scott County, providing further local security
from regional drought;
• actions leading to a permanent Japanese garden of regional impor-
tance and activities such as the first-in-America exhibit of Kazan
Watanabe art, which will provide increased visibility for the
community; and
• expansion and extension of a new general aviation airport estab-
lished only a few years ago as a joint facility with Lexington's
Blue Grass Airport.
City water and sewer are administered not directly by the city but by a
special district, the Georgetown Municipal Water and Sewer District, whose
members are appointed by the city. Rates have risen moderately, but the dis-
trict quickly imposed a $700 tap-on fee for every new house and facility. The
Water and Sewer District announced a $200 increase in that fee and a modest
reduction in water rates for other users. Two new sewer plants—one for use
by Toyota and the other, funded by bonds, for community use—have been
constructed. In earlier years, the district relied on federal grants. Historically,
the water source relied on Royal Spring, an underground stream that emerges
in the middle of Georgetown. With development in the community and im-
pingement on the aquifer by north Fayette County, dependency on Royal
Springs for city water has become problematic. The district now supplements
its supply with water from the north branch of Elkhorn Creek and by pur-
chase from Frankfort through a new pipeline from the Kentucky River. Ken-
tucky American Water System, based in Lexington, supplies Toyota.
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Georgetown
Scott County
Note: 1986-1987 Net Profit Tax is not significant enough of a total to be represented.
The total was $14,636
Fig. 6.7. Georgetown and Scott County: Payroll tax and net profit tax, 1986-
1997.
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GROWTH AND CHANGE: 1985-1999
The rate of growth of Georgetown-Scott County was not rapid in the first
five years after Toyota's announcement; it gradually accelerated in the next
five and is now growing at a significant pace. With a 28 percent population
increase between 1990 and 1997, Scott County is the sixth-fastest-growing
county in the commonwealth. The population of 21,813 in 1980 grew to
23,943 in 1990 and was estimated at 29,446 in 1998. Projections by the
Kentucky Data Center estimate that Scott County will grow to 39,658 by
2010 and to 45,853 by 2020. This growth in absolute numbers is more than
that projected for Lexington-Fayette County, despite the fact that Lexington
has a base ten times larger than Scott County (table 6.1).
Georgetown has grown by a series of annexations tied directly to plan-
ning policies. No rezoning for urban land use is granted without the appli-
cant agreeing to annexation. The property must be contiguous to existing
city boundaries, consistent with the comprehensive plan, and served by the
city's water and sewer system. These policies were tightly bound together
within two years of Toyota's arrival. During the planning review of 1991, it
was discovered that the water and sewer district was developing a plan that
ignored the comprehensive plan, following the single criterion that water runs
downhill. Mayor Prather forced reconsideration by the district, and the pro-
Table 6.1. Georgetown and Scott County: Patterns of growth and change,
1985-1998
1985 1998
Population
Scott County 21,813 29,446*
Georgetown ll,000a 15,714a
Unemployment rate 8.7% 2.4%
Per capita income $10,407a $21,887
Budget
Scott County $2,027,948 $13,418,737
Georgetown $1,840,000 $11,068,761
Payroll tax
Scott County $1,126,592 $7,222,058
Georgetown $531,079 $6,797,501
Assessed value of property $440,701,570 $3,978,104,552
Number of building permits 178 914
Value of building permits $7.6 million $86.2 million
Number of pupils
Scott County schools 4,098 5,359
Notes: a = estimated.
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jected new sewage plant was relocated to a site best serving the comprehen-
sive plan. From that time forward, urban water and sewer extensions have
been entirely consistent with other related planning and development poli-
cies.
The pattern of urban growth since 1985 is best reflected in the compara-
tive maps of Georgetown's annexations and in 1989 and 1998 aerial photo-
graphs. Urban development has reflected a contained, systematic evolution.
The majority of new growth has been urban, bringing Georgetown to a popu-
lation exceeding Scott County's rural population for the first time in history.
Patterns of rural development, however, reflect the legal and policy-mak-
ing problems of preserving prime agricultural land, supporting current and
alternative agriculture, defining suitable rural residential development, imple-
menting transfers of development rights, defining cluster development to sus-
tain agriculture, and maintaining green belts. About 48 percent of new
development has occurred in rural areas, with the minimum-five-acre-lot re-
quirement causing the loss of more than five thousand acres of agricultural
land. A rural cluster development option designed to preserve agricultural
land has been difficult to perfect. Finding that these issues are more difficult
to resolve than urban policies, the planning commission continues to seek
suitable answers. Historically, Scott County has had a five-acre-minimum-
lot-size requirement for residential development. Landowners and specula-
tors have taken advantage of that to get approvals for as many five-acre tracts
as possible before the opportunity might be foreclosed. A twenty-five-acre
minimum has been under discussion and might be adopted in the future.
The pace and pattern of rural land development, and the ability to con-
trol it for public purposes, has been exacerbated by two unrelated events
during the past five years. Scott County Fiscal Court implemented a program
to provide safe water to all rural residents, inadvertently making rural devel-
opment easier at public cost. Lexington-Fayette County further tightened land
availability for development, causing increased pressure for development on
Scott County agricultural and rural land.
Few of Kentucky's 120 counties have planning, and fewer have joint
city-county planning commissions. Agrarian and mining traditions dominate
land-use practice. A mobile home park located on the Scott County-Fayette
County line in the 1960s fueled controversial debate about the need for plan-
ning. Following his reelection in 1965 in which planning and zoning had
been the main issue, County Judge Charles Brooking moved to enact a joint
city-county commission as a watch guard on land use and change in Scott
County. A tradition of open public deliberation on land use was established
more than fifteen years prior to Toyota's arrival. The city and the county
made separate appointments of commissioners, and each bore half of the
cost, but there was a tradition of support of commission decisions by both
political bodies. Even when appointments to the commission were contested,
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personal faction more often than policy drove the contest. The agenda was
not affected.
Kentucky planning law requires the update of comprehensive plans ev-
ery five years. In response to the Toyota location, the 1985 comprehensive
plan revision was quickly accomplished in January 1986 to accommodate the
newly designated site. Few other changes were made. By 1990, it was time to
reconsider the comprehensive plan in light of the fundamental changes that
were in process and to take a considered view of the future.
The issue of land use and growth is at the heart of traditional local
planning consideration and action. It received the most attention during the
planning review. Due to the long tradition of planning, an urban service dis-
trict and strict annexation policy were already in place. Consequently, most
discussion focused on marginal changes to the existing boundary to accom-
modate new growth and innovations to deal with special rural development
districts (i.e., transfers of development rights, new cluster policies for the
preservation of farmland, development around the two other small commu-
nities, and rural crossroads neighborhoods). The community and the com-
mission have refined what was set forth in the plan and decided about their
common "preferred future." The commission has tended to deal mostly in
specific land-use decisions, while the city and county have moved to imple-
ment other elements of the plan when the timing was right. The fundamental
continuity and consensus has been extraordinary.
During the mid-1970s, the local Soil Conservation Committee worked
to educate the community on the preservation of prime agricultural land, a
belt of land in the southern portion of the county from the Lexington-Fayette
County border to five miles north of Georgetown. When Toyota announced
the plant site in late 1985, a citizen commissioned a report from a natural
resources planner on how to begin a trail system and take actions to preserve
and enhance Elkhorn Creek, which drains the Bluegrass, and its north fork
which flows through Georgetown. Water resources had been highlighted a
few years earlier in a successful citizen protest against an experimental coal
gasification plant on the edge of town. The commissioned study on Elkhorn
Creek was presented to the January 1986 meeting of the planning commis-
sion, and its principles were soon incorporated in all planning reviews. The
effort to preserve Elkhorn Creek led to the creation of the Elkhorn Land and
Historic Trust, reinforcing awareness and public-private cooperation with-
out strident conflict.
Because of a pattern of conflict between the city and county govern-
ments, many people believed local government was not capable of dealing
effectively with the challenges posed by Toyota, and they called for extensive
restructuring of local government. Discussion of governmental reorganiza-
tion in Georgetown had been ongoing for several years. Efforts by the Cham-
ber of Commerce and Scott County United to promote city/county merger
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were stimulated by the Toyota plant and the expectation of rapid growth and
change. A petition drive to form a merger commission was completed by
mid-1987, and in December, the city and county made appointments to the
forty-member merger commission. The commission met for six months to
draft a charter for merged city-county government. The issue was placed on
the November 1988 ballot and was defeated.
Coordinated services have become the norm. In June 1993, the city and
county implemented an inter-local government agreement on police services
and, in 1994, an agreement on ambulance service. These combined with al-
ready existing joint efforts in parks and recreation, planning, international
programs, and so on. The list of joint agreements and funding arrangements
has grown routinely and is now considered the first option for any new pro-
gram or function. Some expect another referendum on merger in the foresee-
able future.
The dynamics of community change and challenge were greatly facili-
tated by Georgetown College President Dr. H. William Crouch. Georgetown
College had been an important presence in the community since the 1840s,
when it became a Southern Baptist college, reflecting the dominant local and
regional religion. Many local residents and its principle leadership had at-
tended the college; they remained loyal, continued in the faith, and otherwise
connected with traditions and old associations. In the years just before Toyota's
arrival and through the late 1980s, the institution kept a low profile in the
community. With the appointment of its new president, the college began to
Toyota has supported programs and activities at Georgetown College. For years
the Baptist college has played an integral role in the community. (Photograph by P.P.
Karan)
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reach beyond campus borders. It quickly became apparent that the futures of
Georgetown-Scott County and Georgetown College were intertwined.
Georgetown College participates in a joint agreement among city, county,
college, school system, and community and business leaders to enhance learning
technologies and communications. Georgetown College built a $15 million
learning resources center; Scott County Library has broken ground for a con-
temporary new library; Scott County schools continue their leadership in class-
room technology in Kentucky; and local governments have moved forward
with the Geographic Information System (GIS) and communications. The
college built its first new building in twenty-five years when it opened an art
building and gallery to clear the site for its new learning resources building,
and it provides a pre-season training facility for the National Football League's
Cincinnati Bengals.
PROGRESS AND TRADITION IN GEORGETOWN-SCOTT COUNTY
Looking back, the worst fears about growth and change destroying the way
of life in a small town have not materialized. While the business community
embraced Toyota, local elected leadership were apprehensive. While shock
gave way to fear of being overrun, several key individuals and activities be-
gan to shape a process by which the community would respond to the new
challenges and seek to shape change to achieve local community goals. Local
government was able to implement several decisive actions, such as adoption
of a county payroll and net profits tax, annexation of the plant by Georgetown,
and adoption of the innovative Georgetown-Scott County Comprehensive
Plan of 1991, which enhanced the community's ability to promote its own
interests.
While the plant was enthusiastically welcomed by many, it brought an
array of stresses and strains, from traffic to housing to wastewater treatment.
The rate of growth was less than initially projected, but the past few years
have brought substantial increases in population, employment, and housing.
Through its comprehensive plan and other policy actions, the community has
been able to significantly influence the patterns of growth and its impact on
the community, seeking to define the community's preferred future of eco-
nomic achievement and enhancement of quality of life. The Georgetown-
Scott County Comprehensive Plan of 1991 won a regional American Planning
Association award for best plan shortly after it was completed. Other au-
thors have praised its far-reaching scope and innovative solutions. While re-
finements will be continually made, it is unlikely that the fundamental
philosophy will be altered. It truly reflects Georgetown-Scott County's pre-
ferred future.
During the past thirteen years, Georgetown-Scott County has used two
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public slogans: "Scott County Pride" and "Where Progress and Tradition
Meet." Both are apt, and each played its part in the comprehensive plan that
is officially adopted policy.
New public wealth from the local tax system established in the early
years after the decision to locate the new plant in Scott County has resulted in
fulfilling long-established goals for additional public services and facilities.
Among the dramatic changes to the community are
• emergence of new political leadership and cooperation among city
and county governments;
• a fivefold increase in funding;
• a professionalization of governmental services;
• improved transportation networks;
• a vibrant housing industry;
• growing commercial businesses;
• expanding global contacts;
• implementation of Elkhorn Creek trail system and riparian
reforestation;
• construction of a modern general aviation airport;
• upgrade of education, technology, and library facilities; and
• expanded recreational and leisure activities,
Globalization of the community has produced the most noticeable change.
It is not that a substantial number of Japanese have moved to the community.
The plant manager has lived in town close to the plant since its beginning.
Informal estimates suggest that Scott County may be home to as many as one
hundred Japanese, nearly all of whom are trainers on three- to five-year rota-
tions. Three-quarters of the one hundred are Toyota employees, and the re-
mainder work for subsidiary companies. Consequently, their housing pattern
is scattered throughout the community, the result of available long-term con-
tract rentals through their companies. Few Japanese living in Scott County
are permanent residents. Existence of a Japanese school in Lexington and the
dry status and reputation of Scott County are often cited as factors that lead
to Japanese families living in Lexington rather than Georgetown. The subtle
nuances of American drinking behaviors, laws, and history are lost on most
foreign visitors. With Toyota's headquarters located in Boone County near
the Cincinnati Airport, it is unlikely that there will be substantial increase in
the Japanese population in Scott County.
International and sister-city exchanges with Tahara-cho are common-
place. Tahara (population 34,450), a town built on reclaimed land in what
was formerly Tahara Bay, has cement factories and a Toyota factory. The
Toyota plant was built in Tahara about five years before the Georgetown
plant was built. Mayor Shibata and other officials formalized the relation-
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ship in Georgetown in 1990. Soon afterward, Seisho High School and Scott
County High School established a sister-school relationship. In 1992 Tahara
sent a municipal employee, Toshi Suzuki, to live in Georgetown for a year to
learn about governance and community dynamics and to get acquainted with
local people. Georgetown-Scott County was ill-equipped for such a relation-
ship and the international dynamic that was implied in such a connection.
However, its sister, Tahara-cho, had been a leader of the "opening to the
West" from the late Edo Period. The link of the two small communities through
the sister-city program relationship has led to new advances and opportuni-
ties for Georgetown and Scott County. A special relationship was estab-
lished to send Georgetown College graduates as assistant English teachers
to Tahara under the more general Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) pro-
gram in Japan.
Fundamentally, Georgetown-Scott County is an openly democratic com-
munity in the traditional definition—both before and after the arrival of
Toyota. Elections are contested, but agendas rarely change significantly as a
result. Decisions are made with full discussion and consideration, often in
settings similar to a New England town meeting. That fact has been critical in
the dynamic and positive results that followed Toyota's arrival. With full dis-
cussion, consensus could be formed and agreed upon values and goals were
reached. As time went on, the shaping of consensus for a common future
became easier, moving discussion to agreements for implementation.
The arrival of a powerful global corporation only temporarily caught
the community off balance. But the new resources have provided the oppor-
tunity for achieving the community's preferred future. A leap from the nine-
teenth century to the twenty-first century has taken place in the social,
economic, and political environments of Georgetown-Scott County.
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7Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, and the
Kentucky Economy
CHARLES F. HAYWOOD
IN DECEMBER 1985 TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION and the Common-
wealth of Kentucky announced plans to build a plant to assemble passenger
motor vehicles at a site in Scott County near the city of Georgetown and
fifteen miles north of Lexington. With the prior approval of the Kentucky
General Assembly, Kentucky Governor Martha Layne Collins and Toyota
President Shoichiro Toyoda signed on February 25, 1986, an "Agreement"
confirming the commitments between the Commonwealth of Kentucky and
Toyota Motor Corporation.
State government's participation took the form of an incentives package
covering the costs of certain construction activities and the training of work-
ers. Its components were as follows:
Land purchase $10,273,524
Site preparation 20,000,000
Water and gas lines 10,286,743
Training center 7,200,000
Wastewater facility 12,239,733
Highway improvements 32,000,000
Training and education 55,000,000
Total $147,000,000
Toyota's commitment was to invest $800 million to build and equip an
assembly plant to produce two hundred thousand passenger motor vehicles
with a workforce of three thousand and an annual payroll of $90 million.
Ground was broken for the assembly plant in May 1986, and construc-
tion was completed in May 1988. Pilot production of Toyota's new Camry
was initiated at that time, and volume production was achieved in July 1988.
156 Charles F. Haywood
Norfolk-Southern Toyota Support Yard at the Scott County, Kentucky, plant. The
state paid for the infrastructure development at the plant site. The $305 million
spent on incentives is projected to produce $1.5 billion in tax revenues over a twenty-
year period attributed to Toyota's expenditures in Kentucky. (Photograph by P.P.
Karan)
During the calendar year 1992, the annual production rate of Camry auto-
mobiles reached approximately 230,000; employment was forty-three hun-
dred; and the annual payroll was approximately $185 million, excluding
benefits costs estimated at 37 percent of payroll. That is, by 1992 actual
performance by Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky (TMMK) exceeded
the level of operations projected when the "Agreement" was consummated
in 1986.
T M M K EXPANSIONS
Even before the completion of the assembly plant, TMMK announced (No-
vember 1987) that a facility to produce engines and axles would be added to
the initial plan. Construction of the power train plant began in mid-1988.
Plant capacity was projected at three hundred thousand engines, with two
hundred thousand targeted as the normal production level. Production of
axles began in October 1988, four-cylinder engines in November 1989.
In November 1990 TMMK announced that the capacity of the
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Georgetown plant would be doubled by adding a second assembly line. Tar-
geted capacity would be increased from two hundred thousand to four hun-
dred thousand motor vehicles per year. Construction began in June 1991 and
was completed in early 1994, with pilot production beginning in March 1994.
In September 1994 TMMK initiated production of Toyota's new Avalon on
the second assembly line.
Further expansion of the power train plant was announced in January
1992. TMMK indicated that the capacity of the power train plant would be
increased to five hundred thousand engines, including V-6 cylinder engines as
well as four-cylinder engines. The expansion was completed in the summer of
1994, and production of V-6 engines began in August.
Major additional investments, largely in equipment, were made at TMMK
in 1996 and 1997 in support of a redesign of the Camry and the initiation of
assembly of the new Sienna minivan. By the end of 1997 the cumulative origi-
nal-cost investments in TMMK's Georgetown facility reached approximately
$4.6 billion, or almost six times the $800 million expected when the
Commonwealth's incentives package of $147 million was proposed in late
1985.
As noted above, the expectation in late 1985 was that the Georgetown
facility would be only an assembly plant, capable of turning out two hundred
thousand vehicles. In 1997 the Georgetown facility assembled 325,123 Camry
sedans, 80,277 Avalon sedans, and 26,746 Sienna minivans, for a total of
432,146 vehicles. Manufacturing output included 435,709 four-cylinder and
V-6 engines and, in support of the assembly of vehicles and manufacture of
engines, the necessary numbers of axles, steering components, machined blocks,
cylinder heads, crankshafts, camshafts, and rods and axles assemblies.
ECONOMIC IMPACTS IN KENTUCKY, 1986-1997
Table 7.1 shows the economic multiplier effects of TMMK's outlays in Ken-
tucky during the period 1986-1997. The column captioned "TMMK Out-
lays" includes TMMK's Kentucky payroll (excluding employee benefits),
purchases of parts and supplies from Kentucky vendors, and local construc-
tion expenditures. The next three columns—the "Effects" columns—were
calculated using multipliers from input-output analyses by the Regional Eco-
nomic Analysis Division, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and U.S. Department
of Commerce and are usually referred to as "RIMS (Regional Input-Output
Modeling System) II multipliers." Three economic impacts can be calculated
using the RIMS II multipliers: total output effects—the total volume of trans-
actions generated by the indicated "initial" outlays, earnings effects—the
amount of household income resulting from the indicated "initial" outlays,
and employment effects—the number of jobs that can be attributed to the
158 Charles F. Haywood
Table 7.1.TMMK's economic impacts in Kentucky, 1986-1997
Total
TMMK output Earnings Employment State tax revenues
outlays effects effects effects Annual Cumulative
Year ($ mil.) ($ mil.) ($ mil.) (number) ($ mil.) ($ mil.)
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
10.6
226.6
270.1
157.7
302.0
523.5
574.5
1,053.3
1,107.5
1,435.1
1,610.0
1,702.7
26.6
569.4
681.7
426.9
802.5
1,368.6
1,503.0
2,712.4
2,864.9
3,689.8
4,147.4
4,408.1
10.0
216.4
262.6
191.2
327.3
541.8
563.4
845.6
912.9
1,104.4
1,273.5
1,406.6
259
5,464
7,770
6,987
10,840
16,415
17,883
25,968
26,513
30,577
33,419
34,544
0.8
14.3
18.3
14.2
22.7
43.4
47.7
62.6
67.3
82.5
94.6
103.7
0.8
15.1
33.3
47.5
70.2
113.6
161.3
223.4
290.7
373.2
467.8
571.4
Source: 1986-1992—Charles F. Haywood, Review & Perspective: The Economic Significance
of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, U.S.A., Inc., in Kentucky, Center for Business and Economic
Research, College of Business and Economics, University of Kentucky, December 1992, pp. 3,
6.1993-1997—"TMMK Outlays" from Toyota Motor Manufacturing, North America, Inc.;
other columns calculated by Charles F. Haywood using updated multipliers from 1992 study.
indicated "initial" outlays. The last two columns of table 7.1—State Tax
Revenues—will be discussed in a later section of this paper.
The multiplier effects shown in table 7.1 include direct and indirect ef-
fects. In 1997 the total output effects were $4,408.1 million. Included were
$1,702.7 million of direct effects, consisting of purchases of parts and mate-
rials of $1,141.7 million, payroll of $470.4 million, and equipment purchases
and related activities of $90.6 million. Indirect effects totaled $2,637.2 mil-
lion, including the household expenditures of TMMK workers, spending by
TMMK's suppliers and their workers, and subsequent rounds of expendi-
tures by businesses and workers as the dollars moved from one transaction
level to the next. The total output effects are the sum of the successive rounds
of spending, starting with TMMK's expenditures as the first round, direct
output effects and the further rounds of spending as the indirect output ef-
fects.
TMMK's earnings effects of $1,406.6 million in 1997 included direct
effects in the form of TMMK's payroll of $470.4 million plus estimated con-
tractors' payrolls of $45.3 million. Indirect effects of $890.9 million were the
income payments to households associated with the successive rounds of to-
tal spending described above.
The employment effects in 1997 totaled 34,544 jobs, of which 8,170
jobs (7,689 TMMK jobs; 481 estimated contractor jobs) were direct effects
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A worker at Y H America plant in Versailles, Kentucky. Y H America, owned by
Yokohama Rubber Company and Yokohama Hydex Company, makes air condition-
ing and power steering hose, fittings, and hose assemblies. Toyota is one of its
major customers. A large number of Japanese parts suppliers have established
production facilities in Kentucky and contribute to the region's economic develop-
ment. (Photograph courtesy of Y H America)
and 26,374 jobs were indirect effects at supplier and other business locations
throughout the commonwealth where the successive rounds of spending called
forth increases in the production of goods and services.
PROJECTION OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS IN KENTUCKY, 1998-2005
Table 7.2 projects TMMK's outlays and related multiplier effects through the
year 2005. The main reason for making such projections is to provide the
basis for a cash flow analysis evaluating the return on the state's investment in
the construction and training activities noted at the beginning of this paper.
Underlying the projections to 2005 is an assumption that employment
at TMMK will be constant at a level of 7,850 full-time-equivalent employees
between 1998 and 2005. At present, there do not appear to be any plans to
expand further the capacity of the Georgetown facility. Increases in TMMK
outlays, total output effects, earnings effects, and state tax revenues from
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Table 7.2. Projection of TMMK's economic impacts in Kentucky, 1998-2005
Year
TMMK
outlays
($ mil.)
Total
output
effects
($ mil.)
Earnings
effects
($ mil.)
Employment
effects
(number)
State tax revenues
Annual Cumulative
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
1,740.3
1,762.8
1,815.7
1,861.0
1,907.6
1,955.3
2,004.1
2,054.2
4,505.4
4,563.6
4,700.5
4,818.1
4,938.5
5,062.0
5,188.5
5,318.2
1,437.7
1,456.3
1,500.0
1,537.5
1,575.9
1,615.3
1,655.7
1,697.1
34,614
34,628
34,797
34,797
34,797
34,797
34,797
34,797
105.9
107.3
110.5
113.3
116.1
119.0
122.0
125.0
667.3'
784.6
895.1
1,008.4
1,124.5
1,243.4
1,365.4
1,491.2
a = Includes $571.4 million from period 1986-1997 shown in Table 7.1.
Source: "TMMK Outlays" projected by Charles F. Haywood; multipliers updated to reflect
expected increases in wage rates.
1998 through 2005 reflect an assumption that prices and wage rates gener-
ally will increase by an average of 2.5 percent per annum. The result of such
assumption is that the projection of direct and indirect employment effects in
Kentucky rises to 34,797 jobs in the year 2000 and remains at that level.
CASH FLOW ANALYSIS, 1986-2005
Table 7.1 shows that between 1986 and 1997 the Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky collected an estimated $571.2 million of tax revenues attributable to
the direct and indirect effects of TMMK's outlays in Kentucky. The projec-
tions in table 7.2 indicate that the state's tax collections attributable to TMMK's
effects will total an estimated $1,490.4 million by the end of 2005.
The $147 million cost of the incentives package provided to Toyota Motor
Corporation by the Commonwealth of Kentucky was a "present value" fig-
ure. An alternative estimate projected that the Commonwealth would need
to borrow funds to cover some portions of the incentives package and would
therefore incur interest costs. The total outlay was projected to be $305.2
million spread over a twenty-year period. Those projected costs are shown in
table 7.3 in the first column, denoted as "Incentives Costs with Interest." The
annual state tax collections shown in tables 7.1 and 7.2 of this report are set
forth in the second column, headed "Attributable State Tax Revenues." Sub-
tracting the first column from the second column results in the third column
"Net Cash Flow."
Over the twenty-year period 1986-2005, the total of Attributable State
Tax Revenues in table 7.3 is estimated, as shown, to be $1,491.2 million.
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Table 7.3. Rate of return analysis of incentives' costs and state tax
revenues, 1986-2005 ($ millions)
Year
Incentives costs
with interest
Attributable
state
tax revenues Net cash flow
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Totals
24.7
25.8
25.8
24.1
24.1
12.8
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
305.3
0.8
14.3
18.3
14.2
22.7
43.4
47.7
62.6
67.3
82.5
94.6
103.7
105.9
107.3
110.5
113.3
116.1
119.0
122.0
125.0
1,491.2
Note: IRR
-23.9
-11.5
-7.5
-9.9
-1.4
+30.6
+35.7
+50.6
+55.3
+70.5
+82.6
+91.7
+93.9
+95.3
+98.5
+101.3
+104.1
+107.0
+110.0
+113.0
+1,185.9
= 36.79%
Source: "Incentives Costs with Interest," from Charles F. Haywood, Review & Perspective:
The Economic Significance of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, U.S.A., Inc., in Kentucky, Center
for Business and Economic Research, College of Business and Economics, University of
Kentucky, December 1992, p. 7; "Attributable State Tax Revenues" from Tables 7.1 and 7.2;
"Net Cash Flow" and "IRR" calculated by Charles F. Haywood.
Subtracting the $305.3 million of Incentives Costs with Interest results in a
Net Cash Flow totaling $1,185.90 million. That is, as a result of its invest-
ment in the Toyota incentives package, the Commonwealth of Kentucky will
receive almost $1.2 billion in tax revenues over and above the costs of the
incentives package. On an annual basis, the discounted cash flow rate of
return on the Commonwealth's incentives package, as now projected through
2005, is 36.79 percent.
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ATTRACTION OF OTHER AUTOMOTIVE FIRMS TO KENTUCKY
Toyota suppliers are located in several states, mostly in the eastern United
States (fig. 7.1). By the end of 1997 there were approximately 175 manufac-
turing facilities in Kentucky producing automobile parts and materials. Only
55 of these plants were in operation prior to the December 1985 announce-
ment that Toyota Motor Corporation would build an assembly plant in Scott
County. That is, approximately 120 plants were opened in Kentucky from
1986 through 1997. Total capital investment in the 120 plants is estimated to
have been $2,752 million. The 175 parts plants are located in fifty-six of the
state's 120 counties. Prior to December 1985 the 55 supplier plants were
located in twenty-seven counties. Only two of those twenty-seven counties
did not get at least one "new" plant after 1985. The 120 "new" plants lo-
cated in twenty-five of the counties which had at least one parts plant in 1985
and in twenty-nine counties which did not have any such plants in 1985.
Total employment in the 175 parts plants in 1997 was estimated to be in
excess of 40,000 jobs. The 120 new plants accounted for approximately 23,500
of that total. Total manufacturing employment in Kentucky increased from
255,300 in 1985 to 316,100 in 1997.
TMMK does not purchase parts and materials from all of the 175 auto-
motive parts plants in Kentucky. The majority of them sell to other motor
vehicle assembly plants in Kentucky and other states. In 1997 TMMK pur-
chased parts and materials from fifty-five manufacturers in Kentucky. TMMK's
purchases from its fifty-five Kentucky suppliers are estimated to make up
about one-half of the total sales of the 175 plants, and it is further estimated
that TMMK's purchases account for between nineteen thousand and twenty
thousand of the forty thousand jobs in the motor vehicles parts and materials
companies.
The economic impacts attributed to TMMK in tables 7.1 through 7.3
include only those Kentucky plants from which TMMK purchases parts and
materials. Those parts plants that located in Kentucky after 1985 but which
are not TMMK suppliers have not been considered in calculating the eco-
nomic impacts of TMMK in Kentucky.
It might be argued that many of the 120 new plants followed Toyota's
lead in locating in Kentucky even though there was no expectation of becom-
ing suppliers to TMMK. Therefore, the further argument might be that per-
haps an additional impact should be calculated for the nonsupplier plants
and some part of it attributed to TMMK. However, there is no need to under-
take the difficult task of selecting and defending what weight should be at-
tached to the economic impact of the nonsupplier plants. Tables 7.1 through
7.3 demonstrate that the economic impacts readily attributable to TMMK
have made the Commonwealth's incentives package a prosperous investment,
indeed. The 1985 decision by the Commonwealth and Toyota Motor Corpo-
Production Materials Suppliers for Toyota
STATE
KENTUCKY
OHIO
MICHIGAN
INDIANA
ILLINOIS
TENNESSEE
NORTH CAROLINA
TEXAS
SOUTH CAROLINA
MISSOURI
PENNSYLVANIA
CALIFORNIA
OTHERS
TOTAL
SUPPLIER LOCATIONS
40
26
22
17
16
12
8
6
5
4
4
3
38
201
400 mi
• represents city where production
material suppliers are located. Note:
more than one supplier can be
located in a city.
f
cn
7T
O
O
Fig. 7.1. Toyota's suppliers in the United States.
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ration has been a significant part of the restructuring and relocation of the
motor vehicle and parts manufacturing industry in the United States during
the 1980s and 1990s.
SUMMARY
The 1985 decision to invest in an incentives package to help convince Toyota
Motor Corporation to locate an assembly plant in Scott County has paid off
handsomely for the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Even if only the original
plan had been realized, the benefits would have been sufficient to justify the
incentives package. The benefits have been multiplied several times by the
expansion decisions made since 1985. The following observations sum up
key aspects of the TMMK success story.
1. Employment was projected in 1986 to reach a range of three thou-
sand to thirty-two hundred jobs when full production was attained at the
Scott County plant. Employment at the end of 1997 was 7,689 jobs.
2. The annual payroll was projected to reach approximately $90 million
at full production. In 1997 the payroll was $470.4 million plus employee
benefits costing $125.6 million.
3. In 1985 Toyota Motor Corporation's investment was projected to be
$800 million. At the end of 1997 the total investment at the Scott County
plant was $4,524.4 million. Whereas a production capacity of 200,000 mo-
tor vehicles was planned in 1985, today's capacity is 435,000 motor vehicles
and 500,000 engines
4. In 1985 it was expected that the domestic content of the motor ve-
hicles produced by TMMK would be 60 percent of the value of the finished
product. Today, the domestic content is in excess of 75 percent.
5. Discounted cash flow analysis of Kentucky's 1985 incentives package
indicated at that time an annual rate of return of 8.5 percent from increased
state revenue collections attributable to the direct and indirect effects of
TMMK's projected level of operation. By 1992, adjustment of the 1985 analysis
to take account of increases in state tax rates in 1990 and inflation increased
the originally projected rate of return from 8.5 percent per annum to 16.8
percent per annum. As shown in table 7.3 the updated annual rate of return
on the Commonwealth's incentives package is now approximately 36.86 per-
cent. In the twenty-year period from 1986 to 2005, the Commonwealth of
Kentucky will collect, over and above the costs of the incentives package,
approximately $1.2 billion of tax revenues attributable to the direct and indi-
rect effects of TMMK's operations in Kentucky.
6. TMMK's 1997 outlays of $1,702.7 million in Kentucky for parts and
materials, payroll, and plant and equipment gave rise to $4,408.1 million in
total spending, $1,406.6 million in household earnings, and 34,544 jobs in
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the state. Outlays for the period 1998-2005 are projected to rise by only the
amount of expected increases in wage rates and costs of parts and materials;
after increasing to 34,797 in 2000 the employment effect is expected to re-
main stable at about 35,000 through 2005.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The use of an incentives package to help convince Toyota Motor Corpora-
tion to locate an assembly plant in Scott County has turned out to be a suc-
cess beyond anything that was or could have been creditably projected in
December 1985. Some of the circumstances that have contributed to that
success can be identified as follows.
1. Both sides—the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Toyota Motor Cor-
poration—willingly and graciously lived up to their respective commitments.
2. Approximately 42 percent of the incentives package was for an on-
site training facility and for training programs, which have contributed to the
high quality of TMMK's output.
3. Evident in the local area and region was a great deal of goodwill to
help facilitate the successful development and operation of the plant. There
were numerous voluntary initiatives by private as well as government organi-
zations to that end.
4. TMMK and Toyota Motor Corporation evidenced similar goodwill,
and neither has made any kind of move that could be regarded as intrusive or
as "throwing its weight around." Indeed, the opposite has been true, as TMMK
and Toyota Motor Corporation have been assiduous in seeking to blend in
with and be a part of central Kentucky.
5. Excellent choices were made in the selection of managers from the
onset of the building and operation of TMMK.
6. TMMK's output is a high quality product, in which the workforce
(95 percent Kentuckians) can and do take great pride.
7. Once the early success of the venture became apparent, success bred
success.
APPENDIX
The multipliers used in this report were derived from multipliers acquired in
1991 by the Center for Business and Economic Research, Gatton College of
Business and Economics, University of Kentucky, from the U.S. Department
of Commerce, Regional Input-Output Modeling System II (RIMS II). De-
tailed sets of multipliers were obtained for the state of Kentucky, major areas
within the state, and certain metropolitan areas.
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The multipliers provide a means of estimating the effects that a change
in a specific type of spending in a region (state or other defined area) will
have on the region's total output (= total spending), earnings (= household
income), and employment (= number of jobs).
The following multipliers for Kentucky were used in this paper.
Total Output Earnings
TMMK payroll
TMMK purchases
TMMK contractors' payroll
TMMK contractors' purchases
Jobs, per $1 million of initial spending
2.8670
2.4724
2.8670
2.3593
1993 1994
1.5251
0.5165
1.5251
0.7077
1995 1996 1997
TMMK workers'spending 21.84 20.75 19.71 18.72 17.79
TMMK purchases 17.31 16.45 15.62 14.84 14.10
TMMK contractors'payroll 13.04 12.39 11.77 11.18 10.62
TMMK contractors'purchases 29.84 28.35 26.93 25.58 24.30
The job multipliers were reduced year by year, as shown above, to re-
flect estimated increases in wages and salaries. The reductions were inten-
tionally on the high side as a way of adding some conservatism to the estimates
and projections of job numbers.
The RIMS II multipliers use a "spending" approach rather than a "jobs
on jobs" approach to estimate employment impacts. As shown above, the
multipliers are expressed in terms of the number of jobs created per $1 mil-
lion of initial spending, not in terms of some number of total jobs attributable
to some specific increase in employment.
The coefficients used to obtain the estimates of state tax revenues for the
period 1993-2005 are as follows:
State individual income taxes = 0.034 x Earnings
attributable to TMMK
State sales taxes = 0.024 x Earnings
All other state taxes = 0.005 x Total Output
8Social Impacts of
Japanese Businesses
in Small Communities
of Kentucky
YUKIO YOTSUMOTO
INTRODUCTION
Japanese direct investment since the mid-1980s is partly responsible for a
strong manufacturing expansion in Kentucky. In 1999 more than one hun-
dred Japanese companies were operating in Kentucky. These companies are
located mostly in small rural communities, and most are related to automo-
bile production. Nonautomotive-related companies manufacture a variety of
products such as vacuum cleaners, plastic bottles, and animal feed additives.
The Japanese companies, located in thirty-nine Kentucky communities, em-
ploy about thirty-five thousand Kentuckians and a small number of Japanese
expatriates.
In this chapter the social impacts of Japanese companies on small Ken-
tucky communities are examined. As Japanese direct investment in Ken-
tucky is expected to continue, it is important to know what kinds of changes
are observed in affected communities. Specifically, the focus is on four is-
sues: (a) interactions between local people and Japanese companies; (b) ad-
justment of Japanese companies and Japanese employees into communities;
(c) assessment of Japanese companies' contributions to communities; and
(d) determination of the impact of Japanese companies on the local envi-
ronment.
For this research, five small Kentucky communities were selected:
Bardstown, Berea, Danville, Harrodsburg, and Versailles. The selection is based
on an assumption that the smaller the community and the larger the employ-
ment by Japanese companies in the community, the more noticeable will be
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Table 8.1. Population, income, and labor force in five communities
Bardstown
Berea
Danville
Harrodsburg
Versailles
Population
(1990)
6,801
9,126
12,420
7,335
7,269
Median household
income (1989)
$21,737
$21,622
$21,119
$17,363
$27,220
Labor force
(1990)
2,849
4,582
5,356
3,105
3,809
Source: Kentucky Population Research, 1996.
the impact of a Japanese investment. The selected communities have a high
ratio of employment in Japanese companies.
The data from the U.S. Census and publications by the state government
and universities were supplemented by field research. Open-ended interviews
were conducted with public officials. Also, at least one company from each
community was selected for an in-depth interview. Letters requesting an in-
terview were mailed to all Japanese companies in these communities (nine-
teen companies). Interviews were scheduled with companies that responded
to our request first. We visited seven companies and interviewed several com-
pany executives. The interviews, conducted using a tape recorder, as well as a
notebook, were open ended. At the meeting with executives, we asked them
to distribute an open-ended questionnaire to Japanese employees and Ameri-
can employees. In total, 60 percent of Japanese employees and 80 percent of
American employees completed and returned the questionnaire.
First, a brief socioeconomic profile of each community that includes
historic, demographic, employment, and educational characteristics is pro-
vided. Then, we discuss the social impacts of the Japanese businesses in each
community. We conclude this chapter by noting some implications for
Kentucky's future.
SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILES OF FIVE KENTUCKY COMMUNITIES
Bardstown
Bardstown, thirty-two miles southeast of Louisville, is the county seat of Nelson
County and the county's largest city. In 1990 Nelson County had a popula-
tion of 29,710. The county's topography includes flat land to rolling hills.
The settlement in Bardstown started in 1780. People from Maryland,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia came to the area developed by the Bard family.
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Table 8.2. Bardstown: Population change, education, unemployment, and
poverty
Population change between 1980 and 1996 +18.64%
High school completion rate for the persons 25 years and older (1990) 51.80%
Percent of people who hold associate's, bachelor's, or
graduate/professional degrees (1990) 18.50%
Unemployment rate (1990) 7.05 %
Poverty rate (1989) 18.00%
Source: Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, 1996.
Initially, the area was granted to David Bard by Governor Patrick Henry of
Virginia. Bardstown became the county seat in 1784. In the early days, the
city prospered by the presence of craftsmen, lawyers, educators, and political
leaders. Their presence brought intellectuals and investment to the city. After
the Civil War, the city's economy was based on agriculture and whiskey dis-
tilling (Kleber 1992). Bardstown is internationally known for its Bourbon
whiskey production. The city capitalizes on the romance of its past and its
eighteenth-century buildings to attract tourists. In Bardstown, people can shop
in stores that predate the Civil War, eat lunch in a restaurant that's older than
most cities, and take care of business on a courthouse square that others drive
for miles to see. In Bardstown, the local people's hospitality and gentility has
translated into a savvy way of courting Japanese businesses.
Estimated at 7,594 in 1996, the population of Bardstown has increased
steadily. The populations for 1970, 1980, and 1990 were 5,816, 6,401, and
6,801 respectively. Between 1980 and 1996 population growth was 18.64
percent (table 8.2). Among the population in 1990, 5,493 were white and
1,235 were African Americans. Other minority groups include 23 Filipinos,
27 Japanese and 8 Koreans. In 1990 educational attainment in Bardstown
was higher than the state's figures. Among persons twenty-five years and older,
29.7 percent had less than a high school education. Among persons twenty-
five years and older in Kentucky, in contrast, 35.4 percent had less than a
high school education. In Bardstown, 51.8 percent of persons twenty-five
years and older completed high school. The state's figure was 46.9 percent.
Also, 18.5 percent of persons twenty-five years and older in Bardstown had
associate, bachelor's, and graduate/professional degrees. In the state, 17.7
percent of the age group had those degrees.
People of Bardstown work in various industries. The total labor force in
Bardstown was 2,849 in 1990. There were 216 unemployed persons and a
7.05 percent unemployment rate. Manufacturing industry was the largest
employer, with 870 persons. The second major industry was the wholesale
and retail trade industry, which employed 581 persons. Professional and re-
170 Yukio Yotsumoto
Table 8.3. Bardstown: Number of employment in major industries, 1990
Total labor force 2,849
Manufacturing 870
Wholesale and retail trade 581
Health, education, and other professional services 560
Source: Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, 1996.
lated service industries, which include health, educational, and other services,
employed 560 persons. Median household income in Bardstown in 1989 was
$21,737, slightly lower than the state's median household income of $22,534.
In 1989,18 percent of Bardstown's population was under poverty level; this
is similar to the state's figure of 19 percent. Bardstown's transportation sys-
tem includes the Bluegrass Parkway, U.S. Highway 62, U.S. Highway 31 East,
U.S. Highway 150, Kentucky 49, and Kentucky 245. Using the Bluegrass
Parkway, Interstate 65 is twenty-three miles from Bardstown. The Louisville
International Airport is thirty-seven miles from Bardstown.
Berea
Berea is the second largest city in Madison County. The county had a popula-
tion of 57,508 in 1990; its county seat, Richmond, had a population of 21,183.
Berea is located thirty-nine miles south of Lexington in the foothills of the
Cumberland Mountains near the edge of the Bluegrass region.
Berea's history began with the establishment of Berea College. Rev. John
Gregg Fee, an abolitionist, organized a church for nonslaveholders and estab-
lished a school. The school became Berea College in 1858. Fee thought that
the founding purpose of the college was to educate former slaves and children
of poor Appalachians. As a symbol of the city, Berea College influenced the
city's characteristics. At first, the proposal by Fee and his followers to estab-
lish an integrated school was postponed by an armed mob led by Richmond's
anti-abolitionists. It was not until the end of the Civil War that Fee started to
pursue his ideal. With his effort, interracial neighborhoods were created around
the church and the school. Building houses and constructing facilities at Berea
College boosted the city's economy. Berea College was an integrated school
of blacks and whites, women and men. However, in 1904, the Kentucky leg-
islature enacted the Day Law that prohibited the integrated school. Because
of this law, administrators at Berea College shifted their focus to poor white
Appalachians. At last, Berea College implemented reintegration in 1950.
Currently, Berea College is a center of tourist attraction in the city where
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Table 8.4. Berea: Population change, education, unemployment, and poverty
Population change between 1980 and 1996 +16.36%
High school completion rate for the persons
25 years and older (1990) 37.30%
Percent of people who hold associate's, bachelor's,
or graduate/professional degrees (1990) 29.30%
Unemployment rate (1990) 5.93%
Poverty rate (1989) 17.35%
Source: Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, 1996.
crafts of Appalachian heritage are famous. Tolerance of different cultures,
lack of concern for status symbols, and an earthy, environmental outlook
characterize Berea. Beyond the college, craft industries, and tourism, hidden
among the rolling hills on the town's edge, is a fast-growing manufacturing
sector. One manufacturer after another has flocked to Berea's industrial park.
In 1996 Berea's population was estimated at 10,007. The population of
this city is increasing. The populations for 1970,1980, and 1990 were 6,956,
8,600, and 9,126 respectively. There was a 16.36 percent increase between
1980 and 1996 (table 8.4). In 1990 there were 8,640 whites, 338 African
Americans, 124 Asians, and 24 persons of other races. Among the Asians, 29
were Japanese. Educational attainment in Berea was slightly higher than the
state's figures. In 1990 among persons twenty-five years and older in Ken-
tucky, 35.4 percent had less than a high school education. In Berea, 37.3
percent had completed high school. Also, 29.3 percent of persons twenty-five
years and older in Berea had associate, bachelor's, or graduate/professional
degrees, compared to 17.7 percent in the state.
Berea's total labor force was 4,582 in 1990, with 289 unemployed per-
sons and a 5.93 percent unemployment rate. Service industries employed a
large number of people; 1,847 persons were employed in health, education,
and other areas of professional service. Manufacturing industry was the sec-
ond largest employer, with 829 persons. Wholesale and retail sale trade in-
Table 8.5. Berea: Employment in major industries, 1990
Total labor force 4,582
Health, education, and other professional services 1,847
Manufacturing 829
Wholesale and retail trade 779
Source: Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, 1995.
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dustries were the third major employer, with 779 persons. Median household
income was $21,622 in 1989, lower than the median household income
($22,534) in the state. In 1989, 17.35 percent of the population was under
poverty level, slightly better than the state's figure of 19 percent. Berea's trans-
portation system is excellent. Berea includes Interstate 75 and U.S. Highway
25. Also, the Blue Grass Airport in Lexington is forty-three miles northwest
of Berea.
Danville
Danville, located thirty-five miles south of Lexington, is the county seat of
Boyle County. The city was founded by Walker Daniel, the first district attor-
ney of Kentucky in 1783-84. It was incorporated in 1836. In the late eigh-
teenth century, the legislature of Virginia decided to have a supreme court of
the District of Kentucky. It was housed in the town square of Danville. In
1782, the first convention produced the first constitution of the Common-
wealth of Kentucky. Danville's Centre College, a private four-year liberal arts
college, offers excellent academic programs. Railroads made Danville a trans-
portation and commercial hub. In addition, the city had steady industrial
development throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. During the
1960s, new industrial development occurred in the western and southern parts
of the city.
Danville has an exceptional quality of life, and visitors are quick to rec-
ognize the amenities. It has assets found in few, if any, Kentucky cities its size.
Local government and politics appear to be scandal free. The schools are
good, and the cultural environment exceeds anything found outside Louis-
ville or Lexington. The streets are clean and well-maintained. Growth re-
mains moderate and orderly. Few vacant storefronts face each other across
Main Street. Renovated old homes border Danville's tree-lined streets, and
the town might have more porches per capita than any other city in the state.
In 1996, Danville's population was estimated at 16,059. Between 1970
Table 8.6. Danville: Population change, education, unemployment, and poverty
Population change between 1980 and 1996 +24.08%
High school completion rate for the persons
25 years and older (1990) 47.40%
Percent of people who hold associate's, bachelor's,
or graduate/professional degrees (1990) 19.50%
Unemployment rate (1990) 8.60%
Poverty rate (1989) 20.00%
Source: Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, 1996.
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Table 8.7. Danville: Employment in major industries, 1990
Total labor force 5,356
Health, education, and other professional services 1,460
Wholesale and retail trade 1,142
Manufacturing 1,139
Source: Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, 1995.
and 1980 the population increased, but it decreased slightly from 1980 to
1990. The populations for 1970,1980, and 1990 were 11,542,12,942, and
12,420 respectively. The growth rate from 1980 to 1996 was 24.08 percent.
In 1990, 10,384 residents were whites and 1,939 were African Americans.
Other races include 37 American Indians, 24 Japanese, 15 Samoans, 7 Kore-
ans, and 14 persons of other minority groups. Educational attainment in
Danville was slightly higher than educational attainment in the state. Among
persons twenty-five years and older in Danville, 33.1 percent had less than a
high school education, compared to 35.4 percent in the state. In Danville,
47.4 percent of person twenty-five years and older completed high school.
The state's figure was 46.9 percent. Also, 19.5 percent of persons twenty-five
years and older in Danville had associate, bachelor's, and graduate/profes-
sional degrees, compared to 17.7 percent in the state.
Danville's labor force was 5,356 in 1990, with an 8.6 percent unem-
ployment rate. Professional and related services industry was the largest em-
ployer in Danville, followed by wholesale and retail trade, and the
manufacturing industry (table 8.7). Median household income in Danville in
1989 was $21,119, lower than the state's median family income of $22,534.
In 1989, 20 percent of the population was under poverty level; this is similar
to the state's figure of 19 percent. Danville is served by U.S. Highways 127
and 150. The Norfolk Southern railway serves the city. The Blue Grass Air-
port in Lexington is thirty-eight miles north of Danville.
Harrodsburg
Harrodsburg, thirty-three miles southwest of Lexington, was Kentucky's first
settlement, and "the sense of history here is almost haunting," according to
the city's Mayor Walters. It was founded by James Harrod in 1774. During
the early settlement of the city, settlers fought against raids by American Indi-
ans. The city had thrived as an agricultural market center since the late eigh-
teenth century, but during the Civil War, Harrodsburg sided with Confederate
forces. This position was detrimental to the city's prosperity. After 1862, when
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Table 8.8. Harrodsburg: Population change, education, unemployment,
and poverty
Population change between 1980 and 1996 +6.92%
High school completion rate for the persons
25 years and older (1990) 48.40%
Percent of people who hold associate's, bachelor's,
or graduate/professional degrees (1990) 9.20%
Unemployment rate (1990) 9.37%
Poverty rate (1989) 23.00%
Source: Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, 1996.
Harrodsburg was raided by a Union force, the city was placed under federal
martial law until the end of the war. After the war, it thrived again as a mar-
ket center for agricultural products. During the twentieth century,
Harrodsburg's economy was based more on manufacturing and tourism.
Manufacturing products include glass, clothing, electrical products, and bath-
room accessories. Old Fort Harrod State Park, opened in 1927, is a main
attraction for tourists.
Despite its history and the townspeople's proud heritage, Harrodsburg
never has and does not now exist in a vacuum. An industrial park is located
on the north end of town, and more than two thousand people work in facto-
ries of one kind or another. Some of the industrial newcomers are Japanese
engineers and managers at Hitachi Automotive, one of the town's largest
employers. At first there was concern that the plant might cause resentment
in a town that does not forget the past. Sixty-six Harrodsburg men were
killed or captured by Japanese forces in the Philippines during World War II,
and survivors were forced on the infamous Bataan death march. The huge
Army tank that sits on a hill at the edge of town as a memorial to those men
now overlooks the Hitachi factory. Japanese in Harrodsburg say that they are
well accepted in the community.
In 1996 Harrodsburg's population was estimated at 7,768. The popula-
tion has increased slowly. The populations for 1970, 1980, and 1990 were
6,741, 7,265, and 7,335 respectively. Between 1980 and 1996, the increase
was 6.92 percent. In 1990 there were 6,618 whites and 673 African Ameri-
cans. Also, there were 30 Japanese, 6 American Indians, and 8 persons of
other minority groups. In 1990, among persons twenty-five years and older
in Harrodsburg, 42.4 percent had less than a high school education (com-
pared to 35.4 percent in Kentucky). Harrodsburg's rate for higher education
was very low compared to the state. In fact, only 9.2 percent of persons twenty-
five years and older in Harrodsburg had associate, bachelor's, and graduate/
professional degrees. This was in contrast to the state's figure of 17.7 percent.
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This Army tank, a memorial to the sixty-six local men who were killed or captured
by Japanese forces in the Philippines during World War II, sits on a hill at the edge
of Harrodsburg, Kentucky, and overlooks the town's Hitachi plant. Japanese em-
ployees say that they have been accepted into the community and that there is no
resentment toward Japan in the town. (Photograph by P.P. Karan)
Harrodsburg's labor force was 3,105 in 1990 with an unemployment
rate of 9.37 percent. Manufacturing industry was the largest employment
sector with 857 people. The second major industry, employing 724 people,
was wholesale and retail trade. The third major industry was professional
and related services. Median household income in Harrodsburg was $17,363
in 1989, much lower than the state's median household income of $22,534.
The poverty level in Harrodsburg was 23 percent, compared to 19 percent at
the state level. Harrodsburg's transportation system includes U.S. Highways
68 and 127 and Kentucky 152. The Bluegrass Parkway is sixteen miles from
the city. The nearest commercial airport is the Blue Grass Airport in Lexing-
ton, thirty-two miles northeast of Harrodsburg.
Table 8.9. Harrodsburg: Employment in major industries, 1990
Total labor force
Manufacturing
Wholesale and retail trade
Health, education, and other professional services
3,105
857
724
518
Source: Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, 1996.
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Residents of Harrodsburg, including Mayor Carol Walters, told us they
have accepted the fact that their town is changing but agree that change does
not necessarily mean that nostalgia and historic preservation must disappear.
Amid two-hundred-year-old buildings and farmlands lined with black fences,
alongside people whose local lineage pre-dates the Civil War, Japanese engi-
neers and workers go about their daily business—tradition and modernity
coexisting amicably.
Versailles
Versailles, located thirteen miles west of Lexington, is a typical small town.
People are polite and congenial. At the corner drug store fountain, residents
drink coffee and solve the problems of the world. A civility in Versailles over-
shadows even the bickering between residents who want to protect the small-
town, rural atmosphere and those who favor further residential and industrial
growth.
The city was established in 1792 by Hezekiah Briscoe and his guardian,
Marguis Calmes. In the early days, the city became an agricultural trading
center due to surrounding rich farmlands. During the twentieth century, in-
dustrial development brought factories producing such items as electrical trans-
formers, thermostats, and fluorescent lights.
In 1996 the estimated population was 6,882. The population increased
steadily between 1970 and 1990, from 5,679 to 7,269. Among the popula-
tion in 1990, 6,507 were whites, 754 were African Americans, and 8 were
other minority groups. Educational attainment in Versailles was higher than
the state's average. In 1990 among persons twenty-five years and older in
Versailles, only 30.5 percent had less than high school education. In Versailles,
50.1 percent of the persons twenty-five years and older completed high school.
Also, 19.5 percent of the persons twenty-five years and older in Versailles had
Table 8.1 O.Versailles: Population change, education, unemployment, and
poverty
Population change between 1980 and 1996 +7.08%
High school completion rate for the persons
25 years and older (1990) 50.10%
Percent of people who hold associate's, bachelor's,
or graduate/professional degrees (1990) 19.50%
Unemployment rate (1990) 3.59%
Poverty rate (1989) 9.80%
Source: Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, 1997.
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Table 8.11 .Versailles: Employment in major industries, 1990
Total labor force 3,809
Manufacturing 1,147
Wholesale and retail trade 691
Health, education, and other professional services 658
Source: Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, 1997.
associate, bachelor's, and graduate/professional degrees (compared to 17.7
percent in the state).
Total labor force in Versailles was 3,809 in 1990 with a 3.59 percent
unemployment rate. Manufacturing industry was the biggest employer in the
city. The second major industry was wholesale and retail trade industry. The
third major industry was professional and related service industry. Also, there
were 208 people working in agriculture. Median household income in Versailles
was $27,220 in 1989. This was much higher than the state's median house-
hold income of $22,534. In 1989, in Versailles, 9.8 percent of the population
was under poverty level. This was much lower than the state's level of 19
percent. Versailles transportation system includes U.S. Highways 60 and 62.
The Bluegrass Parkway is accessible at three miles south of Versailles. The
Blue Grass Airport is eight miles east of the city.
SOCIAL IMPACTS OF JAPANESE BUSINESSES IN THE FIVE COMMUNITIES
Bardstown
The city of Bardstown has eight Japanese manufacturing companies. Five
companies came to the city in the late 1980s, and three companies arrived in
the 1990s. Most of the companies are automotive-related manufacturers. In
total, they employ more than fourteen hundred people. Japanese companies
have made an important contribution to the growth of the manufacturing
sector in the 1990s. The industrial park in the north part of the town is a mix
of old and new: bourbon whiskey distilleries and Japanese automotive-re-
lated industry. The park accommodates all the town's Japanese companies
except one (fig.8.1). They built the factories close together, making the park
look more crowded than industrial parks in other communities we studied.
The industrial park is along Kentucky 245 which connects to Interstate 65.
Access to the Bluegrass Parkway is also easy from the location.
The industrial park is the site of Trim Masters, a Japanese company that
makes auto seats and door trims. The plant in Bardstown produces door
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1999 Urban Service Boundary I 1 1999 Urban Area
Japanese Automotive Parts Plants
Q] Mabex Universal Corp. [5] Intertec Systems LLC
[2] FET Engineering \£\ AMB, Inc.
[5] JIDECOof Bardstown, Inc. [7] Trim Masters, Inc.
[4] Inoac Packaging Croup [8] Sumitok Magnetics Co.
1981 Urban Area
Fig. 8.1. Bardstown: Growth, 1981-1999. (Source: Field survey, 1999).
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Trim Masters has plants in Bardstown, Nicholasville, Harrodsburg, and Leitchfield,
Kentucky. The facility in Bardstown began producing automotive interior compo-
nents (door trim assemblies) in 1991. The Nicholasville facility started producing
complete seating along with forming and welding metal components in 1994. The
Leitchfield plant, established in 1997, produces trim for car seats, and the
Harrodsburg facility has been operating since 1988 and specializes in the intricate
cutting and sewing of auto seat and door trim covers. Utilization of an efficient
kanban system Gust-in-time manufacturing environment) guarantees delivery of
products in time to automakers. Trim Masters employs a workforce of nearly sixteen
hundred at its facilities in Kentucky. (Photograph by P.P. Karan)
trims for Toyota Camry and Toyota Avalon. Trim Masters employs 283 per-
sons including two Japanese. One Japanese is administration coordinator;
the other is engineering coordinator. A general manager of the plant thinks
Bardstown is a good location for the factory. The area offers a good workforce.
The company looks for people who are inexperienced in manufacturing. They
do not need highly trained people. They need people who can learn a new
style of manufacturing through in-house training. As a parts supplier to Toyota,
Trim Masters uses the Toyota style of manufacturing which emphasizes qual-
ity and flexibility. The company trains employees; therefore, they do not want
experienced workers who obtained a different style of production training
(e.g., Fordist production system). The Bardstown area offers workers who
are very motivated. It has excellent accessibility to 1-65 and the Bluegrass
Parkway. The company usually ships its auto parts twenty times a day under
the just-in-time production system. Easy access to transportation systems is a
critical factor for the factory's location decision.
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The relationship between the Japanese factory and the city has been
very good. The city has been supportive of Japanese companies and Japanese
investment. The city initially prepared for industrial development by creating
an industrial development corporation. The industrial development corpora-
tion, which was not organized specifically to target Japanese companies,
planned for infrastructures such as land, water, sewer, electrical capacity, and
roads. As the city made its preparations, an industrial development specialist
had contact with Japanese manufacturing companies. Before the specialist
came to Bardstown, he had worked for the state government to bring Toyota
to Kentucky. Eventually, the Toyota investment spun off to Bardstown by
bringing Japanese auto parts companies. The first Japanese company to move
into Bardstown was welcomed by the community. During construction of the
factory, Japanese personnel needed an office. As the first foreign company in
the town, they did not know where to stay. City officials were aware of the
situation. So, they offered office space in the city hall to the Japanese person-
nel for several months until the factory was built. The city officials and the
Japanese personnel had barbecue luncheons and other parties during their
stay in the city hall. This example shows how much the city government tries
to assimilate Japanese into the community.
More than half of Bardstown's employment in the manufacturing sector
is from Japanese companies. Some of them are expanding their production as
well as employment and facility. A public official estimates that one addi-
tional employment of Japanese company has created two or three spin-off
jobs. Retail trade and service industries have expanded as a result of the grow-
ing manufacturing sector. The city is expecting to have more economic growth.
It has started to build two additional industrial parks. New roads and improve-
ment to existing roads are proposed for the further development of the city.
It seems that the growth of the city (fig. 8.1) outweighs the negative
impacts of the development. Citizens expressed two concerns. One is traffic
congestion. Many citizens complain about the traffic. They have to wait for
two or three minutes at a traffic light. This is not an issue for people living in
large cities. However, Bardstown was a small rural community. People in
Bardstown do not like even this level of traffic congestion. The city needs to
have a plan to improve roads and ease traffic flow. Another concern for the
community is that too much dependence on automotive-related industry might
harm the community in the future. This concern is raised whether they are
Japanese, American, or German companies. A public official was concerned
that when the automotive industry declines, the community also will decline.
Thus, the community's fate will depend on Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, in Georgetown. It is a loss of community control (Nash 1987;
Hummon 1990). Although the city is supportive of those automotive-related
companies in Bardstown, the city wants to have a more diversified economy
for sustainable growth.
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Environmental problems have not been an issue in this community. The
Japanese companies in the community are not generating environmentally
hazardous materials in the production processes. This is due to a deliberate
planning of Nelson County where Bardstown is located. The county has a
strict requirement of what companies can produce in the county. For example,
every company has to have a pretreatment program. Before the company
discharges wastewater into the sewer, the government needs to know what it
is discharging. Anything that the city's sewer plant cannot handle must be
shipped outside the county where it can be treated. The same things apply to
landfills. The county does not have a site for hazardous landfills. If a com-
pany produces a hazardous waste, it has to ship it away. Therefore, a com-
pany that produces hazardous wastes is not likely to come to Nelson County.
It is costly for the company to transport the hazardous wastes. Although the
county is good about preventing environmental problems, the citizens also
are conscious about the issue. A company once wanted to build a facility for
nickel plates in the county. It involves a toxic process. Because of the danger,
the company met much opposition from the citizens and eventually decided
to locate in another community. Companies are also working to be environ-
mentally friendly. They try to exceed the requirements of environmental regu-
lations. At Trim Masters, everything that can be recycled is recycled. For
example, cardboard used in packing goes to Louisville for recycling. Excess
vinyl produced in the manufacturing process goes to Louisville and is then
shipped to Germany. Wood mats used in the factory are burned for fuel else-
where in Kentucky. The facility is also environmentally friendly for employees.
Community is meaningful for these Japanese companies. They want to
be community members. Effort to be environmentally friendly is one example.
The companies are active in community participation. At Trim Masters, con-
tribution to the United Way is a major community activity. The companies
also participate in a Red Cross blood drive and other activities. When em-
ployees form a sport team and ask for sponsorship, the company is willing to
support it. Executives of the Japanese companies are actively involved in the
local Chamber of Commerce. For example, a Japanese executive was instru-
mental in bringing higher education to Bardstown. As a result, St. Catherine's
College set up a branch campus in Bardstown. In order to obtain good work-
ers, Japanese executives are interested in higher education in the area.
The Japanese employees of Trim Masters do not have much time to
socialize with Americans outside work. They usually work late. So, they have
only a few occasions in which they have parties with American coworkers
and their families. Japanese in Bardstown experience interactions with main-
stream America through school activities when Japanese employees' children
are in school. Japanese children and wives have more interaction with Ameri-
cans. So, there are two types of interaction between Japanese and Americans.
One is the interaction between Japanese workers and American workers. This
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type is mostly limited to company functions. The other is the interaction at
school between American parents and Japanese mothers of children attend-
ing schools.
Bardstown has changed from a quiet small town to a dynamic commu-
nity. The change has been rapid. A housing boom has occurred. There are
many employment opportunities that were not previously possible. At one
time, when someone wanted to advance or improve his or her life, he or she
had to leave the community. Now, he or she has opportunities to advance in
Bardstown. Furthermore, people in Bardstown can feel the international com-
munity even though it is very small. Before the Japanese investment, many
people in Bardstown had no chance to meet people from other countries.
They did not have any problems in communication. However, they realized
that there are different people. This is a very good educational situation in
which people learn diversity. Therefore, Bardstown has become a different
community from the community of twenty years ago.
Berea
Berea has four Japanese companies. All the companies are related to the auto-
motive industry. They are located in an industrial park, in the north part of
the city (fig. 8.2). The industrial park is very close to Interstate 75. The park
is on a rural setting like other communities we studied. It is on an open space.
Matsushita Electric Motor Corporation of America (MEMA) was built
in the industrial park in 1995. It employs two hundred Americans and five
Japanese. The company started production in 1996. It is an investment of
more than $27 million. It produces electric motors for vacuum cleaners, au-
tomobile anti-lock braking systems, and power window systems. Since its
inception, the company has grown steadily. It reached 72 employees by the
end of 1996,140 by the end of 1997. This company is a part of Matsushita
Group. It is a sister company of Matsushita Home Appliance Corporation of
America in Danville. MEMA supplies blower motors to Matsushita in Danville
for vacuum cleaners. The proximity is convenient for delivery. MEMA also
supplies products to auto parts companies. It is a second-tier supplier com-
pany. It supplies to Sumitomo in Cincinnati, Ohio, and Ohi America in Frank-
fort, Kentucky. Then, those companies supply to automakers like Toyota.
The locational advantage of transportation is a primary reason for MEMA to
choose Berea. Also, the area offers a good stable labor force. The turnover
rate of the company is only 2 percent per year. MEMA mainly draws employ-
ees from Madison County, which includes Richmond and Berea, and
Rockcastle County, south of Madison County. Madison County was instru-
mental to location of the facility in Berea. The local government has been
eager to attract manufacturing companies. It brings more jobs and tax rev-
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184 Yukio Yotsumoto
Matsushita Electric Motor Corporation of America's Panasonic plant in Berea, Ken-
tucky, makes small electric motors. The plant was established in 1995 and employs
160 persons. There are several other major industrial facilities in Berea. Tokico,
which makes shock absorbers; Kl (USA), an auto parts maker; and Alcan Ingot and
Recycling are among the new industrial recruits. There are far more factory jobs
than workers in Berea, so the plants pull employees from nearby counties. Nearly
half of the workers at Berea factories live outside Madison County. (Photograph by
P.P. Karan)
enues. The company has a good relationship with the local government. How-
ever, MEMA has more interaction with community agencies in the county. It
is actively involved in United Way, a local personnel association, and the
Chamber of Commerce. The community is supportive of the business. Thus,
MEMA feels comfortable in Berea.
Matsushita group has a worldwide company philosophy that empha-
sizes the localization of the companies and contribution to communities. Ex-
ecutives in MEMA think the company is the American company and a part of
the community. Based on this idea, MEMA has specific goals to contribute to
the community. Its goal for United Way in 1999 was to increase a contribu-
tion by 11 percent. Last year, MEMA made the fourth largest contribution in
Madison County though it is one of the smaller companies in the area. Be-
sides the monetary contribution, MEMA participates in United Way activi-
ties. For example, employees participate in a bowling activity and become big
brothers and sisters. Another focus of MEMA is fire protection. The com-
pany supports and contributes to the local fire department. It includes a sup-
port in which schoolchildren are taught fire protection. Many employees are
from this area; therefore, contribution to the community means improving
employees' well-being.
Although many American employees are from this area, all five Japa-
nese employees live in other cities. One single man lives in Richmond, about
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fourteen miles north of the city. The other four employees live in Lexington,
thirty-nine miles north of the city. A main reason that they do not live in
Berea is a lack of educational opportunities. The four employees who live in
Lexington came to Kentucky with families. Because they have to go back to
Japan several years later, their concern is how they can help their children's
education so that the children will not fall behind a Japanese educational
standard. They have to prepare for highly competitive university/college en-
trance exams in Japan. Lexington has a Japanese Saturday school and good
junior high and high schools. Commuters to Berea, the Japanese employees
do not have much interaction with local Americans except in job-related
matters.
MEMA is striving to be a role model in environmental protection. All
employees wear a name tag, and a small copy of an environmental policy
statement is attached to the tag. So, employees are always reminded of envi-
ronmental issues. A manual hangs on a wall or is attached to a machine in
each section of the work process. The manual is about how to process waste
products properly or where to bring them for recycling. Waste metal pieces
such as copper, aluminum, and brass, are generated in the processes of pro-
duction. All of these metals, even tiny pieces, are recycled. They have separate
containers for these wastes. Used oil is processed in the factory so that it is
used again. MEMA generates waste plastic which is given free to another
company which uses it for making other products. Also, the company does
not have any drainage to the local sewer. All wastes are recycled or shipped to
other places outside the county. Chemical is kept in a special room. The room
is designed to be lower than the ground level so that if chemicals spill acci-
dentally, they will not spill over to other areas. The floor consists of special
concrete so that spilled chemicals do not penetrate into the soil below. To
stock chemicals, they once used a barrel. However, after using the barrel, it
became a waste. They thought they can do something about it. So, the com-
pany developed a tank in which chemicals are kept and refilled. Also, they do
not use paper towels. Instead, they use rugs. They are washed after use. Card-
board is collected and recycled. A truck comes to the factory and picks up the
pressed cardboard. These examples show that the company tries to reduce
waste as much as possible. In every corner of the factory, there are signs of
ideas and efforts to reduce waste materials and increase recycling.
MEMA has three numerical targets for environmental objectives: (1) to
reduce solid waste by 6 percent each year, (2) to increase recycling by 5 per-
cent per year, and (3) to reduce hazardous waste by 5 percent annually. A
safety/environmental specialist is employed to achieve these targets. In Janu-
ary 1999, the company finished a pre-audit for ISO 14001. ISO 14001 is an
international standard concerned with environmental management. The stan-
dard asks the company not only to comply with environmental regulations,
but also to work on pollution prevention and continual improvement. If a
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company gets ISO 14001 certification, it means the company has substantial
commitment to environmental protection (Ricca 1996). MEMA was expect-
ing to get a final audit for the certification in 1999.
The Japanese companies in Berea try to create a positive image in the
community. Tokiko (USA) is the largest Japanese company (employment of
564) in Berea. On the company's signboard, besides the name, ISO 9000
certification is noted. This is another international standard which deals with
a quality management system. When a company is certified with ISO 9000, it
means that the company produces a quality product. In the United States,
more than eight thousand companies have been certified with ISO 9000. Again,
this sign is also on the wall of the factory with the company name. By show-
ing the certification, the Japanese company tries to present a positive image in
the community.
Danville
Danville has three Japanese companies located in an industrial park close to
the downtown (fig. 8.3). Danville has many American companies such as
R.R. Donnelley and Sons Company and Phillips Lighting Company. How-
ever, the presence of Japanese companies is important in the city. In 1990
there were 1,139 people employed by all manufacturing companies including
American and Japanese. Now, Japanese companies employ 2,601 people.
Matsushita Home Appliance Corporation of America employs 1,700
people. This is the biggest employer in Boyle County where Danville is lo-
cated. It produces vacuum cleaners and microwave ovens under the brand
names of Panasonic and OEM. It is the largest producer of vacuum cleaners
and microwave ovens in North America. The products are exported to the
Middle East, Africa, and Australia. Matsushita initially entered a joint ven-
ture with a vacuum cleaner division of Whirlpool Company. In 1990
Matsushita obtained 100 percent share of the company. Thus, locational con-
sideration was not so important for Matsushita being in Danville. However, a
Matsushita executive says that Danville has a good labor force. People in this
area do not move as easily as people in Los Angeles and New York. Stability
is important for operating factories. A relatively safe environment and beau-
tiful landscape are attractive to Japanese people working here. Safety is one
primary concern for Japanese. Although Danville is attractive, most Japanese
choose to live in Lexington, thirty-eight miles northeast of the city. They com-
mute to Danville every day. For single Japanese, Danville does not offer any-
thing for fun. Also it is a dry county. Usually Japanese workers like to go to
bars after work, but the city does not offer this opportunity. Japanese families
like to stay in Lexington, which offers better schools and cultural events and
Japanese Saturday school. Since they go back to Japan after several years of
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assignment, their life plan is targeted for how well they can adjust their life in
Japan after completing the assignment in the United States (Kanjanapan 1995).
The Saturday school is important to keep up with a Japanese educational
standard. Also, Lexington is convenient for Japanese wives. There are Japa-
nese grocery stores and Japanese restaurants. Availability of Japanese foods is
another important factor to stay in Lexington (Hill, Indegaard, Fujita 1989). For
a place to live, Danville does not offer things Japanese need. However, it is a good
place to do business. The interaction between local and state governments and
Japanese companies is smooth. They cooperate with each other. They have not
had any problems that have not been settled. When the companies ask for some-
thing, local and state governments are quick to respond. For example, as the
economy has grown rapidly in the area, the companies face difficulty in obtain-
ing good workers. The unemployment rate has been too low, and it is difficult to
attract workers. When they complained to the state government about this situ-
ation, the government was quick to respond. However, what to do to solve the
problem of a low unemployment rate is another matter.
Contribution to the community is important for Japanese companies,
especially Matsushita. As the largest company in Danville, the company is
very visible in the community. Many employees live in Danville. So, if the
company thinks about the employees, this means that they think about com-
munity at the same time. Matsushita has a company philosophy established
by Konosuke Matsushita, founder of the company. He said that "through
our industrial activities, we strive to foster progress, to promote the general
welfare of society, and to devote ourselves to furthering the development of
world cultures." In addition to providing employment opportunities, the com-
pany supports local businesses and community activities. Specifically,
Matsushita is active in United Way, March of Dimes, and American Red Cross.
The company donated more than $100,000 to the United Way in 1999, and it
was the second largest contribution in the community. The company is active
in the local Chamber of Commerce. They sponsor a job-training consortium
with various industries in the community to improve the quality of the local
labor force. Scholarship is another big contribution to the community. Annu-
ally, the company gives three or four scholarships to local high school stu-
dents. Also, they have a summer travel program to Japan. They select young
people and send them to Japan to learn Japanese culture. Overall, Matsushita
wants to be welcomed by the community and it tries hard to achieve this.
Another Japanese company, Denyo Manufacturing Corporation is lo-
cated across the street from Matsushita. Denyo is a small company employ-
ing only 41 people. Among those, 5 are Japanese and 36 are Americans. They
make generators, compressors, and welders for industrial use. The plant was
established in 1995. The company came to Kentucky for several reasons. The
most important reason is an appreciation of the yen. Denyo had exported
products to the United States for many years. However, an appreciation of
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the yen in the late 1980s made export costly. Then, an American company
selling Denyo products in the United States asked Denyo to manufacture prod-
ucts in the United States. Also, Kentucky's representative office in Japan was
aggressive in attracting Denyo to Kentucky. An incentives package was an
additional factor in locating in Kentucky (Yanarella 1990). Other factors of-
ten mentioned in interviews were good labor force in the area and good loca-
tion to do business. So far, the company is content with the location.
As a small manufacturing company, Denyo does not have many com-
munity services. When there is a request for donation, they consider partici-
pating. However, overall, the company is too small to have a large budget to
contribute to the community. The company is in an early stage of establish-
ment and is still focused on building a foundation. The company spends its
energy to train employees and to develop middle management. It is essential
for the company to satisfy the employees first. They try to avoid over-pres-
ence in the community.
Many Japanese in Danville do not have interaction with Americans ex-
cept in work settings. Japanese meet with Americans at parties organized as
company functions. However, since most of the Japanese do not live in
Danville, other interactions at schools and neighborhoods are limited.
Both Matsushita and Denyo are concerned about environmental protec-
tion. Denyo follows Environmental Protection Agency and Occupational Safety
and Health Administration guidelines. The company has hired a special main-
tenance company to follow the requirements of environmental protection.
There has been no incident of environmental problems. Matsushita is also
conscious and proactive to tackle the environmental issue. Matsushita wants
to be an excellent company in environmental protection. On the walls of the
factory floor and office, there are two policy statements. One is a quality
policy statement, and the other is an environmental policy statement. The
environmental policy statement reads "Our Environment is Our Future." Based
on this policy statement, the whole company is working to excel in this area.
The company got a certificate for ISO 14001 in 1999. It is a symbol of the
company's effort and pride for environmental protection. Japanese compa-
nies in Danville are considered friendly to the environment.
Harrodsburg
The city of Harrodsburg has two Japanese manufacturing companies (fig.
8.4). Both companies are suppliers to automobile manufacturers. They em-
ploy more than 1,700 people. The employment in the Japanese companies
suggests an important contribution of the Japanese investment to the com-
munity. Hitachi Automotive Products (USA), established in 1985, was one of
the earliest Japanese companies to locate in the small communities of Ken-
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Social Impacts of Japanese Businesses 191
tucky. The company is proud of being one of the earliest Japanese manufac-
turing companies to choose Kentucky, even earlier than Toyota in Georgetown.
The company employs 980 people. Among those, 949 are Americans and 31
are Japanese. Electronic devices, alternators, and starter motors for automo-
biles are its products. Its facility is located in the north end of the city, an
annexed industrial zone. In front of the facility is a well-maintained garden. It
looks clean and does not create an image of pollutant. Cleanness is one of the
company's efforts to show a good corporate citizenship in the city. A public
official in Harrodsburg attests that the Japanese companies keep things very
clean. The effort is appreciated by local public officials.
Several changes occurred in the community after the arrival of Japanese
companies. The most visible change in the community is its economic base.
Manufacturing industry became an indispensable economic base for the city.
It has created many jobs for the community. A public official perceives this
change as positive and as fortunate for being able to bring these Japanese
factories. Another visible change in the community is a presence of Japa-
nese. When the Japanese companies came, they brought Japanese families,
too. According to a public official, in 1996, ninety-four Japanese families
lived in the city—7 percent of the population. Americans have more chance
to meet Japanese in the community compared to two decades ago. Ameri-
cans meet with Japanese at shops, in restaurants, at schools, and in neighbor-
hoods.
The city is eager to accommodate Japanese and their companies as a
part of the community. For example, the city asked a grocery store to stock
Japanese foods. Also, the city has a language program in which local teachers
teach English to Japanese. Sometimes, this program involves one-to-one tu-
toring. It is a good program to build a personal relationship between Ameri-
cans and Japanese. Thus, the city tries to assimilate Japanese into the
community by finding and meeting the needs of the Japanese family. Cultural
diversity is appreciated in the community. The cultural difference is a good
thing because the community can learn something from the difference. The
ties between Japan and Kentucky are getting stronger as the Japanese direct
investment in Kentucky increases.
For Japanese, they are working hard to assimilate themselves into the
community. Before the companies sent them to Kentucky, they learned basic
English skills and American culture. Also, Hitachi, conscious about a nega-
tive image of an enclave, has a philosophy that discourages Japanese employ-
ees from living in one place. So, the Japanese employees follow the company
philosophy by scattering around several subdivisions in Harrodsburg. In their
neighborhoods, they also work hard to be good citizens.
The Japanese companies actively participate in community activities. As
a foreign company, being a good corporate citizen is important so that they
can be successful in the United States (Besser 1996). Therefore, they make
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more effort on being a part of the community than American corporations.
The Japanese company's strenuous effort to be a part of the community has a
positive impact on the city of Harrodsburg. Comparing the Japanese compa-
nies to American companies, a public official says that the Japanese compa-
nies are more giving and always available for help. They always come forward
before the city asks for help. On the other hand, in the case of some American
corporations in Harrodsburg, when needs arise, the city has to ask them. So,
as for community service, the Japanese corporations are proactive and Ameri-
can corporations are reactive.
Hitachi became a part of the community through public relations ef-
forts. In 1998,174 Hitachi employees participated in community services. It
was 3,136 hours of community service. The company encourages the em-
ployees to participate in community activities. The company contributes to
the community in five areas. They are public education, health and welfare,
charities, environment, and community activities. In the field of public edu-
cation, employees work on Teacher Exchange Program, Classroom Visits,
Head Start, Junior Achievement and Adult Literacy. The first two are de-
signed to understand different cultures, especially the Japanese culture. In the
field of health and welfare, they participate in Disaster and Emergency Relief,
Red Cross blood drives, Family Resource Centers, and Senior Citizen Projects.
In charities, they donate to American Cancer Society, March of Dimes, and
United Way. As an environmentally conscious corporation, Hitachi is involved
in recycling projects, soil conservation, landscaping projects, and city- beau-
tification projects. This effort on environment is noticed by the community.
In community activities, employees are members of the Chamber of Com-
merce and Youth Baseball and Soccer Leagues. Their recent pride in commu-
nity service is a donation of a park shelter in a local park. To avoid conflict,
Hitachi does not participate in political, religious, and labor activities. It also
avoids participation in endowment funds.
A potential negative change of environmental degradation is not an is-
sue in this community. For example, Hitachi is aware of environmental issues
and has a department to deal with environmental issues. The company tries
to surpass the requirements of federal and state regulations. As a result, the
company received an award from the governor of Kentucky. It has received
ISO 14001 certification.
In locating in Harrodsburg, Hitachi is happy with the beautiful rural
landscape, relative safety, climate, and work ethic of the people. Next to the
city of Harrodsburg is Shaker Village of Pleasant Hill. It is a restored Shaker
community with thirty buildings and twenty-seven hundred acres of gently
rolling countryside. Besides the beauty, Harrodsburg is a safe place to live
compared to large cities. This is important for Japanese, who are used to
living in the safe environment of Japan. In 1992 the total crime rate in Mercer
County, where Harrodsburg is located, was 140.0 per 10,000. The violent
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crime rate for the county was 45.1 per 10,000. In contrast, the total crime
rate in Jefferson County, where Louisville is located, was 523.8 per 10,000.
The violent crime rate in the county was 75.4 per 10,000 (Kentucky Cabinet
for Economic Development 1995). Thus, Harrodsburg offers a safe place to
live. A good climate is also important for Hitachi. Hitachi, as a supplier of
automobile parts, practices the just-in-time production system. This system
requires suppliers to ship auto parts when auto assemblers need parts. Under
this production system, the suppliers have to ship their products several times
a day. The auto parts have to arrive just in time for assembly (Kenny and
Florida 1993). They can send products to customers in Ohio and Tennessee
by truck without delay. A Hitachi executive said that people in this area can
come to work early and do not mind working late. This is closer to the Japa-
nese work ethic. The company also knows these people are less likely to form
a labor union.
Hitachi perceives two problems with locating in Harrodsburg. The first
problem is specific to Harrodsburg. It is a housing problem. Usually a small
rural community like Harrodsburg does not have houses available for rent.
Instead of renting, most of the residents own houses. However, when Japa-
nese families come to Harrodsburg from Japan, they want to rent a house or
an apartment because they will probably go back to Japan after several years.
The limited options for choosing rental housing is a big problem for Japanese
employees at Hitachi. Another more general problem applies to Kentucky. It
is a short supply of engineers and technicians in the area. There are not many
college-educated people majored in engineering in the area. Many college-
educated people do not stay in rural communities. They want to move to
large cities. So, Hitachi is working hard to recruit these workers through
advertising in newspapers and on the Internet and using the placement cen-
ter at the University of Kentucky. The company also participates in job fairs
and uses a headhunter. Kentucky's economy is too strong and the unem-
ployment rate is too low to have a pool of good workers. Thus, companies
in the area steal employees from each other. A company that pays the high-
est salary gets the best workers. Both the state government and manufactur-
ing companies in Kentucky perceive this as a problem. For example, the state
government has recently emphasized technical schools to create workers that
match the state economy. However, solving the problem is not easy and takes
time.
Japanese companies in Harrodsburg are adjusting well to the commu-
nity. It is a collaborative effort by both the city and the companies. Since the
city's economy is increasingly dependent on the Japanese companies, the city
tries to meet the needs of Japanese through many programs. The Japanese
and Japanese companies are also working hard to be part of the community
through participation in community activities. The companies make conscious
efforts to maintain good reputations within the community.
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Versailles
Two Japanese companies are located in Versailles. They are in an industrial
park on the north side of the city (fig.8.5). They employ approximately 900
people. In total, Versailles's manufacturing sector employed 1,147 people in
1990. These figures infer that the Japanese companies are important employ-
ers in the city. One company, Y H America, produces automotive air condi-
tioning and power steering hoses. The company employs 330 people, including
6 Japanese. The company was established in 1989. Before that time, the com-
pany was a joint venture with an American company. Y H America came to
Kentucky for two reasons. First, it was a convenient location for the com-
pany to supply the products to customers. This area (I-65/I-75) is called an
automotive corridor (Perrucci 1994a, 1994b). It consists of Michigan, Indiana,
Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Automotive suppliers like to locate plants along
this corridor so that they can take advantage of regional agglomeration (Klier
1998). Second, company officials thought the lower wages of Kentucky would
help contain labor costs. Also, people's work ethic is important. A Y H America
executive thinks the employees have a work ethic closer to that of the Japanese
than do people in other areas. Many employees work hard for the company,
and they understand and support the nonunion status of the company.
A Y H America Japanese executive views Versailles as a good commu-
nity to locate the facility. Vice presidents of Y H America who are Americans
usually deal with the local government on issues such as tax and environmen-
tal regulations. There has been a cooperative relationship between the com-
pany and local government officials. When the company built an additional
facility, the local government officials came and gave a speech at a ceremony.
The president, who is Japanese, does not deal with the local government di-
rectly. It is a job for American executives. The company wants to melt into
American society. Although the capital is Japanese, they consider themselves
as an American company. They want to be a genuine American company.
Therefore, their management style is that Japanese employees do not work in
the front stage. They work from behind the scene. This division of labor
works for building a good relationship with the local governments.
This company does not have any programs to help Japanese employees
settle into the community. They use informal networks to help newcomers
from Japan. The old Japanese tell newcomers where to look for Japanese
groceries and restaurants. As a rule, the company asks Japanese employees to
come to Kentucky alone for the first three months. After the employee settles
down, he brings his family to Kentucky. This is one way that the company
deals with settlement problems. Also, while in Japan, once they have been
selected to come to Kentucky, they have an opportunity to attend an English
language school at company's expense. All of the Japanese employees live in
Lexington. The city of Lexington has five Japanese restaurants and two Japa-
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Y H America plant, Versailles, established in 1989, makes auto air conditioning
parts. The plant is located in the industrial park along the bypass which is growing
ever more crowded with fast food outlets and stoplights. Many of the factory work-
ers commute from Lexington or Frankfort to Versailles. The city's tranquillity, livabil-
ity, and accessibility to other areas make it an attractive site for industrial location.
(Photograph by P.P. Karan)
nese grocery stores. A Japanese Saturday school is also in Lexington. Since
they live in Lexington, there are not many interactions with Americans living
in Versailles. The interactions are limited to the company functions.
As a second-tier auto parts manufacturer, Y H America possesses a dif-
ferent characteristic from a large Japanese corporation. It is not active in
community activities. Except providing employment and tax, it does not have
a major program to contribute to the community. It has only nominal partici-
pation in community service. For example, the company once donated small
amounts of money to a college. Also, the company has an annual picnic in its
facility for employees. Although most of the participants are employees, the
picnic is open to the public. The size of the company might have some influ-
ence on its passive action on community service. Versailles has several manu-
facturing companies that are bigger than Y H America. The other Japanese
company in Versailles, United L-N Glass, is bigger than Y H America. This
position puts Y H America to be a minor actor in the community. Since the
company is not so visible in the community, it does not need to spend much
time and money on creating a good public image in the community. There-
fore, its priority for participation in community is low. Another reason might
be that all Japanese employees live in Lexington so that they don't see Versailles
as their own community. Also, its profit goes to employees first. Although the
company keeps its wages at the prevailing level in the area, the competition to
recruit a good worker makes it necessary to consider employees first. Disclo-
sure of company's profit information and profit sharing to the employees are
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important company policy to build a good relationship between the company
and employees. This company's interaction with the community is limited to
employees living there.
As for environmental issues, the company meets the environmental regu-
lations. For ten years' operation in Versailles, the company has had no inci-
dent of environmental problems. However, it is not pursuing excellence in
this field. Currently, it is not interested in obtaining a certification of ISO
14001. Since getting the certification requires a rigorous commitment by a
company in terms of time and money, it is hard for a company of this size.
Japanese companies in Versailles try to adapt to American ways of busi-
ness. Y H America's management focuses on Americanization of the com-
pany. Japanese employees work behind the scenes. This management style
reflects in the relationship with the community. The company does not show
"Japaneseness." The company wants to melt into the American community.
Therefore, it is not interested in introducing Japanese culture to the commu-
nity. It wants to be a genuine American company. Adaptation to American
culture is also seen in the United L-N Glass facility. The facility is built on a
spacious lawn. A black fence with a brick gate surrounds it. This is a tradi-
tional style of horse farms. Horse farms in Woodford County, where Versailles
is located, represent a landscape of this area. The company's effort to be a
part of the community is seen in the facility. To become the American com-
pany is a theme for these Japanese companies.
The Japanese companies contribute to the development of the city. A
rapid development has occurred in this area, and unemployment rate has
declined. Since the development has decreased the unemployment rate, at-
tracting and keeping good workers is becoming more difficult for the compa-
nies. The rapid growth in the community is partly due to the Japanese
companies. The population in the community is changing. For example, some
American employees came to Woodford County from other places to work
for the Japanese company. Now, there are many opportunities in this area.
The Japanese companies have affected the growth of economy and popula-
tion change in Versailles.
CONCLUSION
In Kentucky, there are more than one hundred Japanese companies. Most of
them are located in small communities. More than 70 percent of them are
automotive-related companies. As a result of Japanese factories, many small
communities of Kentucky have grown rapidly. The companies offer employ-
ment to local people. They also bring diversity. Although mostly limited to
work situations, now, many Americans have a chance to interact with Japa-
nese, whose culture is very different. Many schoolchildren have opportuni-
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ties to learn Japanese culture. Activities of cultural exchange are held in schools.
Before the Japanese companies moved in, when a person wanted to advance,
he or she had to leave the community. Now, people can advance in their own
communities. The communities even attract people from other states as top
and middle management personnel. Japanese companies are embraced by the
local communities. The local governments make special efforts to understand
and to work with Japanese companies. They help Japanese assimilate to the
communities. People also welcome Japanese companies (Fujita and Hill 1995).
However, the companies are welcomed not because they are Japanese, but
because they can provide good jobs to the communities. So, for the local
people, it does not matter whether it is Japanese, American, or German as
long as the company can offer a good job.
Executives in Japanese companies think community is important. There-
fore, they are concerned with contribution to community and with environ-
mental protection. However, it seems that whether they take action for the
issues depends on the size of the company. Although there are exceptions,
smaller companies tend not to have many programs to contribute to the com-
munities. On the other hand, bigger companies are active in contributing to
the communities. They are proud of how much they can contribute to the
communities. Those companies want to be good corporate citizens. In envi-
ronmental issues, Japanese companies do not have any problems with pollu-
tion. However, with some exceptions, smaller companies tend just to abide
by the federal and state environmental regulations. Bigger companies tend to
be proactive in environmental issues. They challenge themselves to increase
recycling and to decrease waste. Many companies pursue a certificate of ISO
14001 so that they can be seen as environmentally friendly. These examples
show that projecting an image of excellence for community is important for
large Japanese corporations. They want to be visible in the community. In
order to project this image, they work hard for community participation and
environmental protection. Also, they bring good things from Japanese and
American cultures. They do not hesitate to spend money to achieve this. Small
Japanese companies do not have resources to project an image of excellence
for community. Therefore, they try to be invisible in the community.
From the point of view of Japanese managers and employees, these small
communities offer safety (low crime) and provide good workers. However,
these communities do not have educational opportunities for Japanese chil-
dren. They also do not have places to buy authentic Japanese foods. There-
fore, it is important that the communities are close to bigger cities like
Lexington and Louisville, where employees can enroll their children in Japa-
nese Saturday schools and go to Japanese restaurants and groceries. One major
problem the companies face is how to obtain good workers. As a result of
rapid growth, now, unemployment rate in the area is too low to get good
Social Impacts of Japanese Businesses 199
workers. Specifically, the companies have difficulty getting engineers. There
are simply not many engineers in the area. Therefore, this research suggests
that if the Commonwealth of Kentucky wants to attract more manufacturing
companies to the area, it has to consider producing more engineers and scien-
tists and improve people's education in general through the secondary educa-
tion so that there will be more skilled workers. Also, maintaining and
improving a Japanese Saturday school is critical. For Japanese parents,
children's education is more important than American parents might think.
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Japanese Corporate
Environmental Practices
in Kentucky
MIRANDA SCHREURS
WHILE THERE HAS BEEN MUCH RESEARCH about Japanese invest-
ment at the aggregate level, there are relatively few in-depth studies of the
effects of Japanese investment on specific American communities. Moreover,
to the best of my knowledge, there has been no appraisal of the implications
of Japanese investment for environmental protection in the United States.
The commonwealth of Kentucky provides an interesting laboratory for this
kind of study. Japanese investment into the state rapidly took off in the mid-
1980s. Thus, it is possible to assess what the sudden influx of Japanese cor-
porations has meant for Kentucky's environment.
This chapter is divided into several parts. First there is a brief discussion
of the relationship between investment and the environment. This is followed
by a general comparison between U.S. and Japanese corporate and environ-
mental practices. The next sections address the structure of Japanese invest-
ment and the general environmental and economic situation of Kentucky. This
places Japanese-owned (or -partially owned) corporations in Kentucky into a
larger context. A few brief case studies of the environmental practices of Japa-
nese corporations in Kentucky are then presented. Finally, the conclusion sug-
gests that the strong relationships between Japanese parent corporations and
their United States-based subsidiaries are leading to a transfer of Japanese
strengths in energy efficiency and recycling to their United States-based firms.
More problematic for Japanese firms is addressing the complex toxic chemical
regulations and reporting requirements that exist in the United States.
CORPORATE INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Most studies of the environmental impact of investment examine how invest-
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ments by first world corporations in the developing world affect the develop-
ing state's environment. There are two competing perspectives on what this
kind of foreign investment means for the environments of developing na-
tions. One is that heavy polluting industries will switch their operations to
developing countries, where environmental standards are more lenient. This
tendency may be exacerbated by developing nations, which use their weaker
environmental standards to attract foreign investment. Corporations will flee
their home countries when environmental regulations are strict and the cost
of doing business is somewhat higher and move to developing countries where
environmental regulations are less stringent and weakly enforced. The other
perspective is that first world corporations tend to have better equipment and
production processes. Thus, their operations tend to be more energy efficient
and are often less polluting than are developing-country firms. They may also
require that their suppliers meet certain environmental standards, thereby
pulling up the pollution control measures of domestic firms (Leonard 1988).
If this is the case, then the environment may actually improve as a result of
foreign investment. Foreign investment also can bring jobs. Thus, if the struc-
ture of foreign investment in a region is such that it brings jobs but has mini-
mal adverse environmental consequences, it can contribute to achieving
sustainable development.
Japanese investment and its environmental implications has been a sub-
ject of considerable attention, not all of which has been positive. Most Japa-
nese investment in the developing world has been in Asia. Japanese
corporations have been accused for the role they played in tropical deforesta-
tion in southeast Asia (Dauvergne 1997), transfer of highly polluting firms to
developing regions, and employment of weaker pollution control practices
overseas than those applied at home (Karan and Jasparro 2000). On the other
hand, Japanese corporations have much more environmental know-how than
do firms in many Asian countries where Japanese investment levels are high.
Today, as Japanese environmental awareness grows, Japanese investment prac-
tices in Asia appear to be slowly changing and becoming somewhat more
environmentally sensitive. The hope is that this will have positive implica-
tions for the environment in other Asian countries and that their domestic
industries will be forced to improve their own energy efficiency levels and
environmental standards to meet the expectations of large Japanese multina-
tionals. Large companies may also contribute to the development of basic
pollution control infrastructure.
Surprisingly, there has been little research on the implications of Japa-
nese investment for the environment in the United States. For that matter,
there has been virtually no research done on the impact of foreign investment
on the environment when that investment is between advanced industrial-
ized states. The probable reason for this is an assumption that all advanced
industrialized states have relatively similar environmental standards, and
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therefore, investments by corporations of one nationality or another
should not make much difference in terms of environmental performance.
Yet, an abundant literature shows that states of similar economic levels
often approach environmental protection differently (e.g., Enloe 1975;
Lundqvist 1980; Brickman, Jasanoff, Ilgen 1985; Schreurs and Economy
1997). These differences can have important implications for environmen-
tal outcomes.
GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY-NGO RELATIONS IN JAPAN
AND THE UNITED STATES
Political cultures and institutions influence the environmental policies and
practices adopted by corporations. Relations among government, industries,
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) influence the policy-making
process. In contrast to the United States, where a large and vocal environ-
mental NGO community exists, in Japan, the environmental movement is
weak and there are few large NGOs. Government-industry relations also are
different in the two countries. In the United States, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) regulates industry, but industry often challenges the EPA
in court. In Japan, where government-industry relations tend to be closer and
more cooperative, there is much less reliance on detailed regulations or on the
courts. Instead, greater reliance is placed on broad regulations and adminis-
trative guidance to alter corporate behavior (Pharr and Badaracco 1986; Leane
1991). At the local level in Japan, thousands of informal environmental agree-
ments have been reached among industries, municipalities, and citizens' groups.
These agreements are a means for introducing the concerns of citizens into
environmental protection at the local level. They are also reflective of a gen-
eral orientation in Japan to rely heavily on voluntary pollution control mea-
sures by industry.
On the whole this has meant that in the United States, where the system
is more open, environmental issues get onto the political agenda more quickly
than they do in Japan. However, the enforcement of environmental regula-
tions is often delayed in the court system for years because of industrial chal-
lenges to EPA rulings. It has also meant that in the United States, companies
have to contend with large environmental NGOs that may target them if they
do not maintain adequate environmental standards.
In Japan there was a period when many small citizens' movements dem-
onstrated against polluting industries and brought companies to court to sue
for damages. Once stringent environmental regulations were established in
the early 1970s, however, the citizens' movements became much less active.
Since the 1970s, administrative guidance has been widely used to bring in-
dustries into compliance with regulations. In Japan decision making may be
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slow because of the need to build societal consensus, but once decisions are
reached, implementation is relatively fast and efficient.
Learning how to operate in a different regulatory environment and in a
different political culture is a challenge for Japanese corporations that are
establishing affiliates in the United States. To the extent that United States-
trained employees are hired, however, these difficulties can be overcome.
DEVELOPMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AMONG JAPANESE INDUSTRIES IN JAPAN
Japanese corporate attitudes toward environmental protection have changed
substantially during the last three decades. In the 1960s Japanese corpora-
tions obtained a notorious reputation as heavy polluters that often ignored
citizen complaints of severe pollution problems. So serious was the pollution
at this time that Japan's environmental movement was for a time one of the
strongest in the world. Outbreaks of mercury poisoning (Minamata disease)
from the dumping of untreated effluents directly into water streams and itai-
itai disease from cadmium poisoning horrified the nation and the world. Japa-
nese corporations and the Japanese government came under strong pressure
to introduce pollution control technologies and to prevent pollution.
After a series of new environmental laws was established in Japan in
1970, Japanese corporations began to invest heavily in pollution control tech-
nologies. The oil shock of 1973 became an additional strong incentive for
Japanese companies to improve energy efficiency. By the end of the 1970s,
Japanese companies were among the most energy efficient in the world and
had made major strides in reducing emissions levels of many air pollutants.
A third phase in Japanese corporate attitudes toward the environment
began in the early 1990s. Because of growing international concern with the
global environment and Japan's strong international corporate presence, Japa-
nese companies have begun to take a more proactive stance on environmen-
tal preservation. In the past, improvements in energy efficiency and pollution
control were the main goals of Japanese companies, but since the 1990s, the
establishment of environmental management systems, recycling programs,
and green environmental images have gained in importance.
There are many signs of change in Japanese corporate philosophy to-
ward the environment. For example, in April 1991 Keidanren (the Japan Fed-
eration of Economic Organizations) prepared a much-publicized Global
Environment Charter—a list of environmental guidelines for industry to fol-
low in domestic and overseas operations. The charter pronounces that each
company must aim at being a good global corporate citizen. The charter states:
The task before us is not merely one of rethinking the problems
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Chisso Corporation plant at Minamata, Japan. The organomercury compounds dis-
charged by the plant into Minamata Bay polluted the local fish population; via fish
consumption, a disease similar to acute anterior poliomyelitis appeared in the area
between 1953 and 1960. By 1979 the number of officially designated patients to-
taled 1,293 with another 305 dead. In addition 6,000 victims filed application for
recognition as Minamata disease patients. The Japanese corporations did not pay
much attention to environmental degradation until 1969. Jane Allen Offut, a Scott
County resident, showed up at public hearings on Toyota in Georgetown carrying
{Life magazine) pictures of Japanese disfigured by the Minamata pollution. Her
crusade led to tighter enforcement of water quality standards. The state built a
pipeline through her land that releases the effluent from TMMK at a point well be-
yond the sink holes. Offut sensitized the local people to the need for more effective
pollution control. (Photograph by P.P. Karan)
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caused by the pursuit of affluence in a culture that encourages
mass consumption; we must also come to grips with the global
problems of poverty and population increase, aiming to hand
over to future generations a healthy environment that allows
sustainable development on a global scale... . Japan must not
rest content with its good record in pollution control thus far.
The business world, academic circles, and government must pool
their resources to create innovative technologies for preserving
the environment, conserving energy, and cutting back on resource
consumption. While drawing on the Japanese experience in
reconciling economic development with environmental protec-
tion, we must actively participate in international environmental
undertakings....
Following this, in July 1996 Keidanren announced an "Environmental
Appeal"—a voluntary action plan aimed toward environmental conservation
in the twenty-first century. Four specific fields were mentioned: measures to
cope with global warming, establishment of a recycle-based society, restruc-
turing of the environmental management system and environmental audit-
ing, and introduction of environmental considerations into overseas operations.
Individual industries were asked by Keidanren to draw up action plans. By
December 1996, twenty-nine industries and 131 industrial organizations had
drawn up plans with yearly review plans. A June 1997 Keidanren report an-
nounced that these numbers had climbed to thirty-seven industries and 137
industrial organizations (Keizaidantairengokai 1997).
A majority of industries are focusing on improvements in energy conser-
vation and energy efficiency. This focus includes plans for energy conserva-
tion in offices and efficiency improvements at the level of laborers, equipment,
and processes. Others have announced plans to make improvements through
the development of new technologies. Other plans include the efficient use of
waste heat, electricity production from waste, the use of co-generation, the
introduction of new energies, fuel conversion, and the use of nuclear energy
by the electric industry or, as a backup, improvements in the performance of
nuclear power generation systems. Some industries have also announced plans
to make improvements at the design stage of products, to make contributions
to energy conservation through international technological cooperation, and
to promote reforestation.
The importance of the automotive industry to Kentucky demands atten-
tion to the environmental goals of Japanese automobile manufacturers' head-
quarters in Japan. Considerable efforts are underway by Japan's automobile
manufacturers to develop low-emission vehicles. Because of the substantial
contribution of automobile carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions to the greenhouse
effect, low-emission vehicles are seen as a potential solution to transporta-
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tion-related emissions. At the moment, however, low-emission vehicles are
not cost competitive.
Because of commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions made by
Japan at the Third Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention
on Climate Change (the Kyoto Conference), Japanese automobile companies
have been under considerable pressure to develop cleaner and more energy
efficient models. This has led to competition to develop alternative automo-
biles. In 1995 Mitsubishi Motors Corporation announced that it had devel-
oped the world's first in-cylinder direct-injection gasoline engine, which will
slash nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions by 90 percent. The new engine tech-
nology will also improve fuel consumption by 25 percent (Bureau of Na-
tional Affairs, Inc. May 311995,422). As of 1997 both Toyota and Mitsubishi
were selling vehicles powered by direct-injection engines.
In February 1997 Honda Motor Company announced that it had devel-
oped a car that is powered by compressed natural gas. The car discharges
"almost zero" emissions.1 Nissan Motor Company also has developed basic
technology for low-emission vehicles that can improve fuel efficiency by 50
percent (Bureau of National Affairs March 5,1997, 207-08).2 At the Kyoto
Conference, Toyota Motor Corporation debuted the Prius, its eco-car. The
Prius gets sixty-six miles to the gallon and uses both a gasoline engine and an
electric motor as power sources. In an effort to be at the forefront of an
anticipated large eco-car market in the future, Toyota announced that it would
initially sell the car at a substantial loss. Toyota is also working on a hydro-
gen-powered fuel cell (Washington Post December 14,1994, HI).
ISO 14001 ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SERIES
AND JAPANESE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Sustainable development has become an important global policy imperative,
but until recently it was largely ignored by the Japanese business community.
Japanese corporations lagged behind their business counterparts in the United
States and Europe in terms of corporate environmental reporting. The World
Business Council for Sustainable Development has brought some multina-
tional companies together and raised awareness of environmental manage-
ment principles like eco-efficiency. Today, growing numbers of corporations
in Japan are moving to incorporate eco-efficiency as a key component of their
long-term business plans (Park 1997). Obtaining International Standards
Organization's (ISO) 14001 environmental management series certification
has become an important goal for many of Japan's large manufacturers and
suppliers.
Certification under the ISO 14001 environmental management series
involves certification from an environmental auditor that the company is in
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Kl (USA) Corporation (Berea, Kentucky), which makes components for shock ab-
sorbers, displays International Standards Organization's (ISO) 9002 environmental
management series certification alongside its name. Certification from an environ-
mental auditor means that the company is in compliance with existing environmen-
tal laws, has an environmental management system in place, and takes a proactive
stance on environmental issues. ISO certification has become an important goal for
many Japanese companies in Kentucky. (Photograph by P.P. Karan)
compliance with existing environmental laws, has an environmental manage-
ment system in place, and takes a proactive stance on environmental issues.
Because the process is cumbersome and expensive, certification can be chal-
lenging for smaller firms to obtain.
According to the Agency of Industrial Science and Technology of the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, a total of 248 Japanese applica-
tions for the ISO series had been accepted as of April 1997. Consumer elec-
tric and electronics makers accounted for 59.7 percent of the applications;
machinery makers, 14.1 percent; chemical, 8.5 percent; precision instruments,
5.2 percent; oil products, 3.2 percent; and others, 9.3 percent.
By December 1998,1,542 firms had acquired ISO 14001 certification in
Japan, the highest level of any country in the world (in comparison there
were 210 acquisitions in the United States) (Environmental Governance and
Electric/Electronic Industries—ISO 14001, pp. 71-73). Reasons for the higher
rate of ISO 14001 certification in Japan may be the high degree of depen-
dence on exports for many Japanese industries. This makes Japanese corpo-
rations particularly sensitive to conditions and trends in other countries. Most
of the major manufacturers in Japan have already achieved ISO 14001 certi-
fication and are now expecting their foreign subsidiaries to follow suit. This
has implications for many of the subsidiaries in Kentucky. American compa-
nies have shown far less interest in the ISO 14001 series, possibly because
they do not think the benefits of this certification are worth the cost of ob-
taining it.
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The informal connections that exist among Japanese firms that are part
of a keiretsu system have been used by parent corporations to push their
subsidiaries to obtain ISO 14001 certification. Sony Corporation, for example,
expected all of its manufacturing facilities to obtain certification by the end
of fiscal 1997 and all of its nonmanufacturing facilities to do so by 2000.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Corporation initially targeted the end of fiscal
1998 for all of its manufacturing facilities except those in China. Both Hitachi
and Toshiba Corporation targeted the end of fiscal 1999, and Mitsubishi
Electric Corporation announced a similar goal for the end of fiscal 2000 (Bu-
reau of National Affairs April 30, 1997, 434). The Japanese oil refining in-
dustry announced that it plans to lower benzene and sulfur levels in its oil
products to obtain certification under the ISO 14001 series and in expecta-
tion of stepped-up benzene regulations that are likely to go into effect in 1999
(Bureau of National Affairs September 18,1996, 833).
JAPANESE CORPORATE INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
AND IN KENTUCKY
Efforts to attract Japanese investment to Kentucky are part of a larger plan
by the state to diversify economic activities and stem the economic decline
experienced by the state in the early part of the 1980s. Manufacturing and
tourism are becoming increasingly important parts of the state's economy. In
1995 farm marketing was worth $3.1 billion to the state and mining was
worth $4.4 billion. In comparison, tourism brought the state $7.1 billion and
manufacturing brought $30 billion. Small firms represent more than 85 per-
cent of all Kentucky firms and employ 25 percent of the state's workforce.
This creates many challenges for environmental policy implementation in the
state because of the cost of introducing pollution control equipment and the
difficulty in monitoring the implementation of environmental programs in
numerous small firms.
Within the manufacturing sector, the automobile industry has rapidly
become one of the most important to Kentucky. After the oil crisis of 1973,
auto plants in the United States began to cluster along Interstates 75 and 65.
This region is considered a desirable location for investment by automobile
manufacturers and their suppliers because of its central location in the coun-
try. Because manufacturers produce for the national market as opposed to
regional markets, this region provides a central location from which to ship
cars to customers (Brunger and Kim 1997, 7). Relatively low levels of union-
ization and incentives provided by states to firms that invest in the region are
other reasons this area has become the center of automobile manufacturing.
Kentucky, for example, provided a record amount of financial incentives to
attract Toyota to the state.
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Like their American and European competitors, Japanese automobile
companies have congregated along Interstates 75 and 65. Honda built an
auto plant in Marysville, Ohio, and Nissan set up an operation in Smyrna,
Tennessee, in 1980. Mazda took over the Ford plant at Flat Rock, Michigan,
in 1985, the same year that Toyota built its plant in Georgetown, Kentucky.
The following year Subaru and Isuzu located plants in Lafayette, Indiana,
and the Diamond Star joint venture between Chrysler and Mitsubishi located
its plant in Normal, Illinois. Japanese automobile manufacturers in Canada
also established operations along the 1-65 and 1-75 corridors. The only excep-
tions to this Midwest-centered investment by Japanese automobile manufac-
turers are the Toyota-General Motors joint venture in Fremont, California,
and the Ford-Mazda plant in Mermosillo, Mexico (Brunger and Kim 1997,7).
Studies of Japanese investment in Asia in the 1970s suggest that one
reason Japanese firms may have moved manufacturing operations overseas
was to avoid the strict environmental regulations that had been established in
Japan early in the decade. While there is no reason to believe this was the case
with Japanese automobile manufacturers in the United States, it is worth
asking whether or not the automobile industry was attracted to this region
because of low energy prices. Kentucky has among the lowest electricity prices
in the country.
The heavy concentration of automobile manufacturers in the Midwest
has attracted auto parts producers to the region. The just-in-time delivery
system used in Japanese manufacturing demands that suppliers be proximal:
they must be able to schedule deliveries by the hour. In a study of the automo-
bile industry in the United States, Rubenstein found that 150 new Japanese
auto parts companies were set up in the United States between 1985 and
1990 (Brunger and Kim, p. 7). Kentucky now ranks third among auto pro-
ducing states.
Attracting foreign investment was an important goal for Kentucky's eco-
nomic development. As of the late 1980s, foreign investment accounted for 3
percent of total manufacturers and an investment of more than $4.3 billion.
Japanese firms represented more than one-third of this foreign investment.3
Of the 140 foreign firms (including joint ventures with American firms) that
had been set up in the state by 1989, 57 were Japanese. By the end of the
1980s, Japanese firms in Kentucky represented an investment of more than
$2.5 billion and employed more than 16,000 workers. In addition, three Japa-
nese banks and six Japanese trading companies had moved into the common-
wealth. A decade later these figures had doubled. The state's 109 Japanese
firms provide 35,546 jobs and represent more than $6.9 billion in invest-
ments (Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development March 30,1999).
Most of these Japanese plants were established after Toyota announced
its plans to locate in Georgetown in 1985. At its start, Toyota Motor Manu-
facturing, Kentucky, was a $1 billion investment that created three thousand
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jobs. Expansions since the plant's inception include the establishment of en-
gine and steering assembly operations. Toyota Motor Corporation also de-
cided to establish its North American headquarters in the state. As of 1999
the TMMK had 7,800 employees. As a result of Toyota's big investment in
the state, more than half of the Japanese plants that invested in Kentucky
after 1985 are automobile parts suppliers.
The 109 Japanese companies in Kentucky can be divided into the fol-
lowing three categories, based on workforce size: 500 employees or more
(21), 100 to 499 employees (46), and less than 100 employees (42). The envi-
ronmental externalities caused by production are typically associated with
company size and the nature of the product being produced. Most but not all
of the largest Japanese companies to invest in the state are related to the
automobile industry.4
On the whole, Japanese investment in the state has been viewed posi-
tively. Perhaps because Japanese investment brought new jobs and a richer
cultural environment to the state, it did not received the negative attention
that other investments by Japanese corporations—such as the purchase of
Columbia Pictures by Sony or the purchase of the Rockefeller Center by
Mitsubishi Real Estate—attracted elsewhere in the country in the 1980s.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF JAPANESE INVESTMENT
IN KENTUCKY
A state's environmental problems are closely linked to the structure of its
economy. Because Japanese investment is so heavily concentrated in the auto-
mobile industry, its environmental impacts also are restricted to a subset of
environmental problems. Before attempting to assess the environmental im-
pacts of Japanese industrial investment and the environmental behavior of
Japanese companies in the state, it is important to understand the geographi-
cal and environmental context in which that investment is occurring.
Population density in Kentucky is low. With a population of about 3.8
million, Kentucky ranks twenty-fourth nationally in terms of population size.
There are no real large urban areas. The largest cities in the state, Louisville
and Lexington-Fayette Urban County, have populations of approximately
270,000 and 238,000 respectively. The next ten largest cities have popula-
tions that range from 24,000 to 54,000. On a national scale, these rank as
small to medium-sized cities. Thus, urban environmental problems are less
pressing than they are in some other states. This also means, however, that
when a new large employer like Toyota moves into a region, it will inevitably
affect transportation patterns, housing development, and resource use.
The two biggest polluting industries in Kentucky are agriculture and
coal. Kentucky is a largely rural state. It has the fourth largest number of
212 Miranda Schreurs
farms of any state in the country. Tobacco, horses, cattle, corn, dairy prod-
ucts, and soybeans are its largest agricultural industries. Many of the most
serious environmental problems facing the state are related to agriculture and
include chemical contamination from pesticides and eutrophication of streams
and waterways caused by runoff from farms.
Kentucky is blessed with an abundance of coal. Kentucky is the nation's
third leading coal producer, producing 158 million tons, or 15 percent of the
nation's total, in 1996 (1996-97 State of Kentucky's Environment). Abun-
dant reserves of coal keep energy prices low in the state, and 95 percent of
Kentucky's electricity is generated by coal-fired power plants. The negative
consequences are that much of the coal has been obtained by strip-mining
and that coal burning has led to high sulfur dioxide concentrations. Sulfur
dioxides are a major contributor to local air pollution as well as acid rain.
Approximately 90 percent of sulfur dioxide emissions in the state are emitted
by the power plants.
While air pollution from the power plants overwhelms that of other
contributors, as Kentucky diversifies its economy, industries and automobile
A part of the Toyota plant in rural Scott County, Kentucky. The environmental impact
of Toyota on Scott County engendered the greatest amount of controversy when
the company announced its intention to build a plant there in the late 1980s. When
the Kentucky plant opened in 1988, Toyota met all standards set by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency. It continues to be responsive and sensitive to the local
environment of the Bluegrass region. The company encourages input from all of the
plant's team members on ways to improve environmental protection activities. More
than two thousand environmentally related suggestions were received in 1998. (Pho-
tograph by P.P. Karan)
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tailpipe emissions will contribute increasingly large amounts to the environ-
mental problems of the state. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 that
essentially required the installation of scrubbers and pollution control de-
vices helped reduce industrial and power plant emissions of sulfur dioxide by
more than a third from 1980 to 1995. Because corporations in Japan have
had to meet stringent domestic air quality and energy efficiency standards—
standards that at times are more stringent than those in the United States—
Japanese transplants are likely to have few difficulties in meeting U.S. air
quality standards, particularly for sulfur dioxide and NOx emissions.
The biggest area for concern related to Japanese investment in the state
may be industrial toxic chemicals. Under the Toxic Release Inventory, large
companies are required to self report the amounts of more than six hundred
toxic chemicals generated (prior to 1995 reporting requirements were for
three hundred chemicals). Toxic releases are on the decrease in Kentucky.
According to the 1996-97 State of Kentucky's Environment, toxic releases
had declined by 57 percent since 1988. The requirement that industries dis-
close to the public their use of toxic chemicals places pressure on them to
reduce use of those chemicals. Concerns about meeting regulatory require-
ments also provide incentives for reducing the use of toxic chemicals.
Ten facilities released 54 percent of toxic emissions in the state in 1994.
Among these top ten emitters to the air was one Japanese firm: Toyota. Toyota
released about 1 million pounds of toxic chemicals to the air compared with
more than 3 million pounds for DuPont and 1.3 million pounds for Ford. In
terms of the top ten emitters of toxic chemicals to the water, there was also
one Japanese firm: AK Steel. Compared to the top five emitters, AK Steel's
emissions were not so large. The largest emitter, ISP Chemicals, released more
than 141,000 pounds of toxic chemicals into the water. AK Steel released
about 7,400 pounds. The top ten emitters of toxic chemicals to the land also
included one Japanese firm: AK Steel. Imco Recycling, the largest polluter,
released 670,000 pounds. AK Steel produced about 15,000 pounds, roughly
similar to levels produced by Dow Corning and ISP Chemicals ("Toxics"
1996-97 Kentucky State of the Environment, 5).
For the purposes of this chapter, it also is noteworthy that the Environ-
mental Defense Fund (EDF) recently ranked Toyota's Georgetown plant as
one of the worst toxic chemical waste producers among the nation's fifty-
four auto assembly plants. The Toyota plant's low ranking was because of the
relatively high levels of toxic waste generated in the production of each ve-
hicle. A spokesman for the company said the statistics were misleading be-
cause unlike most other assembly plants, Toyota produces its own engines.
The spokesman claimed that 43 percent of the total toxic chemical waste for
Toyota was scrap steel that had come into contact with a rustproofing chemi-
cal or oil making it toxic. But since the chemicals are later removed and the
steel is recycled, the actual figures are much lower. The EDF report suggested
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that the Toyota plant could reduce waste by introducing a "block painting"
technique, by which several cars in a row are painted the same color to re-
duce the amount of solvent needed to clean hoses between paint jobs. Inter-
estingly, the EDF report surprised environmental groups in Kentucky because
they tend to have a good relationship with the firm. The Toyota firm antici-
pates obtaining ISO 14001 certification in the near future.
ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICES OF JAPANESE CORPORATIONS
IN KENTUCKY: CASE STUDIES
In order to get a picture of the environmental practices of Japanese corpora-
tions in Kentucky, I requested by letter information from all the Japanese
firms in the state. Nine responded. Of these, one responded to say it would
not be able to participate and two simply wrote that they were too small to
have much of an environmental impact. The small size of many of the Japa-
nese transplants suggests that this may be the case for many of them. It ap-
pears that some of the most environmentally progressive firms were the
ones that chose to respond. From the responses, several interesting develop-
ments can be noted that deserve further exploration. First is the push among
several of the companies in Kentucky to obtain ISO ,14001 certification.
Another is the use of corporate environmental plans and efforts to build a
corporate environmental ethos. Recycling efforts are big among the firms
surveyed.
Matsushita Appliance Corporation
Matsushita Appliance Corporation (MAC), the largest producer of micro-
wave ovens and canister vacuum cleaners in the United States, is an inter-
esting case study. The company is part of the Matsushita Group of
Companies. The parent company of this keiretsu is Matsushita Electric In-
dustrial Company (MEI), which was established in 1918 in Japan. Matsushita
Electric Corporation of America was established as a subsidiary in 1959,
after which time the Panasonic name brand was introduced in the United
States. MEI is the eighth largest manufacturer, based on sales, worldwide,
and as of 1987 ranked as the world's eighteenth largest employer. Matsushita
has more than twenty thousand employees in North America; twelve thou-
sand of those employees are in the United States, with two thousand in
Kentucky.
MAC was established in 1990 in Danville, Kentucky, and is one of the
top five manufacturers in Kentucky in sales. It is made of up two distinct
division companies: the Matsushita Floor Care Company, which manufac-
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tures vacuum cleaners, and the Matsushita Microwave Oven Company, which
manufactures microwave ovens. In addition to its Danville operations, MAC
has a parts, service, and subassembly building with approximately eighty
employees in Winchester, Kentucky, and a Technology Development Depart-
ment for microwave ovens with about twenty professional staff in Franklin
Park, Illinois.
MEI drew up the Matsushita Environmental Charter in 1991. The policy
states that "humankind has a special responsibility to respect and preserve
the delicate balance of nature, and we at Matsushita acknowledge our obli-
gation to maintain and nurture the ecology of this planet." In 1997 the com-
pany established a Corporate Environmental Affairs Division and inaugurated
a Corporate Environment Conference. There is a new emphasis in the corpo-
rate group on environmental matters. This is consistent with a growing con-
cern among many Japanese multinational corporations about green
consumerism. As international environmental awareness grows and consum-
ers, stockholders, and environmental groups place demands on large Japa-
nese corporations to become more environmentally friendly in their operations,
a new environmental awareness is taking hold in Japanese firms. Matsushita
is one of many large Japanese corporations that are working to improve prod-
uct recyclability, develop pollutant-free products and processes, and reduce
energy consumption.
Matsushita plants in Japan had reduced industrial waste per unit of sales
by 57 percent from fiscal 1992 levels by the end of fiscal 1997. By fiscal
2001, the company intends to further reduce this to 25 percent of the fiscal
1992 total. Furthermore, the Matsushita Electric Industry set a goal of reduc-
ing CO2 emissions from its plants in Japan to 1991 levels by the end of the
1999 fiscal year (ending March 1999). By the end of fiscal 2001, the volume
of energy consumed per unit of sales is to be reduced by 25 percent from that
of fiscal 1991. While these goals are limited to Matsushita plants in Japan,
the company has announced that it was part of the Matsushita corporate
group's goal for all of its manufacturing companies worldwide to obtain ISO
14001 certification by the end of fiscal 1999.
MAC announced in its daily in-plant newsletter of October 15, 1998,
that the company had adopted an Environmental Policy that will help the
company pursue ISO 14001 certification. The Environmental Policy of the
company pledges the company to "the prudent, sustainable use of the earth's
resources and the protection of the natural environment" while contributing
to "enhanced prosperity for all." The company lists protection of the ozone
layer, reduction of industrial waste, reduction of global warming, and effi-
cient use of resources as top environmental goals. In addition, the company
plans to encourage the use of Environmental Management Systems by suppli-
ers and contractors and to design products in such a way as to minimize its
environmental impacts in production, use, and disposal.
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Matsushita Electric Motor Corporation of America
Another Matsushita affiliate, the Matsushita Electric Motor Corporation of
America (MEMA) located in Berea, Kentucky, received ISO 14001 certifica-
tion from Underwriters Laboratories in May 1999. MEMA is a young com-
pany, established in December 1995. Production began in November 1996.
MEMA is a $27 million investment on a 64-acre site and employs about two
hundred people. The company produces electric motors for vacuum cleaners
and for automobile anti-lock braking systems and power windows used by
the automotive industry.
The company's strict environmental rules prohibit the dumping of any
chemicals or processes water into sinks or drains, and floor drains were plugged
to keep any spills from contaminating the environment. The policy allows for
the use of new chemicals only if they receive prior approval from the safety/
environmental specialist. The company's environmental objectives include
reducing solid wastes by 6 percent per year; increasing recycling of aluminum
cans, cardboard, and paper products by 5 percent per year; and reducing
hazardous wastes by approximately 31 drums (1,705 gallons) in one year.
MEMA also advocates the use of recycled packaging.
To obtain ISO 14001 certification, the company had to show it had a
proactive environmental policy, was committed to comply with legal envi-
ronmental requirements, and had a continually improving environmental
management system in place. ISO 14001 has many of the same characteris-
tics and requirements as the ISO/QS 9000 quality management system but
specifically addresses protection of the environment. (Steve Bratcher, MEMA
safety/environmental specialist, e-mail communication October 28,1999).
According to Steve Bratcher, MEMA safety/environmental specialist (tele-
phone interview March 12, 1999), Japanese corporations tend to be very
energy efficient and recycle-oriented. For example, MEMA recycles 99 per-
cent of processed material from scrap motors. Bratcher also suggested, how-
ever, that although Japanese companies may be concerned about recycling
and environmental protection, they may not thoroughly understand U.S. en-
vironmental regulations. Japanese companies prefer to use Japanese prod-
ucts. In some cases, Japanese companies will order chemicals from Japan that
contain substances not allowed in the United States. There are examples of
Japanese companies incurring heavy penalties under the Toxic Substances
Control Act. Therefore, Bratcher stressed the importance of employing indi-
viduals who have a thorough understanding of these regulations and con-
cluded that "superior environmental performance can be achieved through
environmental education and training."
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ATR Wire and Cable Company
ATR Wire and Cable Company is another Japanese firm in the Danville area.
The company was established in 1970 by Firestone but then was bought by
Tokyo Rope Manufacturing Company, in conjunction with ITOCHU and
Mitsubishi, in 1981, at which time it was given its current name. The com-
pany produces steel cord, and its major customers are tire producers. In June
1990 the plant underwent a major expansion at which time state-of-the-art
equipment and environmental controls were installed. This resulted in the
company's receipt of the Outstanding Environmental Leadership Award at
the Governor's Conference on the Environment in 1991. Two major areas of
focus for the company's environmental cleanup efforts have been reduction
in the use of toxic chemicals and reduction of solid waste by implementing
programs to remove recyclable materials from the industrial landfill. A new
plating process enabled the company to eliminate the use of lead and cyanide
compounds entirely by 1990. In this year, the company reduced by one-third
all hazardous waste generated. The company's efforts at waste stream reduc-
tion won it recognition in 1991 from Kentucky's Cabinet for Natural Re-
sources and Environmental Protection.
The company's progress in solid waste reduction placed the company
six years ahead of EPA targets for industrial landfill materials. By isolating
recyclable materials leaving the plant, the company was able to reduce by
two-thirds the amount of solid waste going to the landfill. As a result in
October 1995 the company received the Governor's Environmental Excel-
lence Award for its "Associates for Total Recycling" program at the Governor's
Conference on the Environment.
Given this record it is not surprising that the corporation's promotional
brochure lists environmental safety as a top concern. In its opening sentence
the brochure states: "We at ATR are proud to be at the forefront of the steelcord
industry, a position we attribute to our guiding principles of operation: un-
compromising quality, customer satisfaction and environmental safety. ATR
manufactures and ships only those products which satisfy our exacting stan-
dards of quality, while conforming precisely to our customers' needs. We ac-
complish all this and lead our industry in fulfilling our environmental
responsibilities to both local and global communities."
The success of environmental groups in lobbying for new laws regulat-
ing toxic chemicals has made the use of toxic chemicals increasingly expen-
sive for companies. This has pushed some companies like ATR to switch
production away from these chemicals to environmentally safer ones.
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YKK Corporation
Another example of a subsidiary of a large Japanese keiretsu, is Universal
Fasteners, of the Y K K Corporation. The YKK Corporation, following the
trend of large corporations in Japan since the early 1990s, established an
Environmental Pledge in 1994: "It is recognized today as being a most impor-
tant duty for all humankind that we preserve the abundantly endowed global
environment and that we transfer it to the next generation in sound condi-
tion. Striving to be an 'earth friendly company,' YKK Group proclaims that
we will address and promote harmony with the environment as the highest
priority of our business activity." Y K K's Environmental Action Guideline
includes a pledge to address environmental concerns related to its overseas
activities.
The plant employs 325 people and produces metal buttons, rivets, burrs,
and hook-and-eye fasteners for the clothing industry. Waste generated from
the plant includes used oils and machine coolants, scrap metals, and general
plant trash. Hazardous wastes include paints and wastewater from burnish-
ing/electroplating operations.
In January 1996 the Kentucky Pollution Prevention Center (KPCC) of
the University of Louisville prepared a preliminary report containing obser-
vations and suggestions for waste reduction. The report included many sug-
gestions for ways in which the company could reduce waste and prevent
pollution. The KPCC's legislative mandate, given at its creation in 1988, is to
provide information and technical assistance to help Kentucky manufactur-
ers to voluntarily reduce hazardous waste by 25 percent. The KPCC works
primarily with small and medium-sized firms like Universal Fasteners. Its
operations are primarily funded by a hazardous waste assessment fee on Ken-
tucky manufacturers and businesses that produce hazardous wastes or use
Title III Section 313 toxic chemicals.
In June 1998 Universal Fasteners established a Corporate Environmen-
tal Policy. The main purpose of establishing such a policy is to help manage-
ment identify waste streams and to advise on waste reduction opportunities.
The environmental guidelines of the company establish environmental pro-
tection as a line responsibility and an important measure of employee perfor-
mance as is the case with safety issues. They also call for the minimization or
elimination of the generation of waste and promotion of the reuse and recy-
cling of process materials. The Environmental Policy notes that incentives for
the company to promote facility-wide waste reduction above and beyond
that of environmental protection and resource conservation include substan-
tial economic returns, reduced liability, ease of regulatory compliance, and
good public image. Also noteworthy was a postclosure permit requirement
that required the facility to submit documentation of the waste minimization
program at the facility.
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CONCLUSION
Japanese corporations have been received in Kentucky with open arms. On
the environmental front, Japanese firms based in Kentucky appear to be ac-
tively pursuing energy and resource efficiency improvements, and several are
obtaining ISO 14001 certification. The heavy concentration of Japanese in-
vestment in auto-related industries means that Japanese firms contribute to
only a subset of the environmental problems facing Kentucky. Moreover, be-
cause most of the Japanese firms in Kentucky were established in the mid-
1980s, they came after parent firms in Japan had already made major strides
in energy efficiency improvements and pollution control practices. Thus,
firms often came to Kentucky with already strong environmental standards.
The biggest problem area may be different expectations regarding the use
of toxic chemicals where the laws in Japan and the United States are some-
what different.
NOTES
l.The new vehicle is called the Civic GX and can drive 248 miles on a full tank.
The carbon monoxide (CO) emissions of the vehicle are 98.4 percent less than those
of comparable Honda vehicles; hydrocarbon (HC) emissions are 94.6 percent less;
and NOx emissions are 98.6 percent less. Honda already has introduced its first low-
emission vehicles, the 1.6-liter Civic Ferio and Partner. These cars discharge only one-
tenth the CO, HC, and NOx of comparable Honda models. Both models have
maximum power output of 105 horsepower at 6,400 rpm (revolutions per minute)
and a maximum torque of 14.3 kilograms at 4,600 rpm. Fuel consumption is compa-
rable to similar Honda vehicles.
2. Nissan's technology uses a reciprocal engine and an electricity generator to
power an electric motor. The experimental car makes use of a 1-liter gasoline engine,
a 55-watt motor, compact lithium ion batteries, and a generator. Emissions of CO,
HC, and NOx are about half of comparable gasoline-powered vehicles. The experi-
mental car has a maximum speed of 120 kilometers per hour and fuel consumption
of 15-20 kilometers per liter. The company reported that to achieve almost zero
emissions, it used a "tumble port design" that enhances stable combustion after the
engine starts, an air-fuel ratio controller with fuel adhesion compensation for main-
taining a precise air-to-fuel ratio, a thin-walled catalytic converter/integrated exhaust
manifold for immediate catalytic converter activation after the engine starts, and a
400-cell catalytic converter to increase the contact area.
3. Brunger and Kim (1997, 9) argue that the concentration of Japanese firms in
a region brings other benefits to Japanese firms as well. As the level of experience
with Japanese corporations in a community increases, it is easier for subsequent firms
to locate there. Translation services, Japanese cultural activities, Japanese food sup-
plies, and the like become embedded in the region. This may also help explain the
large increase in Japanese investment in Kentucky since the mid-1980s. At a Novem-
ber 1989 conference on Japanese investment in the United States, the Economic De-
220 Miranda Schreurs
velopment Office of the State of Kentucky noted that its office was especially mindful
of the sociological and cultural ramifications associated with foreign investments,
"since such changes can have a profound affect on future efforts to attract new for-
eign investment" (Japanese Investments in the US: American Responses 1989, 41).
The successful bid for the Toyota plant has put Japan on the map for Kentuckians. By
1989 five Kentucky high schools were offering Japanese language courses to their
students. In 1986 a U.S.-Japan International Management Institute opened, and in
1987 the Japan-America Society of Kentucky was established. The University of Ken-
tucky has steadily increased its Japan expertise during the past decade as well.
4. The largest Japanese companies are: Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Ken-
tucky (7,800 employees), Matsushita Appliance Corporation (2,000), AK Steel Cor-
poration (1,600), Sumitomo Electric Wiring Systems, Morgentown (1,000), Hitachi
Automotive Products (USA), Inc. (950), Ambrake Corporation (950), Link-Belt Con-
struction Equipment (900), Trim Masters (700), Sumitomo Electric Wiring Systems,
Edmonton (700), Technotrim, Glasgow (690), Technotrim, Maysville (650), AP
Technoglass Corporation (600), Obi Automotive of America Corporation (600), TG
(USA) Corporation (600), Topy Corporation (590), A T R Wire and Cable Company,
Inc. (564), Tokico (USA), Inc. (564), Mazak Corporation (520), Jideco of Bardstown,
Inc. (500), and United L-N Glass, Inc. (500).
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Assessing Environmental
Performance of Japanese
Industrial Facilities
in Kentucky
GARY A. O'DELL
REPRESENTING MORE THAN $7 BILLION invested in more than a
hundred plants, Japanese corporations have been the most important source
of foreign direct investment in Kentucky during the past decade. The eco-
nomic impact of this investment is substantial and benefits the commonwealth
through direct employment, increased tax revenues, and multiplier effects.
Other aspects of the Japanese presence are less easily quantifiable. Although
the proliferation of manufacturing firms serves to diversify and strengthen
Kentucky's economy, quality of life in Kentucky is not limited solely to eco-
nomic considerations but includes the state of the environment.
Economic activity places stresses on the environment in the production
and consumption phases, for the environment serves as a source of materials
and energy, as an assimilator of waste, as a source of amenities, and as a life-
support system. Provision of these services is dependent on preservation of
the environment and maintenance of in situ natural resources and stable eco-
logical relationships. The concept of sustainable development attempts to
unite the need for current economic output with the need to maintain the
continued productivity of environmental and natural resources (Pearson 1985).
When the ability of the environment to renew materials and absorb waste is
exceeded, the environment deteriorates.
Assessment of environmental impacts of human activity may be made
using two different frames of reference: absolute and relative. Evaluation on
absolute terms requires long-term collection of baseline data against which to
measure departures from ambient norms. Evaluation on relative terms does
not seek to measure changes but rather to provide an indication of potential
environmental impact, using performance criteria.
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A primary cause of environmental degradation is the uncontrolled re-
lease of waste residuals, or pollution. Many industrial operations produce
waste that is potentially harmful to the environment. The amount and types
of waste generated by a facility are important indicators of risk to the envi-
ronment, but more significant is the manner in which such waste is managed.
Through production modifications and proper handling, the amount of po-
tentially hazardous waste released into the environment may be greatly re-
duced. Comparison of waste generation and waste management practices
among industrial facilities provides a means to assess the environmental per-
formance of specific facilities or industry segments. The focus of this chapter
is to determine whether Japanese-owned firms operating in Kentucky differ
significantly from those of other ownership in their environmental perfor-
mance. Schreurs, in the previous chapter, focused on the development of en-
vironmental policies of Japanese industry; this chapter is concerned with their
real-world practices.
Performance evaluation of Japanese firms was undertaken using data on
hazardous waste generation reported to the Kentucky Division of Waste
Management under the provisions of the federal Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 and the federal Toxic Release Inventory (TRI)
established by the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA) of 1986. Each of these programs requires industrial facilities to
report on materials that are potentially harmful to human health and the
environment, and each of these programs was established prior to a signifi-
cant Japanese industrial investment in Kentucky.
An additional assessment of environmental performance was conducted
by visiting five large-quantity hazardous waste generators in Kentucky. These
facilities were Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky (Georgetown), KI
(USA) (Berea), Zeon Chemicals (Louisville), Universal Fasteners (Lawrence-
burg), and Hitachi Automotive Products (USA) (Harrodsburg). The firms
visited were selected from the list of large-quantity hazardous waste genera-
tors to provide a diversity of industrial types and facility sizes. At each facil-
ity, the environmental staff was interviewed concerning environmental policies
and practices and the plant was toured to inspect waste reduction measures
implemented.
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
Evaluating environmental performance differs considerably from environmen-
tal impact assessment in its approach. Impact assessment generally deals in
absolutes; performance evaluation considers relations. Impact assessment is
focused on changes that occur in the condition of the environment as a result
of human activity. Therivel (1992) describes environmental impact assess-
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ment (EIA) as "the process of predicting and evaluating an action's impacts
on the environment, the conclusions to be used as a tool in decision making."
Since EIA was first formalized following the National Environmental Protec-
tion Act of 1969 and the subsequent establishment of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, it has been applied primarily to specific proposed actions
or projects. The basic steps followed in an EIA are to review the state of the
environment and the characteristics of the action and possible alternatives
and to then predict the future state of the environment with or without the
action (Baker, Kaming, and Morrison 1977).
Ideally this cause-and-effect approach requires that the environment be
well enough understood that the effect of various actions can be modeled in
some fashion. This requires the accumulation of a substantial volume of data
in many categories from which ambient conditions may be determined against
which to measure or predict changes. The situation is further complicated
because environmental systems—ecosystems—are not static but are constantly
evolving in response to both internal and external dynamics. The response to
this complexity has been attempts to develop specific indicators that reflect
either environmental changes or potential risk to the ecosystem. There is at
present no universally adopted set of indicators. In the words of one researcher:
"No generally accepted approach is available to measure these local and re-
gional impacts: we do not have an ecological indicator for use on the evening
news that is comparable to the GNP" (Karr 1992, 229).
Ecosystems are complex open systems having a constant interaction of
material and biological inputs and outputs. For this reason cause-and-effect
is not a simple linear association but an intricate set of relationships. Therivel's
(1992) discussion of cumulative environmental impacts reflects on this com-
plexity. Environmental impact assessments do not adequately consider cu-
mulative effects of one or more projects or activities. Cumulative impacts
include additive, synergistic, threshold/saturation, induced/indirect, or time-
crowded and space-crowded effects. An additive effect results in environmen-
tal degradation from a sum of activities where any one activity by itself causes
little harm. When the total impact of several activities exceeds the sum of
their individual impacts, this is a synergistic effect. A threshold or saturation
effect occurs when the environment is resilient up to a certain level and then
rapidly degraded. Induced and indirect impacts occur where one develop-
ment project stimulates secondary developments and infrastructure. Time-
and space-crowded effects occur when the environment does not have the
time and space to recover from one impact before subjected to another.
Indicators for performance evaluation do not attempt to ascertain ef-
fects but rather are useful in comparing the potential environmental risk of
activities. Tracking environmental performance of specific facilities over time
provides a means to ascertain whether potential environmental risks posed
by that facility's operations are increasing or decreasing; that is, as a measure
Assessing Environmental Performance 225
of changes in environmental efficiency. Frequently, performance indicators
can be used in association with absolute measures to provide an assessment
of environmental impact. For example, the most recent edition of the State of
Kentucky's Environment (Cole, Richards, and Siegel 1999) notes that there
has been an overall decline in Kentucky in the average air concentration of
sulfur dioxide, a pollutant harmful to human health and other biological sys-
tems. The report also notes that industrial emissions of sulfur dioxide have
significantly declined since 1980. Thus there is a link between performance
evaluation and impact assessment. It is not a direct one-to-one linkage, for
there are other sources of contaminants beside industry, but comparison of
total annual rates of release of industrial chemicals to ambient air quality
implies correspondence.
Environmental impact assessment can be a long and tedious process in-
volving years of monitoring to establish baseline conditions; the larger and
more complex is the area of study, the more difficult becomes the task of
linking cause to effect. Assessing the environmental impact of Japanese in-
dustrial firms in Kentucky, in absolute terms, would be an enormous chal-
lenge requiring analysis of many sorts of data. The most troublesome aspect
of such an undertaking is the inherent difficulty in isolating effects resulting
from Japanese facilities from those produced by the numerous other forms of
economic activity in the state. The solution proposed in this study is to use
environmental efficiency in terms of waste generation and management as a
surrogate for environmental impact. Waste from industrial processes is re-
lated to environmental degradation, in that it represents poor resource utili-
zation and places stresses on the assimilative capacity of the local ecosystem.
Because waste products also reflect inefficiencies in industrial processes, envi-
ronmental efficiency is, to a certain extent, a mirror of economic efficiency.
ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
OF JAPANESE FACILITIES IN KENTUCKY
Two data sources provide the primary information used for performance evalu-
ation in this study: state and federal (under the provisions of RCRA) hazard-
ous waste reporting systems and the federal TRI established by EPCRA.1 Each
of these programs requires facilities to report on materials that are poten-
tially harmful to human health and the environment, and each of these pro-
grams was established prior to the Japanese presence in Kentucky. Although
there is overlap, the programs differ in the classes of materials with which
they are concerned.
TRI reporting is more selective than RCRA, in that TRI is concerned
with the management of "toxic" substances at industrial facilities2 whereas
RCRA regulates "hazardous" substances that encompass a broader range of
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materials and include numerous nonindustrial generators. Substances are regu-
lated under RCRA's more inclusive criteria if they exhibit certain characteris-
tics of toxicity or ignitability, corrosivity, or reactivity (EPA 1997). The
legislation regulates and manages hazardous wastes from generation to dis-
posal, taking a "cradle-to-grave" approach "intended to protect human health
and the environment through proper management practices, to encourage
conservation and recovery of valuable resources, and to alleviate the need for
future corrective action cleanups. In contrast to the Superfund3 program, which
is designed primarily to clean up contamination from past waste disposal,
RCRA is largely prospective in approach" (Openchowski 1990).
There are, however, certain inherent difficulties in the use of data from
these sources. Associated problems arise from overlapping causes that may
be categorized as data inconsistencies and compilation delays. Data inconsis-
tencies arise from changes in program requirements and definitions and from
incorrect reporting of information by facilities. In the first case, federal and
state programs are subject to constant modifications by both legislatures and
regulatory authorities. Both RCRA and the TRI have been substantially re-
vised on several occasions. This results in data sets that vary over time as to
the number of chemical substances included, the reporting requirements for
facilities, and the way in which information is organized. Furthermore, the
information reported by facilities is not always accurate, sometimes inten-
tionally but more frequently inadvertently, so that figures may be subject to
retrospective adjustment. The net effect is to produce substantial delays in
report compilation, so that the most accurate data is usually several years
old. For these reasons, 1996 has been chosen as the base year for comparison
of facility environmental performance, since data collected for more recent
years is generally not yet in usable form.
During 1996 there were ninety-one Japanese-owned industrial facilities
operating in Kentucky, representing 1.6 percent of the manufacturers in the
state (Manufacturers News 1997). In that year, twenty-five of the Japanese
firms were classed as large generators of hazardous waste and regulated
under RCRA, and thirty-one firms produced sufficient toxic chemicals to
qualify for regulation under TRI. These two overlapping segments of Japa-
nese industry comprise the study group for which environmental perfor-
mance is evaluated.
RCRA Hazardous Waste
The RCRA program in Kentucky is managed by the state Division of Waste
Management under federal mandate. Federal and state hazardous waste laws
focus on the regulation and management of RCRA hazardous waste pro-
duced by large-quantity generators (LQG) regardless of facility type. LQGs
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are defined as producing more than 2,200 pounds (1,000 kilos) of hazardous
waste per month. Less closely regulated, small quantity generators (SQG,
10-100 kg) and conditionally exempt generators (1-10 kg) report on hazard-
ous waste in less detail than LQG facilities.
Through 1990 all facility hazardous waste generation was classed as a
single entity. Beginning in 1991, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
divided this waste into two categories, managed waste and exempt waste.
Exempt hazardous waste, more than 90 percent of the total, is primarily cor-
rosive wastewater that is relatively easy to treat and is exempt from most
hazardous waste requirements (Cole, Richards, and Siegel 1999). In addi-
tion, cleanup or remediation of existing contamination sites can result in large
quantities of managed waste attributed to a corporation that is unrelated to
the current-year hazardous waste generation for the facility. Because of this
restructuring of waste classification, only the data for the period 1991-1996,
excluding remediation waste, are used in this paper to analyze waste quantity
trends.
The total number of LQG firms in the state increased steadily from 260
in 1981 to a peak of 482 in 1992, since declining to 409 by 1996. In any
given year, about one-fourth of LQG are nonindustrial and often transient on
the list, consisting of facilities such as gasoline service stations, hospitals, oil
and gas pipelines, and universities that occasionally produce moderate amounts
of hazardous waste, in addition to some relatively large generators such as
military bases. These nonindustrial sites represent, in most years, less than 5
percent of all large-quantity hazardous waste generation. The number of in-
dustrial plants generating hazardous waste remained fairly constant during
the period 1991-1996, averaging about 300 facilities. In 1996 industrial LQG
constituted about 5 percent of nearly 6,000 manufacturing firms operating in
Kentucky. Twenty-five Japanese firms were classed as LQG in 1996, about 8
percent of the 309 LQG in that year. Since the 91 Japanese firms then extant
constituted only about 1.6 percent of all Kentucky manufacturers, a fivefold
greater proportion of Japanese firms were producing hazardous waste than
in the general population of industrial companies. The number of firms gen-
erating hazardous waste is not in itself necessarily significant, however; of
greater import is the proportion of total waste and the manner in which it is
managed.
In 1996 Kentucky industrial firms produced 405,867 tons of managed
hazardous waste and nearly 17.4 million tons of exempt waste. Of these state
totals, Japanese firms generated 9,203 and 86,030 tons respectively in the
two categories. The Japanese contribution represents 2.2 percent of all man-
aged waste and roughly corresponds to the proportion of Japanese facilities
in the general industrial population. Historically, the trend line for the Japa-
nese contribution as a percentage of total industrial LQG waste is nearly flat,
showing neither significant increases nor decreases since 1991 despite consid-
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Fig. 10.1. Rate of increase of Japanese RCRA, 1986-1996.
erable increase in both the number and capacity of Japanese plants (figs. 10.1
and 10.2). During the same period, the actual amount of managed waste
generated by Japanese firms has increased about 50 percent from 5,830 tons
to 9,203 in 1996. This is attributable to growth rather than a decreasing
effectiveness in environmental protection.
Another form of analysis may be conducted by "normalizing" the data
through removal of extreme cases. About 80 percent of Kentucky's managed
waste is generated by only ten firms, none of which are Japanese. Similarly,
about 40 percent of the waste generated by Japanese firms in Kentucky is
produced by a single facility, Toyota Motor Manufacturing in Georgetown.
Discounting the waste production of these top generators allows compari-
sons that are more representative of general industry. When managed hazard-
ous waste generation by the top ten firms is excluded, waste generation by
Japanese firms excluding Toyota is about 6 percent of the total.
The somewhat larger size of Japanese facilities is likely of significance in
accounting for the greater proportion of hazardous waste generated by Japa-
nese firms. Excluding firms having more than 3,000 employees, Japanese LQG
industrial plants average 450 workers per facility compared to 275 workers
per non-Japanese LQG facility. Including the larger plants, in 1996 the 25
Japanese facilities employed a total of 17,400 workers, whereas the 225 non-
Japanese facilities, for which information was available, employed a total of
84,000 persons (Manufacturers News 1997). Using 1996 hazardous waste
figures, the amount of managed RCRA waste generated per job was substan-
tially less at Japanese facilities than at non-Japanese, 1,060 pounds per worker
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Fig. 10.2. Japanese share of Kentucky's hazardous waste, 1991-1996.
compared to 9,040. Even if the top ten non-Japanese generators are excluded
from the calculation, the waste produced per job is still greater for the non-
Japanese plants at more than 1,500 pounds per worker. This data appears to
indicate a greater efficiency at Japanese plants in terms of waste reduction at
the source.
Assessing exempt waste is more problematic because of some serious
reporting problems that have recently become evident. The exempt class of
hazardous waste, consisting primarily of corrosive wastewater, averaged 4
million to 6 million tons annually between 1991 and 1995. A drastic jump
occurred in 1996, to more than 17 million tons. This was not a result of
increased waste production but rather from the failure of two of the largest
Kentucky generators, Ashland and DuPont, to properly report on this class of
hazardous waste in prior years (Cole, Richards, and Siegel 1999), a situation
that was corrected in 1996. This implies that the figures for the period 1991-
1995 may be substantially underreported by as much as threefold. For this
reason analysis of trends in exempt waste must be considered unreliable.
Relatively few of the Japanese facilities produce wastewater as part of
the production process. Only five Japanese firms reported exempt class haz-
ardous waste generation in 1996, totaling 86,030 tons or only 0.5 percent
of the 1996 Kentucky total. The corrosive wastewater that constitutes most
of the exempt hazardous waste is treated and discharged through state wa-
ter permits to surface waters or to publicly owned wastewater treatment
plants.
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Toxic Materials
The TRI provides statistical data that may be used to assess the generation of
hazardous materials specifically in the manufacturing sector. TRI was estab-
lished in 1988 as part of the federal Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act of 1986. The detailed statistics collected under TRI re-
porting requirements provide a means to assess not only total production
toxic waste but also the various ways in which toxics are managed. Genera-
tion and management figures, however, are reported by the individual firms
and in some cases are best estimates since actual monitoring is not mandated.
Furthermore, it is difficult to use the data to indicate trends because the list of
regulated substances is constantly evolving. In 1987 there were 300 substances
on the TRI list; the number was nearly doubled by the addition of 282 chemi-
cals and chemical categories in 1994. For this reason it is better to consider
relative percentages rather than actual volumes of toxics generated.
Companies must report releases and transfers if the facility has the equiva-
lent of ten or more full-time employees and meets established thresholds for
manufacturing, processing, or otherwise using listed chemicals. From the
program's 1987 implementation through 1990, manufacturers reported an-
nually on the type and amount of chemicals released to the local environment
and how much was transferred off the property for treatment or disposal.
During 1996,429 regulated facilities, out of a total production waste of 577
million pounds, released more than 40 million pounds of toxics to the air,
water, and land of the commonwealth of Kentucky. Thus a mean 92 percent
of production toxics was treated or recycled on or off site and 8 percent was
released. During the same year, nearly 76 million pounds were transferred off
site for treatment or disposal. Beginning in 1991 facilities also reported on
the details of how waste was handled, whether it was treated or recycled on
or off site or burned for energy recovery.
About 10 percent of all Kentucky manufacturers produce toxic materi-
als in reportable quantities, compared to one-third of Japanese-owned facili-
ties. Thirty-one of the ninety-one Japanese firms were regulated under TRI in
1996, reporting on just over 11,000 tons of listed TRI chemicals. These facili-
ties represent about 7 percent of the TRI facilities and 3.5 percent of all toxics.
Since the percentage of TRI facilities is nearly five times greater than the 1.6
percent Japanese representation in the industrial community yet the propor-
tion of waste generated is equivalent to only twice the overall Japanese com-
ponent, individual Japanese TRI firms must be producing less toxics than the
average manufacturer. This indicates a greater efficiency in source reduction.
The relative size of Toyota's contribution tends to distort the picture.
Toyota is among the top ten in the state in the quantity of releases; 1,141 tons
of toxics released primarily into the atmosphere is nearly 60 percent of the
total for all Japanese TRI. If Toyota is included, the average Japanese release
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rate of 17.5 percent is significantly higher than the 7 percent average for all.
If Toyota is excluded, other Japanese facilities have an average release rate of
10 percent, more nearly par with other industrial facilities in the state.
EPA Priority Toxics
The 33/50 program, established by the EPA in 1991, was named for goals of
33 percent reduction by 1992 and 50 percent reduction by 1995, using base
year 1988. Seventeen chemicals were selected from the TRI list as priority
chemicals based on relative toxicity, volumes of use, and potential for pollu-
tion prevention opportunities. Among the substances Japanese firms have
released as wastes into the environment are thirteen of the seventeen on the
EPA priority list. These substances are: 1,1,1-trichloroethane, benzene, cad-
mium and cadmium compounds, chromium, cyanide compounds including
hydrogen cyanide, dichloromethane, lead and lead compounds, methyl ethyl
ketone, methyl isobutyl ketone, nickel and nickel compounds, toluene, trichlo-
roethylene, and xylene (table 10.1).
Eleven Japanese facilities in Kentucky reported releases of priority toxics
in 1996 compared to nine in 1991, despite a 50 percent increase in the num-
ber of Japanese firms during the same period. No cadmium has been reported
released to the environment from Japanese TRI facilities since 1989, and no
dichloroethane since 1990. For each of six of the priority chemicals, three or
fewer facilities reported releases during 1996. The primary TRI chemicals
released as waste, in descending rank, are xylenes, toluene, lead, nickel, and
chromium. Quantities of xylenes and toluene released have doubled since
1991 and now account for 60 percent of all the priority toxics released by
Japanese facilities (fig. 10.3).
Comparisons across time can be made for the priority chemicals be-
cause all thirteen have been included on the overall TRI list since 1987. Re-
leases of these thirteen chemicals by all Kentucky TRI facilities have shown a
steady decrease since 1988, amounting to 30 percent for the period 1991-
1996 (fig. 10.4). During the same period, 1991-1996, total releases by Japa-
nese facilities have increased by 30 percent and increased their share of total
Kentucky releases from 6.8 percent to 14 percent (fig. 10.5).
The increases in both the quantity and relative proportion of releases of
priority toxics from Japanese facilities are primarily attributable to the Toyota
facility. Toyota's share of the Japanese priority chemical releases increased
from 41 percent in 1991 to 68 percent in 1996, reflecting a doubling of plant
capacity in 1994. If Toyota is excluded from consideration, releases from
Japanese facilities have remained approximately 4.5 percent of the statewide
total for priority toxics since 1991 and thus have not increased their environ-
mental impact despite plant expansions.
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Table 10.1. Characteristics of the thirteen EPA priority chemicals
released by Japanese facilities in Kentucky.
Substance
1,1,1-
trichloroethane
benzene
cadmium and
compounds
chromium and
chromium
compounds
cyanide
compounds
dichloromethane
lead and
compounds
No. of
Japanese
TRI
facilities
1
2
0
4
3
0
5
Usage
Many uses as solvent and
cleaner.
Used in the manufacture of
many products and to make
intermediate chemicals. A
component of gasoline.
Used for metal plating, in
the manufacture of nickel-
cadmium batteries, in pig-
ments and plastic stabilizers,
numerous other applications.
Used in metal alloys, in
plaating, in the manufacture
of various compounds, and
in many other applications.
Used primarily in electro-
plating, metallurgy, and
production of organic chem-
icals, the making of plastics,
and other applications.
Used in metal cleaning and
as solvent in the production
of other organic chemicals.
Also used as a degreaser and
in the electroincs industry.
Used in a wide range of
consumer products.
Used in production of
batteries and certain other
items and in metal products
such as solder and pipes.
Health effects
Exposure to high levels may
cause death from depression of
central nervous system. Dermal
and mucosal irritant at lower
exposures.
A known carcinogen. Chronic
low-level exposure may result
in damage to internal orgams;
exposure to high concentra-
tions may cause death in
minutes.
Probable carcinogen. Chronic
low-level exposure may cause
lung or kidney damage.
A known carcinogen. Has a
wide range of possible healrth
effects, from minor to severe,
depending on compound form.
Acute and deadly poisons.
Known carcinogen. Exposure
has irritant dermal and
mucosal effects and may cause
central nervous system
depression.
Probable carcinogen. High
exposure levels may cause
brain and kidney damage.
Accumulates in tissures;
chronic exposure may cause
death or damage to internal
organs. Exposure impairs
development in children.
(continued)
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Table 10.1. Characteristics of the thirteen EPA priority chemicals
released by Japanese facilities in Kentucky, (continued)
Substance
methyl ethyl
ketone
methyl isobutyl
ketone
nickel and
compounds
toluene
trichloroethylene
xylenes
No. of
Japanese
TRI
facilities
3
1
4
5
2
6
Usage
Used as solvent, catalyst,a
nd in the manufacture of
several derived chemical
substances, including paint
removers, cleaning fluids,
and adhesives.
Used primarily as additive to
protective surface coatings,
also in the manufacture of
adhesives, ink, and certain
oils. Numerous other uses.
Used to make steels and
alloys, permanent magnet
materials, nickel-cadmium
batteries, and in electro-
plating and ceramics.
Primarily used as a
component of gasoline; also
as a solvent in paints, inks,
adhesives, and cleaning
agents and in manufacture
of organic chemicals.
Used primarily as solvent
and cleaner, particularly in
automotive and metals
industries.
Used as solvent, and in
gasoline manufacture, raw
material for productino of
certain organic chemicals,
dyes, and insecticides.
Health effects
Irritant, wide range of possible
health effects, including
dizziness, dermatitis, and
vomiting. Chronic exposure
may cause central nervous
system depression.
Exposure has irritant dermal
and musosal effects and may
cause central nervous system
depression.
Several compound forms are
probable carcinogens. Chronic
low-level exposure produces
dermatitis and mucosal
damage.
Primary health effect is
dysfunction of central nervous
system through inhalation.
May produce birth defects.
Known carcinogen. Possible
death from exposure at high
levels and damage to internal
organs from chronic exposure.
Flammable. Exposure to high
levels may cause dizziness,
passing out, and death. Chronic
exposure may damage bone
marrow or developing fetus.
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Fig. 10.3. Release of toluene and xylenes by Japanese facilities, 1987-1996.
Fig. 10.4. Amount of thirteen priority toxics released by all Kentucky facilities, 1987-
1996.
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Note: Number at top of bar represents percentage of all KY priority taxes.
Fig. 10.5. Amount of thirteen priority toxics released by Japanese facilities, 1987-1996
Waste Management
While the amount of production waste generated may be considered a mea-
sure of the efficiency of resource usage, the quantity in itself is not necessarily
harmful to the environment. Not until that waste interacts with the environ-
ment, on or off-site, can there be environmental consequences. Thus the waste
management policies and practices of a facility do more to determine its ac-
tual environmental efficiency than do generation figures. Environmental im-
pact is reduced if practices such as recycling are implemented wherever feasible,
following the Japanese model of "continuous improvement," to reduce the
amount that is released to the environment or disposed of in landfills.
The role of TRI in identifying the waste management activities of indus-
trial facilities was expanded following the passage of the 1990 Pollution Pre-
vention Act (PPA). Since 1991, TRI companies have been required to report
waste management practices in some detail, indicating the quantities of toxics
that are recycled or treated on- or off-site or burned for energy recovery, in
comparison to that released or disposed of off-site. Source reduction was
established as national policy by the PPA as the preferred approach to man-
aging waste. Source reduction is defined by the Act as "any practice that
reduces the amount of any hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant
entering any waste stream or otherwise released into the environment (in-
cluding fugitive emissions) and, reduces the hazards to public health and the
environment associated with the release of such substances, pollutants, or
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At the Matsushita Electric Motor Corporation of America plant in Berea, Kentucky,
waste products are separated and shipped for recycling.The company is dedicated
to proactive environmental protection, prevention of pollution, and continual im-
provement of environmental programs. (Photograph by P.P. Karan)
contaminants." Practices can include equipment, process, procedure, or tech-
nology modifications; reformulation or redesign of products; substitution of
raw materials; and improvements in maintenance and inventory controls.
Facilities must report any source reduction activities.
Source reduction is considered the most desirable form of waste man-
agement, followed in ranked order by recycling, energy recovery, treatment,
and as a last, undesirable alternative, disposal. Release to the environment is
not considered to be a form of management. "Environmentally sound" recy-
cling, according to the EPA (1997), shares many of the advantages of source
reduction: "Like source reduction, recycling reduces the need for treatment
or disposal of waste and helps conserve energy and natural resources." On-
site recycling is recovery of the toxic chemical for further use. Off-site recy-
cling is transfer of the material to a facility beyond the plant boundaries for
recovery or recycling. The same on-site/off-site distinction exists for treat-
ment and energy recovery operations. "Treatment" is the destruction of the
toxic material in waste treatment operations. "Energy recovery" is limited to
just that, concerned with materials that are combustible and release energy,
not those that require energy to be incinerated.
About 80 percent of TRI chemicals produced in 1996 at all Kentucky
facilities were managed on site (fig. 10.6) through recycling (46 percent),
treatment (21 percent), or burning for energy recovery (12 percent). Of toxics
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Fig. 10.6. Management of toxic chemical waste in 1996 by all Kentucky TRI.
sent off site, most were handled through recycling. In contrast, Japanese firms
depended more on off-site waste management. Toyota sent a little over half
of its toxics to off-site facilities for management, most of which was recycled.
The average rate of off-site management for all other Japanese plants was
one-third of total waste, again mainly handled through recycling. Examina-
tion of trend figures for 1991-1996 indicates that there has been very little
change in the manner in which waste has been handled by most Japanese
facilities (fig. 10.7). The proportions among management categories and
whether conducted on or off site has remained relatively stable during the
period, although the treatment option did show a slight decrease.
Seventy-six companies with facilities in Kentucky participated in the
Burned for energy
I Treated offsite
| Treated onsite
I Recycled offsite
Recycled onsite
Release or disposal
Fig. 10.7. Toxic waste management by Japanese facilities.
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33/50 program. The 33 percent reduction goal was met in 1992, but only
twenty-four of the companies were able to meet the 50 percent goal by 1995.
Among the few companies who achieved the 50 percent reduction goal was A
T R Wire and Cable, a Japanese firm.
CASE STUDIES: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES
Five Japanese manufacturing plants, representing a diversity of industrial types
and facility sizes, were selected to provide case studies of current environ-
mental policies, practices, and performance. The accounts are based on plant
visitations, interviews with environmental staff, company brochures, and data
from RCRA and TRI. The facilities investigated were Toyota Motor Manu-
facturing, Kentucky, at Georgetown, flagship of Japanese enterprise in Ken-
tucky; KI (USA) at Berea; Zeon Chemicals LP at Louisville; Universal Fasteners
at Lawrenceburg; and Hitachi Automotive Products (USA) at Harrodsburg.
Figure 10.8 shows the location of these facilities.
Although specific problems vary from facility to facility since different
industries have different technologies and generate waste in different ways,
the firms are linked by common themes and concerns. Among these are the
need to meet regulatory standards and reporting requirements and to maxi-
mize production efficiency through waste reduction. Toyota, the largest firm
with more than 7,800 employees, manufactures and assembles automobiles.
Hitachi, with 950 workers, makes electronic controls for vehicle systems.
The 312 KI employees produce metal stampings of certain parts for the auto-
motive industry. Zeon, with 290 workers, makes more than one hundred
varieties of synthetic rubber, and about half of the company's production
ends up in automotive applications. Only Universal Fasteners has no connec-
tion, direct or indirect, with the auto industry, since the buttons and snaps
made by the facility's 298 workers supply apparel manufacturers.
Four of the five firms, excepting only KI, are classed as LQGs of hazard-
ous waste. All the firms reported release of TRI toxic chemicals during 1991,
but only Toyota and Universal Fasteners indicated release of priority toxics.
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky (TMMK), Georgetown
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, is by far the largest Japanese facil-
ity in Kentucky and certainly one of the major industrial concerns of the state
by any measure. The plant, an integrated facility for assembly of three vehicle
models, is located on a 1,300-acre tract just north of Georgetown. Ninety
percent of the 8,000,000 square feet under roof is production area. Most of
the necessary parts are manufactured on site; only a few are brought in from
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Fig. 10.8. Location of five Japanese Companies selected for case studies of envi-
ronmental policies and practices.
outside suppliers. The original plant, which began production in 1988, prom-
ised to employ three thousand people to assemble two hundred cars annually.
After two major expansions, the most recent in 1994, the facility now em-
ploys more than seventy-eight hundred workers who turn out nearly a half-
million automobiles each year.
Toyota is in the process of obtaining International Standards Organiza-
tion (ISO) 14001 certification for all of its manufacturing facilities world-
wide (Chappell 1998a), and the Georgetown plant is so certified by third-party
audit. Staff responsible for primary policy decisions are located at the head-
quarters in Erlanger, Kentucky, and coordinate among plants in North America.
The fourteen-member environmental team at Georgetown is solely concerned
with the local operation.
Each of seven specialists on the environmental team has primary re-
sponsibility for a certain geographic area of the plant and a specialty focus in
a particular program such as water, air, or waste. The specialist in "air" coor-
dinates on matters of that nature with all the geographic area specialists, so
that there is a central point of responsibility and a consistency of implementa-
tion. On the production floor, each work team has a team leader, who serves
to bring ideas and suggestions from the workers. There also are extensively
used suggestion boxes, receiving more than eighty thousand submissions each
year. Employees receive financial bonuses for ideas that result in savings. Many
of the suggestions that come by these routes are concerned with improving
the plant's environmental performance.
Each proposed process modification is evaluated for potential environ-
mental impact. Waste management, termed Internal Resource Management,
is the primary focus of environmental policy. The environmental team writes
a process description and calculates the materials balance, raw materials in
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Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky. Air emissions are the Toyota plant's most
serious environmental management problem. Toyota had the best available pollu-
tion control technology at the time of its construction in 1987 but has twice the
emissions rate of an equal-sized 1994 expansion that incorporated newer technol-
ogy. Air stack clusters are associated with paint operations for auto bodies and
plastic bumpers. (Photograph by P.P. Karan)
versus waste out. The team's operating philosophy is that material that does
not become part of the car is a wasted resource. The evaluations are sent back
to the shops for ideas and input from the workers. This ensures that more
people become involved, that perspectives and ideas derive from more than
just the environmental team. To provide incentive, a scoring system was de-
veloped to calculate points gained in waste reduction in every aspect of a
suggestion, by which means financial rewards to the innovator could be fairly
determined. Initially this feedback system was primarily concerned with re-
ducing usage of raw materials, but recently pollution prevention has been
added to the evaluation.
The rapid growth of the plant, which doubled in size in 1994, has brought
with it some environmental problems. Potential environmental impacts were
addressed in the initial design of the plant, and have been dealt with on a
continuing basis since production began. Now that the expansion phase at
Georgetown has ended, they plan to "take a hard look" at some ways to
improve their environmental efficiency. The role of the plant as one of the
largest emitters of airborne pollutants in the commonwealth is not an image
that the company desires.
The Toyota plant is classed as a LQG of hazardous waste and has in-
creased its generation by nearly 50 percent from the 2,667 tons produced in
1991 to 3,648 tons. Prior to the 1994 expansion that doubled production
capacity, hazardous waste generation was stable at about 2,500 tons annu-
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ally from 1991 through 1994. After the expansion, waste production appears
stabilized in the vicinity of 3,500 tons. Production waste in TRI chemicals
reported by Toyota for 1996 was 3,440 tons, of which 1,141—one-third—
were released into the environment. An additional 11 tons required disposal.
Most of the waste was managed by off-site recycling although a substantial
portion of the remainder was burned for energy recovery. Releases of priority
chemicals during 1996 amounted to half of all TRI releases at the facility, 574
tons of eight different chemicals. More than 90 percent of this was in the
form of methyl isobutyl ketone, toluene, and xylenes.
When the plant size was doubled in 1994, next-generation environmen-
tal controls were installed, resulting in greater environmental efficiency for
the newer facility reflected in the fact that both the quantity of TRI releases
and the hazardous waste managed increased by only half. In other words, the
newer facility produces half the quantity of toxic releases as the part built
seven years before. An example of the difference is in the process modifica-
tions made from the older facility to the new. The best control technology
available for paint booths in 1986 was installed when the plant was de-
signed, but volatile organic compounds (VOCs) were a major problem. The
best technology in 1994 did a better job of handling VOCs, and a materials
change in certain production lines replaced solvent-borne paints with water-
based coatings.
Paint is one of the most important areas that can be manipulated to
reduce environmental impact; for example, air sprays can be replaced with
electrostatic painting. This was taken one step further at Toyota when the
company found an environmentally friendly solution for the ultimate fate of
paint sludge recovered from wastewater. The sludge is shipped to a company
in Ohio that processes it into a pulverized building material used by manufac-
turers to make decorative garden border bricks, roofing material, low-strength
concrete, and road-building material (Chappell 1998b).
After pretreatment, about 1.2 million to 1.3 million gallons of wastewa-
ter per day are discharged to an adjacent city treatment plant, dedicated solely
to serving Toyota, that the company helped build. In 1988, Toyota's waste-
water failed an environmental monitoring test and low levels of toxicity—
nickel and zinc—were found at the Georgetown treatment plant. Several
modifications were made in Toyota's pretreatment system to reduce the met-
als content of wastewater sent along to the city treatment plant. Success in
this endeavor is confirmed by TRI data, which show a trend of decreasing
nickel releases.
Planning to improve the Toyota plant's future environmental performance
is currently focused on reduction of air emissions, the company's largest vec-
tor for releases. Current investigation of materials substitutions may lead to
significant source reduction, if solvent-based paints can all be replaced by
water-borne or powder coats. One way in which Toyota measures its own
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environmental progress is through evaluating release of airborne toxics in
terms of VOC emissions per car produced. In the past year, largely as a result
of focusing on a specific issue—reclaiming solvent sullied by its use in purg-
ing or cleaning of paint guns—VOCs released per car dropped from 15.5
pounds per car manufactured to 14 pounds in six months. Additional incen-
tive is provided by a specific regulation addressing automobile manufacturers
expected in 2000.
KI (USA) Corporation, Berea
KI (USA) has three manufacturing facilities in Japan and a single interna-
tional venture, the nearly 200,000-square-foot Berea plant that began pro-
duction in 1989. The three hundred workers at the facility produce a variety
of metal stampings and welded assemblies for the automotive industry. KI
products including engine mounts and brake boosters are used by automobile
manufacturers such as Toyota, Nissan, Honda, and Ford.
Until recently, environmental management issues at the plant were
handled by a specific team, but all such matters are now included among the
duties of the engineering manager. The company is dedicated to high stan-
dards of product quality, receiving ISO 9000 and QS 9002 certification in
October 1997, but has chosen not to seek ISO 14001 certification.
TRI production-related waste from the Berea plant amounted to nearly
4 tons, of which 87 percent was treated on site or recycled off site; most of
the remainder was disposed of off site. Less than 1 percent was released to the
environment. None of the priority toxics have been released by KI during the
period of TRI record-keeping.
About 1,000,000 gallons of wastewater, effluent from surface coating
equipment, are annually processed at KI's own treatment center before being
released to the Berea treatment facilities. During a recent twelve-month pe-
riod, the company exceeded the standards for heavy metals in wastewater
only once. KI is not classed as a LQG. Hazardous waste resulting from the
production process includes a water-based paint containing lead, sulfuric acid
used in cleaning, and a petroleum-based oil used in parts stamping. Paint
waste is sent to a hazardous materials facility for disposal. Sulfuric acid is
recycled or filtered. Most of the oil is constantly reused in the presses; the
small amount that temporarily adheres to scrap metal is captured and stored,
sent periodically to a recycler for use in making heating oil. Manufactured
parts are initially placed in bins equipped with trays to collect oil drips. All
nonhazardous materials are sent to local landfills rather than recycled. Card-
board, for example, cannot be recycled because it is frequently oil-saturated.
The facility constantly seeks, in the name of efficiency, to reduce the
amount of energy and materials used and waste produced. Installation of
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metered equipment is currently replacing manual dispensal to reduce the quan-
tity of chemicals used. A reverse-osmosis system was installed in the paint
line in September 1998 for the same reason. Parts and supplies are both re-
ceived and shipped in returnable containers.
Zeon Chemicals, Louisville
The corporate office for Zeon Chemicals LP, a subsidiary of Nippon Zeon
Company of Tokyo, Japan, is located at the facility in Louisville. The parent
company has four major plants in Japan and a European subsidiary. Addi-
tional U.S. plants are located in Texas and Mississippi, while the USA Sales
and Product Services Office and a Research and Development/Technical Ser-
vice Center are located adjacent to the Louisville plant. The 180,000-square-
foot Zeon facility, acquired in 1989, employs 290 people to produce a variety
of elastomers (synthetic rubber) using an emulsion polymerization process.
Zeon's specialized rubber is used in the manufacture of automobile hoses,
gaskets, and seals; in many oil field, aerospace, and industrial products; and
in a variety of adhesives.
Zeon Chemicals has a full-time environmental team stationed at the
Louisville headquarters. The team consists of a corporate environmental
manager, whose duties embrace all Zeon's U.S. facilities, and a facility envi-
ronmental health specialist. The company has ISO 9002 certification but has
no immediate plans to seek ISO 14001 certification. Zeon is working with
the Kentucky EMS (Environmental Management System) Implementation
Alliance and the Kentucky Pollution Prevention Center at the University of
Louisville to develop a revised internal EMS that is similar in many respects
to the ISO 14001 standards. Because Zeon is part of a much larger industrial
complex located in a densely urban region, known locally as "Rubbertown,"
linkages have been developed with the community to assure coordinated
emergency planning and information sharing. A company publicity brochure
notes: "We take pride in the fact that in every community in which we are
located our own environmental standards place us well ahead of the various
regulatory standards."
Zeon is classed as a LQG of hazardous waste, but has shown a steady
decline in hazardous waste production during the period 1991-1996, from a
peak of 16 tons annually in 1992 to about 3 tons in 1996. Under the TRI
program, Zeon reported a total production waste of about 3,100 tons in
1996, of which more than 95 percent were managed without release to the
environment. There have been no priority toxics recently released through
the production process at Zeon; the use of methylene chloride and 1,1,1-
trichloroethane as cleaners was eliminated a few years ago.
Zeon produces somewhat less than one million gallons of wastewater
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that is treated by a plant shared with three other facilities; Zeon's contribu-
tion is about one-third of the total flow through wastewater treatment. Two
separate drainage systems serve the Zeon facility. One takes only storm wa-
ter, and the other collects production wastewater throughout the plant. The
storm water access manholes are painted bright yellow with stern warnings
not to dump anything into the system. The separate wastewater collection
system is continuously supervised through a network of automatic monitors.
Hazardous waste is stored in a roofed area with a sump that drains to the
wastewater system.
Aboveground bulk storage tanks, transformers, and other stationary
objects subject to possible leaks are enclosed by two-tiered spill containment
systems. At ground level is a concrete-walled basin with a liner beneath it.
The liners vary in their composition according to the type of material stored.
Certain air emissions receive treatment in the stacks, going through a cata-
lytic oxidizer. Zeon recognizes both a problem and an opportunity to reduce
releases in dealing with airborne styrene and acrilonitrile emissions. Recov-
ery of these two materials is a difficult technological issue. Although a recent
process modification attempting to recover a greater percentage was unsuc-
cessful, the plant continues to explore other ways to handle the problem.
Zeon's current five-year plan incorporates planning to reduce both hazard-
ous waste and TRI substances.
Environmental management has improved since the facility was acquired
by Zeon. Better plant housekeeping and the use of computer controlled flows
reduces hazards both to workers and to the environment. Environmental
management is enhanced by the company's long-term viewpoint and willing-
ness to accept longer-term payback and benefits from environmental innova-
tions.
Universal Fasteners, Lawrenceburg
Universal Fasteners is the U.S. subsidiary of the privately held Y K K Corpo-
ration. Y K K's home offices are in Tokyo, and the corporation conducts
operations in more than forty countries. Originally established in 1895, Uni-
versal Fasteners was acquired by the Japanese corporation in 1987. The head-
quarters of its U.S. operation is at the plant in Lawrenceburg. Universal
Fasteners has two additional manufacturing facilities in Tennessee and a ware-
house location in El Paso, Texas. The Lawrenceburg plant comprises approxi-
mately 300,000 square feet in two buildings, of which 160,000 square feet
are production space. The facility employs 298 people in production and
administration and has a traveling sales force of about 50 people to market
its line of buttons, snaps, rivets, and burrs for the apparel industry.
Environmental affairs for the entire U.S. operation are handled by a full-
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time environmental engineer stationed in Lawrenceburg. Green management
principles are set out in the Y K K Environmental Charter of the parent com-
pany. The Action Guidelines of the charter promote "conducting business
activities friendly to the environment" through technological development,
energy efficiency, employee education, and internal review of activities. Uni-
versal Fasteners is certified under the ISO and QS quality standards and is
pursuing ISO 14001 certification.
The plant recycles nonhazardous material wherever possible. Produc-
tion of hazardous waste by Universal in 1996 was 57 tons of managed waste
and 20,000 tons of wastewater pretreated and released to the local treatment
system. Multiyear data indicate an overall trend of waste reduction, although
significantly higher figures in certain years have resulted from the voluntary
cleanup of contamination sites on the property that date from before the
Japanese acquisition. For example, in 1997 more than 20,000 tons of man-
aged hazardous waste resulted from the cleanup of one such site. Universal
completed all site remediation during 1999.
According to TRI data, of 410 tons of production waste in 1996 entail-
ing toxics, 1.5 tons, or less than .5 percent, were released to the environment.
The primary methods for waste handling were treatment on site and off-site
recycling. Priority toxics released by Universal during 1996 included cyanide
compounds, methyl ethyl ketone, and xylenes. Priority toxics comprised 57
percent of the plant's TRI releases.
Universal Fasteners has two primary waste streams of hazardous mate-
rial that result from the paint and lacquer and the electroplating operations.
Some relatively simple changes made in the production process in recent years
have greatly reduced the amount of waste generated. Paint and lacquer waste
has been reduced from a dozen 55-gallon drums generated per month to about
three drums monthly by the purchase of a solvent still that distills the solvent
back out for reuse.
An even greater reduction was made by dividing a single waste stream
into two. Formerly wastewater from the plating and burnishing operations
was combined and all the sludge that was separated from this water was
treated as hazardous waste. About 40 cubic yards of combined sludge was
produced each month. When wastewater treatment was separated into two
waste streams, only the sludge resulting from the plating operation qualified
as hazardous material. The burnishing sludge was nonhazardous material
and could be disposed of in a special waste landfill. Hazardous waste genera-
tion from wastewater treatment was reduced from about 40 cubic yards
monthly to only about 4 yards per month of plating sludge. The resulting
savings in transport and disposal costs allowed the investment to pay for
itself in only two years.
Making changes in the production process to implement pollution pre-
vention is not difficult when it can be shown to upper management that pro-
246 GaryA.O'Dell
posed changes will pay for themselves in a few years. Administrative staff at
Lawrenceburg has authority to approve production modifications.
Hitachi Automotive Products (USA), Harrodsburg
The Hitachi plant in Harrodsburg has grown rapidly from its establishment
in 1985 as a facility of only 40,000 square feet to the present structure cover-
ing 390,000 square feet and employing more than 650 workers. The plant
manufactures a diverse range of automobile electronics including high-tech-
nology controls for air, fuel, ignition, and transmission systems. Hitachi prod-
ucts are used in vehicles manufactured by Honda, Ford, Nissan, Isuzu, Subaru,
and Toyota. Hitachi facilities are located on every continent except South
America and include four plants in the United States. The Harrodsburg plant
is the headquarters for U.S. operations.
The Harrodsburg plant maintains a staff of six full-time employees in its
Environmental Safety Group. Hitachi has been an industry leader in meeting
ISO standards, obtaining ISO 9001 and QS 9000 certification in December
1995 and achieving ISO 14001 status in March 1998. Proposals for new
techniques or chemicals to be used in production undergo an approval pro-
cess to assure consistency with ISO standards. The facility undergoes an as-
sessment every six months by a third-party registrar to assure compliance
with the standards and with state and federal regulations.
Hitachi's efforts to improve its environmental performance, particularly
in terms of waste generation and management, have been highly successful.
Generation of managed hazardous waste was fairly constant during 1991-
1996, fluctuating between 15 and 25 total annual tons. TRI records provide
data that indicate a progressive reduction of toxics from 1991 to 1996; the 5
tons of toxics reported in 1991 is only 7 percent of the 72 tons generated in
1991. At the same time, releases to the environment were reduced from 90
percent of production waste to less than 1 percent. In terms of actual gain,
the 62 pounds released in 1996 is only 0.05 percent of the quantity released
in 1991. There have been no priority toxics reported for Hitachi during the
period of record.
Near every work station are waste bins. All waste materials, hazardous
and nonhazardous, are sorted according to composition. About 90 percent of
the nearly 100,000 pounds of hazardous waste (mostly alcohol and lead)
annually produced at the plant is recycled, primarily in fuels blending. In
addition, each year nearly 2,000,000 pounds of other materials, such as card-
board and aluminum shavings and castings, are recycled. The recycling pro-
gram earned $138,000 for the company last year. Surprisingly, these earnings
are viewed as a failure rather than success, simply because material that needs
to be recycled represents inefficiency and waste in the production process.
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Hitachi Automotive Products (USA), Harrodsburg, Kentucky. The Hitachi staff con-
tinuously seek opportunities to reduce the operation's environmental impact through
small, inexpensive process changes. The operation in which alternator windings
receive a varnish coating provided an opportunity for hazardous waste reduction by
switching from a solvent-based varnish to a water-based coating. Unlike the sol-
vent-based coating, excess water-based varnish could be recycled back into the
process. (Photograph courtesy of Hitachi Automotive Products)
The environmental team constantly seeks ways to reduce the environ-
mental impact of Hitachi's operations. For example, alternator windings are
coated with a varnish in one stage of the manufacturing process. The varnish
cures on exposure to air, so that any excess material becomes quickly unus-
able. The team is investigating the use of a water-based varnish that requires
heat curing, so that the excess can be reused. Another present concern is the
necessity to dispose of small containers emptied of nonhazardous materials.
The use of large (250-gallon) returnable containers is among alternatives be-
ing considered. Many parts obtained from suppliers are received in return-
able cartons. In another example, plastic scrap from injection molding is
returned to the production process and incorporated, up to 20 percent by
weight, into new moldings. In 1995 the company abandoned the use of chlo-
rofluorocarbons (ozone depleter) for cleaning circuit boards and switched to
alcohol. One of the highest priorities for the team is to find a way to eliminate
lead from the soldering process.
Upper management tends to be receptive to innovations that reduce the
environmental impact of the plant when it can be demonstrated that these
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innovations improve efficiency. Since the reduction of waste in all aspects of
manufacturing is a prime concern, such proposals generally receive favorable
attention. The Harrodsburg Hitachi facility received the 1998 Kentucky
Governor's Award for Environmental Excellence.
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR INDUSTRY
Many possible waste management criteria might be used to evaluate the envi-
ronmental performance of individual industrial firms. Such criteria may rep-
resent simple accounting of total quantities of waste generated during the
production process or the totals or percentages attributed to various
postproduction methods for recovering or disposing of the wastes. More so-
phisticated approaches may compare multiple variables, such as waste gen-
eration per unit of production, per unit of company revenue, or per worker,
in an attempt to define an indicator comparable across different facilities.
Any meaningful indicator of industrial environmental performance must
take into account three distinct aspects of waste generation and management:
magnitude, potential hazard, and efficiency. Magnitude is concerned with the
total quantities of the residual substances involved; hazard refers to the risk
posed by different substances to human and environmental health; and effi-
ciency concerns the proportion of waste that is not reused or recovered but
escapes the production cycle to interact freely with the environment. A fur-
ther dimension of waste efficiency involves the hierarchy of waste manage-
ment strategies, in that options such as source reduction or recycling are both
more efficient and more ecologically desirable than treatment or disposal.
The interplay among these factors is critical to assessing environmental
risk. For example, a firm that generates a large amount of waste might seem
to be a greater environmental threat than a firm that generates a small amount.
Waste does not, however, become an environmental hazard until it begins to
interact with the environment. If the large-quantity waste producer has imple-
mented strategies that recover nearly all the waste and the smaller producer
has not, then the smaller producer may be releasing more waste material to
the environment. Further, environmental risk is greatly dependent on the rela-
tive toxicity or other hazardous attributes of any materials that are not recov-
ered. A small amount of a highly toxic substance is likely to pose a greater
environmental risk than a larger amount of material of low hazard. Thus any
single facet of industrial waste generation is wholly inadequate for assessing
either environmental performance of the firm or the potential risk to the en-
vironment.
Table 10.2 illustrates the complexities inherent in environmental perfor-
mance assessment. The table depicts several different ways of assessing per-
formance, using either or both of the factors of magnitude and efficiency. The
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Table 10.2. Environmental statistics for study group (1996 data)
Toyota
(6,600)
Hitachi
(650)
KI
(350)
Universal
(250)
Zeon
(165)
ff**™1"* ™ Toxic waste
Generation generation
Tool (tore) Ffer jpb (lbs) Total (tons) ftrjpbflbs) Total (Tore) Perjpb(lbs) % total wast;
3,648.3 1,105.5 3,440.54 1,042.6 1,141.43 345.9 33.2
16.5 50.8 5.05 15.5 0.03 0.09 0.6
n/a n/a 3.94 22.5 0.04 0.23 1.0
57.4 459.2 410.43 3,673.6 1.52 12.2 0.4
3.3 40 3,104.36 37,628.6 137.87 1,671.2 4.4
issue of hazard is partly addressed, in that the classes of materials represented
by the RCRA and TRI programs are hazardous by definition, yet there is still
considerable disparity among the different substances. Acknowledging, then,
that any system that does not fully incorporate all three factors imperfectly
represents environmental risk, the two factors of magnitude and efficiency
appear suitable to assess environmental performance in terms of a facility's
ability to reduce or eliminate waste residuals.
Data for the five case studies facilities are used to make comparisons of
environmental performance (table 10.3). The table includes RCRA and TRI
data, both evaluated on the basis of total waste generation, and, for TRI only,
total releases.4 Total waste generation, as noted, does not address either pro-
duction efficiency or environmental risk. Environmental risks can only be
assessed if waste generation is compared to waste management practices. Nor
can examination of practices alone convey a sense of environmental risk. For
example, the release rate for Toyota is 33.2 percent of production waste and
for Zeon, 4.4 percent, but a simple percentage figure tells us nothing about
the magnitude of the problem. Conversely, the total quantity of releases re-
veals little about the relative efficiency of the production system in terms of
waste management. Clearly, neither comprises a meaningful evaluation when
used without other contextual information.
To assess environmental performance, measures of magnitude and effi-
ciency need to be combined in terms of some production ratio generalizable
across industrial categories. Toyota's use of waste emissions-per-vehicle-built
as an indicator of environmental progress might be applied to automobile
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Table 10.3. Environmental performance rating of five Japanese facilities
Zeon 1,655.28
Toyota 345.28
Universal 13.2
KI (USA) 0.20
Hitachi 0.10
assembly plants but cannot be applied to the manufacturers of other prod-
ucts, including automobile parts suppliers, because the units are not compa-
rable. Waste releases per assembled vehicle does not, by any means, correspond
to waste releases per auto brake pad, garment zipper, or VCR manufactured.
Another method might be to use waste generation per dollar revenue, but
accurate information concerning corporate finances at the plant level is often
difficult to obtain. This is particularly true for Japanese companies, most of
which are privately held. One per-unit measure that may be applied using
readily available information is the use of waste releases-per-worker. Whereas
releases, when contextualized, are relative to efficiency, the number of work-
ers roughly corresponds to the scale of the operation and is therefore relative
to the magnitude of production. The combination of releases-per-worker thus
has implications for environmental efficiency.
This is shown in table 10.2, in the column listing TRI toxic waste re-
leases per job. For example, total toxic waste generation for the Georgetown
Toyota plant in 1996 was equivalent to 1,042.6 pounds per worker for each
of the factory's 6,600 workers. Since the calculated rate of releases for that
year is equivalent to 33.2 percent of total waste generation, a rate of 345.9
pounds of waste releases per job can be derived. This provides a measure of
environmental efficiency that takes into account both the magnitude of waste
generated and of the proportion released and the effectiveness of waste man-
agement. Note that, according to this method, Toyota would be credited with
a greater efficiency than Zeon even though the automobile maker had nearly
eightfold greater releases both in total quantity and as a percentage of total
generation. This is a consequence of Toyota's far lower rate of production
waste per worker employed.
Although this method provides a measure of environmental efficiency,
this should not be confused with environmental impact. The potential impact
to the environment from Toyota's airborne emissions is greater than Zeon's
simply because Toyota's contribution is much larger. Theoretically, if Zeon
operated on the same scale as Toyota, the chemical company's impact on the
environment would be greater than the automobile plant because although
Zeon's percentage of releases is less, the releases per worker are five times
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larger. In reality, however, economies of scale would probably invalidate a
direct projection of this sort.
The releases-per-worker method, while providing a means to estimate
environmental efficiency, is subject to several qualifications. A primary weak-
ness in this system is that it only applies to that select group of facilities who
are regulated under RCRA and/or TRI. This group is, however, by definition
most likely to have significant environmental impacts. The method does not
reflect inherent differences in many classes of industry nor the varying hazard
depending on the type of waste produced. Nor does it take account of re-
source depletion through overconsumption nor of the inefficiency implied by
the existence of waste. A low rate, however, is a reflection of the collective
environmental effectiveness of the plant's technology, policies, and practices.
It means that waste is being managed effectively through various strategies so
that there is minimal impact on the environment.
An environmental snapshot consisting of a single year's waste data says
little about trends. A more significant evaluation requires the use of multiyear
data. Despite the problems with federal waste data previously noted, particu-
larly in regard to data inconsistencies from year to year, performance assess-
ments may often be made over time. This may require examination of a single
chemical substance or a group of chemicals that have been in consistent use
throughout the period. The case of Hitachi demonstrates a distinct commit-
ment by the firm to reduce or eliminate waste in the production process (fig.
10.9). In 1991 the Harrodsburg plant generated more than 72 tons of TRI
toxic waste, of which more than 90 percent was released to the environment.
Through process modifications and materials substitutions, by 1996 the com-
pany had steadily reduced its total waste production to no more than 5 tons,
of which all but 1 percent was recycled. Using the releases-per-worker assess-
ment, Hitachi has achieved a reduction from more than 200 pounds per worker
in 1991 to less than one-tenth of a pound in 1996.
The value of environmental performance assessment lies in its ability to
permit evaluation of the effectiveness of waste management practices for in-
dividual firms, to make comparisons among firms, and to track improve-
ments in environmental efficiency over time.
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AS ENVIRONMENTAL EFFICIENCY
Observations from the case studies suggest explanation for the trends evident
in the RCRA and TRI data. Waste management is an important concern for
industrial firms; efforts are being made to reduce or eliminate residuals from
manufacturing by implementing process changes, new technologies, and ma-
terials substitutions. Such innovations are not limited to Japanese-owned in-
dustrial firms, but Japanese companies appear to be more committed, or at
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Burned for energy
offsite
Recycled offsite
~~j Disposal offsite
Released to environment
Fig. 10.9. Toxic waste management at Hitachi, 1991-1996.
least more successful, in waste reduction. This is reflected in data trends which
indicate that (1) total hazardous waste produced by Japanese firms has re-
mained a stable percentage of the total hazardous waste production for all
RCRA firms in Kentucky despite a substantial increase in both number and
capacity of Japanese plants, (2) the number of Japanese industrial plants pro-
ducing toxic waste is proportionately five times greater than for the general
industrial population, yet generates only twice as much of this waste cat-
egory, and (3) releases to the environment of both RCRA and TRI chemicals,
when compared on a per-worker basis, are significantly less for Japanese fa-
cilities than for those of other ownership.
The evaluations conducted in this essay suggest that improvements in
environmental efficiency are carried out by Japanese industrial facilities as
part of a process designed to increase their general efficiency and profitably.
Every environmental staff member encountered emphasized the concept that
economic efficiency and environmental efficiency are tightly linked aspects of
industrial facility management. In the words of the environmental staff team
leader at Toyota, "environmental protection almost always is the result of an
efficiency gain."5 Policies and practices that reduce waste increase the effi-
ciency of the production process and benefit the environment. Environmental
standards and regulations help drive the push toward efficiency.
Toyota's team leader further noted, "Our philosophy is to get as close as
possible to the regulatory requirement and to do it better if it results in cost
efficiency." This is an indicator of priorities among various incentives for
facilities to seek greater environmental efficiency. Cost efficiency remains the
primary impetus for facilities to consume fewer resources and produce less
waste. This is not surprising, since this is the central premise that underlies a
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corporation's existence. Cost efficiency and environmental efficiency appear
to be converging toward a common goal, that of minimal environmental im-
pact by minimal waste production. Fueling this trend are environmental laws
and regulations so numerous and complex that it is often more economical to
implement ecologically sound source reduction and waste management prac-
tices than it is to cope with mountains of paperwork from myriad agencies
and to wield squads of lawyers in litigation.
A further benefit of pollution prevention is that industries that are regu-
lated tend to be classed by certain thresholds, and it benefits the corporate
image to be placed in the lower ranks. No corporation wishes to be reviled in
the media as a result of belonging to a class considered particularly harmful
to the environment. Because of threshold classes such as those in RCRA where
a jump in class results in tighter regulation and stricter reporting require-
ments, there is strong incentive driving facilities to reduce waste generation
and thereby sink below the threshold to a less demanding regulatory level,
such as from LQG to SQG. Facilities whose numbers are just above or just
below a class threshold seek sanctuary by achieving and remaining within a
lower ranking.
Evidence from RCRA and TRI data combined with observations and
conversations during facility visits suggests a hierarchy of incentives for the
improvement of environmental performance. Foremost is economic efficiency,
followed by and driven in part by laws and regulations. Following this is
corporate image, which affects not only its status in the community but the
company's ability to market its products. Interwoven among these concepts
are health and safety issues. A facility's workers are not only the plant's direct
link to the external community; in many cases they are the community. Deg-
radation of the local environment is likely to affect the health of the popula-
tion and consequently productivity. For this reason many facilities believe
that health and safety issues are of equal or greater import than environmen-
tal issues, and sometimes have a separate staff. Environmental issues and
health and safety issues are so closely linked that respective staffs tend to
work closely together.
Measures taken to improve environmental efficiency are part of an on-
going process in the facilities visited. In the case of Toyota and many other
firms, this is part of the company's kaizen, or continuous improvement prac-
tice. From the examples in the case studies, it is evident that often simple and
relatively inexpensive changes made in the production process can result in
substantial reduction in the environmental impact of industrial operations.
These changes may incorporate new technologies, for as Ayres and Ayres
(1996, 24) have observed, " . . . it is not safe to assume (as macroeconomists
tend to do) that every technology in place is the optimal choice, as if it had
been the winner in a Darwinian competition against all possible candidates."
Improvements in environmental efficiency resulting from small technological
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investments are usually within the means of even aging, less competitive fa-
cilities. New plants tend to incorporate newer, more efficient technologies on
a larger scale: the dramatic improvement in waste reduction for Toyota's re-
cent expansion is evidence of environmental improvement through newer,
"best available" pollution control equipment. For many waste management
problems, however, technological solutions have not yet been devised and so
the lack of appropriate technology sometimes forms a presently insurmount-
able barrier to waste reduction. The case studies demonstrated that not all
solutions need to be technological. Process modifications as simple as substi-
tuting one material for another or dividing a single waste stream into two
have paid off both in environmental and economic efficiency.
A facility may be guilty, in both economic and ecological senses, of be-
ing inefficient and squandering natural resources by a production process
that results in a great deal of wastage. When process modifications are imple-
mented that result in reduced demand for resources and reduced waste pro-
duction, a significant move has been made toward sustainable industrial
production. If process waste is contained or is released to the environment in
quantities no greater than the ability of an ecosystem to sustain itself in a
healthy condition while absorbing and transforming the byproducts of civiliza-
tion, then environmental degradation is not occurring. In this way two differ-
ent but overlapping approaches to environmental assessment can be reconciled.
The economist pursues the goal of efficiency in all phases. This ideal
meets the criteria for the ecosystem health paradigm as expressed in Haskell,
Norton, and Constanza 1992: "An ecological system is healthy and free from
distress syndrome (irreversible process of system breakdown leading to col-
lapse) if it is stable and sustainable, that is maintains its organization and
autonomy over time and is resilient to stress"; and in Karr 1992: "A biologi-
cal system is healthy when its inherent potential is realized, its condition is
stable, its capacity for self repair when perturbed is preserved, and minimal
external support for management is needed." To both economist and ecolo-
gist, the ideal is for zero waste production, and failing that, zero releases to
the environment. "Actively seeking zero wastes and pollutants," states
Hirschhorn (1992) in an essay aimed at corporation executives, "is still the
best path to economic success. This kind of zero-waste vision is key to the
economic conversion of costs into profits."
Industrial firms may be proactive within their own terms, promoting
environmental efficiency wherever a gain in economic efficiency can be dem-
onstrated, or may be simply reactive, responding only to the extent required
by government regulations and public opinion. The data analyzed and the
case studies suggest that, while there is still considerable variation in the envi-
ronmental efficiency among different plants and particularly for different in-
dustries, most facilities under Japanese ownership tend to be environmentally
proactive insofar as it serves their own interests. The key, perhaps, resides in
Assessing Environmental Performance 255
a greater appreciation by Japanese management that a sustainable environ-
ment does, indeed, often serve corporate interests.
IMPLICATIONS FOR AN INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY
Conventional industrial systems are primarily linear in nature. Raw materials
and energy enter one part of the system and are transformed to products and
waste residuals; some wastes are recycled or used within the system, and
others are dissipated into the environment. Traditional approaches to man-
aging pollution involve attempts to shift wastes from places where they are
potentially harmful to places where this potential can be controlled, or to
alter the wastes into forms less damaging to the environment. These end-of-
the-pipe approaches do not usually reduce the actual volume of waste. The
solution is to use materials more efficiently or to find ways to transform
wastes so that they are no longer wastes but become useful economic com-
modities. The closer that industry comes to achieving these twin goals, the
more it has maximized both economic and environmental efficiency.
The manner in which particular wastes are managed is a function of the
relative costs of methods of waste management. Conventional economic theory
defines a waste residual as a nonproduct that has a market value less than the
costs of collecting, processing, and transporting it for use. According to Kneese
and Bower (1979), "the definition is time dependent, that is, it is a function
of (1) the level of technology in the society at a point in time and (2) the
relative costs of alternative inputs at that point in time." As evident from the
case studies, more efficient use of resources may involve application of tech-
nological innovations, process modifications, or product redesign, so that
production wastes are reduced or eliminated. Transforming waste residuals
into commodities is usually accomplished by recycling back into the produc-
tion system on site or through off-site recycling by materials processors. It is
again evident from the case studies that efforts to reduce waste are imple-
mented when production costs can be reduced by so doing, or if pressure to
reduce waste is externally imposed, as in the case of government regulations
or a response to public opinion.
In 1998 the Toyota Motor Manufacturing plant in Georgetown adopted
an innovative approach to transforming one class of production waste, paint
sludge, into a commodity. Paint sludge is now shipped to an out-of-state fa-
cility that detoxifies the waste and turns it into a brick-like building material.
As plant officials readily admit, this is not the most economically efficient
solution to the problem of paint waste, since the handling costs for this strat-
egy are greater than those that would be incurred by simply sending the ma-
terial to a landfill (Chappell 1998b). This waste commodification represents,
however, not only an astute public-relations exploit but also a substantive
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experiment in seeking both economic and environmental efficiency by fur-
ther deviating from a traditional linear industrial system.
This precise sort of waste commodification along with efficient use of
resources represent the central concepts in a multidisciplinary body of indus-
trial theory that has become known as industrial ecology. The major focus of
industrial ecology, according to Ayres and Ayres (1996), is "to identify op-
portunities for reducing wastes and pollution in the materials-intensive sec-
tors by exploiting opportunities for using the low-value byproducts (i.e.,
wastes) of certain processes as raw materials for others." Industrial ecology is
a biologic metaphor, reflecting on the similarities between industrial and natural
systems. Both industrial and natural systems assimilate energy and materials
or nutrients and produce waste. Whereas conventional industrial systems
exploit materials and energy in linear fashion, natural systems, however, tend
to recycle most essential nutrients and are driven by solar energy.
An industrial ecosystem is therefore conceptualized as a symbiotic rela-
tionship among a group of firms that closely emulates nature by utilizing the
waste products of each component firm as raw material—food—for another.
In such a cyclic system, there is no such thing as waste, in the sense of a
material without value; all residues are absorbed within the industrial system
and do not impact natural systems. The primary goal of industrial ecology,
according to Garner and Keoleian (1995), is to promote sustainable develop-
ment at the global, regional, and local levels through the sustainable use of
renewable resources and minimal use of those that are nonrenewable. More
precisely, "industrial ecology as applied in manufacturing involves the design
of industrial processes and products from the dual perspectives of product
competitiveness and environmental interactions" (Graedel and Allenby 1995).
The necessary components for establishment of an industrial ecosystem
are described by Ayres and Ayres (1996). A multifirm industrial ecosystem will
usually require a large operational scale and both vertical and horizontal inte-
gration. "An industrial ecosystem must look like a single economic entity (firm)
from the outside. It will have consolidated inputs and outputs (products). It
will compete with other such entities (firms) in both raw material and product
markets. It will also compete with other firms for capital. From the inside,
however, central ownership with hierarchical management is almost certainly
not the optimum solution. Too much depends upon very sensitive and continu-
ous adjustments between the different components of the system" (p. 290).
The authors note that a modern conglomerate, where autonomous units
are linked to a corporate parent by a purely financial set of controls, each
competing for funds on the basis of profits, also does not provide a satisfac-
tory solution. Industrial ecosystems will require close long-term cooperation
and planning between waste producers and consumers, since neither can change
either processes or production levels without affecting the other. Thus, inter-
nal technological choices and financial transactions must be premised on what
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is good for the industrial system as a whole, rather than any one firm. An
industrial ecosystem is likely to consist of a single major waste exporter with
numerous satellite waste converters using the residuals of the primary firm to
manufacture other products. The low value of residual materials dictates lo-
cal use, so that a centralized industrial organization is necessary in which all
firms involved are in relative proximity to one another.
The Ayreses identify three current industrial organizational strategies
that might serve as models on which to build an industrial ecosystem. The
first is the common ownership model of vertical integration, exemplified by
corporations such as IBM and GM that own all or most of their suppliers and
manage the entire collection centrally. A second model may be found in the
retail marketing organization, such as those created by Wal-Mart or
McDonald's. Both of these potential models have significant flaws. Vertical
integration tends to be cumbersome, often losing markets to more agile com-
petitors due to a centralized decision-making process that is slow to react to
changing circumstances. The marketing organization provides little incentive
for cooperation among suppliers.
The third model for interfirm cooperation might be derived from the
Japanese system of keiretsu, a family of firms normally controlled by a large
bank, with links to a common trading company, and several major first-tier
manufacturers spread over a range of industries. Each of the first-tier compa-
nies generally has a number of smaller satellite suppliers. As a model for an
industrial ecosystem, the keiretsu suffers from some of the disadvantages of
the other organizational types, but it has several advantages, including a pri-
marily horizontal integration and a tendency for close geographical associa-
tion of unit firms.
At present, industrial ecology remains more of a concept than a practi-
cal reality, but points the direction for future industrial production in a sus-
tainable manner. Primary problems associated with realization of the concept
are likely to be development of technologies to recover a greater percentage
of waste that now escapes capture, development of products and markets
based on reclaimed materials, and breakdown of barriers in interfirm coop-
eration. Toyota of Georgetown symbolically closed one production cycle with
a structure constructed of bricks manufactured elsewhere from its own waste
products. While this represented only a small fraction of waste generation at
the plant, it was a first important step in the development of interdependent
linkages in a potential industrial ecosystem.
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NOTES
1. RCRA information was obtained with the assistance of the Kentucky Divi-
sion of Waste Management under the Provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.
TRI data was obtained on the Internet through the Right-to-Know Network: http:/l
www.rtk.net.
2. Federal facilities have also been required to report TRI data, but constitute
only about 1 percent of the total. In 1997 the TRI scope was expanded to include
additional classes of facilities, including most electric utilities, petroleum bulk sta-
tions, and wholesale chemical distributors.
3. Officially, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act.
4. Differences between the two federal programs are immediately apparent in
terms of total waste generation. The large discrepancies are attributable primarily to
the different reporting requirements of the two programs.
5. Interview with Steve Green, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, March
1999.
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Attitudes toward Japanese
Investments in Kentucky
STANLEY D. BRUNN
HOW CAN WE GAUGE PUBLIC REACTIONS to crucial issues facing a
population and an economy? This is the central query of this paper. Reac-
tions and perspectives might be obtained through public opinion surveys,
advocacy or opposition groups, and official statements and pronouncements
of public and civic leaders. However, we also can use the media to help mea-
sure sentiments. We can evaluate the amount and content of coverage of par-
ticular events and issues, the positioning of stories (on the front page of a
newspaper or at the top of the news hour), letters to editors, cartoonists'
depictions, and editorials.
In this study I am using editorials in Kentucky newspapers to examine
how the public viewed Toyota's decision to construct an auto assembly plant
in Georgetown in 1986 and subsequent impacts on the regional and state
economies. I want to answer four questions: (1) What newspapers published
editorials on the Toyota decision? (2) What were the natures of these editori-
als, (i.e., What issues were considered to be paramount for readers?) (3)
When did the editorials appear? (4) What differences, if any, existed in the
content of editorials from various city newspapers? These questions are
couched in the context of using editorials to help us to understand how one
influential arm of public opinion, in this case newspapers, can be used to
assess reaction to the decision to build the Toyota plant in Georgetown and
its impacts.
The discussion below is divided into sections that discuss the role of
newspapers as gatekeepers of information, the methodology used to examine
Kentucky newspaper editorials, and the results of the analysis of the edito-
rials. The focus is on the content of editorials concerning Japanese invest-
ment in Kentucky published from 1985 to 1998 in two major metropolitan
newspapers, the Lexington Herald-Leader and the Louisville Courier-Jour-
nal, and in the State Journal, the newspaper published in the state capital of
Frankfort.
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NEWSPAPER EDITORS AS GATEKEEPERS AND THEIR WORLD VIEWS
Two concepts are especially useful in examining newspapers and newspaper
editorials: gatekeeping and world views. Newspaper editors are gatekeepers
in the sense that they assimilate information from various sources, filter it,
and disseminate it to others. In this case the editorial serves as the dissemina-
tion of the "written word." Thus, what one reads in a newspaper, be it in an
editorial or in a report on a local or international event, is the product of
what the gatekeeper wishes to relay to a large audience. Gatekeepers, whether
they are newspaper and magazine editors or radio and television broadcast-
ers, have specific backgrounds that influence how they look at the world.
Since newspapers and radio and television stations are the sources of most of
our news about contemporary events and interpretations of those events, they
reflect the views of the owners of the media outlets. Those owners often have
philosophical, ideological, and political views that are reflected in what infor-
mation is presented to a media audience. The concept of world view, as used
by those in the social sciences, describes how institutions and individuals "or-
ganize, structure, and look at the world." They may look at the world through
the perspective of the editor's or the owner's political views or ideology or
philosophy. Those views may be influenced as well by the local and regional
culture, or they may be views that are not in concert with the local reader-
ship. Thus the gatekeepers' world views may be similar to or at odds with the
local or regional culture. Editorials thus serve several purposes: they can rein-
force prevailing opinions among the readership; they can be contrary to the
vast majority of their readers; or they can educate a readership and may influ-
ence changes in attitudes.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
I obtained from the Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development a publica-
tion titled "Announced/Reported Japanese Industrial Investment in Kentucky
(at least 10 percent Foreign Owned)." This December 1998 publication listed
107 plants which employed thirty-five thousand workers and had investments
of $6.9 billion. From this publication I identified thirty-six counties with Japa-
nese investment. The distribution is concentrated in northern Kentucky, cen-
tral Kentucky, and south-central Kentucky, west of Interstate 75. The largest
number of plants is in Jefferson County (5).
From this list of counties I consulted the 1998 Kentucky Media
Guide: Directory of Newspapers and Broadcast Stations to obtain the
newspapers published, and their editors, in the thirty-six counties with
Japanese investments. I sent letters—describing the project and asking
for copies of their published editorials that related to Japanese investment in
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the state—to forty-three editors of daily and weekly newspapers in these
counties.
The results of this effort were disappointing and surprising. I received
letters from only five newspapers, all in central Kentucky. However, one of
those letters was from the editor of the Lexington Herald-Leader. I contacted
the librarian at the Louisville Courier-journal and requested the same infor-
mation. I visited the Kentucky Department of Libraries and Archives in Frank-
fort to examine their files of articles and clippings about Toyota developments
and especially the editorials from the State Journal. That I failed to receive
any word from nearly three dozen editors leads me to think they did not
publish editorials about Japanese investment. So, not knowing whether there
were editorials published in other newspapers in small cities and towns
throughout the state, I discuss below only the editorials published in the Lex-
ington, Louisville, and Frankfort newspapers.
RESULTS: EDITORIALS FROM THE FRANKFORT, LOUISVILLE,
AND LEXINGTON NEWSPAPERS
Below I examine the twenty-six editorials published in the Lexington Herald-
Leader, the nine editorials published in the Louisville Courier-Journal, and
A worker at Y H America plant in Versailles, Kentucky. Kentucky newspapers have
highlighted the employment benefits of Japanese investments in the state. (Photo-
graph courtesy of Y H America)
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the seven editorials published in the State Journal. Inasmuch as the Lexington
and Louisville newspapers enjoy large statewide circulation, the former espe-
cially in central and eastern Kentucky and the latter in central and western
Kentucky, it seems fitting that they would publish editorials about this impor-
tant economic development enterprise, especially during the period when it
was a major topic of media attention statewide. The Frankfort newspaper,
being published in the state capital, may reflect the sentiment of the legisla-
tors and the many people employed in various state offices and agencies.
Since the capital is in central Kentucky, which is also the site of the Toyota
plant, I anticipated that some of the newspaper's editorials would be similar
to those appearing in the Lexington newspaper.
The editorials presented views on a number of different subjects, from
the impacts on the regional and state economies to incentives provided by the
state to problems that affected Scott County (tables 11.1 and 11.2). Some
editorials discussed specific issues, such as the legal and constitutional issues
raised in the state's incentives package to the corporation, the cost of the gas
pipeline Columbia Gas constructed to the Toyota plant, the dollar value of
state incentives, and the number of jobs generated by Japanese investments.
Others focused on more general subjects, including how the development
stimulated an economy that was experiencing problems (downturns in the
tobacco and coal economy) and how union activities may deter future out-
side industrial developments in the commonwealth. Also mentioned were in-
dividuals such as former Governor Martha Layne Collins because of her
sustained and tireless efforts to bring the Toyota plant to Scott County, former
governor Wallace Wilkinson because of his opposition to the investment while
he was seeking the office, and union leader Jerry Hammond, who sought to
block the investment through legal actions.
Five main themes appeared in these editorials, and several editorials ad-
dressed more than one issue. The five themes are: (1) immediate and long-
term impacts on the state; (2) the benefits seen to accrue to the Bluegrass; (3)
the size, nature, and impacts of state incentives to the corporation; (4) legal
and constitutional issues; and (5) problems facing Scott County. Other im-
portant issues were raised, but not as frequently.
Immediate and hong-Term Impacts on the State
Editorials in all three newspapers expressed congratulations more than once
(usually to former governor Collins and her administration) for encouraging
Toyota to select Kentucky as the site for its huge auto assembly plant. There
was praise, albeit it sometimes a faint praise, when the decision was announced
and also once the plant was opened. The Courier-Journal in a November
1987 editorial stated: "There is no question that Kentucky's governor must
pursue outside investment. To do otherwise today would be jingoistic and
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Table 11.1. Titles of editorials on Japanese investment in Kentucky,
1985-1998
Date Newspaper Editorial title
Dec. 11, 1985 Lexington Herald-Leader "A Noteworthy Performance Brings Toyota
to Kentucky"
Dec. 21,1985 Lexington Herald-Leader "Toyota Incentives Are Worth It"
Jan. 17,1986 The State Journal "A Little Fiction"
Jan. 27,19 8 6 The State Journal " Settle Questions Now"
Feb. 8,1986 Lexington Herald-Leader "Welcome Toyota; Don't Criticize Deal"
Feb. 9,1986 Lexington Herald-Leader "Base Toyota Discussion on Reason, Not
Emotion"
Feb. 17,1986 Lexington Herald-Leader "Secrecy about Toyota Road Is Silly and
Inappropriate"
Mar. 4,1986 The State Journal "Is It Worth It?"
Mar. 8,1986 Lexington Herald-Leader "Toyota's Pesky Problems: Knicely's
Communications, Coal's Unrealistic"
Mar. 9,1986 The State Journal "Details, Details, Details"
Mar. 31,1986 Lexington Herald-Leader "Coal and Toyota: Don't Be a Bully"
May 22,1986 The State Journal "A Case of Toyota Fever in High Places"
May 27,1986 Lexington Herald-Leader "Quick: What's 100 Feet Long and Eats
Toyotas for Lunch"
June 16,1986 Lexington Herald-Leader "Cooling Off Toyota Fever"
Aug. 1,1986 Lexington Herald-Leader "The Hammond Candidacy: Toyota Isn't the
Only Issue"
Sept. 1,1986 Lexington Herald-Leader "Unions in Trouble. Reasons are Evident in
Kentucky"
Sept. 12,1986 Lexington Herald-Leader "Toyota May Still Be Good Deal. But One
Such Deal Is Enough"
Sept. 20,1986 Lexington Herald-Leader "Labor's Pyrrhic Victory in Its Battle with
Toyota"
Oct. 27,1986 Lexington Herald-Leader "The Toyota Deal: Still Looking Good"
Nov. 9,1986 Louisville Courier Journal "Beyond the Toyota Deal"
Nov. 28,1986 Lexington Herald-Leader "Unions Win, Kentucky Loses in Settlement
at Toyota"
Dec. 4,1986 The State Journal "Track Record of Success"
Jan. 20,1987 Lexington Herald-Leader "Is City-County Merger Key to Managing the
Change Brought by Toyota Plant"
Jan. 27,1987 The State Journal "Enough Is Enough for Toyota Motor Corp."
Jan. 27,1987 Lexington Herald-Leader "Toyota's Gas Deal: Why Is This Incentive
Necessary?"
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Date Newspaper Editorial title
Feb. 9,1987 Lexington Herald-Leader "Let Toyota Pay for its Own Gas"
Mar. 23,1987 Lexington Herald-Leader "Wilkinson and Incentive: At Least Toyota
Isn't Leaving a Big Hole in Scott
County"
Mar. 31,1987 Lexington Herald-Leader "Toyota Deal: Warts Aplenty, But Still Worth
the Effort"
June 13,1987 Lexington Herald-Leader "Court Ignored Constitution in Toyota
Incentives Ruling"
June 21,1987 Louisville Courier Journal "Constitutional Taffy"
April 6,1988 Lexington Herald-Leader "Toyota Testing Experience Doesn't Speak
Well for State"
June 20,1988 Lexington Herald-Leader "Results so Far Suggest Deal with Toyota Is
Paying Off"
Oct. 9,1988 Lexington Herald-Leader "Toyota: The Dream Is Open for Tours"
Feb. 2,1990 Louisville Courier Journal "Kentucky's Loss"
Nov. 11,1990 Louisville Courier Journal " . . . We Build Their Cars"
Nov. 28,1990 Lexington Herald-Leader "Toyota Deal Pays Off: Those Incentives
Look Sensible Now, "Don't They?"
July 11,1992 Louisville Courier Journal "Trading Places"
Dec. 2,1995 Louisville Courier Journal "Incentives Aside Toyota Choice of Indiana
Didn't Hinge on State Bait"
Feb. 21,1996 Louisville Courier Journal "Headline: Back to the Future?"
May 10,1996 Lexington Herald-Leader "Top of the Line: Toyota's First 10 Years
Worth Every Penny"
July 29,1996 Louisville Courier Journal "What the Global Economy Means to
Kentuckiana"
July 7,1998 Louisville Courier Journal "Trade War"
Table 11.2. Topics of editorials related to Japanese investment in Kentucky
Governor Collins mentioned 20
State incentives 16
Benefits reaped by the state and region 14
Legal/constitutional issues 10
Central Kentucky's economy changing 8
Unions and organized labor 6
Governor Wilkinson mentioned 6
Energy: Coal and gas supply 4
Old images and racism 2
Source: The State Journal, Louisville Courier Journal, and Lexington Herald-Leader.
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irresponsible." It continued: "Toyota's investment also increases Kentucky's
credibility with other Asian countries and augers well for the Commerce
Cabinet's plan to pursue Korean electronic component manufacturers." The
State Journal in a December 1986 editorial titled "Track Record of Success,"
emphasized the importance of the state taking an aggressive posture to be
competitive in luring other international companies. It stated: "When word
spreads throughout the international marketplace that Toyota—along with
Ford and General Motors—are successful with their Kentucky operations,
and the ancillary industrial plants that serve them also are successful, that
track record may be as attractive to future investors as whatever economic
inducements are offered by the state."
Regional Economic Impacts
The Lexington and Louisville newspapers' editorials addressed issues about
the impact of Japanese investments, and especially Toyota's, on central
Kentucky's economy. The Herald-Leader editorials were mostly about the
Bluegrass region; whereas, those from the Courier-Journal were about ben-
efits the state was reaping from the investments. Only two editorials from the
State Journal addressed the economic impacts. Editorials in the Lexington
and Louisville newspapers expressed support for Toyota decision's to locate
in Scott County and the impacts the decision would have on changing central
Kentucky's economy from an agricultural base, experiencing the declining
role of tobacco, to one in which Kentuckians with good skills and schooling
could earn higher incomes. They praised additional Japanese investments in
satellite auto parts plants started in Kentucky and southern Indiana in the
early and mid-1990s. The Herald-Leader noted in an editorial in May 1996
that Toyota was a "model corporate citizen," citing its investments in the
Kentucky History Center and investment in state educational and cultural
ventures. Six months earlier an editorial praised the corporation for contrib-
uting $2 million to the University of Kentucky for its new library and paying
local property taxes, even though they were not required, that would be used
to construct a new school in Scott County.
State Incentives
A dozen editorials in the Herald-Leader commented on the state incentives.
While the newspaper was strongly supportive of the corporation coming to
central Kentucky, there were also several editorials that noted opposition to
this support. The newspaper appeared to take the position of educating the
readership on the merits of the state providing incentives for training work-
ers, construction of an interchange, and supplying energy. A major criticism
of the incentives package was noted in an editorial on the Kentucky Supreme
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Court's decision in June 1987 to uphold the incentives package. While the
newspaper applauded the investment, and did not wish for Toyota to depart,
it was concerned about the precedent the court set by approving financial
packages for firms wishing to do business in the state. The Constitution pro-
vides an exemption to the ban on "donations" that are used for "a valid
public purpose." This editorial expressed concern for this phrase being used
to define reducing employment as a valid public service. In a December 1995
editorial the newspaper commented on the Toyota decision to construct a
pickup truck plant in southern Indiana and noted that state incentives were
not that crucial in deciding where to locate the plant. Rather the company
was more concerned with being located in and around "Automobile Alley"
(between Interstates 65 and 75).
Legal and Constitutional Issues
Issues of legality and constitutionality were raised in regard to the incentives
package (about $300 million) provided by the state and by union leaders who
opposed the tax reform bill. It was suggested in a September 1986 editorial
that the state should avoid "financial flirting" with other corporations, which
also may want similar incentives from the state. Two editorials in the Herald-
Leader criticized the unions for taking positions that in the future may deter
other industrial investment in the state. The newspaper's position was that
Kentuckians would be more interested in the jobs generated by Toyota than
victories that might come from organized labor. Four editorials that appeared
in the State Journal in 1986 raised similar questions of a constitutional na-
ture, including the procedure to award the lucrative engineering contract to
the company constructing the roads, the purchase of Scott County land for
the factory site, the benefits package the state provided the corporation, and
the cost of the Toyota training program. A June 1987 editorial in the Courier-
Journal, titled "Constitutional Taffy," expressed some of the same concerns
and suggested: "If the Constitution no longer serves the state's interests—and
much of it doesn't—it needs an overhaul." In a November 1986 editorial, the
same newspaper raised questions about the costs (in what it called "murky
numbers") of various incentives programs to Kentucky taxpayers, including
the Saturday school for Japanese children.
Problems Facing Scott County
Again it was the Herald-Leader, more than the other two newspapers that
raised questions about problems facing Scott County in a series of editorials
in 1987 and 1990. Georgetown and Scott County, more than anywhere else
in central Kentucky, were affected by the Toyota plant in the areas of land
use, traffic, housing stock, and school system. Real estate speculation was
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another problem resulting from population growth and land use changes. A
March 1987 editorial included comments denoting "warts aplenty" but stat-
ing that the development looked "like a real winner for Kentucky" because of
providing jobs at a time when tobacco is in trouble. One editorial in January
1987 suggested that a newly forged city-county government, as exists in Lex-
ington-Fayette County, represented the "residents' best chance of managing
change and preserving what they like best about their community." It contin-
ued by stating that such a merger could be "a trailblazing act of leadership"
for other counties. This same message regarding merger was echoed in a
November 1990 editorial.
Other Issues
A number of other issues were discussed in editorials, again mostly by the
Lexington Herald-Leader, which voiced concerns about issues affecting work-
ers, residents, and businesses and political leaders in central Kentucky. On
some issues the newspaper responded to positions taken by individuals, such
as those seeking political office, who made the Toyota investment a political
issue. At other times, it sought to inform the region's residents about issues it
considered important to debate as part of the public forum.
I will discuss four topics from the latter category mentioned above. First,
the coal industry was taken to task for bemoaning the fact that Toyota corpo-
ration decided to use gas rather than coal as an energy source in its produc-
Solid waste at Japanese facility in Berea, Kentucky. Newspapers have generally
ignored discussion and reports on the environmental and social impacts of the
Japanese investments in the state. (Photograph by P.P. Karan)
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tion system and energy source. A second issue, the only single major issue the
Lexington newspaper contested regarding the Toyota corporation, was the
decision by Columbia Gas to charge eastern Kentucky customers a higher fee
to offset the cost of constructing a thirty-two-mile, $3.8 million pipeline.
January and February 1987 editorials expressed views that the cost should be
incurred by the corporation rather than by eastern Kentucky residents, who
would probably only receive marginal benefits from the corporation. A simi-
lar editorial in the State Journal (January 27,1987) noted the benefits pack-
age the corporation received from a negotiated agreement between Columbia
Gas and the Public Service Commission. The newspaper noted that "the real
culprit in this ripoff is not Toyota, which is doing nothing but looking out for
itself. The blame lies with those who apparently are so mesmerized at the
prospect of the Toyota plant that they are prepared to give Toyota whatever
it wants and to allow the public, which has no say in any of this, to pay the
bill." A third issue was a challenge put to state leaders and legislators to seek
ways to improve the quality of education for potential workers at Toyota and
future investments. It noted in an April 1988 editorial that in Toyota's screen-
ing of job applicants, only 20 percent passed the General Aptitude Test Bat-
tery test. The fourth issue was the opportunity for central Kentucky residents
to learn about the Japanese people and Japan's important role in the global
economy. A February 1986 editorial, only a few months after the decision
was made to locate the plant in Scott County, contained this message: "It
opened the door for state residents to exorcise some of the misgivings still
lingering from World War II and the Japanese economic resurgence." It went
on to state that "Toyota executives shouldn't misread the signals coming from
Kentucky as being more than isolated opposition towards its plant. Kentuck-
ians are an argumentative lot, and any proposal the size of the Toyota pack-
age would be certain to spark some heated debate." It mentioned as well that
some of the warning expressed by opponents to the plant "would appear
little short of hysterical." Similar strong rhetoric against opponents appeared
in a November 1986 editorial; it discussed the victory of organized labor for
some construction jobs. It remarked about "always inflammatory and some-
times racist rhetoric used by union leaders" and the threat to hold an anti-
Toyota rally on Pearl Harbor Day. It went on to criticize the behavior of
construction union leader Jerry Hammond for lawsuits he filed to halt con-
struction of the project and for his "anti-Japanese rhetoric."
Governors Mentioned
Former governor Martha Layne Collins was mentioned in eleven editorials
that ran in the Herald-Leader, six that appeared in the State Journal, and
three in the Courier-Journal. These credited her for bringing the plant to cen-
tral Kentucky and supported the incentives package she pushed through the
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legislature. She, more than any other political leader, is credited for this eco-
nomic development effort in the region. Her successor, Wallace Wilkinson,
was mentioned in six editorials, four of which were in the Herald-Leader. He
is mentioned in connection with Toyota during his gubernatorial campaign,
in connection with a business partner of his Secretary of Commerce who
made money on a land speculation, and in connection with being in office
when the Toyota plant enjoyed early success.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study I used the editorials of three influential major newspapers in the
state, the State Journal, published in Frankfort, the Lexington Herald-Leader,
and the Louisville Courier-Journal to discern how they looked at Japanese
investments in the state during the past fourteen years. This is not to say that
other newspapers, perhaps in small counties and small towns in the state, did
not also have editorials about Toyota's investment or other Japanese invest-
ments in their counties and communities. But the absence of such informa-
tion, which was requested from editors of newspapers in communities where
Japanese plants are located, leads me to conclude that only the newspapers in
the two largest cities plus the state capital chose to express on a number of
occasions their world views about this significant political and economic de-
cision. The editorials were examined in the context of newspapers being
gatekeepers of information and editors using their editorial pages to inform
their readers about their own positions on issues. In this process newspapers
serve as both filters of information and conveyors of information, in particu-
lar about new issues, such as the impact of sizable foreign investment on a
state and a region with strong rural economies based on agriculture.
The Louisville newspaper had only nine editorials about Japanese in-
vestments, and these were mostly about their magnitude and impacts state-
wide and globally. A July 1996 editorial noted that Kentucky has "done nicely
when it comes to luring foreign investment" to the tune of more than $3.5
billion invested statewide with seven thousand jobs directly and another twenty
thousand jobs through suppliers to plants. It concluded by stating that "any-
one who says 'global economy' is a synonym for downsizing and impoverish-
ment hasn't been paying attention."
The Lexington Herald-Leader, on the other hand, published more than
two dozen editorials, most with a focus on where its readers reside. It periodi-
cally educated readers about the size of the investment and number of jobs
created, praised Toyota's contributions to the local community (Georgetown-
Scott County) and to the University of Kentucky, and praised Toyota for
helping industrialize the central Kentucky economy. It also took note to com-
ment that Toyota's Georgetown facility is a place that welcomes visitors (an
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editorial on plant tours ran in October 1988) and that Toyota was serving as
a model corporate citizen.
The State Journal, as noted above, mostly raised legal and constitutional
issues, especially about the awarding of the contract to the Kentucky engi-
neering firm to construct the roads, the costs of the incentives program to
"one of the world's wealthiest industrial giants" (May 22, 1986). Six of its
seven editorials on Toyota appeared during 1986.
The three newspapers, through editorials that ran during 1986 and later,
performed an important public service to their own readers, the residents of
Kentucky, and Kentucky politicians at state and local levels about the short-
and long-term economic impacts of Toyota's plant on the state and region
and about state officials being careful and forthright in explaining incentives
to the company and costs to Kentuckians. I believe an October 1988 editorial
in the Herald-Leader best reflected on the company's impact on Bluegrass
area residents and the state: "It's a match made in heaven, come to reality in
the rolling fields of Kentucky."
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Public Perception of
Toyota Motor Corporation
in Kentucky
JAMES G. HOUGLAND JR.
T H E NATIONAL AND WORLD ECONOMIES currently are character-
ized by a geographic redistribution of industry and employment opportuni-
ties. Considerable attention has been devoted to the problems of localities
experiencing deindustrialization (e.g., Bluestone and Harrison 1982). His-
torically, the impact of new industry on communities also has been a matter
of research interest (Summers et al. 1976). Such attention is appropriate be-
cause new industry can represent a significant source of change for a commu-
nity. As Hallinan (1997) notes, social change is neither linear nor predictable.
At times, it is sufficiently disruptive that one cannot predict whether a system
confronted with change will collapse completely, regenerate in a new form
resembling its former structure, or emerge as a totally new social structure.
Despite its potential for introducing major change in a community or region,
the impact of new industry on communities has received somewhat less at-
tention in recent years. This has occurred in part because of the growing
number of problems associated with plant closings. Recent trends, however,
make new industry—particularly industry that involves Japanese transplant
organizations—increasingly important to study.
It appears that the decreased attention to the social implications of new
industry has occurred despite inconclusive evidence and disagreement about
whether growth (through industrialization or other means) works to the ben-
efit or detriment of local communities and their citizens. Some who have
studied "boomtowns" have stressed the impact of their rapid population
growth on "social disruptions, cultural conflicts, and pathological behaviors,"
but such analyses have been criticized for their implicit antigrowth bias as
well as inadequate statistical controls (Summers and Branch 1984,154-55).
Albrecht (1982) has noted that such analyses may overlook the phase of
change. Early discontinuities associated with growth may dissipate after the
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passage of time has allowed primary relationships and community attach-
ments to be re-established.
More positive views of the impact of growth on communities are repre-
sented by the work of Eberts (1979), who found from an analysis of rural and
urban counties in the northeastern United States that "economic and demo-
graphic growth are associated with increases in some of the most commonly
used quality-of-life indicators" (1979, 180). He concludes that growth may
be important because "economic and demographic structures generate the
income and opportunities for individuals and collectivities to invest in the
appropriate infrastructure of facilities and activities around which better qual-
ity of life can develop" (1979,180).
Such benefits, however, may not be evenly distributed, and research con-
ducted through the mid-1970s appeared to lead to a firm conclusion that
they would not be. Summers and colleagues (1976) found from a review of
numerous case studies that, while new industry was associated with increases
in median income, the relative economic status of certain segments of the
population (e.g., the elderly and minorities) may decrease. In many cases, new
industries are found to provide few employment opportunities for the previ-
ously unemployed or other relatively deprived segments of the population.
Such findings are consistent with the contention by Molotch (1976) that
local growth is of benefit to and supported by only certain segments of a
locale's population. As would be predicted from reports by Summers and
colleagues (1976) that new industry tends to be associated with increased
home construction, real estate valuation, and retail sales volume, Molotch
contends that local business interests are most likely to push for continued
local growth. As Molotch (1976, 319) notes, survey evidence suggests that
"most people's values are . . . more consistent with small places than large."
Recent studies also find that agrarianism represents a pervasive orientation
shared by urban as well as rural residents (Dalecki and Coughenour 1992).
While some may criticize small towns and rural areas for their lack of cul-
tural and recreational opportunities, the overall conclusion suggested by this
body of research is that new industry and other aspects of growth are being
pushed by a privileged elite whose members will benefit at the expense of the
economic interests and preferred lifestyles of most community members.
This analysis may not represent the final word, however. Bartik (1991)
has used case study materials, earlier research, and national data sets on the
effects of "shocks" to employment in local economies (i.e., increased demand
for labor, whether caused by new employers or greater activity on the part of
existing employers) on the short-term and long-term economic experiences of
local residents. In the short run, increased demand for labor leads to tighter
labor markets, resulting in reduced unemployment and increased wages. It is
more important, however, to examine long-term effects. Many (e.g., Marston
1985) have argued that local labor demand shocks lack long-term effects
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because in-migrants will be attracted to localities whose economies are seen
to be growing. Bartik, however, contends that mobility is constrained by the
financial and psychological costs of moving, and his analysis indicates that
labor demand shocks have long-term effects including a small but persistent
drop in unemployment and an increase in local labor force participation rates.
His analysis suggests that, of one hundred net new jobs for a metropolitan
area, six or seven will go to local residents who otherwise would be unem-
ployed, sixteen will go to local residents who otherwise would be out of the
labor force, and the remaining seventy-seven or seventy-eight will go to in-
migrants (Bartik 1991, 95). Further analysis indicated that a 1 percent in-
crease in a metropolitan area's employment level will lead to a 0.44 percent
increase in "real earnings" (i.e., the product of labor force participation, em-
ployment rate, weekly hours, and the real wage). Moreover, effects were found
to be larger for less educated residents and blacks (Bartik 1991, 157-79).
Bartik interprets these results as a reflection of changes in human capital:
"In the short run, a shock increasing local growth allows some individuals
to obtain jobs who otherwise would be unemployed or out of the labor
force. This employment experience alters the 'human capital' of these indi-
viduals: they obtain better job skills, or at least they are perceived by em-
ployers as having better skills. As a result of improved human capital, they
are more likely to be employed in the long run" (1991, 96). In addition,
"local growth helps the promotion prospects for blacks and the less-edu-
cated significantly more than it helps the promotion prospects for other
groups" (1991,170).
Bartik acknowledges that any progressive effects on the distribution of
earnings may be canceled, in whole or in part, by effects on property values.
Because of patterns of property ownership, increased property values almost
certainly will lead to a regressive distribution of benefits. Bartik's analysis
leads him to conclude that individuals in the lowest income quintile will gain
more from growth (based on earnings effects alone) than those in the highest
quintile will gain from the combination of property value and labor earnings
effects of growth (1991,175). At the same time, he acknowledges that, aver-
age differences notwithstanding, "growth will still often have large costs for
specific poor individuals and families and large benefits for specific wealthy
individuals and families" (1991,177). These dramatic individual experiences
may, of course, affect community members' perceptions to a greater extent
than do the average experiences of the overall population. Perceptions may
also be affected by changes in non-economic aspects of the community. Bartik
acknowledges that community growth may be experienced negatively by lo-
cal residents because "they are accustomed to the local area as it originally
was, and may even have chosen it for its particular qualitative features" (1991,
74). Thus, General Motors' decision to locate its Saturn plant in the small
town of Spring Hill, Tennessee, led to concerns about threats to its small-
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town quality of life and to the viability of farming in the area. Bartik's analy-
sis raises the possibility that classic studies of the impact of new industry may
have been overly pessimistic regarding the economic impacts of new industry
but on target regarding possible deleterious social impacts.
T H E PRESENT STUDY
A 1985 decision by Toyota Motor Corporation to locate an automobile
assembly plant in Kentucky created an opportunity to trace changes in pub-
lic perceptions and evaluations of the plant as it went through its phases of
planning, construction, hiring, and early years of manufacturing. The fore-
going review suggests that perceptions of the plant's local impact will be of
importance. Toyota, in particular, generated opposition on several issues
(Yanarella and Reid 1990). Thus, public perceptions of Toyota in central
Kentucky may be influenced by early controversies involving the incentives
package developed by the state to attract Toyota to Kentucky, the role of
unions during the construction phase of the plant, and land and environ-
mental issues.
Perceptions of Toyota's Impact
The announcement of a major new employer often is cause for euphoria, but
the euphoria may be short-lived as local residents experience disruptions and
become aware of objective limitations in the benefits that the employer will
bring to the area. In particular, those who are less likely to benefit from in-
creased property values (Molotch 1976); individuals in the sociodemographic
categories less likely to be hired for the workforce of the new plant (Summers
et al. 1976), although they may benefit from increased employment in the
overall labor market (Bartik 1991); and those who express concern about
newcomers in general and the Japanese in particular are likely to have a rather
negative view of the impacts of the Toyota plant on the community.
This reasoning suggests the hypotheses that perceived impacts of the
plant will be more positive for:
v HI . residents with more education;
H2. residents with higher incomes;
H3. males;
H4. those who are currently employed;
H5. owners of property or homes in Scott County;
H6. those who expect personal or family benefits from the Toyota plant;
H7. those who have lived in the community for a relatively short time;
H8. those with less attachment to the community as it currently exists;
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H9. those who are relatively accepting of newcomers;
H10. those who are relatively accepting of Japanese; and
H l l . those who are more knowledgeable about the Toyota plant.
Reactions to the Incentives Package
Incentives packages in general and (as discussed below) the Toyota package
in particular have been highly controversial. While individuals may favor or
oppose incentives packages on a number of objective and philosophical
grounds, it is predicted that attitudes toward the plant will influence evalua-
tions of the incentives package used to attract it to the area. Thus, hypotheses
12 through 22 correspond to hypotheses 1 through 11. In addition, it is pre-
dicted that the incentives package will be favored by:
H23. residents who perceive more community benefits associated with
the plant and
H24. residents who perceive fewer community problems associated with
the plant.
An examination of the foregoing hypotheses will occur in the context of
a consideration of the changes that have accompanied Toyota's entry into
central Kentucky. While hypothesis testing is only one aspect of this study, it
is important from a policy perspective to see what segments of a local popu-
lation will be more or less receptive to new industry and community change.
An identification of those who are less enamored of new industry will pro-
vide hints as to the segments of a local population that may need particular
assistance or information during a period of change.
STUDY SETTING AND CONTEXT
In December 1985, after considering sites in several states, Toyota announced
its choice of Scott County, Kentucky, as the site for its first solely owned
manufacturing plant in the United States. (Since 1984, Toyota has been pro-
ducing cars in a joint venture with General Motors in California. However,
the Kentucky plant was to be operated by the wholly owned subsidiary now
known as Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky [TMMK]). Because Ken-
tucky Governor Martha Layne Collins had been disappointed by a recent
decision by General Motors to locate its Saturn plant in Tennessee, the re-
cruitment of Toyota received high priority from the governor's office, and a
far-reaching incentives package was developed to induce Toyota to choose
Kentucky.
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The State Incentives Package
The incentives package used to attract Toyota to Kentucky was large in com-
parison with incentives used to attract comparable manufacturers to nearby
states (Milward and Newman 1989). Moreover, examination by the press
suggested that the initial public announcements of the size of the package
were understated. Original estimates of the incentives package used to attract
Toyota to Kentucky were made public in December 1985 and totaled be-
tween $120 and $130 million. These estimates were revised in June 1986,
with significant increases for some items. While the estimates for land acqui-
sition and the training center remained roughly similar, the cost of site prepa-
ration increased by more than 75 percent, from an original estimate of between
$20 million and $25 million to nearly $44 million. The increase resulted in
part from cost overruns for a sewage treatment plant to serve both Scott
County and the Toyota plant. Cost estimates for highway construction were
reduced by $10 million, from $47 million to $37 million, but this reduction
was based on a decision to use federal highway funds already allocated to
Kentucky to finance part of the highway construction in the vicinity of the
Toyota facility. Estimates for a state-funded employee training program were
revised downward from $33 million to $20.4 million. The 1986 revised esti-
mates for the entire project were put at $122.4 million. Newspaper reporters
Miller and Swasy (1986) concluded that estimating all items at their true
costs (including federal funding and supplemental state appropriations) led
to a total of approximately $155 million, for a total increase of between $25
million and $35 million over the original estimates. Later, the University of
Kentucky Center for Business and Economic Research (1992, 2) concluded
from an examination of records maintained by Toyota that the best estimate
of the cost to the state was $147 million.
Several additional costs were not included in these estimates. These in-
cluded $224 million in interest on the twenty-year bonds issued by the state,
$4 million in additional costs for the sewage treatment plant overruns, $3.7
million for a school for Japanese students, and relatively minor expenditures
for legal and surveying fees, impact studies, and the Toyota Planning Center.
Taking these additional items into account, Miller and Swasy (1986) esti-
mated the total cost of the incentives package to be about $377 million over
a twenty-year period.
The incentives were offered in the belief that Toyota's presence in cen-
tral Kentucky would strengthen the economy by generating jobs from direct
employment at the Toyota facility, support industries associated with the plant,
and additional satellite plants. Early calculations suggested that the annual
rate of return on the state's investment after a twenty-year period would be
approximately 20.1 percent. The plant has been sufficiently successful to lead
to announcements of major expansions in its production capacity and
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workforce. In contrast to its original projections of providing three thousand
to thirty-two hundred jobs at full production, TMMK employed seventy-
eight hundred people in 1999 (Butters 1999, 11). According to Haywood
(1998), TMMK in 1997 purchased parts and materials from fifty-five manu-
facturers in Kentucky as well as from manufacturers in five other states. His
analysis indicates that TMMK accounts for 34,544 jobs in Kentucky (based
on its own payroll as well as jobs in its suppliers in 1997) as well as 49,735
jobs in the other five states, for a total of 84,729 jobs (Haywood 1998,11).
Haywood also estimates that Kentucky currently is receiving an annual rate
of return of 36.86 percent on its incentives package: "In the 20-year period
1986-2005 the Commonwealth of Kentucky will collect, over and above the
costs of the incentives package, approximately $1.2 billion of tax revenues
attributable to the direct and indirect effects of TMMK's operations in Ken-
tucky" (Haywood 1998,16).
While Toyota's success in Kentucky has made its specific incentives pack-
age less controversial than it once was, the general wisdom of incentives pack-
ages is a matter of ongoing controversy. With debate continuing on a national
level, it is unlikely that central Kentucky residents will forget the Toyota in-
centives package.
Characteristics of the Community and Area
According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Scott County had a population
of 22,198 in 1985, the year of Toyota's decision. Although this population
was larger than that of most contiguous counties, it was appreciably smaller
than that of Franklin County, site of the Kentucky state capital (1985 popu-
lation: 44,137) and Fayette County, which is to Scott County's immediate
south and includes the city of Lexington (1985 population: 212,195). Al-
though much of Scott County has a rural or small-town quality, it is part of
the Lexington Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and is within reason-
able driving distance via interstate highways of two larger metropolitan
areas, Louisville and Cincinnati. By the time of the 1990 census, Scott
County's population had grown to 23,867, an increase of 7.5 percent since
1985 and 9.4 percent since 1980. County population growth accelerated
during the 1990s and was estimated to be 30,685 in 1998. Scott County's
percentage increase in population from 1990 to 1998 was 28.6 percent, the
highest of the seven counties in the Lexington MSA and the sixth highest of
Kentucky's 120 counties. From 1990 to 1998, Georgetown's population
increased from 11,414 to 14,365. This increase of 25.9 percent ranked third
among Kentucky's thirty-three cities with 1998 populations exceeding 10,000
(Kentucky State Data Center 1999). Although Georgetown and Scott
County's growth began accelerating in the 1990s, its slower start in the
years immediately following TMMK's announcement may have given the
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city and county time to adjust and prepare for the coming demand on their
infrastructure.
Scott County is not unlike other semirural areas that have been found
attractive by incoming industry. It has three incorporated areas (Georgetown
and the smaller towns of Stamping Ground and Sadieville). It is the location
of a privately funded college and some industrial activities, but agriculture
plays an important role in the county's economy. It is linked to major popula-
tion centers through the interstate highway system. Some research suggests
that Japanese firms differ from their American counterparts in their criteria
for choosing industrial sites (Doeringer and Terkla 1992). Even so, the char-
acteristics of the Scott County area are consistent with Fulton's (1974, 77-
78) identification of the characteristics of communities most likely to attract
new industry. The characteristics noted by Fulton (president of the Fantus
Company, which acts as a consultant to industries seeking plant sites) are a
good highway system, strong community leadership, lack of domination by
another single large industry, availability of qualified labor, proximity to a
large city, and terrain and industrial sites that can be developed at a reason-
ably low cost.
Although Scott County has several characteristics conducive to new in-
dustry, its residents and government officials were not prepared to deal with
some aspects of social and economic change associated with new industry.
Local leaders had been allowed little involvement or even information when
state officials were attempting to attract Toyota to the area. As a result,
they had not been in a position to secure binding promises from either Toyota
or the state government. A new mayor of Georgetown had to be appointed
when his predecessor suffered a stroke ("brought on, it was said, by now
having to work around the clock" [Gelsanliter 1990,124]) about ten months
after Toyota's announcement. City and county officials differed in their ten-
dencies to favor the plant and in their views of the distribution of new tax
money.
The city of Georgetown has had zoning regulations since the early 1950s,
but the regulations had not had a major revision since 1976 (Stroud 1991a).
This set the stage for considerable land speculation that began immediately
after the 1985 announcement of Toyota's Scott County location. Property
values increased almost immediately by 20 percent or more (Stroud, 1991b),
but many developers built houses that were more expensive than those that
the typical Toyota employee could afford. As a result, many newly constructed
homes did not sell. In the meantime, efforts by the Georgetown-Scott County
Planning Office to control growth generated criticism from many developers,
who saw the office as taking a "no-growth" approach (Stroud 1991a). The
planning office and other county and city officials, however, were caught
between the desires of developers to establish new residences and the desire
of many county residents to preserve a small-town atmosphere marked by
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friendliness, quiet, and a rural quality. In addition, they confronted the task
of balancing development with the protection of environmental quality.
The inherent contradictions involved in striving simultaneously for de-
velopment and preservation took a toll but did not completely deter efforts to
improve the community. In 1993, the Georgetown mayor who had worked
closely with TMMK as it became a member of the community was defeated
by a man who had served three terms as mayor during the 1970s and early
1980s. Throughout much of the period, city and county governments had
difficulty sustaining cooperation and the planning office experienced turn-
over in key personnel. These difficulties illustrate Hoyman's (1997, 38) con-
tention that "the road to permanent change in Georgetown was uneven,
marked by many bumps, detours, and switchbacks."
However, elsewhere in this volume, Patton and Patton (1999) present
considerable evidence that positive development has continued and is gaining
momentum. They point, among other things, to new civic organizations, a
more representative Scott County Fiscal Court, and the assumption of office
in 1999 of a new Georgetown mayor who may be more inclined than his
immediate predecessor to support the comprehensive plan and to recognize
the ways in which the community is changing.
Corporate Strategies toward Community Relations
Because Georgetown city officials received little information as Toyota was
making its site selection, Toyota was viewed initially as a promising but un-
known entity that could have disruptive effects on a community whose resi-
dents valued its small-town quality. During the months following the
announcement, however, Toyota officials began building local ties and making
focused monetary and in-kind contributions. Key officials were invited to Toyota
Motor Corporation's headquarters in Japan, where they were involved in tours,
meetings, and other events intended to symbolize their importance in Toyota's
eyes. On a local level, TMMK's top officials became involved in community
civic organizations. TMMK made monetary and in-kind contributions that
seem to have been designed to respond to local fears about the plant's disrup-
tive impacts. Fears about school overcrowding were offset by monetary contri-
butions to the school system. Fears of increased crime and deterioration of
government services were offset by contributions to the police and fire de-
partments and assistance in developing recreational facilities. Meanwhile,
TMMK quickly became involved in such institutionalized endeavors as United
Way of the Bluegrass, and it symbolized a commitment to higher education
through major gifts to the University of Kentucky and cooperative relation-
ships with the Scott County school system. After its assembly line was in
production, TMMK tried to satisfy local curiosity with a three-day open house.
One of the three days was set aside for residents of Scott County.
284 James G. Hougland Jr.
In general, Toyota's community and local relations appear to have been
designed to build ties with key actors and to speak to the public's major fears
about Toyota's impact while making some positive contributions to the com-
munity. Comparative research conducted by Hoyman (1997,147-8) suggests
that Toyota's task was not an easy one. Her 1992 surveys of residents of four
communities with new automobile plants found that residents of Georgetown
and of Spring Hill, Tennessee (home of the Saturn plant), expressed lower
levels of satisfaction than did residents of Marysville, Ohio (Honda), or
Smyrna, Tennessee (Nissan). However, the survey results presented below
show that Toyota's efforts to win community acceptance have been increas-
ingly successful over time. In fact, local residents who are dissatisfied with
changes in their community appear to be more inclined to blame state offi-
cials than Toyota for their frustrations.
SOURCE OF DATA
The data for this analysis come primarily from telephone interviews con-
ducted by trained and supervised interviewers on the staff of the Survey Re-
search Center of the University of Kentucky. The surveys were conducted
over one-month periods in 1986 (approximately eight months after the plant's
location was announced), 1987,1988,1989,1990, 1991, 1993, and 1995.
In every year except 1991 and 1995, residents of Scott, Bourbon, Clark,
Fayette, Franklin, Grant, Harrison, Owen, and Woodford Counties were in-
cluded in the surveys. Thus, the study includes residents of the county where
the plant is located (Scott) as well as eight additional counties that are con-
tiguous to Scott County and/or linked to it by major transportation arteries.
Because of limited funds, the 1991 and 1995 surveys were confined to resi-
dents of Scott County. Because Toyota's most direct and visible impacts occur
in the county in which it is located, much of the analysis will focus on Scott
County residents. However, results from other counties are presented for com-
parison in Appendices A through E.
Different samples were drawn each year to ensure that new residents
and young adults would be included in the study. Random-digit dialing was
used so that all residential telephone numbers would have an equal chance of
being called. Multiple attempts were made to reach all numbers. Once a num-
ber was reached, the specific respondent from the household was chosen on
the basis of randomized selection of a man or woman aged 18 or older.
Table 12.1 shows the number of respondents and response rates for each
survey. The response rate is calculated by dividing the number of completed
interviews by the number of eligible households that were called. About two-
thirds of the noncompletions for each survey reflect refusals to begin or to
complete the interview. The remaining noncompletions reflect such factors as
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Table 12.1. Number of respondents and response rates
Year
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1993
1995
Number of respondents
Scott County
322
397
355
323
396
235
344
431
Total
1,049
1,309
1,269
716
979
235
977
431
Response rates
Scott County
69.7
70.5
72.0
65.0
65.5
62.0
45.1
44.8
Total
66.0
66.0
66.3
63.3
66.5
62.0
42.4
44.8
illness, inability to find a convenient time for the interview, and prolonged
unavailability because of travel or other commitments.
The potential sampling error for all counties is plus or minus 3 percent-
age points at the 95 percent confidence interval for questions asked of all
respondents in 1986-1988. Because of smaller samples in 1989, 1990, and
1993, the potential sampling error for those years is slightly less than 4 per-
centage points. For Scott County alone, the margin of error each year is ap-
proximately 5 percentage points.
Responses from counties other than Scott were weighted on the basis of
1985 population size. Information about specific questions and scales is pro-
vided in Appendix F.
T H E TIME PERSPECTIVE OF THE STUDY
Many studies of the impact of new industry focus only on a plant's first few
years in a community. The surveys providing the basis for this study have
been conducted over a ten-year period, allowing one to observe changes in
perceptions of Toyota as it has moved through phases of planning, construc-
tion, early production, and expansion. Nevertheless, this may not be long
enough to assess TMMK's long-term impacts on the community and region.
Freudenberg and Gramling (1992) rather pessimistically note that the most
important long-term effects are those that occur after a major industry has
pulled out. At that time, community leaders may discover that leadership
skills have been lost because key people have left or been transferred and that
"the economic flexibility that once characterized predevelopment entrepre-
neurs may no longer exist" (1992, 944). A community that has tied its for-
tunes to a single industry may fail both to preserve traditional talents and
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ways of life and to engage in alternative activities that might represent more
promising opportunities.
As noted above, TMMK's brief history in Kentucky has been character-
ized by expansion rather than contraction, and Toyota is like most major
Japanese manufacturers in that it has a history of avoiding plant closings or
layoffs as responses to economic downturns. Nevertheless, the fate of the
Volkswagen plant in Pennsylvania, the closings of many plants owned by
General Motors and other American manufacturers, and recent problems in
Japan's economy (resulting in reduced sales for Japanese automobile manu-
facturers) all represent warnings of the risks involved with allowing an area
to become dependent on a single industry.
With specific reference to Kentucky's decision (described in somewhat
exaggerated terms) "to cast its lot with the auto industry," Falk and Lyson
(1988) speculate about the effects of declining car sales: "It takes little imagi-
nation to see that layoffs will soon follow. Local people will lose income; the
state will lose tax revenues; and the industries involved may have to recon-
sider their investment, since they all 'have a business to run' which essentially
means a profit to be made. Kentucky has definitely succeeded in attracting a
particular industry: but at what price and to be paid by whom and with what
guarantees for long-term commitment?" (1988,163).
Some economic downturns and sales declines have occurred since Falk
and Lyson's book was published, but, as of this writing, the layoffs they pre-
dicted have not occurred. Vehicles manufactured in Kentucky were exported
to Europe beginning in April 1992 and to Japan beginning in July 1992. This
may reflect a desire to maintain production during a period of lagging sales in
the United States. It also should be noted that neither Kentucky as a state nor
the Scott County area is as dependent on the automobile industry as many
resource-dependent regions are on the extractive industries that locate there,
deplete the resources, and leave. At this time, it does not appear likely that
Scott County and central Kentucky will replicate the experiences that some
Kentucky counties have had with the coal industry.
FINDINGS
On a broad level, central Kentucky residents have always tended to be opti-
mistic that Toyota would benefit their communities. Figure 12.1, which sum-
marizes Scott County residents' expectations over time, shows that at least
three-fourths of the residents have consistently been optimistic about Toyota's
likely community impact. Once the plant moved beyond its somewhat dis-
ruptive construction phase and began focusing on actual production, the level
of optimism has consistently exceeded 80 percent, and it reached 90 percent
in the most recent survey. Appendix A shows specific percentages for Scott
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Fig. 12.1. Scott County: Percent saying Toyota is benefiting community, 1986-1995.
County and other central Kentucky counties. In counties other than Scott,
optimism about Toyota's community impact dropped somewhat in 1987 and
1988 but then rebounded.
More specific expectations are summarized in tables 12.2 and 12.3. Table
12.2, which summarizes responses from the 1995 survey, shows that the per-
ceived effects generating the most widespread consensus are generally posi-
tive. Increased business activity, more jobs, more tax money for the county,
and higher wages are all perceived by more than 90 percent of Scott County
residents as effects of Toyota's presence. However, substantial proportions
also associate the plant with increased congestion on roads (90.4 percent)
and in schools (82.2 percent).
Smaller percentages (but well over half) of Scott County's residents as-
sociate the plant with a higher cost of living, more pollution, housing short-
ages, increased personal taxes, and the more positive outcome of keeping
young people from moving away. Still smaller percentages associate Toyota
with increased union activity, harm to local farming, and increased crime.
A comparison of trends over time (summarized in table 12.3, with more
complete information presented in Appendix B) shows that perceptions of
several positive outcomes are becoming increasingly prevalent, while concern
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Table 12.2. Perceived community effects of Toyota in Scott County, 1995
Widely perceived effects (80% or more)
Increased business activity
More jobs
More tax money for county
Higher wages
Increased road congestion
Crowded schools
Less widely perceived effects (less than 80%)
Higher cost of living
Keeping young people from moving away
More pollution
Housing shortages
Increased personal taxes
Increased union activity
Hurt local farming
Increased crime
95.0
93.6
91.6
91.0
90.4
82.2
75.0
72.2
70.5
65.4
65.3
50.0
47.8
43.0
about some negative outcomes appears to be abating. Thus, respondents to
the two most recent surveys were more likely than respondents to the two
earliest surveys to perceive Toyota as leading to higher wages and more jobs.
By contrast, concern about housing shortages, harm to local farming, and
higher cost of living had abated somewhat, and concern about pollution,
increased personal taxes, and increased crime had decreased to a consider-
able extent. Perceptions of increased union activity (which some would view
positively and others negatively) also decreased by a considerable margin.
A different set of questions, included for the first time during the survey's
third administration in 1988, asked respondents about their views of changes
in their community since Toyota's 1985 announcement that it would be lo-
cating in Scott County. Results are summarized in table 12.4 and presented
more completely in Appendix C. While 1995 respondents did see their com-
munity as more congested and more expensive than it had been before Toyota's
arrival, most also viewed it as more interesting. Concern about increased
congestion, expense, and pollution changed very little between the original
and most recent administrations of the survey, but respondents have become
more likely to see their community as being more interesting and a more
exciting place to live. Such trends suggest that Toyota may have played a role
in revitalizing the community and in making residents aware of a broad range
of new possibilities.
Figure 12.2 summarizes the results of the analyses reported in tables
12.2-4. As previously discussed, Scott County residents are showing a grow-
Public Perception of Toyota in Kentucky 289
Table 12.3. Changes in perceived community impacts of Toyota in Scott
County (change from 1986-1987 to 1993-1995)
Increased impacts perceived (5 percentage points or above)
Higher wages +13.50
More jobs +5.15
Little change perceived (change less than 5 percentage points)
More tax money for county +4.85
Keeping young people from moving away +3.90
Increased business activity -0.45
Crowded schools -4.15
Increased road congestion -4.90
Decreased impacts perceived (-5 percentage points or below)
Housing shortages -5.00
Hurt local farming -7.60
Higher cost of living -8.50
More pollution -18.55
Increased personal taxes -20.05
Increased crime -29.30
Increased union activity -32.25
ing tendency to be optimistic about their community and its future. Predic-
tions of several positive economic and social outcomes are becoming increas-
ingly prevalent, while concerns about negative outcomes are either remaining
stable (e.g., crowded schools, increased road congestion) or becoming less
prevalent (e.g., crime, personal taxes, housing shortages).
In counties other than Scott (Appendices B and C), increased business
activity and more jobs have consistently been seen as the major effects of
Toyota's move into the area. Residents of other counties have shown an in-
Table 12.4. Perceived community change since 1985
More congested
More expensive
More interesting
More polluted
A more exciting place to live
% Responding
"Yes" (1995)
91.7
77.1
73.2
58.6
56.0
Change: 1993-1995
vs. 1988-1989
+1.60
-0.05
+9.35
-2.75
+11.80
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Note: There is no data for 1992 and 1994.
Fig. 12.2. Scott County: Percent considering state funding of Toyota justified, 1986-
1995.
creasing tendency to associate Toyota with higher wages. Throughout the sur-
vey period, residents of other counties have been less likely than those in Scott
County to associate Toyota with negative social or environmental impacts.
Figure 12.3 summarizes another approach to gauging local acceptance
of Toyota as a member of the community. Respondents were asked in each
survey whether they believed that "a foreign-owned company like Toyota
will fulfill its obligations to the community." The phrasing, of course, was
designed to call attention to Toyota's national origins and probably had the
effect of creating some doubt about the strength of TMMK's long-term com-
mitment to the community. Thus, an expression of "a great deal of confi-
dence" represents a very strong expression of trust in Toyota. It is noteworthy
that, even during the somewhat disruptive period of plant construction, ten-
dencies to answer the question affirmatively increased. Since 1991, between
40 percent and 50 percent of respondents have been answering the question
with the strongest possible affirmative response. During the 1991,1993, and
1995 surveys, more than three-fourths of the Scott County respondents (82
percent in 1995) expressed either "a great deal of confidence" or "some con-
fidence," suggesting that TMMK has inspired widespread trust in its commu-
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Note: There is no data for 1992 and 1994.
Fig. 12.3. Scott County: Percent with "a great deal of confidence" that a foreign-
owned company like Toyota will fulfill its obligations, 1986-1995.
nity. Specific results for Scott and other counties are presented in Appendix
D. Outside Scott County, confidence has remained relatively stable.
Figure 12.2 summarizes Scott County residents' responses to a key ques-
tion regarding the state's incentives package—whether they considered the
expense justified. Despite the early disagreements regarding the incentives
package, more than half of the respondents to each survey have considered
the expense justified. From 1989 on, support has exceeded 60 percent, and
about three-fourths of the respondents to the 1993 and 1995 surveys have
considered state funding justified. Thus, support for the incentives package is
another area in which support has shown consistent increases.
More complete results regarding the incentives package are shown in
Appendix E. The appendix shows that trends in other central Kentucky coun-
ties largely mirror those in Scott County. Of the three specific questions used
to measure support for the incentives package, one produced somewhat lower
levels of enthusiasm than the others, but all show clear tendencies for support
to increase over time. For all three items, however, support is somewhat re-
served. Respondents are more likely to consider the expense "somewhat jus-
tified" than "highly justified," and they are more likely to "agree" than to
"strongly agree" with current and future incentives.
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A follow-up to one of the questions provides additional insights into
reactions to the incentives plan. In 1993 and 1995, those who expressed dis-
agreement with state funding for Toyota were asked whether they would
support state funding for an American-owned plant. About a third of the
Scott County residents and 40 percent of those in other counties indicated
that they would. Thus, opposition to incentives funding for Toyota cannot be
attributed entirely to philosophical opposition to the idea of state-funded
incentives packages.
Tables 12.5-7 summarize correlation and regression analyses regarding
predictors of support for or concern about TMMK among respondents to the
most recent survey. Because regression analyses control for other variables,
they provide stronger indications of support or concern and will be the pri-
mary focus of this summary. Table 12.5 shows that community-level benefits
of TMMK are perceived by those who expect family or individual-level ben-
efits, those who are attached to their community, those who have positive
opinions of the quality of their county, and those who are accepting of new-
comers. Two other predictors that were significant at the .10 but not the .05
level were income (with higher income respondents more likely to perceive
benefits) and years in county (with relative newcomers more likely to per-
ceive benefits). A positive correlation exists between acceptance of the Japa-
nese and perceived benefits, but this relationship did not survive the regression
analysis. Contrary to predictions, knowledge of TMMK, gender, education,
property ownership, location in Scott County, age, race, home ownership,
and employment status were not significantly related to perceived benefits.
In many ways, relationships in table 12.6, focusing on perceived strains
associated with TMMK, are the opposite of those in table 12.5. Perceptions
of perceived strains were negatively related to age, property ownership, per-
ception of family or individual-level benefit, acceptance of the Japanese, and
acceptance of newcomers. Perceived strains are positively associated with
number of years in the county and home ownership. Thus, relatively estab-
lished residents are particularly likely to be concerned about the potentially
disruptive impacts of new industry.
Supporters of the state incentives package (table 12.7) are likely to in-
clude those who associate TMMK with community-level benefits, those who
perceive themselves or their families as receiving benefits, those with positive
views of the quality of the county, and those with higher incomes. Those who
associate TMMK with community-level strains and property owners are less
likely to support the state incentives package. Although they did not survive
as predictors in the regression analysis, the correlation analysis indicated that
those who are accepting of newcomers and the Japanese and those with stron-
ger community attachment were likely to support the incentives package,
while those who had lived in the county longer and older respondents were
likely to oppose it.
Public Perception of Toyota in Kentucky 293
Table 12.5. Predictors of perceived benefits associated with TMMK (Scott
County, 1995)
Correlation Standardized
coefficients regression
(N = 332-376) coefficients
(N = 284)
Perceived knowledge of Toyota
Family benefit expected
Perceived quality of county
Community attachment
Gender
Education
Income
Years in county
Property ownership in Scott County
Location in Scott County
Age
Race
Home ownership
Employment status
Acceptance of newcomers
Acceptance of Japanese
Adjusted R2
,121b
.298'
,196C
,232C
-.018
.029
.189'
-.097*
.040
-.057
.021
.027
.015
.029
.183'
.135b
.298*
.151b
.164"
.098
-.105
.111*
.223
Notes
Gender: male=0; female=l
Location in Scott County: outside Georgetown=0; Georgetown:: I
Race: nonwhite=0; white=l
Employment status: not employed=0; employed=l
Correlation coefficients are based on all respondents answering both questions. Regression
coefficients are based on listwise deletion. Regression coefficients are shown only if p<.10.
a p < . 0 5 ; b p < .01;cp< .001
While each of the analyses summarized in tables 12.5-7 has some unique
results, some common patterns emerged as well. These are summarized in
figure 12.5. Relatively consistent support for TMMK can be found among
those who expect or perceive benefits for themselves and their families (three
significant relationships) and those who have positive views of the quality of
the county (two significant relationships). In addition, respondents who ex-
press stronger feelings of attachment to the community, those who report
higher incomes, those who are younger, those who have been county resi-
dents for fewer years, those who are accepting of newcomers, and those who
are accepting of the Japanese are shown by some but not all of the analyses to
be supportive of TMMK's presence in central Kentucky. The one variable
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Table 12.6. Predictors of perceived strains associated with TMMK (Scott
County, 1995)
Correlation Standardized
coefficients regression
(N = 304-337) coefficients
(N = 264)
Perceived knowledge of Toyota
Family benefit expected
Perceived quality of county
Community attachment
Gender
Education
Income
Years in county
Property ownership in Scott County
Location in Scott County
Age
Race
Home ownership
Employment status
Acceptance of newcomers
Acceptance of Japanese
Adjusted R2
-.028
-.216'
-.064
-.037
.050
.000
-.046
.154
.018
-.059
-.009
.029
.060
.008
-.155
-.141b
-.166b
.262'
-.191b
-.186b
.229*
-.104
-.143*
.127
Notes
Gender: male=0; female=l
Location in Scott County: outside Georgetown=0; Georgetown=l
Race: nonwhite=0; white=l
Employment status: not employed=0; employed=l
Correlation coefficients are based on all respondents answering both questions. Regression
coefficients are based on listwise deletion. Regression coefficients are shown only if p<.10.
' p < .05; b p < .01;c p < .001
that generated significant but inconsistent relationships was property owner-
ship in Scott County. Property owners were less likely than others to associ-
ate Toyota with strains but were also less likely than others to support the
state incentives package. The implications of ownership become even more
puzzling when it is noted that a particular category of property owners—
those who own their homes—are more likely than others to associate Toyota
with community strains. It should be noted that none of the zero-order corre-
lations involving property or home ownership in tables 12.5-7 were statisti-
cally significant, so the significant but inconsistent regression coefficients could
simply be statistical artifacts. However, it is also possible that property own-
ers, on the one hand, could see a potential for appreciating land values based
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Table 12.7. Predictors of support for state incentive package (Scott
County, 1995)
Correlation Standardized
coefficients regression
(N = 319-381) coefficients
(N = 248)
Perceived benefits
Perceived strain
Perceived knowledge of Toyota
Family benefit expected
Perceived quality of county
Community attachment
Gender
Education
Income
Years in county
Property ownership in Scott County
Location in Scott County
Age
Race
Home ownership
Employment status
Acceptance of newcomers
Acceptance of Japanese
Adjusted R2
.472'
-.274'
.074
.419'
.195'
.083*
.034
-.070
.171'
-.123b
-.001
.024
-.085a
.005
-.001
.007
.223'
.151'
.329'
-.196'
.236'
.149*
.133*
-.117'
.381
Notes
Gender: male=0; female=l
Location in Scott County: outside Georgetown=0; Georgetown=l
Race: nonwhite=0; white=l
Employment status: not employed=0; employed=l
Correlation coefficients are based on all respondents answering both questions. Regression
coefficients are based on listwise deletion. Regression coefficients are shown only if p<.10.
a p < .05;bp< .01;cp< .001
on TMMK and therefore did not associate it with strain but, on the other
hand, tended to hold ideological views leading them to oppose state incen-
tives.
The results summarized in tables 12.5-7 also allow an assessment of the
hypotheses that were presented earlier. In general, hypotheses regarding the
incentives package fared better than those involving perceptions of the com-
munity impact of the Toyota plant. Tables 12.5 and 12.6 are pertinent to
hypotheses 1-11. To receive complete support, a hypothesis would need to be
supported in both tables. Only hypothesis 6 (personal or family benefits) re-
296 James G. Hougland Jr.
ceived consistent support from both tables. Hypotheses 7 (less time as county
resident), 9 (acceptance of newcomers), and 10 (acceptance of Japanese) were
supported in one of the two tables, and hypothesis 2 (income) was supported
in terms of its correlation coefficient with perceived community benefits.
Hypothesis 8 was reversed in table 12.5 in that those with higher levels of
community attachment were more likely to associate TMMK with benefits.
Regarding support for the state incentives package, results in table 12.7
show that hypotheses 13 (higher income), 17 (perceived individual or family
benefits), 23 (perceived community benefits), and 24 (lower perceived com-
munity strain) were supported, but hypotheses 16 (property ownership) and
19 (perceived quality of county) were reversed.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
As noted, social change is neither linear nor predictable. At times, it is suffi-
ciently disruptive that one cannot predict whether a system confronted with
change will collapse completely, regenerate in a new form resembling its former
structure, or emerge as a totally new social structure (Hallinan 1997). As
Toyota becomes more established in central Kentucky, it is apparent that it
has introduced changes but that these changes have not been so dramatic as
to lead to complete system collapse or the emergence of a totally new social
structure. Instead, residents of central Kentucky have adapted to change, find-
ing their communities more interesting and exciting than they once were but
not so radically changed as to challenge all of their established customs or
ways of life.
The increasingly positive responses to Toyota are undoubtedly due in
part to the economic benefits and employment opportunities it has brought
to Kentucky, but, for every current TMMK employee, there are many who
were unsuccessful in obtaining a job there. Besides its direct economic ben-
efits, Toyota's acceptance has been helped by a successful strategy of commu-
nity philanthropy and involvement and by the fact that some of its critics'
worst fears were not realized. Those expecting an influx of Japanese were
relieved to learn that most people hired by TMMK were long-time Kentucky
residents. Those expecting unmanageable population growth, a destruction
of small-town values, and increased crime have been relieved to find that
most Toyota employees commute, move to larger cities that can more easily
absorb them, or at least delay their decision to move to Scott County. In
Hallinan's terms, the change introduced by Toyota has resulted in a commu-
nity configuration that is new but that resembles its former structure. Be-
cause of the resemblance to familiar patterns, the changes created by Toyota
have been relatively easy to accept.
Some earlier studies (reviewed above) of the impact of new industry
Public Perception of Toyota in Kentucky 297
suggest that it will be beneficial primarily to those who already enjoy consid-
erable advantages. However, Bartik's (1991) more recent analysis suggests
that new industry may introduce more widespread benefits that will not be
confined to the relatively advantaged members of a community. The analysis
in this study shows that Toyota is particularly likely to be supported by those
who perceive themselves or members of their family as benefitting from it.
Interestingly, however, most of the hypotheses based on traditional social capi-
tal variables (e.g., gender, education, present employment, property owner-
ship) were not supported in this study. It is likely that TMMK has been more
attentive than the more traditional industries from which some hypotheses
were generated to principles of affirmative action and aptitude testing in hir-
ing and to carefully developed community relations. Some human capital
variables that may have been highly advantageous with traditional employers
(e.g., being male or coming from an economically advantaged background)
have been less likely to lead to advantages with TMMK. Moreover, TMMK's
attention to community relations may have made it less threatening than would
otherwise have been the case to those with feelings of attachment to their
community and its traditions.
Some disagreements introduced by Toyota's presence may be slow to
disappear. The appropriateness of the incentives package that was used to
help attract Toyota to Kentucky is something on which complete agreement
appears unlikely. Disagreements between the governments of the United States
and Japan concerning economic policy are unlikely to disappear completely,
and culturally based misunderstandings are an ongoing possibility. For the
most part, however, central Kentucky's residents appear to be maintaining a
favorable image of their communities and developing a favorable image of
Toyota and its management. New industry and the residents of semirural
areas and small towns will always be the subject of some tension. Enough
examples of corporate disinvestment and layoffs, low wage levels, and envi-
ronmental damage exist that efforts to attract new industry cannot always be
viewed as justified even if a new employer does move into an area. However,
Toyota's experience suggests that a combination of new employment oppor-
tunities, carefully focused programs of community relations, and a commit-
ment by corporate officials to continue investing in an area can increase the
local acceptance of a new manufacturer.
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Appendix A. Percentages saying Toyota plant is benefiting community and
its residents
Percentages
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 1995
Scott County 76.9 75.1 77.3 84.0 83.7 86.1 88.3 90.1
Othercounties 77.9 71.9 69.6 78.3 75.2 88.4
Note: Respondents answering "don't know" were excluded. In Scott County, "don't know"
responses steadily declined from 12.5% in 1986 to 2.3% in 1995. In other counties, "don't
know" responses fluctuated between 11.1% (1989) and 5.3% (1993). Responses from
counties other than Scott have been weighted.
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Appendix B. Specific perceived community effects of Toyota
Toyota plant has
1986
led to:
Increased business activity
Scott County
Other counties
More jobs
Scott County
Other counties
More tax money
Scott County
Other counties
Higher wages
Scott County
Other counties
95.8
93.3
89.9
87.2
1987
94.1
93.6
84.6
82.4
for county
86.8
70.6
78.6
58.3
Increased road congestion
Scott County
Other counties
Crowded schools
Scott County
Other counties
93.4
84.8
84.9
48.3
Higher cost of living
Scott County
Other counties
82.4
55.7
88.0
73.5
75.3
64.0
96.8
82.4
88.0
57.3
85.3
58.1
Keeping young people from moving
Scott County
Other counties
More pollution
Scott County
Other counties
70.0
69.4
85.2
67.9
Housing shortages
Scott County
Other counties
73.5
40.1
Increased personal taxes
Scott County
Other counties
84.3
52.4
Increased union activity
Scott County
Other counties
72.9
73.0
Damage to local farming
Scott County
Other counties
Increased crime
Scott County
Other counties
51.8
33.3
69.7
32.1
65.5
59.0
84.8
70.1
65.3
49.5
82.9
63.9
80.2
68.7
52.2
42.2
69.5
33.9
Percentage agreeing
1988
94.1
91.8
81.0
80.8
91.4
73.2
81.9
67.6
96.2
82.3
86.7
66.2
83.8
63.9
away
59.6
56.0
80.8
69.1
61.1
52.0
76.5
53.4
64.5
69.4
50.3
45.1
58.8
29.4
1989
95.9
90.4
89.5
88.3
92.6
76.8
89.0
76.6
94.1
78.8
76.9
59.7
76.4
53.8
64.5
67.5
71.6
64.8
62.8
42.8
67.9
45.1
54.1
59.8
48.3
42.2
42.9
27.0
1990
91.9
92.9
86.9
90.0
90.7
74.5
82.5
76.0
92.2
77.6
73.7
54.2
80.2
59.1
64.4
62.9
70.8
66.4
52.0
39.7
73.4
53.7
49.0
57.2
45.3
45.2
37.0
26.7
1991
92.0
87.7
90.0
85.1
92.7
65.4
77.1
61.3
68.9
46.8
69.8
51.4
41.3
32.3
1993
94.0
90.8
91.2
92.8
92.9
81.0
89.9
87.4
90.0
77.6
82.4
47.0
75.7
51.5
71.1
74.0
62.4
53.9
63.4
35.5
61.8
45.1
38.6
51.6
41.0
32.4
37.6
18.0
1995
95.0
93.6
91.6
91.0
90.4
82.2
75.0
72.2
70.5
65.4
65.3
50.0
47.8
43.0
Note: Responses are ranked according to the 1995 results for Scott County. Percentages are
based on the proportion of those expressing an opinion who agree or strongly agree that
TMMK is having the specified effect. Results from counties other than Scott have been weighted.
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Appendix C. Perceived community change
Percentage responding "Yes"
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 1995
Since 1985, community has become:
More congested
Scott County
Other counties
More expensive
Scott County
Other counties
More interesting
Scott County
Other counties
More polluted
Scott County
Other counties
A more exciting place to live
Scott County
Other counties
90.5
56.2
72.3
57.7
60.8
37.2
60.1
43.5
40.1
30.6
92.6
57.3
71.6
57.9
61.4
48.1
54.8
41.1
44.9
36.5
93.7
64.9
77.6
62.7
60.5
40.7
63.1
54.0
41.7
34.1
93.5
74.2
64.0
62.9
45.0
94.6
65.2
66.7
52.0
67.7
48.0
50.8
35.5
52.6
38.5
91.7
77.1
73.2
58.6
56.0
Note: Responses are ranked according to the 1995 results for Scott County. Percentages are
based on the proportion of those expressing an opinion who answered "yes." Results from
counties other than Scott have been weighted.
Appendix D. Confidence in foreign-owned Toyota to fulfill obligations
Percentages
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 1995
Scott County
A great deal of confidence
27.4
Some confidence
40.3
A little confidence
24.2
None at all 8.1
30.2
36.5
22.8
10.5
Other counties (weighted)
A great deal of confidence
26.8
Some confidence
41.6
A little confidence
22.8
None at all 8.8
31.3
38.3
21.3
9.2
33.6
34.8
21.3
10.3
28.8
36.1
24.7
10.6
41.7
34.2
17.9
6.2
29.5
43.1
21.8
5.6
33.1
40.0
18.4
8.5
24.3
45.6
20.5
9.6
39.7
38.9
14.3
7.1
50.5
36.4
9.2
3.8
32.4
46.6
14.8
6.1
44.3
38.4
12.5
4.8
Note: Exact question wording was, "In general, how much confidence do you have that a
foreign-owned company like Toyota will fulfill its obligations to the community?" Respondents
answering "don't know" (no more than 5% for any one year) were excluded.
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Appendix E. Views of Toyota incentive package
1986
EXPENSE JUSTIFIED
Scott County
Highly justified
11.3
Somewhat justified
44.1
Somewhat unjustified
20.4
Highly unjustified
24.1
1987
12.8
40.9
19.5
26.8
Other counties (weighted)
Highly justified
12.4
Somewhat justified
45.9
Somewhat unjustified
19.4
Highly unjustified
22.3
11.5
39.7
27.0
21.9
SUPPORT STATE FUNDING
Scott County
Strongly agree
3.5
Agree
43.1
Disagree
36.7
Strongly disagree
16.6
6.3
34.3
37.7
21.8
Other counties (weighted)
Strongly agree
4.2
Agree
46.3
Disagree
30.9
Strongly disagree
18.5
2.6
42.0
37.9
17.6
1988
12.3
43.8
22.1
21.7
13.0
44.7
22.4
19.9
8.9
31.8
41.8
17.4
3.1
32.5
41.2
23.3
Percentages
1989
19.7
42.4
20.6
17.3
11.0
51.3
23.0
14.8
7.4
43.2
36.0
13.4
3.9
35.4
45.0
15.6
1990
17.3
45.6
17.0
20.1
8.9
52.1
20.0
18.9
5.5
34.7
45.7
14.1
4.1
35.8
45.6
14.4
1991
14.1
48.1
22.2
15.6
5.9
35.8
44.1
14.2
1993
23.9
50.3
15.4
10.4
15.1
57.8
17.2
9.9
10.3
42.3
31.8
15.5
5.7
47.2
40.1
6.9
1995
21.3
52.9
13.5
12.2
9.5
44.8
33.1
12.7
If Disagreed or Strongly Disagreed: Would you support state funding for an
American-owned plant?
Scott County
Yes 34.0 30.1
Other counties (weighted)
Yes 40.4
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Percentages
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 1995
SUPPORT FUTURE STATE FUNDING
Scott County
Strongly agree
6.4
Agree
54.5
Disagree
30.3
Strongly disagree
8.7
5.2
51.9
32.7
10.1
Other counties (weighted)
Strongly agree
9.6
Agree
59.7
Disagree
20.5
Strongly disagree
10.2
6.2
54.8
31.9
7.1
9.8
45.8
34.9
9.4
6.7
50.7
34.0
8.6
7.8
58.9
24.2
9.2
7.4
55.0
31.3
6.2
7.1
54.1
31.1
7.7
8.0
54.8
30.5
6.7
8.3
58.2
28.7
4.8
14.0
57.6
22.5
5.9
8.1
62.8
27.3
1.8
13.6
56.7
23.8
5.9
Note: See Appendix F for question wording. Respondents answering "don't know" (5.8% to
10.4% for Scott County residents and 4.7% to 8.2% for residents of other counties answering
the first question, 2.8% to 7.8% for Scott County residents and 4.3% to 6.4% for residents of
other counties answering the second question, and 3.7% to 10.4% for Scott County residents
and 3.5% to 8.9% for residents of other counties answering the third question) were excluded.
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Appendix F. Measurement of variables
Perceived benefits
Cronbach's alpha = .7516
There are a number of potential effects the Toyota plant may have. For
each one I read, please tell me if you would strongly agree, agree, disagree,
or strongly disagree that it is having that effect on your community.
More jobs.
Higher wages.
Increased business activity.
More tax money for your county.
Keeping young people from moving away.
Perceived strain
Cronbach's alpha = .7721
There are a number of potential effects the Toyota plant may have. For
each one I read, please tell me if you would strongly agree, agree, disagree,
or strongly disagree that it is having that effect on your community.
Crowded schools.
Increased crime.
More pollution.
A higher cost of living.
Hurt local farming.
Housing shortages.
Increased personal taxes.
Increased road congestion.
Support for state incentive package
Cronbach's alpha = .7898
Some Kentuckians say that the state funding for the Toyota plant is too
much to pay, while others believe the plant will benefit the people of
Kentucky enough to justify the expense. Do you think the expense is highly
justified, somewhat justified, somewhat unjustified, or highly unjustified?
Now I'd like to read you several statements that people have made about
the project and ask if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree
with each.
First, I support the idea of state funding for the Toyota plant in Scott County.
Next, the state should provide support for additional industrial development
like the Toyota plant in Kentucky.
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Perceived knowledge of Toyota
Now I'd like to change the subject just a bit and ask how much, if any, you
have heard about the Toyota plant in Scott County. Would you say you
have heard a lot, a little, or heard nothing at all?
Family benefit expected
Do you think that you or any member of your immediate family is benefiting
(or will benefit) from the Toyota plant? (Yes; No)
Perceived quality of county
Overall, how would you rate your county as a place to live . . . excellent,
good, fair, or poor?
Community attachment
Cronbach's alpha = .6898
Now I'd like to read you a few statements about your community. For
each one, please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly
disagree with it.
First, I have very few interests in common with most people in my
neighborhood. (-)*
The future success of my community is very important to me.
I share a number of interests with the leaders of my community.
I have more important things to do than getting involved in community
affairs. (-)
The quality of my community has little effect on my overall happiness. (-)
When I think of the people in the community where I live, I think of THEY
rather than WE. (-)
* (-) indicates item reversed.
Gender (recorded by interviewer)
Education
What was the last grade in school that you completed?
Income
Last year, what was your total family income before taxes? (Under $5,000;
$5,000 to $10,000; $10,000 to $15,000; $15,000 to $20,000; $20,000 to
$25,000; $25,000 to $30,000; $30,000 to $40,000; or over $40,000.)
Years in county
Let me begin by asking about how many years you have lived in the county
you're now in, or have you lived there all of your life?
Property ownership in Scott County
Do you own property in Scott County? (Yes; No)
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Location in Scott County
Do you live in Georgetown, Sadieville, Stamping Ground, or another part
of Scott County?
Age
In what year were you born?
Race
What is your race? (white, black, Japanese or other Asian, other)
Home ownership
Do you own or rent your home?
Employment status
Are you currently working full-time or part-time outside the home?
(Yes—part-time; Yes—full-time; No).
Acceptance of newcomers
If a large number of newcomers happen to move into your community, do
you think that, overall, they will be a benefit or a burden to the community,
or will they not make any difference?
Acceptance of Japanese
Cronbach's alpha = .8977 (Scott County); .9142 (other counties)
We would like to have your reactions to each of the following groups of
people. Please do not give your reactions to the best or the worst members
that you know, but think of the picture or impression that you have of the
whole group.
I would admit Japanese:
to employment in my occupation (yes; no).
to my street as neighbors.
to my group of close friends.
Note: Cronbach's alpha values are based on 1995 results from Scott County.
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Japan and Kentucky
in Perspective
P.P. KARAN
JAPANESE INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES is a subject that has
elicited considerable attention ranging from the highly journalistic to the schol-
arly. During Japan's boom years in the 1980s, Japanese investment in the
United States soared, leading many to raise questions about what this invest-
ment would mean for the U.S. economy as well as for society. The paranoid
concern that Japanese investment elicited in the 1980s has given way to more
balanced assessments in the 2000s. Perhaps one reason Japan's investment
surge became such an issue is because of the different cultural traditions of
Japan and the United States. Considerable concern existed about how Japa-
nese management, hiring, recruitment, and promotion practices would affect
American workers and communities. Assessments included both positive ap-
praisals of Japan's quality management circles and frustration with Japanese
attitudes toward women and minorities in the workplace.
Since the 1980s Kentucky has put out the welcome mat for Japanese
companies interested in establishing or expanding operations in the state.
Japanese investors have found a haven of resources and motivated business
partners (Whitmire 1999). Japanese investments in Kentucky go beyond the
production and movement of goods in and out of the United States. The
Japanese companies often are significant players in the cultural, social, and
educational activities in the communities in which their businesses are lo-
cated. The Japanese executive takes on a role within the company, a second
role within the local Japanese community, and a third role as a member of the
community in which the company is located. Communication with the local
Japanese community and the community at large are key for executives. Gen-
erally, they set the tone for the company's future relationships. The Japanese
even simplify their names—Mike for Messamichi, Mark for Mizumoto, Jim
for Taiji, Ken for Kenichiro—to blend in better.
Efforts to facilitate cross-cultural relationships are prevalent in Kentucky.
These include the Japan/America Society of Kentucky, business associations,
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The headquarters of Matsushita Corporation in Minami Semba area of Osaka, Ja-
pan. Matsushita operates plants in Danville and Berea, Kentucky. The quality of its
engineering and the efficiency of its mass production techniques are second to
none. Japanese companies such as Matsushita are going abroad to get away from
Japan's high costs. Matsushita, for example, doubled its overseas workforce be-
tween 1992 and 1999 to 134,000, but took only 6,000 new people in Japan. Over
the same period, Hitachi, which has a plant in Harrodsburg, Kentucky, also nearly
doubled its number of overseas employees, but reduced its workforce in Japan by 3
percent to 267,000. (Photograph by P.P. Karan)
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Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa addressing the Japanese and Ameri-
can business community and the University of Kentucky faculty and students at the
Japan in the Bluegrass conference April 2,1999. (Photograph by Lee Thomas)
and sister-city connections. Lexington, Berea, Georgetown, Madison County,
Elizabethtown, and Morgantown are among the Kentucky communities with
sister-city connections to Japan. Many offer home-stay tours for students and
adults (Shelby 1999). Japanese firms routinely finance student and group trips
to Japan as well as cultural and educational activities in public schools. They
are actively involved in facilitating good understanding and cooperation be-
tween Japan and Kentucky. The Japanese companies that have been located
in Kentucky the longest continue to have major impacts on their local areas.
Japanese have a tremendous work ethic, and they get involved in the commu-
nities. Kentucky operations of Japanese manufacturers have adjusted to the
Bluegrass in ways equally subtle and profound. The Japanese have been largely
successful at inspiring their Kentucky employees to adopt Japanese ideals of
long-term loyalty and a team-oriented company ethic.
Both Japan and Kentucky are now challenged to find ways to continue
forging their economic and cultural relationships in the twenty-first century.
Both are trying to expand their economic interests with a more inclusive world
view expounded by leaders of Japan and Kentucky. There is belief in Ken-
tucky and Japan that stake in the new international political-economic order
rests, more than ever, on being internationalist. Japanese expanding foreign
direct investment in Kentucky and elsewhere is one reflection of this historic
314 P. P. Karan
shift of national purpose. Kentucky's own historical struggle to catch up eco-
nomically with other affluent American states gives it a strong urge to attract
investments from abroad. Kentucky used conditions in the international
economy in the 1980s to its advantage in attracting Japanese investment. In
both Japan and Kentucky a "new internationalism" began to take shape in
the 1980s as exemplified by expanding investment and trade.
For the past twenty years, beginning with the administration of Gover-
nor Martha Layne Collins, Kentucky's leadership has been trying to come to
grips with the state's new situation, to make a shift in the direction of eco-
nomic development that reflects the reality of international economy. Collins
was a pioneer seeking to chart the future course of state's economic, techno-
logical, and social organization. The ferment of ideas that Collins stirred was
further stimulated by successive governors (with possible exception of Wallace
Wilkinson, Collins's successor, who won the governorship by campaigning
against the state's incentives package to Toyota). Many developments gave
impetus to the flow of investments and export trade. The essential point was
the recognition that Kentucky was on the threshold of a new era in which
global trade and investment would be important.
Japan's internationalism is also partly a reflection of its realization that
pursuit of the narrow mercantilist policies of the 1970s could leave it isolated
in the world community. As Japan racked up record-breaking current ac-
count trade surpluses each year, it found itself an outcast in the world eco-
nomic community. Yayama Taro, a widely read Japanese social critic, described
his country in March 1988 as an international outcast because of the pursuit
of narrow self-interest (kokutoku), and failure to remove impediments to
trade, balance of payments adjustments, and opening markets. The new in-
ternationalism in Japan is partly a response to the threat of isolation, partly
on Japan's conception of its future in the age of globalization. Japan's new
internationalism and globalization policies implemented by its multinational
corporations are based on a confident belief that Japan is destined by its
unique economic, scientific, and cultural skills to project itself as a global
leader. An essential part of this role as world economic leader is the stimula-
tion of world economic and technological progress through foreign direct
investment.
Japanese foreign direct investment, as discussed earlier in this volume,
has grown rapidly in Kentucky since the mid-1980s; it is expected to continue
in the 2000s but not at the high rate of the previous two decades. It is a key
element of the new internationalism. The obvious arguments in support of
investment are made for the benefits to the host state—expanded employ-
ment, increased tax revenues, transfer of technology and skills. But the ben-
efits for Japanese are also significant—markets, lowered production costs,
easing protectionist pressures, acquiring benefits from the preferential poli-
cies of local and state host governments. Among the reasons Japanese auto
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Shortage of educated and skilled labor force, particularly engineers and scientists,
is a major problem facing future expansion of industries in the state. Kentucky has
been noted for its job growth, investment per capita, and location of facilities owned
by foreign companies in the "golden triangle" comprising Lexington, Louisville, and
greater Cincinnati (Ohio). Future growth will depend on the intellectual capacity of
the state to compete in the knowledge-based economy. (Photograph courtesy of
Hitachi Automotive Products [USA])
industry came to the United States in the 1980s was the desire of the compa-
nies to build their cars in the country where they sold them. The trend will
continue because the plants are the best insurance against several political
and economic uncertainties. Foreign direct investment is a new critical di-
mension of Japanese economic development and its success depends on the
realization of globalization policies of Japanese multinational corporations,
with enhanced sensitivity, tact, and knowledge of cultural conditions in the
host areas.
Japan is the United States' third largest export market. The United States
is the largest market for Japanese exports. However, in many sectors, U.S.
exporters, including Kentucky exporters, continue to have incomplete access
to the Japanese market. While Japan has reduced its formal tariff rates on
most imports to relatively low levels, it has maintained nontariff barriers—
such as nontransparency, discriminatory standards, and exclusionary busi-
ness practices—and tolerates a business environment that protects established
companies and restricts the free flow of competitive foreign goods into the
Japanese market. In 1997 the U.S. government cited autos, flat glass, paper
products, and variety-by-variety testing of fruits as sectors where Japanese
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trade practices give rise to particular concern and noted Japanese port prac-
tices as areas warranting continued attention. A rigid and unnecessarily bur-
densome regulatory system, standards, testing, and certification problems
hamper market access in Japan. Foreign direct investment into Japan has
remained extremely small in scale relative to the size of the economy. The low
level reflects the high cost of doing business in Japan, the legacy of former
investment restrictions, and a continuing environment of structural impedi-
ments to greater foreign investment. Recently, the Japanese government has
implemented some potentially useful measures from the perspective of in-
creasing foreign direct investment, including easing restrictions on foreign
capital entry. Still, most Japanese government investment promotion mea-
sures to date have been dictated by domestic priorities and do not address the
most important concerns of potential investors. In addition, acquisition of
Japanese companies is difficult, due in part to cross holding of shares be-
tween allied companies and a resulting small publicly traded percentage of
shares. This practice hinders the efforts of foreign firms wishing to acquire
distribution or service networks through mergers or acquisitions.
TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES OF KENTUCKY IN JAPAN
Kentucky's exports to Japan were valued at $1,436 million in 1998. This
represented an increase of 87 percent over 1993 (Lexington Herald-Leader
2000). Imports have grown too, but state figures are not available. Japan
ranked as the second largest export market, after Canada, for Kentucky. Most
of Kentucky's exports comprised traditional goods such as tobacco and agri-
cultural products, bourbon, and Thoroughbred horses.
Tobacco
The Japanese cigarette market was technically opened to American compa-
nies in 1985, under trade pressure from the United States. But the American
companies did not gain a foothold until 1987, when Japan lowered tariffs on
imported cigarettes. Since then, sales of American cigarettes have mushroomed
in Japan. Market leader Philip Morris's share has grown from less than 3
percent in 1986 to more than 12 percent. The U.S. companies now control
more than one-fifth of the Japanese cigarette market. That has forced Japan
Tobacco Company, the government-owned cigarette monopoly, to play de-
fense, selling brands with American names and using Caucasian actors in its
advertising. It also has bought more U.S. leaf for use in its cigarettes, boosting
burley exports to Japan.
Cigarette advertising is legal in Japan from 11:00 P.M. until 5 A.M. For an
American, watching the ads is like going back in time. For instance, in one
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Tobacco field in Kumamoto prefecture in western Kyushu. Although most Japanese
cigarettes are made from domestically grown tobacco, imported tobacco from Ken-
tucky and other states is added for improved taste. (Photograph by Cotton Mather)
ad, an attractive Caucasian woman dances around the screen in a short, black
chiffon dress. As she performs a graceful flying leap, her legs spread wide. A
pack of Salem Lights, about the size of the dancing woman, moves slowly up
from the bottom of the screen. A single cigarette rising from the middle of the
pack moves closer, then slides back into the pack as it approaches the fading
image of the woman. The cigarette, an obvious phallic symbol, is aimed di-
rectly between her legs. In another ad, a young blond man on a motorcycle
cruises on a highway to the sounds of a wailing rock 'n' roll guitar. A narrator
says simply, "American orijinaru" (American original). The ad is for Lucky
Strikes.
Perhaps because of the increased advertising, the overall rate of smoking
has not slowed. Consumption in Japan, which declined every year from 1984
to 1987, has increased steadily since the American companies entered the
picture. An estimated 60 percent of Japanese adult men smoke; among women,
13.3 percent smoke, according to a recent survey. Although smoking is pro-
hibited by any one younger than twenty, vending machines make cigarettes
readily available to minors. Japan has become a growth market for American
cigarettes.
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Bourbon
Along with cigarettes, one of the most successful Kentucky exports to Japan
is bourbon whiskey. Bourbon, in fact, has taken such a hold that a Japanese
company thought it made good sense to buy a Kentucky distillery in 1992.
Takara Shuzo Company of Kyoto, which makes sake, or rice wine, bought
Age International, of Frankfort, after another company tried to buy it. Age
International, which makes Blanton's premium, a popular brand in Japan,
and other Ancient Age products, became the first Kentucky distillery wholly
owned by a Japanese company. While sales of bourbon in the United States
have declined steadily, sales in Japan have continued to rise since 1986. Pri-
marily younger people in Japan started the drinking of bourbon. Now bour-
bon is becoming popular with many Japanese of all ages and has become a
fashion trend (Daily Yomiuri 1993).
In 1969, virtually all restrictions on import of liquor were lifted in Ja-
Vending machines along a street in Matsumoto, Nagano prefecture. These ma-
chines sell beer, wine, whiskey, soft drinks, coffee, and cigarettes as well as other
personal items. Sapporo (second from left) commands a large share of the domes-
tic market for liquor along with Suntory, Kirin, and Asahi. Sapporo Breweries, founded
in 1876, has annual sales of nearly $4 billion. Japan has about 5.4 million of these
vending machines. More than $45 billion in goods are sold through the vending
machines annually. Because of convenience, many Japanese prefer to drop coins
into a machine for cigarettes and drinks rather than to go to a store. (Photograph by
Cotton Mather)
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pan. Until then, annual quotas based on sales in previous years limited im-
ports. Since the rate of consumption of bourbon in Japan was low, its quota
was next to nothing. The market for bourbon grew slowly at first. The Japa-
nese loved their sake. When they tried other alcohol, they generally chose
Scotch whiskey over bourbon. The companies aimed their sales at college and
postcollege consumers, and they set up special "bourbon bars" in Tokyo and
other major cities. At the same time, two of Kentucky's three main bourbon
producers—Brown-Foreman International, makers of Jack Daniels, Early
Times, and Old Forester, and Schenley Industries, which owned I.W. Harper,
J.W. Deny, and Ancient Age before it was acquired by United Distillers in
1987—entered a distribution deal with Suntory, a conglomerate that con-
trolled 70 percent of Japan's whiskey market. Sales of bourbon whiskey in
Japan have virtually doubled every year since then. The industry got an addi-
tional boost in 1989 when Japan lowered tariffs on several goods, including
liquor. The rise in the number of Japanese businessmen working in Kentucky
probably helped boost the popularity of bourbon whiskey in Japan. These
Japanese businessmen discovered the taste of bourbon while they were sta-
tioned in Kentucky and introduced bourbon to friends and acquaintances
when they returned to Japan. The young, urbanites, and urbane of Japan
have embraced bourbon as a liquor for those with savoir faire, causing its
popularity to skyrocket over the past decade. Jardine Wines and Spirits K.K.
Japan, which distributes I.W. Harper (one of the best selling brands), is trying
to further enhance bourbon whiskey's new upmarket image with ads tailored
to ultracool, sophisticated, and outgoing drinkers. Though focused on youth,
Jardine Japan has not forgotten the older drinkers who now make up an
important segment of the bourbon market.
Maker's Mark, the best seller in Kentucky, was a latecomer in Japan.
Unlike the bigger bourbon distilleries, Maker's Mark of Loretto could not
spend much on plugging its product. But Toyota's arrival in Kentucky was a
marketing opportunity which Maker's Mark seized. As Japanese executives
arrived, they were presented with Maker's Mark, which made the brand popu-
lar among the business community. Maker's Mark sales in Japan have in-
creased since the late 1980s.
Bourbon's popularity is growing among Japanese consumers in their
thirties and forties, who have already established their drinking style. Many
Japanese who discovered bourbon during the late 1980s are now buying pre-
mium quality bourbons. Also, the taste for bourbon is spreading quickly out-
side of major city centers into more suburban and rural areas, opening up
whole new markets. Bourbon whiskey comprises nearly 73 percent of liquor
imports into Japan from the United States.
The increased cultural tolerance of drinking and rapid economic expan-
sion in the 1980s also contributed to the surge in bourbon sales in Japan.
Japan had never shied away from alcohol consumption. Drunken people are
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often seen on trains, in the streets, and in other public places. Not only is
drunkenness tolerated, but social drinking, often to excess, is common in
after-hours business activities. Economic expansion in the 1980s, coupled
with rapid currency appreciation, provided many Japanese with disposable
income and a desire to discover new fashions and acquire new tastes.
By 2000, the bourbon boom was slowing significantly. Despite its popu-
larity as the drink of choice among young professionals, bourbon has not
been able to escape the economic recession. In recent years there has been a
drop in import of bourbon into Japan.
Thoroughbred Industry
During the last twenty-five years Japanese Thoroughbred breeders have im-
proved their horses through breeding with superior stock from Kentucky.
Nearly all of Japan's breeding farms are in the Iburi and Hidaka regions of
Hokkaido. The area lies between the Hidaka Mountains and the Pacific Ocean.
Here the landscape is beautiful but rugged, and the climate is cold. The farms,
much smaller and less manicured than those in the Bluegrass, rarely include
training facilities. Although many of the breeding operations are modeled
after Kentucky horse farms, they do not look like Bluegrass horse farms.
Most are small (thirty to forty acres) family-run operations. Shadai Farm,
Japan's biggest with more than sixteen hundred acres, is divided into four
locations. Its facilities are superior to most others in Japan, but they are small
as compared with most Kentucky operations. Lack of available grazing and
the long winter present difficulties. Lack of training facilities because of space
shortage is another problem. Japanese have bought many good stallions and
mares; it is the training not the breeding of Japanese horses that is inferior.
Japan Racing Association, the sport's main governing body, has built a
massive new training facility for yearlings in the Hidaka region. Within view
of the snow-capped Hidaka Mountains, the thirty-five-hundred-acre center
includes a huge grass training course, a five-furlong straight indoor track,
and a three-furlong oval indoor track.
Although the Japanese have learned some of the basics of Thorough-
bred racing at Western tracks, they have developed their own style. Racing in
Japan occurs only on weekends and is very popular. Japanese bettors wager
more than those of the United States. They do it on track, off track, and by
telephone. Jockeys and horses are much bigger heroes in Japan than they are
in the United States.
In the late 1980s, as Japan's economy expanded, the surging value of the
yen made foreign investment much easier for Japanese horsemen. The effect
was felt at horse sales at Keeneland in Lexington, Kentucky. The owner of
Shadai Farm and other Japanese buyers established an important presence at
the sales. Because foreign-bred horses are allowed to compete in only a hand-
Japan and Kentucky in Perspective 321
One of Japan's large horse farms between the Hidaka Mountains and the Pacific
Ocean near Shizunai, Hokkaido. While the facilities at this farm are superior to most
others in Japan, they are small compared to those of most Kentucky horse farms.
Foreign-bred horses are allowed to compete in only a handful of Japanese races. If
the strict limits on foreign-bred horses are lifted, Japanese may be buying lots of
yearlings at Keeneland summer sales, which could make a huge impact on
Kentucky's economy. (Photograph by Cotton Mather)
ful of Japanese races, Japanese buyers spent most of their money on stallions
and broodmares rather than yearlings. Except for the Japan Cup and a couple
of other events, horses with racing experience in other countries cannot com-
pete on Japanese tracks. A Kentucky horse cannot run in the Japan Derby,
but a Japanese horse can run in the Kentucky Derby. The Japan Racing Asso-
ciation contends that restrictions on foreign-bred horses are necessary to keep
Japanese breeders in business. If Kentucky-bred horses had access to more
races in Japan, the Japanese market would be much more substantial for
American breeders.
GLOBALIZATION, JAPANESE PRODUCTION SYSTEM,
AND KENTUCKY COMMUNITIES
As discussed earlier, Toyota's decision to locate a manufacturing plant in
Georgetown, Kentucky, was part of the corporate globalization strategy. The
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decision had several major advantages. First, by locating the plant in Ken-
tucky, Toyota was able to avoid a quota on exports to the United States.
Foreign direct investment was a corporate decision in response to protection-
ist measures and the trade dispute with the United States. Second, the appre-
ciation of the yen made it profitable to make automobiles in the United States.
The third advantage was Toyota's ability to obtain substantial subsidies from
the state and local governments for site preparation, land purchase, road im-
provements, worker training, and education (Milward and Newman 1990).
Proximity to market and reduction in transport costs represent additional
advantages. Finally, there is a symbolic benefit of a positive corporate image.
By locating production in other countries, the automaker can project a global
image. It serves to counter the national sentiment, which favors domestic
products over imports.
In transplanting, Toyota brought a production system which differs from
American firms such as Ford and General Motors. Organizational structures,
work process at the point of production, and the company's relationship with
suppliers show a unique production system specific to Japanese industries.
The Japanese production system in the auto industry is often called lean pro-
duction (Besser 1996). This system was developed by Toyota Motor Com-
pany in Japan. It is different from the production system used by the U.S.
auto industry. In the United States, automakers use the Fordist production
system. The Fordist production system has several distinct characteristics: (1)
a capital-intensive, large scale plant; (2) an inflexible production process; (3)
a rigid, hierarchical, and bureaucratic managerial structure; (4) the use of
semiskilled labor performing repetitive and routine tasks, often subject to the
discipline of scientific management; (5) a tendency toward strong unioniza-
tion and vulnerability of production by industrial action; and (6) protection
of national market (Jary and Jary 1991). It has been a useful production
system for mass production with reasonable cost.
The Japanese lean production system is more efficient and cost effective
than the Fordist system. The lean production system has five characteristics:
(1) efficient use of resources, (2) low inventories, (3) just-in-time production
and delivery, (4) rapid product development, and (5) efficient staffing (Kenny
and Florida 1993). These characteristics are strengthened by human resources
management that differs from Fordist human resources management. Capac-
ity building of workers for the system and for workers themselves are the
main objectives of human resources management in the Japanese manage-
ment model. In a sense, the Japanese production system is designed to avoid
the negative characteristics of the Fordist model. That is, the system tries to
achieve a flexible production process, a less hierarchical management struc-
ture, avoidance of repetitive and routine work, and nonunionization or union-
ization that is not conflict oriented. Since this system is more efficient, many
U.S. automakers are trying to adopt some of the features.
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The Japanese production system has developed many organizational fea-
tures that differ from those of U.S. automakers. Three organizational fea-
tures—job classification, quality circle, and hiring process—are noted here.
Job classification at Japanese auto transplants involves usually three or four
classifications. In contrast, the average number of job classifications for Gen-
eral Motors, Ford, and Chrysler is ninety. This difference is manifestation of
the Japanese system that avoids a rigid hierarchical management structure.
The flat management structure allows suggestions and grievances to go to
top management quickly. Also, managers and workers interact more. This
environment creates a satisfaction of work situation among the plant work-
ers. In many of the Japanese transplants, managers eat with workers and do
not have reserved parking. In addition, managers wear the same uniform as
workers. More egalitarian organizational structure is implemented in the Japa-
nese auto transplants.
Quality circle is another feature implemented by the Japanese auto trans-
plants. A team-based activity improves product quality at the shop floor level.
Unlike the Fordist production system that controls quality separately from a
shop floor, the quality circle is designed to control production quality at each
production point by shop floor workers. For this function to work, shop
floor workers need to be knowledgeable about products and production pro-
cesses. Workers' problem-solving skills and knowledge about the products
and production process are harnessed through training sessions and on-the-
job training. Workers as a team on the shop floor work together to solve
quality problems at hand. Quality circle reduces costs by not having inspec-
tors and by more detailed and quick response to quality problems.
The hiring process in Japanese auto transplants differs from the hiring
process at many American automakers. It takes a longer time, and applicants
are required to have different qualifications. In the Toyota transplant in
Georgetown, the hiring process takes at least six months. This is an unusual
situation for American applicants who are not familiar with the Japanese
hiring procedure. The careful screening involved in this hiring process assures
having the best workers for Toyota. Besser describes an example of the hiring
procedure: "For the first groups, the process was to fill out an application
form and take a half-day aptitude test administered by the state employment
service. If an applicant made it through this screening, he or she next com-
pleted two days of hands-on and situational tests designed to assess physical
dexterity, ability to work with a group, problem-solving skills, motivation,
and creativity. An interview with a potential supervisor and a human resources
representative followed for applicants successful in the second phase of screen-
ing. A physical exam proceeds or follows the interview" (Besser 1996, 56).
Japanese automakers hire persons who have initiative, commitment to the
company, group orientation, and high level of attendance. The lean produc-
tion system requires these traits in workers for efficient operation.
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In addition to the organizational features discussed above, the Japanese
production system also requires a special interorganizational feature for its
success. The system requires close relationships with suppliers. As noted be-
fore, lean production involves a flexible production system. Flexible produc-
tion is achieved through the just-in-time supplier system. In the just-in-time
system, a core company has suppliers of first tier, second tier, third tier, and so
on, and product quality is ensured at each level. A first-tier supplier ensures
quality of its product, which is composed of quality-ensured parts made by
second-tier suppliers, and so on. Information, technology, and even person-
nel also are exchanged from tier to tier.
This is very different from the Fordist supplier system. In the Fordist
supplier system, production of parts is dispersed, and relationships between
the core company and suppliers are tenuous. The relationships are based on
price. A supplier that offers the cheapest price can be picked up by the core
company. In the just-in-time suppliers system, the relationships between the
core company and its suppliers are long-term; they commit to each other.
They also are often geographically close to each other. The just-in-time sup-
plier system is designed for productive efficiency.
There are several implications for Kentucky communities where trans-
plants are located. First, the Japanese company's emphasis on group orienta-
tion has an impact on the community. In Georgetown the school system has a
close relationship with Toyota. Eighth- and tenth-grade students tour the plant
and learn Toyota's production system and corporate philosophy. Also, politi-
cal leaders and school officials have been sent to Japan to learn the Japanese
system. Now, as the school officials are convinced about the effectiveness of
the Japanese system, the school system implements teaching that emphasizes
group skills. Second, the community can expect employment that is more
stable than with American companies. Although no explicit agreement exists
between company and employees, Japanese automakers are committed to
keep employees as long as possible, even when they face slumps. The long-
term relationship is an essential component of the lean production system.
Third, the surrounding communities can expect more employment opportu-
nities. The just-in-time supplier system requires suppliers to be close to the
core company. Therefore, supplier companies are more likely to locate near
the host community. Also, if local companies are chosen as suppliers, they
may be able to anticipate technology and information transfers that are criti-
cal for their own viability. The viable company is beneficial for the commu-
nity because it generates employment and tax revenue. Fourth, in the
communities, Americans have more interaction with Japanese. Many Japa-
nese companies have an official company policy that encourages their em-
ployees and their family members to be ambassadors of Japan and the company.
They are expected to create a positive image of Japan and the company. For
example, Toyota discourages its employees from all living in one area. The
Japan and Kentucky in Perspective 325
company is concerned about a negative image of a Japanese enclave. There-
fore, Japanese employees and their families are scattered throughout
Georgetown and Lexington. Also, some Japanese wives are involved in local
community activities. They teach Japanese language, cooking, and music to
Americans in several communities.
Among other things, Japan's presence in Kentucky is enabling local work-
ers to recapture core American values that many believed to be lost: the work
ethic, a sense of community, and respect for craftsmanship. In the towns where
Japanese have built plants, we found little mistrust of Japanese.
Toyota's decision to locate its auto transplant in Kentucky is instructive
in understanding the implications of globalization for Kentucky communi-
ties. Using Reinicke's argument on globalization as a tool, the auto transplant
can be understood better. Although there are many definitions of globaliza-
tion, Reinicke says that "globalization appears to be understood as a con-
tinuous process of increasing cross-border economic flows, both financial
and real, leading to greater economic interdependence among formally dis-
tinct national economies" (Reinicke 1998). Also, globalization is a corpo-
rate-level phenomenon. Capital flows across the borders, and organizational
structures are created in such a way that companies can respond quickly to
changing environment. Although it is mainly a corporate-level phenomenon,
governments also respond to globalization.
Reinicke notes three policy options: defensive intervention, offensive
intervention, and global public policy. Global public policy option is Reinicke's
recommendation for governments to adjust to globalization. To understand
the impacts of globalization on corporations and governments, defensive in-
tervention and offensive intervention are used. Briefly, defensive intervention
is government's action to buffer the impact of globalization. Offensive inter-
vention is government's action to involve aggressively in globalization.
The Toyota transplant in Georgetown informs us how globalization af-
fected Toyota, the U.S. government, and the state of Kentucky. The U.S.
government's action to restrict import from Japan can be considered defen-
sive intervention. Defensive intervention is a state's strategy that "relies on
such economic measures as tariff and nontariff barriers or capital controls
that force companies to reorganize along national lines" (Reinicke 1998, 9).
It is protection of the U.S. industry specifically and of sovereignty of the coun-
try generally. This was the reaction of the U.S. government and automakers to
the globalization process. Japanese automakers responded to this political change
by foreign direct investment. They established joint ventures, such as New United
Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI) (a joint venture between General Mo-
tors and Toyota in Fremont, California), or they established production plants
of their own, such as the Toyota plant in Georgetown. This was a corporate
strategy in response to quota imposition and the appreciation of the yen.
The action by the Kentucky state government can be viewed as offensive
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intervention. In the offensive intervention strategy, "states themselves become
global competitors by vying to provide within their respective territories the
most attractive economic geography for competition" (Reinicke 1998, 8). It
is a zero-sum game among states. As the federal government's devolution
proceeds, states have more public responsibilities with smaller budget. In this
political environment, offensive intervention was the strategy many states
pursued. The strategy worked for states that received Japanese factories. In
contrast to the federal government, states actively sought to attract the Japa-
nese auto transplants. In this process many Japanese automakers have ben-
efited.
In sum, automobile companies, the U.S. government, and states are ac-
tors in the globalization process. At the same time, all the actors are influ-
enced by globalization. The actors are motivated to act for different reasons.
The federal government concerns sovereignty. The state government seeks
economic vitality (jobs and tax revenue). Foreign companies seek to survive
in competition (profit generation). Japanese investments in Kentucky reflect
all these facets of globalization.
The research presented in this book has examined the impact of Toyota
and other Japanese employers on Kentucky—and the impact of Kentucky on
Japanese managers and their families. It is a useful reminder that relatively
free trade—along with a relatively free flow of capital—has brought benefits
to Kentucky as well as to Japan. Both Kentucky and Japan have a big stake in
globalization. Kentucky needs to press ahead with education so it can attract
the good jobs of the twenty-first century, and Japan needs to further open
access to its markets to bring benefits of globalization to a long list of govern-
ment-protected industries, in which anticompetitive behavior locks too much
capital and labor with gross economic inefficiency.
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